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Federal Circuit: Mandate rule applies only to issues actually decided on appeal

by Dexter Hamilton | Jul 23, 2026 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a Patent Trial & Appeal Board obviousness determination, finding that the Board did not exceed the scope of the Court’s prior mandate by addressing a claim limitation that the Board had not reached in its original final written decision. Intellectual Pixels Ltd. v. Sony Interactive Entertainment LLC, Case No. 24-2174 (Fed. Cir. July 10, 2026) (Dyk, Stoll, Stark, JJ.)

Sony Interactive Entertainment petitioned for inter partes review (IPR) of an Intellectual Pixels Limited (IPL) patent directed to methods and systems for generating digital images using an external visual server. IPL is a UK-based intellectual property licensing company known for holding a US patent that covers methods for generating and displaying digital images using a remote visual server. A key feature of the claimed invention was that the external server assumed responsibility for generating the images, relieving the client device of that processing burden.

The primary prior art reference disclosed a system in which a game was hosted “exclusively on a server/host computer” while users played the game through separate client or terminal computers. The Board instituted review but, in its first final written decision, concluded that Sony had not shown the challenged claims to be unpatentable.

Sony appealed. The Federal Circuit vacated the Board’s decision, finding that substantial evidence did not support the Board’s determination regarding the claim limitation requiring “generating” a new image.

On remand, the Board addressed a separate “compressing” limitation, concluded that the prior art satisfied that limitation, and issued a second final written decision finding the challenged claims unpatentable as obvious.

IPL appealed, arguing that the Board violated the Federal Circuit’s mandate by revisiting findings that had not been expressly disturbed in the first appeal. Under the mandate rule, issues decided on appeal generally may not be reconsidered by a lower tribunal on remand.

The Federal Circuit rejected IPL’s argument. One of the two findings IPL identified had, in fact, been vacated by the Court’s prior decision as unsupported by substantial evidence. The other concerned the Board’s observation that the primary reference was “completely silent as to the content or origin of that ‘compressed video MPEG stream.’” The Court concluded that this second finding fell outside the scope of the prior mandate because it related to the “compressing” limitation, which the Board had not reached in its first final written decision. Because the Board’s original decision rested only on the “generating” limitation, the “compressing” issue was not before the Court in the first appeal and, therefore, was not resolved – expressly or implicitly – by the Court’s mandate.

The Federal Circuit also noted that its prior discussion of the “generating” limitation had implicitly undermined IPL’s reliance on the Board’s earlier observation. Both the “generating” and “compressing” limitations referred to “at least one updated image,” making the prior finding difficult to reconcile with the Court’s earlier analysis.

IPL relied on a 2025 Federal Circuit decision, Bitmanagement Software GmBH v. United States, suggesting that factual findings made during [...]

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A $40 million jury instruction error sends trade secret dispute back to trial

by Jodi Benassi | Jul 23, 2026 | Trade Secrets

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed a jury damages award, a permanent injunction, and an attorneys’ fee award in a trade secret misappropriation case, finding that the district court improperly instructed the jury on which party bore the burden of proving whether the asserted trade secrets were “readily ascertainable through proper means.” Comet Technologies USA, Inc. et al. v. XP Power, LLC, Case Nos. 23-15601; 25-15709; 25-745 (9th Cir. July 14, 2026) (Hamilton, Nelson, Bumatay, JJ.) (Bumatay, dissenting)

Comet Technologies, a Swiss-based leader in x-ray and radio-frequency products, sued US-based competitor XP Power after three former Comet engineers left to join XP, allegedly bringing thousands of confidential documents relating to Comet’s radio-frequency power technologies, product designs, and research and development. Comet asserted claims under the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) and California’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act (CUTSA).

Before trial, Comet narrowed its case to five alleged trade secrets and voluntarily dismissed its CUTSA claims, leaving only its DTSA claims. The parties addressed the effect of that dismissal on the jury instructions, with XP requesting that the burden of proving lack of ready ascertainability be shifted to Comet to conform to the DTSA while Comet argued that the instruction should be removed entirely. The district court rejected both requests without an on-the-record explanation and left in Instruction 20, which told the jury that XP was not liable for misappropriation if XP proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the alleged trade secrets were readily ascertainable by proper means, meaning they could be lawfully “obtained, discovered, developed, reverse-engineered, or compiled without significant difficulty, effort, or expense.”

