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In Good Hands: Compilation of Publicly Available Information Can Still Be a Trade Secret

by Sarah J. Fischer | Sep 21, 2023 | Trade Secrets

The US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed a district court decision, finding that a compilation of customer-related information, even if publicly available, is a protectable trade secret. Allstate Insurance Co. v. Fougere, Case No. 22-1258 (1st Cir. Aug. 29, 2023) (Gelpi, Lynch, Thompson, JJ.)

Allstate hired two agents—James Fougere and Sarah Brody-Isbill—to sell the company’s auto and casualty insurance products in Massachusetts. In connection with their employment, both agents signed exclusive employment agreements that imposed numerous responsibilities, including an obligation to maintain information identified by Allstate as confidential, an undertaking not to misuse or improperly disclose the information and a promise to return the information to Allstate when their agency relationships terminated. Allstate eventually terminated its agreement with the agents because of noncompliance with Allstate regulations and Massachusetts state law.

After the agreements were terminated, Allstate believed the agents had retained confidential information belonging to Allstate and had been using it to solicit Allstate customers. Allstate ultimately learned that the agents had kept confidential Allstate spreadsheets that contained the names of thousands of Allstate customers, along with their renewal dates, premiums, types of insurance, Allstate policy numbers, driver’s license numbers, home addresses, phone numbers and email addresses.

Allstate filed suit against the former agents, bringing claims under both Massachusetts law and the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA). The agents brought counterclaims under Massachusetts law, alleging that Allstate failed to provide adequate notice before their terminations, misappropriated information that belonged to the agents and wrongfully interfered with the agents’ contractual relations by engaging in bad-faith business practices. On summary judgment, the district court found that the agents misappropriated Allstate’s trade secrets and dismissed the agents’ counterclaims. The agents appealed.

The agents argued that the customer information was available from various publicly available sources and therefore did not constitute a trade secret. The First Circuit disagreed, explaining that the compilation of publicly available information could constitute trade secrets, particularly where attempts to duplicate that information would be “immensely difficult.” The Court also found that the factual record suggested that not all of the customer information was publicly available—and certainly not in the same compilation as it would be from Allstate.

The agents also argued that the customer information had no economic value. In analyzing this argument, the First Circuit looked to the employment agreements between the former agents and Allstate, which specifically stated that the misuse of Allstate’s confidential information would cause “irreparable damages” to Allstate. The employment agreements also provided a mechanism for terminated agents to sell their “economic interest” back to Allstate. The Court also relied on its finding that this sort of information would be valuable to Allstate’s competitors in attempting to market policies to Allstate customers so that the competitor could offer lower pricing. Taken together, the Court found that the customer data had economic value.

The agents next argued that Allstate had not sufficiently protected the customer information. The First Circuit, affirming the district court, found that Allstate had multiple protections in place. [...]

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Hit Rewind: Analogous Art and Field of Endeavor

by Tessa Kroll | Sep 21, 2023 | Patents

Addressing the Patent Trial & Appeal Board’s application of the field of endeavor and reasonably pertinent tests for determining analogous art, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that the Board should not have required a petitioner to precisely articulate the relevant field of endeavor for the patent and prior art using the magic words, “field of endeavor.” However, the Court agreed with the Board that the prior art was not reasonably pertinent because it concerned a different problem than the challenge addressed by the patent. Netflix, Inc. v. DivX, LLC, Case No. 22-1138 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 11, 2023) (Stoll, Hughes, and Stark, JJ.)

Netflix filed an inter partes review (IPR) challenging DivX’s patent directed toward a feature called “trick play functionality,” which refers to the ability to fast forward, rewind and skip frames in a multimedia file. The patent’s background explains that the invention generally relates to the “encoding, transmission and decoding of multimedia files.” Notably, the claimed invention implements a multimedia file based on the Audio Video Interleave (AVI) structure with an additional storage structure called an “index chunk.”

