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Kissing cousins? SUNKIST and KIST deemed confusingly similar

by Sydney E. McDermott | Jul 31, 2025 | Trademarks

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a Trademark Trial & Appeal Board decision, concluding that there was a likelihood of confusion between the marks KIST and SUNKIST when used in connection with soft drinks. Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Intrastate Distributors, Inc., Case No. 24-1212 (Fed. Cir. July 23, 2025) (Prost, Taranto, Stark, JJ.)

For at least 90 years, Sunkist has offered soft drinks under the SUNKIST trademark both directly to consumers and through its licenses. Intrastate Distributors Inc. (IDI) purchased the KIST brand and proceeded to use the KIST mark for soft drink and sparkling water products. The KIST mark was active for about a decade before being cancelled in 2013. In 2019, IDI filed intent-to-use trademark applications for the KIST mark both in standard characters and in a stylized character form for “[s]oft drinks, namely, sodas and sparkling water; concentrates and syrups for making soft drinks.” Sunkist opposed the registration, arguing the KIST mark was likely to cause confusion with the SUNKIST mark.

Focusing its analysis on the SUNKIST standard character mark, the Board determined that all DuPont factors other than similarity of the marks favored likelihood of confusion. The Board found that the marks were not sufficiently similar because they conveyed different commercial impressions. According to the Board, while SUNKIST referenced the sun, the KIST mark referenced a kiss, relying on the image of lips that appear next to the KIST mark. The Board therefore found no likelihood of confusion between IDI’s marks and the registered SUNKIST marks. Sunkist appealed.

The Federal Circuit began by emphasizing that the KIST mark was not a design mark and the image of lips did not always appear beside the mark. The Court relied on the following image in its opinion, noting that “[n]one of the bottles include a lips image or reference a kiss” and instead “emphasize flavors.”

The Federal Circuit noted that the record contains no evidence concerning the degree of consumer exposure to the mark with the image of lips versus without lips. The Court found that the Board relied too heavily on the KIST mark’s appearance alongside an image of lips, and ultimately determined that substantial evidence did not support the finding that the mark referenced a kiss. The Court noted that while some of the SUNKIST marks contained a sun, many were standard character marks that did not include a sun. The Court thus concluded that substantial evidence did not support a finding that the similarity of the marks favored no likelihood of confusion.

Since the Board had previously found that the remaining DuPont factors favored likelihood of confusion and the Federal Circuit determined that the similarity of the marks also favored likelihood of confusion, the only remaining consideration was actual confusion. Although Sunkist had not proven instances of actual confusion, the Court noted that its precedents had never required actual confusion, primarily because [...]

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Sound the alarm: Fourth Circuit affirms $190 million verdict based on deceptive trade practices

by Dexter Hamilton | Jul 31, 2025 | Uncategorized

The US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed a $190 million verdict based on deceptive trade practices, concluding that the district court performed well within its discretion in making the procedural ruling and that the jury verdict was fully supported by the evidence. CPI Security Systems, Inc. v. Vivint Smart Home Inc., Legacy Vivint Smart Home, Inc., Case No. 24-1120 (4th Cir. July 22, 2025) (Benjamin, Berner, Niemeyer, JJ.)

CPI Security Systems and Vivint Smart Home are competitors in the home security industry. CPI sued Vivint in 2020 alleging violation of the Lanham Act and North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (UDTPA), and the common law torts of unfair competition and tortious interference with contracts. CPI’s claims were based on allegations that Vivint used deceptive tactics for door-to-door sales that caused CPI customers to confuse Vivint’s salespeople with CPI representatives. CPI alleged that those customers “unwillingly found themselves with Vivint’s alarm systems installed in their homes and with contractual obligations to both Vivint and CPI.”

During trial, CPI presented testimony from customers who had been solicited by Vivint salespeople. The customers all testified to deceptive tactics. For example, one customer testified that a Vivint representative told her Vivint was acquiring CPI and that she would therefore “no longer have CPI for [her] security company.” The customer was “scared and worried” and signed a contract with Vivint. Another customer testified that a Vivint sales representative claimed to be “with CPI” and was “one of the guys that installed [his] CPI system.”