The jury found that XP misappropriated three of the five trade secrets and awarded Comet $20 million in compensatory damages and $20 million in exemplary damages. The district court also entered a permanent injunction and awarded more than $17 million in attorneys’ fees. XP appealed.

Erroneous jury instruction: “Readily ascertainable by proper means”

XP argued that the district court improperly instructed the jury that XP bore the burden of proving that Comet’s alleged trade secrets were “readily ascertainable by proper means.” Comet argued that XP invited the instructional error by requesting that the challenged instruction be given to the jury and, alternatively, that any error was harmless because the instructions were accurate as a whole, they correctly stated the law, and the evidence overwhelmingly established that Comet’s trade secrets were not readily ascertainable through proper means.

The Ninth Circuit agreed with XP, explaining that under the DTSA, lack of ready ascertainability is an element of Comet’s DTSA claim – not an affirmative defense – and, therefore, Comet bore the burden of proof. The Court rejected Comet’s invited-error argument, finding that XP timely objected after Comet dismissed its CUTSA claims and correctly argued that, under the DTSA, Comet – not XP – bore the burden of proving that the alleged trade secrets were not readily ascertainable through proper means.

The Ninth Circuit also rejected Comet’s harmless-error argument. The Court explained that [...]

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Who decides trademark strength: Judge or jury?

by Kelsey Wun | Jul 16, 2026 | Cert Alert, Trademarks

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the strength of a trademark in a likelihood-of-confusion analysis under 15 U.S.C. § 1114 is a question of law for the court or a question of fact for the jury. RiseandShine Corp. v. PepsiCo, Inc., Case No. 24-1016 (Supr. Ct. June 29, 2026).

RiseandShine sued PepsiCo in the US District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging that PepsiCo’s Mtn Dew Rise Energy drink infringed RiseandShine’s RISE marks for cold-brew coffee products. The district court granted RiseandShine a preliminary injunction, but the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated and remanded.

The Second Circuit concluded that the district court erred in its analysis of the strength of the RISE marks and the similarity of the parties’ marks. Treating trademark strength as a question of law, the Second Circuit found that the RISE marks were weak because of the “strong logical associations between ‘Rise’ and coffee.” After reviewing images of the parties’ cans, the Second Circuit also concluded that the district court erred in finding PepsiCo’s mark confusingly similar to the RISE marks.

On remand, the district court entered summary judgment for PepsiCo, relying on the Second Circuit’s determination that the RISE marks were “inherently weak as a matter of law” and that the similarity factor “weigh[ed] strongly against” RiseandShine. The Second Circuit affirmed, reiterating that trademark strength is a question of law.

RiseandShine petitioned for certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted. The question presented is: Whether trademark strength is a question of fact in a likelihood-of-confusion analysis under 15 U.S.C. § 1114.

Back on track: Contextual inquiry required before applying § 112(f) to software claim element

by Richard (Rick) Evans | Jul 16, 2026 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded a district court’s indefiniteness ruling based on an insufficient means-plus-function analysis under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) while affirming the denial of judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) and a new trial following a jury verdict finding a related patent invalid as anticipated. TrackTime, LLC v. Amazon.com Services LLC, Audible, Inc., Case No. 24-1102 (Fed. Cir. July 2, 2026) (Prost, Taranto, JJ; Kovner, J., sitting by designation.)

TrackTime sued Amazon and Audible for patent infringement, asserting two related patents directed to time-synchronized transcript technology for audio and video files. One patent relates to methods for annotating and sharing time-synchronized transcripts on mobile devices. The other relates to “tap-to-jump” technology, which allows a user to tap a word in a transcript and jump to the corresponding point in the associated audio or video file.

The district court issued a claim construction order finding the annotation-and-sharing patent invalid for indefiniteness. The court concluded that the claim terms “executable program code configured to facilitate annotation” and “executable program code configured to synchronously play multimedia” were means-plus-function terms that recited functions without sufficient corresponding structure. Because the specification did not adequately disclose structure for performing those functions, the district court held the terms indefinite.

The tap-to-jump patent proceeded separately to a jury trial. The jury found the asserted claim invalid on multiple grounds, including anticipation by a prior art program called LiveNote, and found no infringement. The district court later denied TrackTime’s post-trial motions for JMOL and a new trial. TrackTime appealed both the indefiniteness ruling on the annotation-and-sharing patent and the denial of JMOL and a new trial on the tap-to-jump patent.