In its petition, Netflix asserted that the challenged claims were obvious over two prior art references, Zetts in view of Kaku. Kaku disclosed the use of an AVI file with an index chunk to show image data and/or play sound data in a digital camera. Kaku explained that the invention’s primary object is to reproduce a motion image in a device with minimal memory but clarified that the invention is “applicable to every electronic appliance to reproduce motion images.” Netflix asserted that Zetts disclosed a system for facilitating trick play while Kaku disclosed using an AVI file format with an index chunk to store video/audio data.

In its patent owner response, DivX argued that Kaku was non-analogous art because the challenged patent relates to facilitating trick play in streamed multimedia content, whereas Kaku utilizes M-JPEG files in limited-memory cameras. DivX similarly argued that Kaku was not reasonably pertinent to the problem of “facilitating trick play functionality in streaming services.” Netflix countered that Kaku must be considered for its AVI teachings and/or the “encoding and decoding of multimedia files,” both of which are “applicable to every electronic appliance to reproduce motion images” and render Kaku reasonably pertinent. The Board rejected Netflix’s obviousness argument, holding that it failed to identify the field of endeavor for the DivX patent or Kaku, as well as the problem to be addressed by the DivX patent. Netflix appealed.

The Federal Circuit first considered the Board’s conclusion that Netflix failed to identify an overlapping field of endeavor for Kaku and the DivX patent. The Court explained that the field of endeavor is determined by reference to explanations of the invention’s subject matter in the specification and is not limited to the specific point of novelty or the particular focus within a field. Rather, a field of endeavor may be broadly defined because it relies on the specification’s complete disclosure. Applying this principle, the [...]

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Less Is More: IPR Claim Amendments May Not Enlarge Claim Scope

by Amol Parikh | Sep 14, 2023 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a decision from the Patent Trial & Appeal Board denying a motion to amend claims during an inter partes review (IPR) proceeding, explaining that a claim amendment is improper if a proposed claim is broader in any respect relative to the original claims, even if it is overall narrower. Sisvel International S.A. v. Sierra Wireless, Inc., et al., Case Nos. 22-1387; -1492 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 1, 2023) (Prost, Reyna, Stark, JJ.)

Sisvel owns two patents directed to methods and apparatuses that rely on the exchange of frequency information in connection with cell reselection between a mobile station (or user cell phone) and a central mobile switching center. Sierra Wireless filed petitions for IPR alleging that claims of Sisvel’s patents were unpatentable as anticipated and/or obvious in view of certain prior art. During the IPR proceeding, the Board determined that the claim term “connection rejection message” should be given its plain and ordinary meaning of “a message that rejects a connection.”

The Board also denied Sisvel’s motion to amend the claims of one of the patents, finding that the amendments would have impermissibly enlarged the claim scope. the Board focused on a limitation relating to “setting a value,” comparing the original claims’ requirement with that of the proposed substitute claims. The original claims required that the value be set “based at least in part on information in at least one frequency parameter” of the connection rejection message while the substitute claims recited that the value may be set merely by “using the frequency parameter” contained within the connection rejection message. The Boeasoneasoned that in the proposed substitute claim, the value that is set need not be based on information in the connection rejection message, and thus the claim was broader in this respect than the original claims. After denying the motion to amend, the Board concluded that the original claims were unpatentable. Sisvel appealed.

Sisvel challenged the Board’s construction of “connection rejection message,” arguing that the term should be limited to a message from the specific cellular networks disclosed in the specification. The Federal Circuit rejected Sisvel’s argument, finding that the intrinsic evidence provided no persuasive basis to limit the claims to any particular cellular network disclosure. Having agreed with the Board’s construction, the Court affirmed the unpatentability determination.

Sisvel also challenged the Board’s refusal to permit Sisvel to amend the claims. Sisvel argued that the Board had incorrectly found that the proposed substitute claims were broader than the original claims because when all the limitations were considered as a whole, the scope of the substitute claims was narrower than the original claims.

