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Attorney-client relationship owed to both joint IP owners

by Taylor MacDonald | Feb 19, 2026 | Patents

Addressing attorney-client relationship formation and legal malpractice, the US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded a district court’s grant of summary judgment. The Court concluded that an attorney-client relationship existed as a matter of law and that a malpractice claim was premature for resolution at the summary judgment stage. BlueRadios, Inc. v. Hamilton, Brook, Smith & Reynolds, P.C., Case No. 24-1942 (1st Cir. Feb. 2, 2026) (Gelpi, Thompson, Montecalvo, JJ.)

In 2007, technology companies BlueRadios and Kopin Corporation entered into an agreement to jointly own intellectual property developed through their collaboration and assigned primary responsibility for patent prosecution to Kopin. That responsibility included retaining patent counsel. Kopin selected Hamilton, Brook, Smith & Reynolds (HBSR) to prosecute patents arising from the collaboration. HBSR worked with both companies to prepare and file patent applications, but over time the relationship between the agreement parties deteriorated.

In 2017, during discovery in unrelated litigation with Kopin, BlueRadios uncovered alleged conduct by HBSR that BlueRadios contended was contrary to its interests. On December 5, 2017, BlueRadios and HBSR entered into an agreement preserving any timely claims. BlueRadios filed suit against HBSR in 2021, asserting malpractice and related claims. The parties agreed that Massachusetts law governed and that, under the tolling agreement and the applicable statute of limitations, BlueRadios’ claims were timely if they accrued after December 5, 2014.

The district court granted summary judgment in HBSR’s favor, concluding that BlueRadios’ claims were time-barred, that no equitable tolling doctrine applied, and that no attorney-client relationship existed between BlueRadios and HBSR. BlueRadios appealed.

The First Circuit concluded that the district court failed to view the record in the light most favorable to BlueRadios when addressing the statute of limitations. The parties disputed when BlueRadios knew or reasonably should have known of the alleged harm caused by HBSR. Under Massachusetts law, this issue is typically a question of fact for the jury. Given the technical complexity of patent prosecution and BlueRadios’ lack of patent expertise, the Court found multiple reasonable interpretations of the record. The Court rejected the notion that internal correspondence or business decisions by BlueRadios conclusively demonstrated sufficient knowledge to trigger the statute of limitations as a matter of law.

The First Circuit further noted that BlueRadios’ later engagement of independent patent counsel did not necessarily reflect suspicion of malpractice, and that a reasonable jury could conclude that the review was undertaken for ordinary business reasons. Declining to aggregate the knowledge of client and counsel to establish accrual where neither independently possessed the requisite awareness, the Court reversed the district court’s statute-of-limitations ruling and vacated its dismissal of the related claims.

The First Circuit also addressed whether an implied attorney-client relationship existed between BlueRadios and HBSR, concluding that as a matter of law there was such a relationship. Applying Massachusetts law, the Court rejected the district court’s conclusion that BlueRadios failed to seek legal assistance from HBSR independent of Kopin. The 2007 agreement made clear that Kopin’s selection [...]

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Here’s an abstract idea: Patent eligibility depends on what is claimed, not unclaimed disclosure

by Hannah Hurley | Feb 19, 2026 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a district court’s rejection of Netflix’s 35 U.S.C. § 101 challenge, finding that claims directed to tailoring content specifications for wireless devices were patent ineligible. GoTV Streaming, LLC v. Netflix, Inc., Case Nos. 24-1669; -1744 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 9, 2026) (Prost, Clevenger, Taranto, JJ.)

GoTV sued Netflix for direct and induced infringement of three related patents directed to server-based tailoring of content for wireless devices. The district court dismissed the induced infringement claims and rejected Netflix’s § 101 challenge. A jury found infringement of one of the asserted patents and awarded $2.5 million in damages. Netflix appealed.

The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s indefiniteness ruling as to a key term of the representative patents and adopted GoTV’s proposed construction of that claim term: “discrete low level rendering command.” Based on its construction, the Court concluded that the asserted claims were directed to an abstract idea and lacked an inventive concept under Alice. The Court concluded that the claims merely recited the abstract idea of using a generic template tailored to a user’s device constraints and relied on conventional computer and network functions without specifying a concrete technological improvement. The Federal Circuit determined that the claims failed both steps of the Alice framework and were invalid under § 101.

Although its § 101 holding resolved the case in Netflix’s favor, the Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s summary judgment of no inducement and its denial of GoTV’s motion for a new trial on damages, explaining that GoTV had presented substantial arguments on those issues, before directing entry of final judgment for Netflix.

Practice note: The Federal Circuit noted that the ineligibility analysis depends on the claim language at issue, not whether there may be a patent eligible invention disclosed in the specification. Although the prosecution history may be intrinsic evidence for claim construction, recitation of the problems faced by the inventor and the inventive solution cannot be relied on to argue unclaimed details of the invention to render an abstract idea patent eligible.

Blackbeard’s revenge: State sovereign immunity ends long running copyright battle

by Sarah Bro | Feb 12, 2026 | Copyrights

The US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed a 2021 district court ruling and vacated a subsequent 2024 ruling in a decade-long legal battle over copyright infringement claims related to the pirate Blackbeard’s Queen Anne’s Revenge shipwreck, concluding the claims were barred under state sovereign immunity. Allen v. Stein, Case No. 24-1954 (4th Cir. Jan. 23, 2026) (Niemeyer, King, Harris, JJ.)

Background

The dispute stems from Frederick Allen and Nautilus Productions’ allegations that the state of North Carolina and its officials infringed on Allen’s copyrights for photographs and videos of the shipwreck recovery project.

Allen initially filed suit in 2015, alleging that North Carolina officials infringed his copyrights by using his footage without authorization and enacting legislation (dubbed “Blackbeard’s Law”) that designated such materials as public records. The district court largely dismissed Allen’s claims in 2017 on sovereign immunity grounds, but the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling on the validity of the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act (CRCA) in 2018, concluding that Congress had not validly abrogated state sovereign immunity for copyright claims. The Supreme Court affirmed that decision in Allen v. Cooper (2020), confirming that states are immune from copyright infringement suits under the CRCA.

Despite the Supreme Court’s ruling, Allen sought to reopen the case in 2021, relying on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) and introducing a new constitutional theory based on United States v. Georgia (2006). The district court allowed Allen to amend his complaint and proceed with his claims under the “Georgia theory,” which argues for case-by-case abrogation of state sovereign immunity for conduct that violates the Fourteenth Amendment. In 2024, the district court denied North Carolina’s sovereign immunity defense for Allen’s copyright infringement claims under this theory, allowing the case to proceed. North Carolina appealed.

Fourth Circuit decision

The Fourth Circuit reversed the 2021 district court decision and vacated the 2024 ruling, finding that the district court abused its discretion in reopening the litigation. The Fourth Circuit explained that Rule 60(b)(6) was the only applicable procedural mechanism for reconsideration because the case had been fully resolved in 2020 following the Supreme Court’s decision and Allen’s voluntary dismissal of the remaining defendant. The Court emphasized that Rule 60(b)(6) requires “extraordinary circumstances,” which were not present in this case. Allen’s failure to raise the Georgia theory earlier in the litigation did not meet this standard.

The Fourth Circuit also criticized the district court’s reliance on Rule 54(b), which applies to interlocutory orders, rather than Rule 60(b), which governs final judgments. The Court noted that the district court’s 2021 decision was based on erroneous legal premises and failed to properly evaluate the timeliness, merits, and prejudice factors required under Rule 60(b).

Pendent appellate jurisdiction

A key aspect of the Fourth Circuit’s decision was its exercise of pendent appellate jurisdiction to review the 2021 district court ruling, even though it was not directly appealable. The Fourth Circuit determined that the 2021 decision was “inextricably intertwined” with the appealable 2024 ruling on sovereign immunity because the [...]

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Method steps must be done in order where there is logical dependency

by Art Dykhuis | Feb 12, 2026 | Patents

In a second appeal, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s summary judgment of noninfringement based on an implicit ordering of steps in a method claim after disagreeing with the lower court on another basis for noninfringement. Sound View Innovations, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, Case No. 24-1092 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 29, 2026) (Chen, Prost, Wallach, JJ.)

At the district court, Sound View asserted an expired patent against Hulu’s use of a central content server connected to end users through intermediate edge servers. The asserted claim recites downloading streaming content from a buffer in a helper server to an end user while concurrently retrieving more streaming content from a content server.

The district court issued a decision in favor of Hulu, which Sound View appealed. In that first appeal, the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the district court’s ruling, based on the district court’s negative claim construction.

On remand, the district court determined Hulu did not infringe, finding that the claimed method requires the steps of “receiving a request” and “allocating a buffer” to be performed in sequence. Since Hulu did not perform these claimed steps in order, the district court found there was no infringement. Sound View appealed.

The claim-at-issue recites:

Source: Sound View Innovations, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, Case No. 24-1092 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 29, 2026), Slip Op. at 4.

The Federal Circuit reasoned that the phrase “requested SM object” in the buffer-allocation step grammatically and logically depended on the prior step of “receiving a request,” because an object cannot be “requested” until a request has occurred. The Court explained that “‘requested’ is not only a grammatical descriptor, but also is a status indicator reflecting a completed action – the receiving of a request.”

The Federal Circuit applied precedent on implicit ordering of method steps and noted that “[o]ur caselaw on implicit ordering does not help Sound View, as it does not require a finding that the performance of the claimed steps would be inoperable if the steps are not followed in the order they appear in the claim” (emphasis added). The Court explained that the “logical” dependency between the method steps mandates that the request-receiving step precede buffer allocation. Because there was no dispute that the accused systems performed these steps in a different order, the Court affirmed summary judgment of noninfringement.

Relax, design patent claim scope doesn’t include functional elements

by Lisette Donewald | Feb 12, 2026 | Patents

Addressing the issue of functional versus ornamental features, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment of noninfringement, concluding that no reasonable juror could find the accused product’s design substantially similar to the patented design once functional features were properly excluded. Range of Motion Prods. v. Armaid Co., Case No. 23-2427 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 2, 2026) (Cunningham, Hughes, JJ.) (Moore, J., dissenting).

Range of Motion Products (RoM) owns a design patent titled “Body Massaging Apparatus.” RoM sued Armaid Company, alleging that its Armaid2 product infringed RoM’s patent. Armaid owns an expired utility patent (prior art to the RoM patent) titled “Limb Massager” (Armaid1) that embodies elements of the Armaid2 design. The relevant drawings from the product and patents are below.

Source: Range of Motion Prods. v. Armaid Co., Case No. 23-2427 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 2, 2026), Slip Op. at 14.

The district court granted summary judgment in Armaid’s favor, concluding that after properly filtering out functional elements, no reasonable jury could find the Armaid2 design substantially similar to the RoM’s design patent. RoM appealed.

The Federal Circuit reviewed claim construction de novo, the underlying factual findings for clear error, and the summary judgment determination de novo. Applying the ordinary observer test as articulated in Egyptian Goddess, the majority found that several prominent features of the claimed design, most notably the clam shaped arms, were functional. The Court relied on RoM’s own marketing materials, which described the arm shape as providing leverage, and the fact that Armaid’s prior utility patent had claimed similar features.

After excluding those functional elements, the Federal Circuit assessed whether an ordinary observer familiar with the prior art would be deceived into believing the accused design was the same as the patented design based solely on their ornamental aspects. Consistent with post-Egyptian Goddess precedent, the analysis proceeded in two steps: determining whether the designs were “plainly dissimilar,” and if not, comparing the designs in light of the prior art.

The majority concluded that the designs were plainly dissimilar, citing differences in arm shape and the manner in which the fixed arm connects to the hinge. The panel majority further stated that even if the designs were not plainly dissimilar, a comparison against the prior art would yield the same result. The Federal Circuit therefore affirmed summary judgment of noninfringement.

The decision is notable for Chief Judge Moore’s dissent. The dissent argued that both the district court and the majority improperly usurped the jury’s role by resolving what should have been a fact question, which is whether the designs were substantially similar in overall appearance. More broadly, the dissent criticized the Federal Circuit’s evolution of the ordinary observer test, contending that Egyptian Goddess shifted the inquiry away from the Supreme Court’s substantial similarity framework established in Gorham Co. v. White [...]

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Can’t patent idea of using asynchronous data streams during web conferencing

by Dexter Hamilton | Feb 5, 2026 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s dismissal of a patent infringement suit, holding that the asserted web conferencing claims were directed to an abstract idea, lacked any inventive concept, and were therefore not patent eligible under 35 U.S.C. Section 101. US Patent No. 7,679,637 LLC v. Google LLC, Case No. 24-1540 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 22, 2025) (Moore, CJ.; Hughes, Stoll, JJ.)

The patent owner accused Google of infringing a patent that describes systems for web conferencing that allow users to view and manipulate multiple data streams asynchronously, for example by reviewing earlier content while a live presentation continues. The representative claims recited client applications for presenting and observing participants, and some claims recited a server application and a “time scale modification component” to maintain audio quality at different playback speeds. Google moved to dismiss, arguing that the claims were ineligible under Section 101. The district court agreed and denied leave to amend on the rationale of futility. The patent owner appealed.

Reviewing de novo, the Federal Circuit applied the two-step Alice framework. At step one, the Court concluded that the claims were directed to the abstract idea of allowing users to manipulate and review data streams in a web conferencing environment. The Court found that the claims recited desired results, such as asynchronous viewing, without explaining how those results were achieved or identifying any specific technological improvement. The patent owner argued that the claims were not result oriented because they recited two client applications, but the Court found that the claims still failed to describe any technical mechanism for performing the claimed functions.

The patent owner also pointed to alleged “functional claiming” in Google’s own patents, but the Federal Circuit noted that the eligibility of unrelated patents was irrelevant. The Court further rejected the notion that the mere existence of factually distinguishable Google-owned patents somehow amounted to a sweeping concession by Google that all patents involving functional claiming approaches were necessarily patent eligible.

Turning to step two, the Federal Circuit concluded that the claims lacked an inventive concept. The specification described the client applications and the time scale modification component as conventional components performing their ordinary functions. The patent owner largely repeated its step one arguments, which the Court found insufficient to supply an inventive concept.

Finally, the Federal Circuit rejected the patent owner’s argument that dismissal at the pleading stage was premature. Because the asserted patent was ineligible as a matter of law and the patent owner identified no factual allegations that could alter the Section 101 analysis, any amendment would have been futile.

Case exterminated too soon: DTSA and CFAA claims survive

by Jodi Benassi | Feb 5, 2026 | Trade Secrets

The US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit partially reversed and partially affirmed a series of district court rulings arising from alleged corporate espionage between competitors in the pest control industry. The decision clarifies the scope of recoverable “loss” under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) after Van Buren and underscores that causation requirements under the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) and state trade secret law depend on the remedy sought. Moxie Pest Control LLC, et al. v. Kyle Nielsen, et al., Case No. 24-4076 (10th Cir. Jan. 21, 2026) (Hartz, Moritz, Rossman, JJ.)

Moxie sued rival Aptive Environmental, alleging that Aptive employees bribed current and former Moxie sales representatives to obtain confidential sales data stored in Moxie’s password-protected SalesRoutes system. According to Moxie, Aptive used this data (particularly sales leaderboards) to recruit door-to-door sales representatives by portraying Aptive as the more lucrative employer. Moxie brought claims under the CFAA, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, DTSA, and Utah’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA).

The district court dismissed Moxie’s CFAA claim at the pleading stage, denied motions to compel broad damages discovery, and granted Aptive summary judgment on the RICO, DTSA, and UTSA claims based on a lack of causation. Moxie appealed.

CFAA claim reinstated

The Tenth Circuit found that the district court erred in dismissing Moxie’s CFAA claim for failure to plead a qualifying “loss.” The district court had interpreted Van Buren v. United States as requiring plaintiffs to allege a technological harm, such as damage to data or systems, to recover under the CFAA. The Tenth Circuit rejected that interpretation, explaining that Van Buren addressed what conduct constitutes a CFAA violation, not the scope of recoverable loss once a violation has occurred.

Under the statute’s plain language, “loss” includes reasonable costs incurred in responding to an offense or conducting a damage assessment. Moxie’s allegations that it spent more than $5,000 investigating the unauthorized access (specifically identifying the perpetrators, methods, and scope of access) fell squarely within that definition. The Tenth Circuit emphasized that investigative costs aimed at understanding the breach itself are recoverable, even absent data corruption or system impairment.

Discovery rulings affirmed

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Moxie’s motions to compel expansive damages discovery. While acknowledging that some requested information could be relevant, the Court concluded that the district court acted within its discretion by limiting initial disclosures and inviting more targeted follow-up discovery. Moxie’s failure to pursue narrower discovery after the district court’s ruling weighed against a finding of abuse of discretion.

Trade secret and RICO claims

The Tenth Circuit agreed that Moxie failed to establish causation sufficient to sustain its RICO claim or to recover unjust-enrichment damages under the DTSA and UTSA. Evidence showing that Aptive sought Moxie’s data, used it in recruitment meetings, and experienced revenue growth during the same period amounted to correlation, not proof that the misappropriation caused Aptive’s profits. Without evidence tying the stolen data to actual financial gain, unjust-enrichment theories failed.

However, the [...]

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IRPA claims accrue at first publication, not first discovery

by Ashley K. Justice | Feb 5, 2026 | Copyrights

The US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit confirmed that the single publication rule applies to claims brought under the Illinois Right of Publicity Act (IRPA), 765 ILCS 1075/1 et seq. Giovannelli v. Walmart Inc., Case Nos. 24-2869; -3103; 25-1185; -1223 (7th Cir. Jan. 22, 2026) (Brennan, Scudder, Pryor, JJ.)

In 2009, US Army veteran Nicholas Giovannelli was unknowingly photographed while deployed in Afghanistan. The image was later posted on a US Department of Defense website, downloaded by Stocktrek Images, and then licensed and sold as posters on public retail websites, including Posterazzi, Walmart, Pixels, and a large e-commerce company. Giovannelli remained unaware of the photo’s commercial use until 2020, when a friend discovered the posters while searching for their unit number.

Giovannelli sued Walmart, Stocktrek, Pixels, the large e-commerce company, and Posterazzi under the IRPA, which prohibits the unauthorized commercial use of an individual’s name or likeness. After removal to federal court, the cases were severed to address misjoinder.

Under Illinois law, IRPA claims are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. The defendants argued that the claims were time barred under the single publication rule, which starts the limitations period at first publication, meaning Giovannelli would have needed to sue within one year of Pixels’ 2011 posting, Walmart’s 2016 posting, or the large e-commerce company’s 2018 posting. Giovannelli countered that the discovery rule should apply because the publications were “hidden” or “inherently undiscoverable,” asserting he had no reason to know of the posters until 2020. The district courts granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, applying the single-publication rule. Giovannelli appealed.

The Seventh Circuit, applying Illinois substantive law under diversity jurisdiction, made an “Erie guess” because the Supreme Court of Illinois has not addressed whether IRPA claims follow the single publication rule or the discovery rule. The Seventh Circuit looked to the 2006 Illinois Appellate Court decision in Blair v. Nevada Landing Partnership, which rejected the discovery rule in the IRPA context. Although Giovannelli argued that Blair’s discussion was dicta, the Seventh Circuit explained that dicta may still guide an Erie analysis. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment, finding that Illinois would apply the single publication rule to IRPA claims. The Court explained that the exception for hidden or inherently undiscoverable publications did not apply because the posters were available on public websites, and Giovannelli’s friend located them through a simple search using their unit number.

Skinny label: Supreme Court to weigh inducement claims against generics

by Anisa Noorassa | Jan 29, 2026 | Cert Alert

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review whether a generic drugmaker that fully carves out a patented use from its label can nonetheless be held liable for induced infringement based solely on marketing its product as a generic version of a branded drug and referencing public information about the branded product, without promoting the patented use.