CPI presented additional evidence to show that these practices were “widespread and systematic,” and that Vivint sales representatives had similarly targeted customers of other competitors. Vivint was aware of the conduct, because, for example, “16 state attorneys general had brought enforcement actions against Vivint for its sales agents’ conduct.”

The jury found in favor of CPI and awarded a combination of compensatory and punitive damages totaling nearly $190 million. Vivint appealed.

Vivint argued that CPI failed to prove reliance on the false statements made to CPI customers, which it claimed was an essential element of a UDTPA claim. Vivint argued that CPI itself must have relied on the false statements, rather than just the customers. The Fourth Circuit rejected Vivint’s argument, in part because:

The UDTPA “is broader and covers more than” fraud.
CPI’s claim was “grounded on unfair competition.”
Unfair competition claims do not require a showing of reliance.

Vivint also argued that CPI had not presented sufficient evidence to support the damages award. CPI had presented evidence to support four distinct categories of damages, and the jury did not specify which category or categories were included in each award. The Fourth Circuit explained that CPI was not required “to show an exact dollar amount with mathematical precision” and had presented evidence that “considered as a whole, was sufficient to allow the jury to reasonably estimate that CPI’s [compensatory] damages were $49.7 million.”

Vivint argued that “at minimum, judgment should be vacated and [...]

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Game over: Prior interference doesn’t preclude IPR proceeding

by Joshua Revilla | Jul 31, 2025 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a Patent Trial & Appeal Board unpatentability determination during an inter partes review (IPR) proceeding, concluding that the Board’s decision to not apply interference estoppel fell within the general rule of unreviewability. IGT v. Zynga Inc., Case No. 23-2262 (Fed. Cir. July 22, 2025) (Prost, Reyna, Taranto, JJ.)

IGT owns an expired patent that addresses the need for gaming machines, such as slot machines and video poker machines, to securely communicate over a public network. The patent was issued in January 2007 from an application filed in April 2002 and published in August 2002. Zynga filed a patent application on August 21, 2003, that included claims copied from IGT’s published application.

In March 2010, the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) Board of Patent Appeals & Interferences (predecessor of the Patent Trial & Appeal Board, which Congress created in 2011) declared an interference proceeding between Zynga’s application and IGT’s patent. During the interference proceeding, Zynga argued IGT’s patent was obvious over three pieces of prior art. IGT argued that Zynga lacked standing because the claims in Zynga’s application were unpatentable for a lack of written description. The Board granted IGT’s motion for judgment on the “threshold issue” that Zynga’s application lacked adequate written description support, terminated the interference with a judgment against Zynga, and dismissed the motion that the claims were unpatentable as moot.

In April 2021, IGT sued Zynga alleging infringement of six patents, including the patent that was subject to the interference proceeding. Zynga filed an IPR petition for that patent, asserting obviousness based on new prior art. In its preliminary response, IGT argued that the Board should deny institution based on interference estoppel under 37 C.F.R. § 41.127(a)(1) because Zynga could have raised the newly asserted art in the interference proceeding. The Board rejected IGT’s interference estoppel arguments because:

The interference was terminated based on the “threshold issue” of lack of written description and therefore the Board did not analyze or decide any issues of unpatentability.
It would be unfair to estop Zynga, and to the extent that estoppel applied, the Board waived its application under 37 C.F.R. § 42.5(b).

IGT requested rehearing and precedential opinion panel review, arguing that interference estoppel barred institution. The PTO Director affirmed the Board’s decision, stating that interference estoppel under § 41.127 did not apply because IPR proceedings are governed by 37 C.F.R. pt. 42, which does not incorporate Part 41 or its estoppel provisions. The PTO Director also noted that the Board’s termination was based on a threshold issue. The Board proceeded with the review and ultimately concluded that all the challenged claims were unpatentable as obvious. IGT appealed.

IGT argued that the Board and PTO Director erred in ruling that interference estoppel did not bar the petition and challenged the Board’s holding that the claims would have been obvious over the newly asserted prior art.

The Federal Circuit concluded that the interference estoppel determination fell within the [...]