Citing 35 U.S.C. § 316(d)(3), the Federal Circuit noted that when a patent owner seeks to amend its claims during an IPR, the amended claims “may not enlarge the scope of the claims of the patent.” The Court explained that removal of a claim requirement can broaden the resulting amended claim and concluded that such was the case [...]

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Whisk-y Business: Notice Alone Is Sufficient for Preliminary Injunction

by Alexander Piala, PhD | Sep 7, 2023 | Trademarks

The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that only notice of a preliminary injunction (PI) motion, and not perfected formal service, is needed to assert jurisdiction to issue an injunction. Whirlpool Corp. v. Shenzhen Sanlida Elec. Tech. Co., Ltd., Case No. 22-40376 (5th Cir. Aug. 25, 2023) (Barksdale, Southwick, Higginson, JJ.)

Shenzhen Sanlida sells stand mixers within the United States, primarily through online sales. Whirlpool filed a complaint for trademark infringement and dilution against Sanlida, arguing that Sanlida’s mixers were too close in appearance to Whirlpool’s iconic KitchenAid stand mixer. Shortly after filing its complaint, Whirlpool requested a PI hearing. In its request, Whirlpool provided evidence that Sanlida had actual notice of the pending hearing. The district court granted the request and scheduled a hearing.

Counsel for Whirlpool and Sanlida attended the hearing. At the hearing, Sanlida argued it had never been properly served under the Hague Convention and that without service, the district court could not assert personal jurisdiction over it. The district court disagreed and granted the PI. Sanlida filed an emergency motion to stay the order, but the district court rejected Sanlida’s request. Sanlida appealed.

Sanlida argued that the district court did not have the power to issue a PI and that it abused its discretion in awarding the injunction. The Fifth Circuit found no error or abuse and affirmed.

The Fifth Circuit explained that service is not a prerequisite to issuing a PI. Citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 65, the Court explained that the only requirement for issuing a PI is notice to the adverse party. Since it was undisputed that Sanlida had notice of the PI hearing, the Court found that the district court had the power to issue the PI. In doing so, the Court distinguished this case—where there was no dispute that the district court would have personal jurisdiction over Sanlida after the process was perfected—from cases where personal jurisdiction was a live question at the PI hearing.

Turning to the merits of the PI, the Fifth Circuit addressed the four factors the district court had to consider before issuing the injunction: likelihood of success on the merits, threat of irreparable injury, balance of harms and public interest.

On the first factor—likelihood of success—the Fifth Circuit found that the district court made no clear error. The two components of the likelihood of success analysis are validity and likelihood of confusion. On both points, the Fifth Circuit upheld the district court’s finding. While Sanlida argued that Whirlpool’s trademark was invalid because it covered “functional” elements, the Court found insufficient factual support for that argument. Nothing in the record showed that Whirlpool’s mixer head shape had any effect on the “cost or quality” of the mixer. Nor did Sanlida point to any evidence showing that the housing shape would put competitors at a “significant non-reputation-related disadvantage.” Without a showing on either element, Sanlida failed to rebut the presumption of validity. Sanlida also failed to show [...]

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It’s a Taking: Copyright Deposit Requirement Violates Fifth Amendment

by Eleanor B. Atkins | Sep 7, 2023 | Copyrights

Addressing the issue for the first time, the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found that the Copyright Act of 1976’s requirement to deposit two copies of a work with the Library of Congress within three months of the work’s publication was unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. Valancourt Books, LLC v. Merrick B. Garland and Shira Perlmutter, Case No. 21-5203 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 29, 2023) (Srinivasan, Henderson, Edwards, JJ.)