The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the indefiniteness ruling on the annotation-and-sharing patent, finding the district court’s § 112(f) analysis insufficient considering the Federal Circuit’s intervening decision in Dyfan, LLC v. Target Corp. (2022). In Dyfan, the Court explained that determining whether a limitation should be construed under § 112(f) requires a full contextual analysis, including whether the claim language recites sufficient structure when viewed in light of the specification, the surrounding claim language, and how a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand the term.

The Federal Circuit found that the district court did not conduct the full inquiry required by Dyfan because it failed to consider extrinsic evidence regarding usage in the field and how a skilled artisan would understand the disputed “executable program code” limitations. The Court declined to decide the § 112(f) issue in the first instance, leaving it to the district court on remand to determine whether the disputed limitations, read in context, recited sufficient structure for performing the claimed annotation and synchronous-play functions on a mobile device.

The Federal Circuit reached a different result on the tap-to-jump patent. TrackTime argued that LiveNote failed to disclose three limitations, namely “performing a data lookup,” a “mobile computing device,” and a “touch-sensitive input interface.” The Court rejected each argument. It found that TrackTime [...]

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Construing claims to fit the brand

by Ian J. Howard | Jul 9, 2026 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s claim construction and grant of a preliminary injunction, concluding that an accused infringer’s proposed construction would have produced the “highly improbable” result of excluding the patentee’s Orange Book-listed drug from the scope of the asserted claims. Otsuka America Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. Hetero Labs Limited, Case No. 25-2016 (Fed. Cir. July 1, 2026) (Bryson, Stoll, JJ.) (Dyk, J., dissenting in part)

Otsuka sued Hetero Labs, alleging that Hetero Labs’ generic drug product would infringe Otsuka’s patent rights. Otsuka moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent Hetero Labs from entering the market. The district court granted the motion, concluding that Otsuka was likely to succeed on its infringement claim. Hetero Labs appealed, arguing that the district court erred in construing the asserted claims.

The central dispute concerned how to calculate the patent’s claimed weight ratio. The representative claim requires administering dextromethorphan in combination with quinidine, with the proviso that the “weight to weight ratio of dextromethorphan to quinidine is 1:0.5 or less.” The district court construed “dextromethorphan” and “quinidine” to include their pharmaceutically acceptable salts. Under that construction, the claimed ratio is calculated using the full weight of the compounds as administered – for example, the full weight of dextromethorphan hydrobromide rather than only the dextromethorphan active moiety. Hetero Labs, by contrast, argued that when the compounds are administered as salts, the ratio must be calculated using only the weight of the active moieties.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s construction, concluding that the intrinsic evidence supported construing “dextromethorphan” and “quinidine” to include both the free base compounds and their pharmaceutically acceptable salts. The Court found that the patent claims, specification, and prosecution history consistently used those terms to encompass the compounds in the form in which they are administered. The Court also found that extrinsic evidence supported its construction. Relying in part on its 2007 decision in Osram GmbH v. ITC, the Court explained that Hetero Labs’ proposed construction would produce the “highly improbable” result of excluding Otsuka’s Orange Book-listed Nuedexta product – the very product the patent was intended to protect – from the scope of the claims. The Court also rejected Hetero Labs’ indefiniteness argument, concluding that the claims were not rendered indefinite simply because they encompassed formulations using either free bases or pharmaceutically acceptable salts.

Judge Dyk, dissenting in part, concluded that the district court’s construction was inconsistent with both the intrinsic evidence and the purpose of the claimed invention. According to Judge Dyk, the invention depended on maintaining a specific ratio of dextromethorphan to quinidine to ensure that:

Dextromethorphan achieved a therapeutic effect
Quinidine slowed the metabolism of dextromethorphan
Patients were not exposed to excessive amounts of quinidine

In his view, calculating the claimed ratio using the full weight of pharmaceutically acceptable salts rather than only the active moieties distorted that relationship by incorporating the weight of carrier ions that have no therapeutic significance. Judge Dyk also disagreed with the majority’s reliance [...]

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La vida loca: First Circuit vacates summary judgment entered before meaningful discovery

by Richard (Rick) Evans | Jul 1, 2026 | Copyrights

The US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated summary judgment in favor of singer Ricky Martin in a copyright infringement action, concluding that the district court improperly resolved key factual issues without allowing the plaintiff to obtain discovery. The Court also vacated the district court’s order invalidating the plaintiff’s copyright registration because that ruling depended on the same prematurely decided issues. Luis Adrián Cortés-Ramos v. Enrique Martin-Morales, a/k/a Ricky Martin, Case No. 24-1805 (1st Cir. June 12, 2026) (Thompson, Aframe, JJ.) (Barron, J., dissenting in part).