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Don’t get too comfy: Prosecution disclaimer also applies to design patents

by Connor M. Larson | Jul 24, 2025 | Patents

Concluding that the principles of prosecution history disclaimer apply to design patents, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a district court’s denial of judgment as a matter of law and entry of a jury verdict that found liability for design patent infringement. Top Brand, LLC v. Cozy Comfort Company, LLC, Case No. 24-2191 (Fed. Cir. July 17, 2025) (Dyk, Reyna, Stark, JJ.)

Top Brand and Cozy Comfort compete in the market for oversized hooded sweatshirts. Cozy Comfort owns a design patent directed to “the ornamental design for an enlarged over-garment with an elevated marsupial pocket.” It accused Top Brand of infringing the patent through its sale of certain hooded sweatshirts and wearable blankets. In response, Top Brand filed a declaratory judgment action seeking findings of noninfringement and invalidity. Cozy Comfort counterclaimed for design patent and trademark infringement.

During prosecution, Cozy Comfort overcame an anticipation rejection by distinguishing the prior art under the ordinary observer test, pointing to specific features such as the shape and placement of the marsupial pocket and the bottom hem line. Top Brand argued that these statements constituted a clear disclaimer of claim scope, and that the accused products fell within the surrendered subject matter.

The district court disagreed, instructing the jury to compare the accused products to the design as claimed (without considering any prosecution disclaimer). The jury found infringement, and the court entered judgment accordingly, denying Top Brand’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. Top Brand appealed.

Top Brand argued that the district court erred by failing to apply prosecution history disclaimer, asserting that the accused design was within the scope of the subject matter Cozy Comfort had disclaimed. Cozy Comfort responded that the disclaimer doctrine does not apply to design patents and, even if it did, Cozy Comfort’s prosecution statements were not sufficiently clear to constitute a disclaimer.

The Federal Circuit disagreed, concluding that prosecution history disclaimer applies to design patents. The Court reasoned that allowing patentees to recapture disclaimed subject matter in litigation would undermine the integrity of the patent system. The Court emphasized that Cozy Comfort’s statements during prosecution clearly surrendered the identified features as supporting a finding of overall similarity. Because the accused design incorporated those surrendered features, the Court concluded that no reasonable jury could find infringement.

Accordingly, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of judgment as a matter of law and vacated the jury’s verdict.

Eleventh Circuit sides with Fourth, Fifth Circuits on bankruptcy discharge exception split

by Deanna D. Boll | Jul 24, 2025 | Uncategorized

Addressing a split among bankruptcy courts in their interpretation of whether a corporate debtor, like an individual debtor, is subject to the exceptions to discharge outlined in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) when confirming a nonconsensual Subchapter V plan, the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed a US Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida decision. The Eleventh Circuit held that the cross-reference in 11 U.S.C. § 1192 to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)’s exceptions to discharge applies to both corporate and individual debtors. BenShot, LLC v. 2 Monkey Trading, LLC, Lucky Shot USA, LLC, Case No. 23-12342 (11th Cir. July 9, 2025) (Branch, Lagoa, JJ.) (Luck, J., dissenting).

Prior to filing for chapter 11 protection under Bankruptcy Code Subchapter V, 2 Monkey Trading and Lucky Shot (together, the debtors) were sued by BenShot for violations of the Lanham Act in connection with the debtors’ false advertising that their competing products were produced in the United States. The jury found in favor of BenShot and awarded punitive damages, determining that the debtors acted “maliciously toward” BenShot or “in an intentional disregard” of BenShot’s rights. Following this decision, the debtors filed for bankruptcy and attempted to discharge the jury award owed to BenShot. BenShot argued that the jury award constituted an exception to discharge under § 523(a)(6) for claims involving “willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity.” The bankruptcy court, like many bankruptcy courts in other jurisdictions, found in favor of the debtors, holding that § 523(a)’s discharge exceptions exclude corporate debtors and therefore the debtors could discharge BenShot’s debt.

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed and extended the application of § 523(a) in nonconsensual Subchapter V cases to corporate debtors. It observed that § 1191(c) of Subchapter V enables a debtor, if certain conditions are met, to confirm a nonconsensual plan without adhering to the absolute priority rule, thereby allowing a debtor to receive a discharge and retain assets even when all unsecured creditors are not paid in full. The discharge granted under a confirmed Subchapter V nonconsensual plan is governed by § 1192, which includes an exception to discharge in the form of a cross-reference to § 523(a). The question of whether the exception applies to corporate debtors arises from the text of § 523(a)’s preamble, which uses the term “individual debtor” before listing the exceptions to discharge.

In reaching its decision, the Eleventh Circuit engaged in a plain reading of the language of § 1192, which makes no distinction between individual and corporate debtors. The statute uses the word “debtor,” a term applied elsewhere in the Bankruptcy Code to both individuals and corporate entities. The Court also acknowledged that § 1192 states that the discharge is of a “debt,” which does not distinguish between an individual and a corporation. The Court noted that Congress could have used the term “consumer debt” if it wanted the discharge to apply only to individuals.

The Eleventh Circuit also interpreted the language in § 1192(2) that references [...]

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Clean bill of health: Only domestic activities count when analyzing likelihood of confusion

by Hannah Hurley | Jul 24, 2025 | Trademarks

Affirming a summary judgment decision finding no trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that the district court properly focused on domestic activity with regard to the allegedly infringing trademark. Doctor’s Best, Inc. v. Nature’s Way Products, LLC, Case No. 24-2719 (9th Cir. July 15, 2025) (Paez, Ikuta, Nelson, JJ.) (Ikuta, J., concurring).

Doctor’s Best (DB) manufactures nutritional supplements under the mark NATURE’S DAY at its California facility. Although the products bear English labels compliant with US regulations, they are marketed and sold exclusively in China, South Korea, and Taiwan.

Nature’s Way Products (NWP), owner of the long-standing US trademark NATURE’S WAY, opposed DB’s attempt to register NATURE’S DAY in the United States, citing potential consumer confusion. After NWP sent a cease-and-desist letter, DB preemptively sued for a declaratory judgment of noninfringement. NWP counterclaimed for trademark infringement under Sections 32 and 43(a) of the Lanham Act.

In June 2023, the Supreme Court held in Abitron Austria GmbH v. Hetronic Int’l, Inc. that the Lanham Act’s infringement provisions apply only to domestic “use in commerce.” DB moved for summary judgment, arguing that its only domestic activity – transporting products within the US – did not create a likelihood of confusion among US consumers. The district court agreed, finding that DB’s domestic transport of Nature’s Day products was insufficient to support a claim of infringement. The court concluded that no reasonable jury could find that this conduct would confuse US consumers and granted summary judgment in favor of DB. NWP appealed.

NWP argued that any domestic use in commerce, however minimal, triggered the full likelihood-of-confusion analysis, even if confusion occurred abroad. The Ninth Circuit rejected this interpretation, holding that Abitron requires courts to first identify domestic use before evaluating confusion. The Court found that DB’s manufacturing and transport activities were the only relevant domestic conduct.

Turning to likelihood of confusion, the Ninth Circuit applied the eight-factor test set forth in its 1979 decision in AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats:

Strength of the mark
Proximity or relatedness of the goods
Similarity of the marks
Evidence of actual confusion
Marketing channels used
Type of goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser
Defendant’s intent in selecting the mark
The likelihood of expansion of the product lines

Reviewing the Sleekcraft factors, the Ninth Circuit concluded that no genuine dispute existed as to the likelihood of confusion. DB’s products were sold exclusively overseas while NWP’s products were sold only in the US. The Court emphasized that confusion must occur among domestic consumers to be actionable under the Lanham Act, and that did not occur here.

In a concurring opinion, Judge Ikuta agreed with the outcome but clarified that DB’s transport of products constituted a domestic use in commerce. However, she found no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether that use caused domestic confusion, reiterating that Abitron excludes extraterritorial confusion from the analysis.

Victory lap: Extraterritorial injunction permitted for breach of settlement agreement

by Kavya Rallabhandi | Jul 24, 2025 | Trademarks

The US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld a permanent injunction, concluding that the district court properly determined that a party’s violation of a settlement agreement would lead to irreparable harm. Wudi Industrial (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. v. Wong, Case No. 24-1186 (4th Cir. July 11, 2025) (King, Gregory, Rushing, JJ.)

The dispute originated in 2017 when Wudi registered the trademark GTRACING with the US Patent & Trademark Office. Wai L. Wong, asserting prior use of the similar mark GT OMEGA RACING, initiated cancellation proceedings before the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board. In 2020, the Board ruled in Wong’s favor. Wudi sought review in the Eastern District of Virginia under 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b), and Wong counterclaimed for trademark infringement.

In May 2021, the parties entered into a confidential global concurrent-use settlement agreement resolving their litigation. Under the agreement, Wudi was permitted to use GTRACING globally, except in designated regions including multiple European countries. Critically, paragraph 6(b) of the agreement prohibited Wudi from using the phrases “GTRACING” or “GT RACING” in online advertising or social media within the European carve-out. The district court subsequently granted a stay of the dispute pending compliance by the parties.

Following the compliance period, Wong alleged that Wudi violated the agreement by using prohibited terms in online marketing within the restricted regions. The district court granted Wong’s motion to enforce the agreement, ordering Wudi to remove specific content and cease future violations. The district court warned that continued noncompliance could result in contempt proceedings.

Wudi appealed, and the Fourth Circuit initially remanded the case, instructing the district court to apply the four-factor eBay test for injunctive relief. The district court found that Wudi had breached the agreement and that Wong had suffered irreparable harm to the goodwill of its marks. The court concluded that monetary damages were inadequate, the balance of hardships favored Wong, and enforcing the agreement served the public interest. The district court issued a permanent injunction. Wudi appealed again.

Wudi challenged the injunction on multiple grounds, including claims of extraterritorial overreach, improper application of the eBay factors, erroneous breach findings, exclusion of parol evidence, failure to apply the unclean hands doctrine, and improper award of attorneys’ fees.

The Fourth Circuit rejected Wudi’s arguments and affirmed the district court’s ruling. The Court held that the injunction merely enforced contractual obligations voluntarily undertaken by Wudi and that the district court properly applied the eBay test. The Court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s exclusion of parol evidence and its rejection of the unclean hands defense, finding that the district court properly concluded that reputational harm can demonstrate that irreparable injury will flow from the breach of a trademark-related settlement agreement.

Valve turned: Prosecution history estoppel applies to closely related claims

by Anisa Noorassa | Jul 24, 2025 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a jury’s infringement finding, concluding it was precluded by prosecution history estoppel. Colibri Heart Valve LLC v. Medtronic CoreValve LLC, Case No. 23-2153 (Fed. Cir. July 18, 2025) (Taranto, Hughes, Stoll, JJ.)

Colibri Heart Valve sued Medtronic CoreValve for infringing a patent covering a method of implanting an artificial heart valve. At trial, the district court denied Medtronic’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, allowing the jury to consider Colibri’s infringement theory under the doctrine of equivalents. The jury found in Colibri’s favor. Medtronic appealed.

The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that Colibri was estopped from asserting its equivalents theory. During prosecution, Colibri had canceled a claim that explicitly recited “retracting the movable sheath.” The asserted claim, while using different language, involved a similar concept: “pressing against the pusher member with a force that moves the pusher member outward from the moveable sheath.” The Court concluded that a skilled artisan would recognize these limitations as equivalent in light of basic physics.

Citing the Supreme Court’s 2002 Festo v. Shoketsu decision, the Federal Circuit emphasized that prosecution history estoppel can arise not only from formal amendments but also from the cancellation of closely related claims. Here, the cancellation of one claim effectively narrowed the scope of the remaining claims, triggering estoppel.

Accordingly, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of judgment of noninfringement.

Applicant-admitted prior art may inform but can’t be basis for IPR challenges

by Ashley K. Justice | Jul 24, 2025 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit clarified that while applicant-admitted prior art (AAPA) may be cited as evidence of general background knowledge in inter partes review (IPR) proceedings, it cannot serve as the basis for an IPR ground. The Court also confirmed that the petitioner had Article III standing to cross-appeal based on concrete plans for future activity. Shockwave Medical, Inc. v. Cardiovascular Systems, Inc., Case No. 23-1864 (Fed. Cir. July 14, 2025) (Lourie, Dyk, Cunningham, JJ.)

Shockwave Medical owns a patent directed to treating atherosclerosis using a balloon catheter in combination with shockwaves generated by electrodes and a pulse generator. The patent specification acknowledged that “over-the-wire angioplasty balloon catheters” were well known in the art. Cardiovascular Systems, Inc. (CSI) filed an IPR petition asserting that it would have been obvious to modify a European patent application with the angioplasty balloon catheter disclosed in the AAPA.

The Patent Trial & Appeal Board found all but one claim unpatentable as obvious, relying on the AAPA solely as evidence of background knowledge. Both parties appealed.

Shockwave challenged the Board’s reliance on the AAPA, arguing that 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) prohibits using AAPA as a basis for an IPR petition. The Federal Circuit disagreed, reaffirming its prior decisions in Qualcomm I and Qualcomm II. In Qualcomm I, the Court explained that AAPA cannot be the basis of a ground in an IPR petition but can be evidence of background knowledge. In Qualcomm II, the Court found that the Board erred in determining that the use of AAPA was proper when the petitioner expressly included AAPA in one of its grounds. Relying on these decisions, the Court explained that while AAPA cannot form the basis of a ground in an IPR petition, it may be used to demonstrate the general knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art and to supply missing claim limitations.

Shockwave pointed to a table in the Board’s final written decision listing AAPA under “reference(s)/basis” as evidence that the Board improperly relied on AAPA as a ground. The Federal Circuit rejected this argument, distinguishing Qualcomm II and emphasizing that the petitioner, not the Board, defines the grounds for review. Because CSI did not rely on AAPA as a ground, its use was permissible.

CSI cross-appealed the Board’s finding that one claim was not obvious. Shockwave challenged CSI’s standing, but the Federal Circuit found that CSI had Article III standing because it had concrete plans to begin clinical trials and because of Shockwave’s public statements suggesting it would assert the patent. The Court concluded that these facts created a substantial risk of future infringement.

On the merits, the Federal Circuit agreed with CSI that the Board erred by failing to consider the prior art as a whole. The Court reiterated that the obviousness inquiry requires evaluating the combined teachings of the prior art, not individual references in isolation. Finding no evidence to support the Board’s conclusion, the Court reversed the Board’s decision as to the remaining [...]

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Don’t walk away: Trademark owner can’t bring infringement suit against co-owner

by Amit Kumar Saha, PhD | Jul 17, 2025 | Trademarks

The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld a district court’s summary judgment decision that a co-owner of a trademark cannot bring infringement or dilution claims under the Lanham Act against other co-owners or their licensees. Reed v. Marshall et al., Case No. 24-20198 (5th Cir. July 2, 2025) (Graves, Smith, Duncan, JJ.)

Originally formed by Di Reed, Joi Marshall, and Tonya Harris (aka Tonya Kelly), Jade was a music group that enjoyed commercial success before disbanding in 1995. In 2018, the trio attempted a reunion and jointly applied for the federal service mark JADE, which was registered in June 2019. The reunion ultimately did not materialize. In 2021, Marshall and Harris began performing under the JADE name with a new singer, Myracle Holloway, engaged under a six-month work-for-hire agreement. Reed objected, claiming they used the jointly owned mark without her consent, and filed suit in the US District Court for the Southern District of Texas, asserting claims under the Lanham Act and Texas law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Marshall and Harris. Reed appealed.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The central question was whether a co-owner of a federally registered trademark may bring an action under the Lanham Act against another co-owner for alleged unauthorized use of the mark.

The district court concluded that absent a contractual agreement to the contrary, co-owners of a trademark each have equal rights to use the mark. The Fifth Circuit affirmed that the Lanham Act does not authorize one co-owner to sue another for infringement or dilution; such disputes must be resolved through contract law or other private arrangements. Because Holloway’s use of the mark was authorized by two co-owners of the registration, she too was shielded from liability under the Lanham Act.

The Fifth Circuit also rejected Reed’s unfair competition and dilution claims, finding no evidence of misuse that would infringe the rights of an equal co-owner.

Practice note: When multiple parties intend to co-own a trademark, it is usually advisable to enter into an agreement that clearly defines each party’s rights and limitations on use. Without such an agreement, co-owners may find themselves with limited recourse in the event of a dispute.

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