Valancourt Books is a small business in Richmond, Virginia, which publishes rare and out-of-print fiction on an on-demand basis (i.e., in response to a specific customer request). Despite never having sought copyright registration for any of its works, Valancourt received a letter in 2018 from the US Copyright Office (CO) demanding a complete copy of 341 books published by Valancourt “for the use or disposition of the Library of Congress.” Failure to comply would subject Valancourt to fines of up to $250 per work plus the total retail price of the copies and an additional $2,500 for repeated failure to comply. Valancourt responded that it could not afford to submit copies of all the requested works, noting that some of the works contained material in the public domain and offering instead to sell copies of the works to the CO at cost. In response, the CO narrowed the list of requested copies to 240 works.

Valancourt sued seeking a declaration that the application of Section 407 of the Copyright Act is unconstitutional under the First and Fifth Amendments and an injunction against its enforcement. The CO offered Valancourt the option to electronically submit the deposits, but Valancourt declined. The parties both moved for summary judgment. After considering whether the CO’s offer to accept electronic copies had mooted the dispute, the district court concluded that the CO’s offer had merely narrowed the dispute to one of electronic deposit copies and granted summary judgment to CO on the constitutional claims. Valancourt appealed.

Valancourt challenged the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Valancourt’s First and Fifth Amendment claims and the district court’s conclusion that the dispute had been limited to one about electronic copies. The DC Circuit agreed, stating that the CO’s “offer did not moot Valancourt’s challenge to the demand for physical copies” because “[a] party’s voluntary cessation of challenged conduct does not moot the challenged [requirement] unless it is ‘absolutely clear’ that the challenged conduct will not recur after the litigation.” Accordingly, the Court considered only the demand for physical (rather than electronic) deposits.

With respect to Valancourt’s constitutional challenges, the DC Circuit concluded that Section 407’s requirement for physical deposit copies violated the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause as there was no benefit received by the copyright owner in response to the deposit: “A demand for personal property would not be a taking . . . if it involved a voluntary exchange for a governmental benefit.” In this case, however, no such benefit existed. Pursuant to the Copyright Act, copyright attaches automatically upon fixation of a [...]

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Back to the Future: Prior Third-Party Settlement Doesn’t Impact Future Trademark Licensees

by Gaylon C. Hollis | Sep 7, 2023 | Trademarks

The US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that under certain circumstances a trademark licensee can bring a claim against a third party for unfair competition under the Lanham Act even if the licensing agreement does not expressly authorize it to do so. Overhead Door Company of Kansas City v. OGD Equipment Company, LLC, Case No. 22-10985 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 22, 2023) (Branch, Brasher, JJ.; Winsor, Dist. J., sitting by designation).

This appeal involved three parties: D.H. Pace Company, Overhead Door Corporation and Overhead Garage Door (OGD). All three companies are involved in selling and servicing garage doors. Pace is a licensee of Overhead. Under its license, Pace is permitted to advertise and promote the trade name OVERHEAD DOOR COMPANY. OGD is a competitor of Overhead and Pace. Prior to the current appeal, Overhead and OGD had been involved in litigation involving OGD’s alleged trademark infringement and unfair trade practices, which resulted in a settlement. As a part of the settlement, OGD and Overhead could not bring suits against each other. However, the settlement terms were not expressly binding on any current or future licensees of Overhead.

In the current litigation, Pace filed suit against OGD for unfair competition in violation of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, deceptive trade practices and various state trademark infringement violations. Pace alleged that OGD was leading consumers to believe that it was the same company as, or was affiliated with, Overhead (Pace’s licensor). In response, OGD moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted. The district court ruled that the licensing agreement between Pace and Overhead was a contractual bar to relief because the agreement did not affirmatively give Pace the right to sue. The district court also ruled that as a non-exclusive licensee, Pace lacked standing to bring its suit. The district court held that because Pace’s trademark rights were derived from a licensing agreement with Overhead, by discharging rights in the prior settlement with OGD, Overhead also discharged Pace’s right to sue.