The dispute stems from Cortés-Ramos’s submission of a song and music video to a contest sponsored by a recording studio and Ricky Martin for inclusion on the 2014 FIFA World Cup official album. After Martin released the song “Vida,” Cortés-Ramos alleged that it infringed his copyrighted work. Martin defended on the ground that Cortés-Ramos had assigned his copyright to the recording studio by agreeing to the contest rules. Cortés-Ramos contended that he never received those rules despite signing documents acknowledging compliance with them.

The district court rejected Cortés-Ramos’s argument that the dispute belonged in arbitration because Martin was not a party to the arbitration agreement between Cortés-Ramos and the recording studio. The court then adopted an expedited summary judgment schedule that foreclosed discovery, concluding that Cortés-Ramos had assigned his rights to the recording studio and, as a result, that his copyright registration was invalid. Cortés-Ramos appealed.

The First Circuit agreed that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction because Martin could not be compelled to arbitrate under an agreement to which he was not a party. The Court cautioned, however, that factual findings in the litigation could have preclusive effect in the parallel arbitration between Cortés-Ramos and the recording studio.

The First Circuit nevertheless vacated the summary judgment ruling, explaining that Cortés-Ramos had repeatedly sought discovery regarding evidence uniquely within the possession of the recording studio and Martin. Although Cortés-Ramos had not formally moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d), the Court treated his repeated requests for discovery as functionally seeking Rule 56(d) relief. The Court found it fundamentally unfair to resolve dispositive issues while denying Cortés-Ramos access to evidence necessary to challenge Martin’s assertion that the contest documents assigned ownership of the work.

Because the district court entered summary judgment without permitting discovery on issues central to ownership of the copyright, the First Circuit vacated both the summary judgment order and the ruling invalidating Cortés-Ramos’ copyright registration and remanded for further proceedings.

Compound errors: Written description, not typographical error analysis, controls priority claim

by Taylor MacDonald | Jul 1, 2026 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment that the asserted patent was invalid as anticipated because the provisional application to which it claimed priority did not provide adequate written description support for the claimed compound. The Court explained that the proper inquiry was whether the provisional demonstrated possession of the later-claimed subject matter, not whether a discrepancy in the provisional could be characterized as an obvious typographical error. Enanta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., Case No. 25-1427 (Fed. Cir. June 23, 2026) (Lourie, Bryson, Chen, JJ.)

Enanta owns a patent direct to coronavirus inhibitors. The patent claimed priority to a July 20, 2020, provisional application. In April 2021, before Enanta filed a nonprovisional application correcting what it later characterized as a typographical error, Pfizer publicly disclosed the compound that ultimately became part of its COVID-19 treatment, Paxlovid®.

The dispute centered on a structural limitation defining an alkyl substituent. The provisional disclosed NHC(O)-C2-C12-alkyl while the asserted patent claimed NHC(O)-C1-C12-alkyl. According to Enanta, the “C2” designation in the provisional was an obvious drafting error that a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize and mentally correct.

The district court granted summary judgment that the patent was anticipated because the asserted claims were not entitled to the provisional application’s filing date. Enanta appealed.
While the Federal Circuit affirmed, it clarified that the district court framed the issue incorrectly. Rather than asking whether a court could correct an alleged error in the provisional, the proper question was whether the provisional itself provided sufficient written description support for the later-claimed invention.

In clarifying the appropriate inquiry, the Federal Circuit rejected Enanta’s reliance on cases addressing correction of errors in issued patents and decisions concerning genus-species written description issues, explaining that those authorities did not govern the priority analysis presented here. Nor could the Court simply construe the provisional to correct the alleged mistake because the disclosure was subject to reasonable debate.

Applying the written description standard, the Federal Circuit concluded that “C2 is simply different from C1.” Because the provisional disclosed only the C2 structure, it did not demonstrate that the inventors possessed the later-claimed C1 embodiment as of the provisional filing date. The Court also found Enanta’s expert testimony insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact, explaining that generalized opinions regarding carbon chain nomenclature and drafting errors elsewhere in the specification did not establish written description support for the specific claimed limitation.

Because the asserted claims were not entitled to the provisional application’s priority date, Pfizer’s intervening public disclosure constituted anticipatory prior art, rendering the patent invalid.

Up in smoke: Eighth Circuit sends Lanham Act dispute to state court

by Lauren Hong | Jun 25, 2026 | Trademarks

The US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed dismissal of a trademark dispute on forum non conveniens grounds, finding that the Lanham Act claims concerning ownership and scope of trademark rights arose out of a stock purchase agreement and therefore belonged in the state court designated by the parties’ forum selection clause. Vaughn Boyd v. Deadwood Tobacco Company, Case No. 25-1659 (8th Cir. June 8, 2026) (Smith, Kelly, Grasz, JJ.)

The dispute stemmed from the 2018 sale of Deadwood Tobacco, a South Dakota cigar business associated with the DEADWOOD family of marks. Prior to the sale, Deadwood Tobacco and Drew Estate had collaborated on a successful cigar line sold under names including Sweet Jane, Fat Bottom Betty, and Crazy Alice. The stock purchase agreement reserved trademark registrations associated with those three brands from the transaction. After acquiring the company, the new owners launched additional cigar products under other Deadwood Tobacco branding. Vaughn Boyd and Drew Estate (the sellers under the agreement) subsequently alleged that the new products infringed trademark rights they had retained under the agreement.

After the parties failed to reach a resolution, Boyd and Drew Estate filed suit under the Lanham Act in federal district court in Florida. The district court concluded that the asserted trademark claims arose out of the stock purchase agreement and therefore fell within the scope of the agreement’s South Dakota forum selection clause.

Following that dismissal, Deadwood filed a related contract suit in South Dakota state court and Boyd and Drew Estate countered with a Lanham Act claim in federal district court in South Dakota. The South Dakota district court likewise determined that the dispute arose from the agreement and that the forum selection clause was valid and mandatory. Boyd and Drew Estate appealed the district court decision.

On appeal, Boyd and Drew Estate argued that their claims arose exclusively under federal trademark law rather than contract law and therefore did not “arise out of” the agreement. They further contended that the forum selection clause was permissive rather than mandatory and could not divest federal courts of jurisdiction. Finally, they asserted that public policy favored adjudication of Lanham Act claims in federal court.

The Eighth Circuit rejected each argument. Beginning with trademark ownership, the Court emphasized that trademark rights are inseparable from the goodwill they represent. Because determining the scope of Boyd and Drew Estate’s retained trademark rights required analyzing what goodwill, if any, accompanied the reserved marks, resolution of the dispute necessarily depended on interpreting the stock purchase agreement. The Court therefore concluded that the trademark claims arose out of the agreement, notwithstanding that they were pleaded solely under the Lanham Act.

The Eighth Circuit also found that the forum selection clause was mandatory. The agreement provided that disputes arising out of the agreement “shall” be venued in Lawrence County, South Dakota, and that the Lawrence County circuit court “shall have jurisdiction.” Applying South Dakota law, the Eighth Circuit found the language unambiguously mandatory and concluded that the reference to [...]

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A costly discovery misstep: Untimely damages evidence excluded

by Nicholas J. DiRoberto | Jun 18, 2026 | Copyrights

The US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed a district court’s exclusion of damages evidence under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1) and the resulting grant of summary judgment against the plaintiff on all claims. Deque Sys. Inc. v. BrowserStack, Inc., Case No. 25-1534 (4th Cir. June 5, 2026) (Agee, Traxler, Floyd, JJ.)

Deque Systems develops software that helps businesses make websites accessible to users who have visual and hearing impairments. Deque sued competitor BrowserStack for copyright infringement, false advertising, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment, alleging that BrowserStack reverse-engineered Deque’s software to develop a competing product and falsely advertised it as “5x faster” than Deque’s flagship offering.

Under the district court’s scheduling order, initial disclosures were due on June 7, 2024; expert disclosures were due on August 9, 2024; and fact discovery closed on October 11, 2024. Although Deque timely served its Rule 26(a)(1) initial disclosures, it failed to provide a computation of damages as required by Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iii). When BrowserStack later served an interrogatory seeking the categories and calculations of Deque’s claimed damages, Deque again declined to provide a damages computation, stating only that it intended to seek all available damages and that its calculations remained incomplete.

Deque also failed to serve a damages expert report by the August 2024 expert disclosure deadline. After retaining new counsel, Deque disclosed a $30 million damages calculation on October 8, 2024, just three days before the close of discovery. BrowserStack moved to exclude the damages evidence and sought summary judgment.

The district court excluded Deque’s damages evidence under Rule 37(c)(1), finding that Deque failed to comply with Rule 26’s disclosure requirements. Because Deque could no longer prove damages and failed to establish entitlement to injunctive relief, the district court granted summary judgment in BrowserStack’s favor on all claims. Deque appealed.

The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The Court explained that Rule 37(c)(1) “gives teeth” to Rule 26’s disclosure requirements by prohibiting a party from using information that was not properly disclosed during discovery. The Court found that Deque had “indisputably failed to comply” with Rule 26(a)’s damages disclosure requirements by failing to provide a damages computation in its initial disclosures, expert disclosures, or interrogatory responses. The Court rejected Deque’s argument that its disclosure of damages in a rebuttal expert report three days before the close of discovery constituted a timely disclosure.

Turning to the propriety of the sanction, the Fourth Circuit applied the five-factor test set forth in its 2003 Southern States Rack & Fixture, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co. decision:

Surprise to the opposing party
Ability to cure the surprise
Disruption of trial
Importance of the evidence
Explanation for the nondisclosure

The Fourth Circuit concluded that all five factors favored exclusion. BrowserStack was plainly surprised by Deque’s $30 million damages claim, which was disclosed only days before discovery closed. Curing that surprise would have required reopening discovery and significantly delaying the proceedings. Although the damages evidence was important, Deque failed to offer any meaningful justification for its repeated failure [...]

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Tick tock: Related trade secrets have single accrual date under DTSA statute of limitations

by Tori Lazerson | Jun 11, 2026 | Trade Secrets

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a judgment awarding damages and a permanent injunction, finding that the plaintiff’s trade secret misappropriation claims were barred by the statute of limitations under the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA). Insulet Corp. v. EOFlow, Co. Ltd., Case No. 25-1807 (Fed. Cir. May 28, 2026) (Dyk, Reyna, JJ.) (Prost, J., dissenting).

Insulet manufactures the Omnipod, an adhesive wearable insulin patch pump currently sold in 25 countries. EOFlow developed a competing product, the EOPatch 2, marketed in Europe and South Korea. On August 3, 2023, Insulet filed suit against EOFlow alleging trade secret misappropriation under the DTSA and patent infringement.

The misappropriation allegedly occurred when EOFlow hired several former Insulet employees to develop the EOPatch 2. The employees included Steve DiIanni, former director of mechanical engineering at Insulet, who possessed “detailed technical information” about the Omnipod. Between March and May 2018, DiIanni provided EOFlow with computer-aided design (CAD) files and information regarding the Omnipod’s soft cannula and occlusion-detection algorithm.

The district court bifurcated the DTSA and patent claims. At trial on the DTSA claims, the jury found misappropriation of four trade secrets, including the Omnipod CAD files, and concluded that none of Insulet’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The jury initially awarded $170 million in compensatory damages and more than $280 million in exemplary damages. These amounts were reduced to $26 million and $34 million, respectively, with the district court’s grant of a permanent injunction. Insulet’s patent claims were dismissed without prejudice.

On appeal, Insulet moved to transfer to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The Federal Circuit denied the motion, concluding that it retained jurisdiction because the dismissal of the patent claims functioned, at least in part, as a dismissal with prejudice, since the statute of limitations expired with respect to certain alleged acts of patent infringement. The Court then addressed two issues under the DTSA statute of limitations: when the statute of limitations begins to run and whether related trade secrets are subject to a single accrual date.

On the first issue, the parties disputed the applicable standard. EOFlow argued that the statute of limitations began to run under an inquiry-notice standard while Insulet contended that the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Merck & Co. v. Reynolds required application of a discovery standard under which the limitations period begins when the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered the facts underlying its claim. The Federal Circuit declined to decide which standard governed, concluding that Insulet’s claims were time-barred even under the more demanding Merck standard. Applying an access-plus-similarity framework, the Court found that, before the critical date, Insulet knew or should have known that EOFlow had access to its trade secrets through a former Insulet employee, and possessed sufficient information regarding similarities between the EOPatch 2 and Insulet’s trade secret technology to plead a misappropriation claim.

On the second issue, for which there was no controlling First Circuit authority, the Federal Circuit determined that the [...]

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