In Amarin Pharma v. Hikma Pharmaceutical USA, Case No. 23-1169 (Fed. Cir. June 25, 2024), the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concluded that Amarin adequately pleaded induced infringement based on allegations that Hikma marketed its product as a “generic” version of Vascepa and cited publicly available information about Vascepa, even though Hikma’s label carved out the patented indication pursuant to Section viii of the Hatch-Waxman Act.

In its petition to the Supreme Court, Hikma argued that the Federal Circuit’s ruling threatened the statutory balance struck by Hatch-Waxman by exposing skinny-label generic manufacturers to inducement liability based on conduct unrelated to the carved-out use. According to Hikma, permitting inducement claims under these circumstances would effectively nullify Hatch-Waxman Section viii by allowing plaintiffs to rely on generic marketing statements that do not instruct or encourage use of the patented method.

The questions presented are:

When a generic drug label fully carves out a patented use, are allegations that the generic drugmaker calls its product a “generic version” and cites public information about the branded drug (e.g., sales) enough to plead induced infringement of the patented use?
Does a complaint state a claim for induced infringement of a patented method if it does not allege any instruction or other statement by the defendant that encourages, or even mentions, the patented use?

Hot out of the oven: Trademark limits on pizza-inspired names

by Keval Amin | Jan 29, 2026 | Trademarks

The US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed-in-part and reversed-in-part a preliminary injunction barring the use of PIZZA PUFF, concluding that the trademark owner failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits because the term was likely generic and, in any event, was descriptively and fairly used. Illinois Tamale Company, Inc. v. LC Trademarks, Inc., Case Nos. 24-3317; 25-1072; -1076; -1112 (7th Cir. Jan. 16, 2026) (Scudder, St. Eve, Jackson-Akiwumi, JJ.)

Illinois Tamale Company (Iltaco), a Chicago-based food company, has sold its signature “Pizza Puff” since 1976, distributing the product nationwide alongside other “Puff”-branded products. Iltaco owns federal trademark registrations for PIZZA PUFF (registered in 2009) and PUFF (registered in 2022).

In March 2024, Little Caesars introduced “Crazy Puffs,” small baked dough cups filled with pizza ingredients. The product launched as part of Little Caesars’ long-running “Crazy” line and was marketed prominently under the Little Caesars name, logo, and orange trade dress. Little Caesars secured its own federal registration for CRAZY PUFFS, and the United States Patent and Trademark Office identified no conflicting marks during examination.

Following the product launch, Iltaco sent a cease-and-desist letter claiming that CRAZY PUFFS and the phrase “4 Hand-Held Pizza Puffs” infringed its trademarks. When Little Caesars declined to change its marketing, Iltaco sued for trademark infringement and unfair competition and sought a preliminary injunction. The district court issued a split ruling, enjoining Little Caesars from using PIZZA PUFF but permitting continued use of CRAZY PUFFS and PUFF. Both parties appealed.

The Seventh Circuit found that the district court applied the wrong legal standard in assessing the protectability of PIZZA PUFF. The Court explained that rather than asking whether competitors could offer similar products without using the term, trademark protectability turns on the “primary significance” test, which is whether consumers primarily understand the term as a brand name or as the common name of a product. Because generic terms can never function as trademarks, the Court focused on evidence of consumer perception.

Applying that framework, the Seventh Circuit found substantial evidence that PIZZA PUFF was generic:

More than 80% of surveyed consumers viewed the term as referring to a product category rather than a brand.
Dictionary definitions treated the term generically.
Third-party filings and industry usage consistently employed the phrase as a common name.

This evidence rebutted the presumption of validity afforded by Iltaco’s federal registration, and Iltaco failed to demonstrate a likelihood of proving distinctiveness at trial. The Court therefore concluded that Iltaco did not show a likelihood of success on the merits and reversed the preliminary injunction barring Little Caesars’ use of PIZZA PUFF.

The Seventh Circuit further found that even if PIZZA PUFF were distinctive, Iltaco still could not obtain injunctive relief because Little Caesars was likely to prevail on a fair-use defense. The Court emphasized that fair use requires only descriptive, good-faith use, and not a perfect fit between the challenged term and the product. Here, PIZZA PUFF plausibly described Little Caesars’ light, pizza-filled food [...]

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