Through a de novo review, the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the district court’s grant of summary judgment against Pace. As the district court recognized, under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, parties other than the owner of the mark can bring suit, but here the district court barred Pace’s claims based on the licensing agreement, Pace’s status as a non-exclusive licensee and the settlement agreement between OGD and Overhead. In reversing, the Eleventh Circuit held that none of these reasons was sufficient to bar Pace’s claims.

According to the Eleventh Circuit, the licensing agreement did not bar Pace from suing since there were no contractual term imposing a bar. While a licensee’s right to sue can be restricted, there was nothing in the licensing agreement at issue that limited Pace’s right to sue. The license agreement did not address trademark enforcement or either party’s ability to sue.

The Eleventh Circuit explained that the district court misread the Eleventh Circuit’s 2019 decision in Kroma Makeup v. Boldface [...]

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Rimini, Meeny, Miny, Moe: Ninth Circuit Affirms Most PI Violation Findings, Reverses Others

by Kathleen Lynch | Sep 7, 2023 | Copyrights

Addressing the boundaries of a permanent injunction awarded to a major software developer, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit largely agreed that the defending developer was in contempt for violating the order but reversed on certain issues where the district court overextended the injunction. Oracle USA, Inc. v. Rimini St., Inc., Case No. 22-15188 (9th Cir. Aug. 24, 2023) (Bybee, Bumatay, JJ.; Bennett, Dist. J., sitting by designation).

Oracle creates enterprise software to carry out business functions. Oracle’s customers buy licenses to its products, which require updates and technical support. These necessary support services can be outsourced to third-party vendors, such as Rimini.

This case is the byproduct of a 13-year battle that Oracle initiated on the grounds that Rimini’s support services constituted copyright infringement. Rimini made generic versions of Oracle software on Rimini computers to develop updates and bug fixes (local hosting) and supported clients by using development environments created pursuant to a different client’s license (cross-use). After multiple appeals and remands, the case resulted in a permanent injunction prohibiting Rimini from reproducing or cross-using Oracle software unless pursuant to a customer license. Rimini revamped its support services and sought a declaratory judgment of noninfringement. After Oracle was permitted to conduct discovery into potential violations of the injunction, the district court held a bench trial on 10 possible violations. The district court found Rimini in contempt for five of the 10 alleged violations (issues 1–4 and 8). On two others (issues 7 and 9), the district court found no contempt but enjoined Rimini from continuing a specific copying practice. The district court sanctioned Rimini $630,000, calculated according to statutory damages available under the Copyright Act.

Rimini appealed each contempt finding, the injunction and the sanctions.

First, the Ninth Circuit addressed the five contempt findings, sorted into three groups:

Local hosting (issue 1)
Cross-use (issues 2–4)
Database copying (issue 8).

On issue 1, the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The lower court had found that Rimini received copyrighted files from its clients. Instead of following internal policies requiring them to quarantine or report these files, Rimini employees forwarded and saved them locally. Based on the plain language of the PI, this was a clear violation.

On issues 2–4, regarding cross-use, the Ninth Circuit also affirmed. Rimini used one client’s environment to modify and test updates that the client did not need and were intended for other clients. Since the injunction specifically prohibited cross-use, this was a violation. Rimini lodged multiple failed arguments, including that the injunction only prohibited cross-use in “generic” (non-client) environments, so its use of one client’s environment to support another client was allowed. The Court disagreed that the injunction was so specific.

On issue 8 (database copying), however, the Ninth Circuit reversed. The district court held Rimini in contempt for making copies of an Oracle database file on Rimini systems. When the client uploaded the file to Salesforce for Rimini to provide technical assistance, a copy was automatically created on Rimini’s system. Here, the [...]

