US Court of Appeals
Subscribe to US Court of Appeals's Posts

Royal Play Penalty: No Standing in the End (Zone)

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit dismissed an appeal from the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board, finding that the appellant lacked standing because it failed to allege any actual and particularized injury. Michael J. Messier v. New Orleans Louisiana Saints, LLC, Case No. 24-2271 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 14, 2025) (per curiam) (Moore, C.J.; Prost, Stark, JJ.) (nonprecedential)

Michael J. Messier claimed that he is a direct descendent of the kings of France, and that he and his family own intellectual property rights to the Fleur-de-Lis mark used by the NFL’s New Orleans Saints. Messier filed a petition with the Board for cancellation of the Saints’ Fleur-de-Lis mark. Messier’s petition contained no claim that he or his family currently use any fleur-de-lis marks in commerce or any other avenues for revenue, such as licensing. The Board dismissed the petition.

The Board held that pursuant to Sections 13 and 14 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1063 and 1064, to maintain a cancellation action, Messier had to “allege a commercial interest in the registered mark or a reasonable belief in damage from the mark’s continued registration.” Messier’s original and amended petitions failed to do so. The Board noted that Messier did not own or conduct “any business under the mark, and thus he cannot allege entitlement.” Messier appealed.

The Federal Circuit determined that Messier lacked standing to bring the appeal. The Court explained that to demonstrate Article III standing for his appeal, Messier had to demonstrate actual or imminent injury that was concrete and particularized, a causal connection between the alleged conduct and the injury, and potential redressability by a favorable decision. Messier failed to meet his burden, primarily because he failed to demonstrate injury by the Saints’ use of the Fleur-de-Lis mark that went beyond “a general grievance or abstract harm.” Messier did not allege that he used a fleur-de-lis design in commerce whatsoever and thus failed to demonstrate any injury.




read more

Broadcast Alert! Applying Conventional Machine Learning to New Data Isn’t Patent Eligible

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s ruling that patents applying established machine learning methods to new data are not patent eligible under 35 U.S.C. §101. Recentive Analytics, Inc. v. Fox Corp. et al., Case No. 23-2437 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 18, 2025) (Dyk, Prost, Goldberg, JJ.)

Recentive sued Fox, alleging infringement of four patents designed to tackle long-standing challenges in the entertainment industry – namely, optimizing the scheduling of live events and refining “network maps,” which determine the content aired on specific channels across various geographic markets at set times. These patents aim to streamline broadcast operations and enhance programming efficiency.

The patents at issue can be divided into two categories: network maps and machine learning training. The machine learning training patents focus on generating optimized event schedules by training machine learning models with parameters such as venue availability, ticket prices, performer fees, and other relevant factors. The network map patents describe methods for dynamically generating network maps that assign live events to television stations across different geographic regions. These methods utilize machine learning to optimize television ratings by mapping events to stations and updating the network map in real time based on changes to the schedule or underlying criteria. The patents’ specifications explain that the methods employ “any suitable machine learning technique” using generic computing machines.

Fox moved to dismiss on the grounds that the patents were subject matter ineligible under § 101. Recentive acknowledged that the concept of preparing network maps had existed for a long time. Recentive also recognized that the patents did not claim the machine learning technique. Nonetheless, Recentive argued that its patents claimed eligible subject matter because they involve using machine learning to generate custom algorithms based on training the machine learning model. Recentive characterized its patents as introducing “the application of machine learning models to the unsophisticated, and equally niche, prior art field of generating network maps for broadcasting live events and live event schedules.”

The district court disagreed and granted Fox’s motion. Applying the Alice framework, at step one, the court determined that the asserted claims were “directed to the abstract ideas of producing network maps and event schedules, respectively, using known generic mathematical techniques.” At step two, the court determined that the machine learning limitations were no more than “broad, functionally described, well-known techniques” that claimed “only generic and conventional computing devices.” The court denied Recentive’s request for leave to amend because it determined that any amendment would be futile. Recentive appealed.

For the Federal Circuit, this case presented a question of first impression: whether claims that do no more than apply established methods of machine learning to a new data environment are patent eligible.

Step One

While Recentive claimed that its machine learning approach was uniquely dynamic and capable of uncovering hidden patterns in real time, the Federal Circuit found these features to be merely standard aspects of how machine learning operates. The Court explained that iterative training and model updates are not [...]

Continue Reading




read more

Transatlantic Terminology: Skilled Artisan Could Equate UK, US Word Meanings

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a Patent Trial & Appeal Board unpatentability determination, finding that a skilled artisan would have found the term “sterile” in a UK publication to mean the same as the term “sterilized” in the United States. Sage Products LLC v. Stewart, Case No. 23-1603 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 15, 2025) (Reyna, Cunningham, Stark, JJ.)

Sage owns two patents related to a sterilized chlorhexidine product in a package, such as an applicator filled with an antiseptic composition for disinfecting skin. Becton, Dickinson and Company petitioned for inter partes review (IPR) of both patents. The Board relied on four key pieces of prior art, including one that was a UK publication, to find the challenged claims unpatentable. In instituting the IPR and evaluating the petition, the Board construed the term “sterilized” to mean that “the component or composition has been subjected to a suitable sterilization process such that sterility can be validated.” In the final written decision, the Board found that a skilled artisan at the time of the invention would have known, through education and experience, that the term “sterile,” as used in the UK prior art publication, is equivalent to the term “sterilized,” as used in the US and particularly in the Sage patents. Reviewing the totality of the evidence before it, including both parties’ experts’ reports and testimony, the Board determined the challenged claims were unpatentable. Sage appealed.

The Federal Circuit declined to overturn the Board’s findings, affirming the Board’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art and their understanding of the term “sterilized” at the time of the invention. The Court found that the Board did not ignore or disregard evidence but properly weighed the evidence before it, concluding that a skilled artisan having the education and experience required by the Board’s definition would know the differences between the US and UK regulatory standards for “sterile” and therefore would know that UK references to “sterile” items would satisfy the challenged claims’ requirement for “sterilized” items.




read more

Opposers Beware: Your Own Mark May Not Be Protectable

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board’s dismissal of an opposition to the registration of the marks IVOTERS and IVOTERS.COM while also noting that the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) might want to reconsider whether it permits registration of those marks. Heritage Alliance v. Am. Policy Roundtable, Case No. 24-1155 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 9, 2025) (Prost, Taranto, Stark, JJ.)

American Policy Roundtable (APR), a publisher of campaign and political information since June 2010, filed applications to register the marks IVOTERS and IVOTERS.COM for “providing a web site of information on current public policy issues, political campaigns and citizen concerns related to political information” after the PTO approved the marks for publication. Heritage filed an opposition.

Since the 2008 US presidential election season, Heritage has published online voter guides under the names “iVoterGuide” and “iVoterGuide.com” (the iVoters marks). Without a valid registration but having priority of use, Heritage filed an opposition asserting its common law rights in the iVoters marks.

The Board considered Heritage’s opposition but ultimately found that Heritage’s mark was not distinctive. The Board first considered whether the iVoters marks were inherently distinctive and determined they were not just descriptive but “highly descriptive.” The Board next considered whether the iVoters marks had acquired distinctiveness through secondary meaning but found that the record evidence Heritage submitted was inadequate to support a finding that the iVoters marks had any source-identifying significance. Heritage appealed.

On appeal, Heritage argued that the Board had erred by finding the iVoters marks to have neither inherent nor acquired distinctiveness and that the Board violated the anti-dissection principle by evaluating the individual components of the marks instead of the marks as a whole. The Federal Circuit disagreed. The Court found the Board’s determination that the iVoters marks were highly descriptive to be supported by substantial evidence because the prefix “i” generally refers to something internet based. Heritage chose not to challenge the Board’s finding that “VoterGuide” and “.com” were not distinctive, a ruling the Court characterized as “facially reasonable.”

The Federal Circuit also disagreed with Heritage’s argument that the Board improperly evaluated the marks’ individual components. The Court found the Board properly considered the marks as a whole through its determination that the iVoters marks “on their face refer to online voter guides” and because no evidence demonstrated that the combination of the individual components conveyed “any distinctive source identifying impression contrary to the descriptiveness of the individual parts.”

Heritage argued that the Board had erred in its determination that notwithstanding over five years of use, the iVoters marks did not have statutory acquired distinctiveness. Under Section 2(f) of the Lanham Act, registration applicants may submit evidence that a mark has acquired distinctiveness because as a consequence of extensive use and promotion of the mark, consumers now directly associate the mark with the applicant as the source of those goods. Heritage argued that the Board should have accepted its five-plus years of continuous use as prima facie [...]

Continue Reading




read more

High Burden Dooms Intra-District Transfer Request

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit denied a mandamus petition requesting transfer from the Marshall division to the Sherman division within the US District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, finding that there was lack of clear error and no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to deny transfer. In re SAP America, Inc., Case No. 25-118 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 10, 2025) (Dyk, Prost, Chen, JJ.) (per curiam).

Valtrus Innovations and Key Patent Innovations (collectively, Valtrus) filed a patent infringement lawsuit against SAP. SAP moved for an intra-district transfer from the Marshall division, where the case was originally filed, to the Sherman division. In support of the motion, SAP cited the presence of SAP offices, relevant witness residences, and two SAP employees, all located in Sherman. Valtrus opposed the transfer, pointing out that co-pending litigation in Marshall involved the same asserted patents.

The district court denied SAP’s motion, even though the co-pending case had been closed. The district court also pointed out that most of SAP’s witnesses were out of state or international, making either Texas division equally inconvenient for those witnesses. SAP appealed.

The Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s ruling under the stringent standards for mandamus relief, which are as follows:

  • There is no other adequate means to attain the desired relief.
  • There is a clear and indisputable right to relief.
  • The writ is appropriate under the circumstances.

Under the Federal Circuit’s 2022 decision in In re Volkswagen, there must be “clear abuses of discretion that produce patently erroneous results.”

Under Volkswagen, a court must consider both private and public factors when deciding whether to transfer venue. The private factors are:

  • The relative ease of access to sources of proof.
  • The availability of a compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses.
  • The cost of attendance for willing witnesses.
  • All other practical issues that make trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive.

The public interest factors are:

  • The administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion.
  • The local interest in having localized issues decided at home.
  • The forum’s familiarity with the law that will govern the case.
  • The avoidance of unnecessary conflict of laws issues or in the application of foreign law.

The Federal Circuit found that the district court erred in assigning weight to the co-pending litigation in Marshall, which had been closed and had all defendants dismissed by the time the motion to transfer was resolved. The Court added that the district court improperly weighed the court congestion factor against transfer based solely on the case’s smooth progression to trial.

Despite these errors, the Federal Circuit concluded that SAP failed to demonstrate that the denial of transfer was erroneous. The district court had plausibly found the convenience of the two divisions comparable for most potential witnesses who resided outside of Texas, and that SAP had not sufficiently shown that its Sherman-based employees had relevant knowledge or would be trial witnesses. The Court therefore denied [...]

Continue Reading




read more

Ill-Gotten Gains: Unjust Enrichment Remedy Not Barred by Limitation of Liability Provision

Examining the issue of trade secret misappropriation when parties have contractually limited their liability from breach, the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the case, finding that a plaintiff could still recover damages under a theory of unjust enrichment. Pemco Aircraft Engineering Services Inc. v. The Boeing Company, Case No. 22-13776 (11th Cir. Apr. 4, 2025) (Pryor, Branch, Carnes, JJ.)

Pemco and Boeing, who are usually competitors, entered into an agreement to jointly bid for a government contract. The parties’ contract had three separately executed parts that functioned as one agreement. When the contractual relationship fell apart, Pemco sued Boeing for breach of contract and trade secret misappropriation. Based on Boeing’s contractual breach, a jury awarded Pemco more than $2 million of out-of-pocket damages. The district court dismissed the trade secret misappropriation claim, however, as time-barred under Alabama law. After Pemco appealed, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed and determined that the trade secret misappropriation claim arose under Missouri law, not Alabama law, and that under Missouri law, Pemco’s trade secret claims were not time-barred. On remand, Pemco brought amended trade secret misappropriation claims under Missouri law, which the district court dismissed based on the parties’ contract, which limited liability. Pemco appealed.

The issue on appeal was whether the parties’ contractual limitation of liability provision precluded any damages, even for misappropriation. The contractual provision lists the categories of damages that the parties disclaimed, namely, incidental, punitive, and exemplary, or consequential damages. The Eleventh Circuit explained that two sophisticated parties negotiating at arm’s length are permitted by Missouri public policy considerations to contractually limit future recovery for even intentional torts. By including punitive and exemplary damages, which are available only for tort claims and not contractual ones, the parties clearly intended to include torts related to the contract within its scope. Thus, even though trade secret misappropriation is a tort and not a contractual claim, the Court found that the claim was restricted by this provision and Pemco was therefore limited in its potential recovery.

The Eleventh Circuit next looked to whether the jury award had sufficiently compensated Pemco. The district court found that a Missouri trade secrets claim was barred in this context because of a full recovery under the related contract claim. The Court, however, distinguished the two causes of action. So long as the trade secrets claim provides a separate, non-duplicative remedy, it can stand on its own despite other recoveries under the contract. The Missouri Trade Secrets Act explicitly provides for an unjust enrichment remedy not available for contractual breach and the parties chose not to limit recovery for unjust enrichment. Thus, the Court concluded that this remedy was available as a trade secret claim that was not, and could not have been, available to Pemco under the contract.

Boeing advanced two arguments against the availability of an unjust enrichment remedy. Boing argued that any further award would be duplicative of the previous jury award and that unjust enrichment constitutes a [...]

Continue Reading




read more

Not Secret and Not Used: Misappropriation Claim Dismissed

The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld a district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that the plaintiff failed to identify a trade secret and presented no evidence of its use or disclosure. DeWolff, Boberg & Associates, Inc. v. Justin Pethick and The Randall Powers Co., Case No. 24-10375 (5th Cir. Apr. 3, 2025) (Smith, Clement, Duncan, JJ.)

In 2018, Justin Pethick was a DeWolff, Boberg & Associates (DBA) employee. That year, DBA’s competitor, The Randall Powers Company (Powers), hired Pethick as regional vice president of sales. After Pethick began working at Powers, some prospective DBA clients hired Powers for consulting services. DBA sued Powers for trade secret misappropriation, asserting that Pethick stole its trade secrets and used them to poach clients. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Powers and Pethick. DBA appealed.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed but on alternative grounds. To prevail on a misappropriation claim under Texas law (where the initial suit was brought), “a plaintiff must show that (1) a trade secret existed, (2) the trade secret was acquired through a breach of a confidential relationship or discovered by improper means, and (3) the defendant used the trade secret without authorization from the plaintiff.”

On appeal, Powers first argued that the information DBA claimed was trade secrets, such as contact information, meeting notes, and “confidential information related to business opportunities,” did not qualify as protectable trade secrets. DBA pointed to “large swathes of database information” without distinguishing what exactly was supposedly a trade secret. The Fifth Circuit found it was unclear as to what materials were trade secrets, noting that it had “no obligation to sift through the record in search of evidence to support a party’s opposition to summary judgment.” The Court held that summary judgment was justified on this basis.

The Fifth Circuit further held that, even assuming the information qualified as trade secrets, summary judgment was still warranted because there was no evidence that Powers and Pethick used the information. Although Pethick had requested a copy of a document that DBA claimed contained trade secrets prior to joining Powers, there was no evidence that he ever possessed it while at Powers. To the contrary, the forensic expert retained by DBA to remove its data from Pethick’s computer did not find the document. The Court concluded that DBA failed to demonstrate any use of an alleged trade secret.




read more

Prosecution Disclaimer Alive and Well, Especially in Closed Claim

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s noninfringement determination, finding that the presence of a disclaimed compound in the accused product precluded infringement. Azurity Pharm., Inc. v. Alkem Lab’ys Ltd., Case No. 23-1977 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 8, 2025) (Moore, Chen, Murphy, JJ.)

Azurity owns a patent directed to a nonsterile, stable liquid formulation of vancomycin hydrochloride, specifically designed for oral administration to treat Clostridium difficile infections. Following Alkem’s submission of an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA), Azurity brought a Hatch-Waxman Act claim against Alkem for infringement of certain claims of the patent. The district court found that Azurity had disclaimed the presence of propylene glycol in the claimed formulation during the prosecution. Since Alkem’s ANDA product contained propylene glycol, the district court held that it did not infringe. Azurity appealed.

The Federal Circuit affirmed, focusing on the patent’s prosecution history and noting that Azurity used the lack of propylene glycol to distinguish its claimed invention from the prior art. The Court noted that this distinction was made during prosecution multiple times in response to the examiner’s rejections, and that Azurity had added negative claim limitations that specifically omitted propylene glycol from the scope of the claims.

The Federal Circuit also noted that Azurity used a “consisting of” transitional phrase to narrow the claims and relied on the closed transition to overcome the prior art. The Court explained that “consisting of” is a closed transition that limits the claim scope to only the recited components. By using this transition and not including propylene glycol as one of the claim components, Azurity effectively disclaimed propylene glycol from the invention. Therefore, the Court found that omission of propylene glycol during patent prosecution was “clean, unambiguous, and complete.”

Azurity argued that a pretrial stipulation between the parties, which stated that “[s]uitable flavoring agents for use in the asserted claims include flavoring agents with or without propylene glycol,” should preclude the application of the disclaimer. The Federal Circuit did not find this argument persuasive, concluding that the stipulation did not alter the clear and unambiguous disclaimer made during prosecution, nor did it affect the noninfringement finding. Since Alkem’s ANDA product contained propylene glycol and Azurity disclaimed inclusion of propylene glycol, there was no infringement.




read more

When Is a Trade Secret Accessible? As Soon as It Can Be Reverse Engineered

Although the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld a damages award for trade secret misappropriation and breach of a confidentiality agreement, it found that the district court erred in its determination of when the trade secret became publicly accessible for the purpose of applying a reverse engineering defense. The Federal Circuit also vacated and remanded the prejudgment interest award, finding that interest should not accrue on future sales. ams-OSRAM USA Inc. v. Renesas Elect. America, Inc., Case No. 22-2185 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 4, 2025) (Taranto, Schall, Chen, JJ.)

In 2008 ams sued Renesas for patent infringement, trade secret misappropriation, and breach of contract for using information that ams revealed in confidence. In 2015 a jury found for ams, and the district court entered judgment for trade secret misappropriation damages, but not for breach of contract. The district court determined that the breach award was duplicative of the misappropriation award. On appeal, in 2018 the Federal Circuit affirmed Renesas’ liability for misappropriation on a more limited basis than had been presented to the jury. The Court vacated the misappropriation award and remanded, instructing that disgorgement of profits damages should be decided by the judge, not the jury.

On remand, ams argued that it was entitled to “re-elect its remedy” and narrowed to the misappropriation and contract claims, which required the case to be retried. The new jury also found in favor of ams. The district judge then determined the monetary award for trade secret misappropriation, consisting of disgorgement of profits for one product and exemplary damages of double that sum. On ams’s breach of contract claim, the jury awarded a reasonable royalty on sales of products, other than the one subject to disgorgement damages. ams was also awarded prejudgment interest on both its misappropriation and contract claims, and attorneys’ fees on its breach of contract claim. Both parties appealed.

Trade Secret Accessibility and Reverse Engineering

The district court ruled that ams’s trade secrets became accessible in January 2006 when Renesas successfully reverse engineered the trade secret embodied in ams’s product. The district court determined that the relevant inquiry for accessibility is what the misappropriator actually did rather than what the misappropriator or other parties could have done. Renesas argued that the trade secret first became accessible when it could have reverse engineered the trade secret in February 2005.

The Federal Circuit agreed with Renesas, explaining that the district court’s ruling was inconsistent with Texas law. Under Texas law, information that is generally known or readily available by independent investigation does not qualify as a trade secret. Citing Fifth Circuit precedent, the Federal Circuit emphasized that the public is free to discover and exploit trade secrets through reverse engineering of products in the public domain. The Court found that Renesas could have accessed ams’s trade secrets through proper and straightforward means by February 2005. While acknowledging that the trade secret may not have been immediately apparent through casual inspection, the Court pointed out that reverse engineering is a common [...]

Continue Reading




read more

A Patent Without a Pulse: Provisional Rights Don’t Outlive the Patent

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit dismissed an appeal from a patent applicant seeking provisional rights on a patent that would issue only after it had already expired, finding that the applicant lacked the necessary exclusionary rights to support a claim for provisional rights. In re: Donald K. Forest, Case No. 23-1178 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 3, 2025) (Taranto, Schall, Chen, JJ.)

Donald K. Forest applied for a patent on December 27, 2016. Forest’s patent application claimed priority through a chain of earlier-filed patent applications dating back to March 27, 1995. If Forest’s patent application matured into a patent, it would have expired 20 years after the 1995 priority date (i.e., prior to the 2016 filing date). The patent examiner nevertheless examined and rejected the proposed claims. The Patent Trial & Appeal Board partially affirmed the examiner’s rejection of certain claims on grounds of obviousness and double patenting. Forest appealed.

The Patent & Trademark Office raised a threshold issue that since Forest’s application could only result in an expired patent, he lacked a personal stake in the appeal sufficient to establish jurisdiction. Forest countered that he could still acquire “provisional rights” under 35 U.S.C. § 154(d) – a limited right to royalties for certain pre-issuance activities – despite the expiration of any issued patent as it issued.

The Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal, explaining that since Forest could not be granted a patent until after the patent’s expiration date, he would never receive any exclusionary rights. The Court clarified that provisional rights only arise once a patent issues and crucially do not extend beyond the statutory patent term. Because Forest sought the issuance of a patent that would confer no enforceable rights – either exclusionary or provisional – the Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The Federal Circuit’s primary conclusion was predicated on the principle that provisional rights are only available when a patent issues with enforceable exclusionary rights, meaning the patent must issue before its expiration date. The Court emphasized that provisional rights under § 154(d) are expressly provided “in addition to other rights provided by” the patent statute. Because this statutory language indicates that provisional rights are not standalone, the Court determined that provisional rights depend on the existence of a valid, enforceable patent.

According to the Federal Circuit, the entire purpose of provisional rights is to provide temporary relief to the patentee during the gap between publication of a patent application and issuance of a patent. However, such rights only arise if the issued patent provides enforceable rights. The Court reasoned that provisional rights are meant to encourage early publication and protect patentees from pre-issuance infringement, but only as a precursor to full patent protection.

The Court rejected Forest’s interpretation of § 154(d), explaining it would create an anomalous situation where provisional rights could survive without any corresponding enforceable rights, allowing a patentee to collect royalties on a patent that could never be asserted in infringement litigation.

Practice Note: Patent rights, whether provisional [...]

Continue Reading




read more

STAY CONNECTED

TOPICS

ARCHIVES