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The End Is Not So Near: Patent Term Adjustments Count in Obviousness-Type Double Patenting Determinations

by Jake B. Vallen | Sep 7, 2023 | Patents

Addressing for the first time how patent term adjustments (PTAs) interact with obviousness-type double patenting (ODP), the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concluded that when members of a patent family have different expiration dates due to PTAs, the earlier expiring family members can be used as a basis for an ODP invalidity challenge against the later expiring family members. In re Cellect, LLC, Case Nos. 2022-1293; -1294; -1295; -1296 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 28, 2023) (Lourie, Dyk, Reyna, JJ.)

Cellect owns several patents directed to devices with image sensors, such as personal digital assistant devices and phones. Each patent claims priority from a single application. None of the patents were subject to a terminal disclaimer, and each was granted PTA under 35 U.S.C. § 154(b) because of PTO delay during prosecution. Had the patents not been granted PTA, each one would have expired on the same date as the original application.

After Cellect sued for infringement, the defendant requested ex parte reexaminations and asserted that the patents were unpatentable based on ODP. During the reexaminations, the Examiner “determin[ed] that the challenged claims were obvious variants of Cellect’s prior-expiring reference patent claims” because “although the ODP invalidating reference patents form a network across the four ex parte reexamination proceedings, all invalidated claims can be traced back to the single family member [now expired] patent that did not receive a grant of PTA.” The Patent Trial & Appeal Board affirmed the Examiner’s finding. Cellect appealed.

The Federal Circuit began with the inquiry for determining unpatentability based on ODP and whether, in that context, a patent’s expiration date includes a duly granted PTA under 35 U.S.C. § 154. While the Court recognized that the relevant expiration date for an ODP analysis where a patent received a patent term extension (PTE) is the pre-PTE expiration date, the Court concluded that, in the context of patents that have received PTAs, the relevant expiration date for analyzing ODP is the expiration date accounting for the PTA regardless of whether a terminal disclaimer has been filed. The Court reasoned that when determining whether claims are unpatentable for ODP, PTA and PTE, they “should be treated differently” because each is governed by different statutes that were designed to address different circumstances. While both PTAs and PTEs were intended to recover lost patent terms, PTAs were designed to extend patent terms because of administrative delays in patent processing and preclude the extension of a patent term past a terminal disclaimer. PTEs were designed to extend a patent term because of regulatory delays in product approval and are not foreclosed by a terminal disclaimer. As such, the Court reasoned that not contemplating a PTA when analyzing ODP would “frustrate the clear intent of Congress” because “when a terminal disclaimer has been entered in a patent subject to PTA, no patent (or claim) may be extended beyond the disclaimed expiration date.”

The Federal Circuit next considered whether examiners are required to consider “equitable concerns” such as good faith when [...]

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Cover-Up Isn’t Covered Under VARA

by Vincent Li, PhD | Aug 31, 2023 | Copyrights

The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed that the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA) does not prohibit covering an artist’s mural where there is no damage to the mural. Samuel Kerson v. Vermont Law School, Inc., Case No. 21-2904 (2d. Cir. Aug. 18, 2023) (Livingston, Cabranes, Kovner, JJ.)

In 1993, Samuel Kerson and Vermont Law School entered into a written agreement for Kerson to paint two murals on the walls of the law school’s community center. The completed murals were publicly viewable and depicted several distinct scenes spanning the history of US slavery, from the capture of Africans in their homelands through the abolitionist movement.

Because of complaints from community members regarding how the murals presented Black people, the law school considered options for the murals’ removal. The school decided to conceal the murals behind a barrier of fabric-cushioned acoustic panels. The panels were constructed such that they were suspended approximately two inches away from the murals’ surface and did not touch the murals.

Kerson filed suit seeking to enjoin the installation of the acoustic panels on the theory that they amounted to a violation of his rights under VARA. Under the relevant part of VARA, the author of a “work of visual art” “shall have the right”:

(A) to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation, and any intentional distortion, mutilation, or modification of that work is a violation of that right, and

(B) to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature, and any intentional or grossly negligent destruction of that work is a violation of that right.

17 U.S.C. §§ 106A(a)(3)(A)-(B).

In the district court, Kerson argued that blocking the public from viewing his work of art would amount to the “destruction” or “intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification” of the murals. The district court disagreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the law school. Kerson appealed.

Kerson argued that permanently concealing the murals with a solid barrier of acoustic panels modified and thus “destroy[ed]” his work. The Second Circuit agreed with the district court that covering a work of art did not amount to “destruction” under VARA. The Court explained that Kerson’s argument did not comport to the conventional understanding of the word “destruction” under the plain meaning of the statute. The acoustic panels were designed to not touch the murals, let alone destroy them.

The Second Circuit also rejected Kerson’s argument that covering a work of art amounts to “modification.” Under VARA, “modification” would entail a change to the work of art that alters some portion of it without radically transforming the whole. For example, an additional brush stroke, erasure of content or the reorganization of a movable component would be a modification of a work of art. Modifications do not include concealing the entire work behind a solid barrier.

The Second Circuit also rejected Kerson’s argument that concealing the murals was [...]

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Don’t Be So Stern: Copying Carries Significant Weight in Assessing Objective Evidence

by Amol Parikh | Aug 31, 2023 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded a Patent Trial & Appeal Board decision invalidating a patent, finding that the Board erred in assessing nexus and weight to be accorded to objective evidence of nonobviousness. Volvo Penta of the Americas, LLC v. Brunswick Corp., Case No. 22-1765 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 24, 2023) (Moore, Lourie, Cunningham, JJ.)

Volvo Penta owns a patent directed to a tractor-type stern drive for a boat. A stern drive is a type of engine that is mounted in the hull of a boat and connected to a drive unit mounted outside of the hull, typically on the stern. In the industry, this arrangement is often referred to as an inboard/outboard drive. In 2015, Volvo Penta launched its commercial embodiment of the patent called the Forward Drive and was popular particularly for wake surfing and other water sports. The Forward Drive included forward-facing propellers that increased the distance between the propeller and swimmers or surfers compared to prior pulling-type stern drive boats.

In August 2020, Brunswick launched its own drive, the Bravo Four S, which embodies Volvo Penta’s patent. On that same day, Brunswick filed a petition for inter partes review asserting that the challenged claims were anticipated or obvious based on several references, two of which were Kiekhaefer and Brandt. In response, Volvo Penta argued that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have been motivated to combine Kiekhaefer and Brandt with a reasonable expectation of success and that the objective indicia of nonobviousness overcame any prima facie case of obviousness. In support, Volvo Penta offered evidence of copying, industry praise, commercial success, skepticism, failure of others and long-felt but unsolved need. Volvo Penta also argued that it was entitled to a presumption of nexus between the objective indicia and the claimed invention, and, even if there was no presumption, there was still nexus.

The Board found that Kiekhaefer did not anticipate the challenged claims, but it would have been obvious to redesign the stern drive of Brandt in light of Kiekhaefer’s outboard motor to arrive at the challenged claims. After finding a motivation to combine (and prima facie obviousness), the Board turned to Volvo Penta’s objective evidence of nonobviousness. The Board first determined that Volvo Penta was not entitled to a presumption of nexus because, even though the Forward Drive and Bravo Four S indisputably embody the challenged claims, Volvo Penta did not make sufficient arguments on coextensiveness. The Board also found that regardless of the presumption, Volvo Penta did not otherwise show nexus because it failed to identify the “unique characteristics” or “merits” of the claimed invention.

Despite finding no nexus, the Board still analyzed the objective evidence and concluded that Volvo Penta’s objective evidence weighed somewhat in favor of nonobviousness but that Brunswick’s strong evidence of obviousness outweighed the objective evidence. The Board therefore concluded that the challenged claims were unpatentable. Volvo Penta appealed.

Volvo Penta raised three primary arguments on appeal: