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Diamond in the Rough: Federal Circuit Polishes § 101’s Abstract Idea Test

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded a determination by the US International Trade Commission regarding subject matter ineligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Court concluded that the Commission’s “loose and generalized” analysis did not adequately consider the specific and technical improvements specified by the claims. US Synthetic Corp. v. International Trade Commission, Case No. 23-1217 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 13, 2025) (Dyk, Chen, Stoll, JJ.)

US Synthetic Corp. (USS) filed a complaint with the Commission, alleging that several entities (intervenors) violated § 337 of the Tariff Act by importing and selling certain products that infringed five of USS’s patents. The patent at issue concerned a composition of a polycrystalline diamond compact (PDC) and disclosed an improved method for manufacturing PDCs.

An administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that several claims of the patent were valid and infringed under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, and 112. However, the ALJ found the claims patent-ineligible under § 101, deeming them directed to an abstract idea. The Commission affirmed this finding while rejecting the intervenors’ argument that the claims lacked enablement under § 112. Consequently, the only bar to a § 337 violation was the § 101 ruling. USS appealed, challenging the Commission’s patent ineligibility determination, while the intervenors argued that the claims were not enabled.

The Federal Circuit determined that the patent claims were directed to a specific technological improvement rather than an abstract idea. The Court had consistently explained that claims that provide a concrete technological solution to a recognized problem in the field are patent-eligible under § 101. Here, the claimed invention was not merely an implementation of an abstract idea on a generic computer; rather, it provided a particularized solution rooted in the physical composition of matter defined by constituent elements, dimensional information, and inherent material properties.

Applying the Supreme Court’s two-step Alice framework, the Federal Circuit reasoned that, under Alice step one, courts must determine whether the claims are directed to an abstract idea or a patent-eligible improvement. In this case, the Court found that the patent claims were not directed to an abstract idea because they recited a specific solution that was directed to a non-abstract composition of matter: PDC. Unlike claims found ineligible in prior cases, USS’s patent did not merely recite a mathematical algorithm or fundamental economic practice but instead provided a tangible technological advancement for an improved method for manufacturing PDCs.

The Federal Circuit noted that even if the claims were directed to an abstract idea under Alice step one, the claimed invention contained an inventive concept sufficient to transform the nature of the claim into patent-eligible subject matter under Alice step two. The Court explained that an inventive concept exists when the claims recite a specific, unconventional solution that goes beyond well-understood, routine, and conventional activities previously known in the field. Here, the Court determined that the claimed invention included an innovative combination of components (diamond, cobalt catalyst, and substrate) in conjunction with particular dimensional information (grain size) and [...]

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Small-Market Segment Can Still Satisfy Domestic Industry Requirement

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a US International Trade Commission finding, explaining that small-market segments can be significant and substantial enough to support the Commission’s domestic industry requirement. Wuhan Healthgen Biotechnology Corp. v. International Trade Commission, Case No. 23-1389, (Fed. Cir. Feb. 7, 2025) (Moore, Chen, Murphy, JJ.)

Ventria Bioscience Inc. owns a patent directed to cell-culture media, which supplies nutrients to cells grown in artificial environments. Ventria filed a complaint at the Commission alleging that Wuhan Healthgen Biotechnology violated § 337 of the Tariff Act by importing products that infringed the patent. The Commission ultimately found that Healthgen imported infringing products and that Ventria had satisfied the domestic industry requirement. Healthgen appealed.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the Commission’s domestic industry finding. The Court began by explaining the long-standing principle that patent infringement-based violations of § 337, which establishes unlawful import practices, require that “an industry in the United States, relating to the articles protected by the patent…exists or is in the process of being established.” This requirement is divided into economic and technical prongs. Here, Healthgen conceded that the technical prong was satisfied by a Ventria product (Optibumin) that practiced the patent.

The economic prong considers three factors, any of which are sufficient to satisfy the prong. As identified by the subsections of § 337(a)(3), “there is in the United States, with respect to the articles of the patent…(A) significant investment in plant and equipment; (B) significant employment of labor or capital; or (C) substantial investment in its exploitation, including engineering, research and development, or licensing.” The Commission found that each of these factors was met because, among other things, Ventria had 100% of its relevant investments in Optibumin located within the United States. The conclusion was further supported by a comparison of the investments to Obtibumin’s revenue.

Healthgen argued that the investments were too small to be significant or substantial, and that Optibumin’s revenue was low, which inflated investment-to-revenue ratios. The Federal Circuit rejected Healthgen’s argument, stating that “[s]mall market segments can still be significant and substantial enough to satisfy the domestic industry requirement.” The Court continued, stating that a domestic industry analysis “cannot hinge on a threshold dollar value or require a rigid formula; rather, the analysis requires a holistic review of all relevant considerations that is very context dependent.” Here, the Court found that “[t]hough the dollar amounts of Ventria’s Optibumin investments are small, the Commission found all of the investments are domestic, all market activities occur within the United States, and the high investment-to-revenue ratios indicate this is a valuable market.” The Court found that the Commission’s findings were supported by substantial evidence and affirmed the Commission.




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Collateral Estoppel Doesn’t Apply to Unchallenged IPR Claims

The US Court Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that despite a Patent Trial & Appeal Board determination that certain challenged patent claims were unpatentable based on a preponderance of the evidence standard, the patent owner is not collaterally estopped from asserting other, unreviewed claims of that patent in district court litigation. Kroy IP Holdings, LLC v. Groupon, Inc., Case No. 23-1359 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 10, 2025) (Prost, Reyna, Taranto JJ.)

Kroy sued Groupon for patent infringement. In response, Groupon filed two inter partes review (IPR) petitions challenging 21 claims of the patent at issue. After Groupon’s IPR deadline passed, Kroy amended its complaint to add additional claims from the challenged patent. The Board found all 21 challenged claims unpatentable. Kroy amended its complaint again, this time removing the 21 unpatentable claims and including only claims that were not at issue in the IPR proceedings.

In response, Groupon moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the Board’s prior IPR rulings on the unpatentable claims collaterally estopped Kroy from asserting the new claims. The district court agreed, finding that if the Board issues final judgment that a patent claim is unpatentable and another claim is immaterially different, then collateral estoppel applies to that other claim for purposes of invalidity. Applying that standard, the district court determined that the new claims were not materially different from the unpatentable claims in terms of invalidity and granted Groupon’s motion to dismiss with prejudice. Kroy appealed.

Kroy argued that collateral estoppel should not apply because the burden of proof for invalidity in an IPR proceeding (preponderance of the evidence) is lower than in the district court (clear and convincing). The Federal Circuit noted that this case presents a distinct question of collateral estoppel law; that is, whether a prior final written decision of the Board that certain patent claims are unpatentable precludes a patentee from asserting other claims from the same patent, even assuming the asserted claims are immaterially different from the unpatentable claims for purposes of invalidity.

Referring to its recent 2024 decision in ParkerVision v. Qualcomm, the Federal Circuit clarified that collateral estoppel does not apply to new claims that have not yet been adjudicated. The Court explained that Groupon must prove the invalidity of these new claims in the district court by clear and convincing evidence. The Court dismissed Groupon’s reliance on the 2013 Ohio Willow Wood decision, noting that this case addressed whether a prior district court’s invalidity ruling estopped the patentee from asserting claims in the district court that are immaterially different for purposes of invalidity. On the other hand, the Ohio Willow Wood estoppel scenario occurred in district courts involving the same burden of proof. Because the Board determined unpatentability on separate patent claims based on a preponderance of the evidence standard, courts cannot collaterally estop a patentee from asserting other, unadjudicated patent claims in district court litigation.




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Trade Dress Requires Separate Articulation and Distinctiveness Requirements

The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated and remanded a district court’s dismissal of a complaint for trade dress infringement and unfair competition, finding that the district court erred in requiring the plaintiffs to articulate distinctiveness of trade dress infringement at the pleading stage. Cardinal Motors, Inc. v. H&H Sports Protection USA Inc., Case No. 23-7586 (2d Cir. Feb. 6, 2025) (Chin, Sullivan, Kelly, JJ.)

Cardinal is a designer and licensor of motorcycle helmets. At issue was the “Bullitt” helmet, which Cardinal exclusively licenses to Bell Sports and is “one of the most popular helmets made by Bell.” H&H manufactures and sells the “Torc T-1” helmet. Both the Bullitt and Torc T-1 helmets have “flat and bubble versions,” feature “metallic borders around the bottom and front opening of the helmet,” and “share similar technical specifications.”

Cardinal sued H&H in September 2020, alleging unfair competition and trade dress infringement. Cardinal amended its complaint twice but both amended complaints were dismissed for failure “to adequately plead the claimed trade dress with precision or with allegations of its distinctiveness.” In Cardinal’s third amended complaint, it included two alternative trade dresses – a “General Trade Dress” and “Detailed Trade Dress” – which listed features of the Bullitt at different levels of detail.

Despite the amendment, the district court dismissed the third amended complaint with prejudice. Based on the general trade dress, the district court reasoned that Cardinal failed to allege distinctiveness and therefore failed to allege a plausible trade dress claim. The district court extended its reasoning to “summarily conclud[e]” that the detailed trade dress also failed to articulate distinctiveness. Cardinal appealed.

Prior to making any determinations, the Second Circuit clarified that distinctiveness and the articulation requirement are separate inquiries, and that the articulation requirement is evaluated first. A plaintiff meets the articulation “requirement by describing with precision the components – i.e., specific attributes, details, and features – that make up its claimed trade dress.” The Court explained that the articulation requirement assists courts and juries to evaluate infringement claims, ensures the design is not too general to protect, and allows a court to identify what combination of elements would be infringing.

Focusing on distinctiveness, the Second Circuit explained that a trade dress plaintiff must specifically allege that its product design has acquired distinctiveness. Acquired distinctiveness is when the mark has a secondary meaning, where the public primarily associates the mark with the “source of the product rather than the product itself.” Separate from the elements of trademark, the plaintiff must meet the articulation requirement, which entails listing the components that make up the trade dress.

Having clarified the pleading requirements, the Second Circuit found de novo that the district court erred in mixing the articulation requirement with the distinctiveness requirement at the pleading stage. The Second Circuit determined that the district court erred in dismissing Cardinal’s complaint for failure to meet the articulation requirement. The Court found that Cardinal met the articulation requirement because the general trade dress was “sufficiently [...]

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Religious Texts, Copyrights, and Estate Law: A Case of Strange Bedfellows

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part a case involving a deceased religious leader who owned the copyrights to works reflecting his teachings. The Court found that the copyrighted works were not works for hire under copyright law, that the leader therefore had the right to license his copyrights, and that the subsequent owner of the copyrights (not a statutory heir) also had the right to terminate licenses. Aquarian Foundation, Inc. v. Bruce Kimberley Lowndes, Case No. 22-35704 (9th Cir. Feb. 3, 2025) (Hawkins, McKeown, de Alba, JJ.)

Aquarian Foundation is a nonprofit religious organization founded by Keith Milton Rhinehart. During his time as the leader of Aquarian, Rhinehart copyrighted his spiritual teachings. An Aquarian member, Bruce Lowndes, claimed that he obtained a license from Rhinehart in 1985. Upon Rinehart’s death in 1999, he left his estate, including interests in copyrights, to Aquarian. In 2014, Aquarian discovered that Lowndes was uploading Rhinehart’s teachings online and sent Lowndes takedown requests pursuant to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). In 2021, Aquarian sent Lowndes a letter terminating Lowndes’ license and sued Lowndes for copyright infringement, trademark infringement, and false designation of origin.

After a bench trial, the district court concluded that Rhinehart’s works were not works for hire under either the 1909 or the 1976 Copyright Act, so Rhinehart had the authority to grant Lowndes an unrestricted license. The district court also found that Aquarian did not have the authority to terminate the license as a nonstatutory heir and should have given Lowndes two years notice. The district court denied attorneys’ fees. Both parties appealed the district court’s ruling on ownership and attorneys’ fees, and Aquarian appealed the ruling on its lack of authority to terminate the license.

The Ninth Circuit, finding no clear error, affirmed the district court’s holding that Rhinehart’s works were not works for hire under either the 1909 or the 1976 Copyright Act. Under the 1909 Act’s “instance and expense” test, the Court found that “the creation and maintenance of the works was Rhinehart’s purview, and not the church’s domain.” Under the 1976 Act, which applies agency law, the Court similarly found that Rhinehart’s creation of the works was outside the scope of his employment as Aquarian’s president and secretary. Therefore, under either act, Rhinehart’s works were not works for hire, making Rhinehart the copyright owner. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that as owner, Rhinehart had authority to grant the license to Lowndes. The Court also found that Lowndes’ license to “use copyrighted materials ‘without restriction’” referenced “a coming World Wide Network,” so Lowndes did not breach the license by posting the works online.

The Ninth Circuit also affirmed that the testamentary transfer of copyrights to Aquarian was permitted by both the 1909 and 1976 Copyright Acts: “Both the 1909 and 1976 Copyright Acts allow for the transfer of a copyright by will. 17 U.S.C. § 42 (repealed) (providing that copyrights ‘may be bequeathed by will’); [...]

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Judicial Bias and Erroneous Admission of Expert Testimony Prompt Case Reassignment

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a district court’s decision to admit expert testimony and remanded the case to a different judge, noting that “from the moment this case fell in his lap, the trial judge’s statements indicate that he did not intend to manage a fair trial with respect to the issues in this case.” Trudell Medical Intl., Inc. v. D R Burton Healthcare, LLC, Case Nos. 23-1777; -1779 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 7, 2025) (Moore, C.J.; Chen, Stoll, JJ.)

Trudell Medical sued D R Burton Healthcare for infringement of a patent directed to respiratory treatment devices. Leading up to trial, Trudell filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude testimony from Dr. John Collins on invalidity and noninfringement. At the pre-trial conference, the court denied the motion in limine. A few days later, however, on the first day of trial, the district court reversed itself and granted the motion in limine after Trudell filed a motion for reconsideration. Moments later, the district court indicated that it would reserve a ruling on the motion until the end of Trudell’s case.

On the third and final day of trial, the district court ruled that Collins was allowed to testify. After trial, the jury returned a verdict that the asserted claims were valid but not infringed. Trudell appealed.

Trudell argued that the district court erred in allowing Collins to testify. The Federal Circuit indicated that it reviews a district court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence under the law of the regional circuit – here, the Fourth Circuit, which applies an abuse of discretion standard. Trudell argued that because Collins did not timely serve an expert report on noninfringement and the failure to do so was neither substantially justified nor harmless, the district court abused its discretion in allowing the testimony. Although D R Burton had filed a seven-page declaration from Collins in support of its opposition to summary judgment of infringement, Trudell argued that it was afforded no opportunity to depose Collins regarding the declaration and was therefore prejudiced by the allowance of the testimony. Trudell argued that the admitted testimony also exceeded the scope of the declaration and was “untethered from the district court’s claim constructions.”

The Federal Circuit agreed, finding that the district court abused its discretion in allowing Collins’s noninfringement testimony because D R Burton did not disclose Collins’ noninfringement opinion in a timely expert report as required by Rule 26. Regarding the declaration, the Court found that it was submitted a month after the close of discovery and therefore was not timely served. The Court concluded that the proper remedy was exclusion of Collins’ noninfringement testimony absent a showing that the failure to disclose was either substantially justified or harmless.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the denial of Trudell’s post-trial motion seeking a finding of infringement. While the Court agreed that without Collins’ testimony there was minimal evidence to support noninfringement, the jury would still have been free to discredit the testimony of Trudell’s [...]

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It’s Obvious: Erroneous Claim Construction Can Be Harmless

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a Patent Trial & Appeal Board obviousness determination even though it found the Board had improperly construed a claim term, because the Court found the error harmless in the context of the prior art. HD Silicon Solutions LLC v. Microchip Technology Inc., Case No. 23-1397 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 6, 2025) (Lourie, Stoll, Cunningham, JJ.)

During a 2022 inter partes review (IPR), the Board determined that all but one of the 17 challenged patent claims were unpatentable as obvious in light of a prior patent (Trivedi) and other secondary prior art. The patent described methods of creating “a local interconnect layer in an integrated circuit” using two films. The independent claim recited a first film composed of titanium nitride and a second film as “comprising tungsten.” The Board construed “comprising tungsten” to include either elemental tungsten or tungsten-based compounds. The Board also found that the Trivedi patent disclosed films comprising either elemental tungsten or tungsten compounds. Thus, the Board held that all claims except one were obvious in light of Trivedi and that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Trivedi with other prior art. The patent owner appealed, arguing that the Board’s obviousness finding was dependent on the Board’s incorrect construction of the phrase “comprising tungsten.”

The Federal Circuit agreed that the Board’s claim construction was erroneous, because the term “comprising tungsten” required elemental tungsten. The Court explained that the claims explicitly used compound names when referring to compounds, such as “titanium nitride.” Thus, when the drafters wrote “comprising tungsten” without more, they clearly intended to exclude non-elemental tungsten options. The Court also noted that the patent specification used “tungsten” to reference only elemental tungsten and used the word “based” to encompass both elements and their compounds. For example, the patent discussed “chlorine-based” and “fluorine-based” components. Thus, the Court concluded that the claim drafters knew how to delineate when terms should include compounds, and that there was no such delineation in the term “comprising tungsten.”

The Board relied on a single sentence in the patent that stated: “the second film may comprise tungsten, for example,” to support its construction. The Federal Circuit rejected such a broad reading of this language, explaining that it only provided for impurities mixed among the elemental tungsten in the second film, rather than the film comprising a tungsten compound. The Board also cited a European Union (EU) patent in support of the construction that “comprising tungsten” explicitly included tungsten compounds. The Court stated that such extrinsic evidence was insufficient to overcome the asserted patent’s intrinsic teachings.

The Federal Circuit analyzed whether the Board’s obviousness holding could stand given its erroneous construction. The Court found that because the Board determined that Trivedi disclosed layers made of a tungsten compound and elemental tungsten, the patent claims were obvious when the disputed term was properly construed to be limited to elemental tungsten. Thus, the Board’s error was harmless.




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Eye-Catching: Biosimilars Injunction Prevails

Addressing a preliminary injunction in patent litigation related to the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA), the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction, finding that there was a proper exercise of personal jurisdiction and that no substantial question of invalidity had been raised for the patents at issue that would prevent the injunction from issuing. Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc., Case No. 24-1965 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 29, 2025) (Moore, C.J.; Reyna, Taranto, JJ.)

Regeneron holds a Biologics License Application for Eylea®, a therapeutic product containing aflibercept (a VEGF antagonist used in various treatments for eye diseases). Regeneron owns multiple patents related to its Eylea® product, including a patent directed to intravitreal injections using VEGF formulations. Mylan, Samsung Bioepis (SB), and other companies filed abbreviated Biologics License Applications (aBLAs) with the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) seeking approval to market Eylea® biosimilars. Regeneron brought suit against these parties asserting infringement of its patent and filed a motion for a preliminary injunction.

The district court granted the preliminary injunction against SB, enjoining it from offering for sale or selling the subject of its aBLA without a license from Regeneron. SB appealed, arguing that:

  • The exercise of personal jurisdiction over it was improper.
  • There was a substantial question of invalidity of the patent under either obviousness-type double patenting or lack of adequate written description.
  • There was no causal nexus established.

The Federal Circuit upheld the exercise of personal jurisdiction on SB, finding that SB had minimum contacts with the state of West Virginia. SB is headquartered in South Korea and entered into a development and commercialization agreement with Biogen for a biosimilar to Eylea®, SB15, that gives SB continuing rights and responsibilities as the agreement is implemented. The Court found that SB did not have to distribute the product itself under the agreement for it to be subject to personal jurisdiction. Further, the Court found that SB’s aBLA and internal documentation indicated an intent to distribute SB15 US-wide, which was sufficient to establish intent to distribute the product in West Virginia.

The Federal Circuit also upheld the district court’s grant of the preliminary injunction. SB invoked another patent in the same family as the asserted patent that was directed to an intravitreal injection containing a VEGF trap as the reference patent for an obviousness-type double patenting theory. The Federal Circuit upheld the district court’s findings that the stability requirement, the “glycosylated” requirement, and the “vial” limitations in the claims of the asserted patent were all patentably distinct from the reference patent. The Court found that the stability requirement recited in the asserted patent was more specific than, and not inherent within, the reference patent. The Court further agreed that the reference patent embraced both non-glycosylated and glycosylated aflibercept, not only the glycosylated aflibercept contained in the asserted patent claims.

The Federal Circuit then addressed SB’s arguments that the specification lacked sufficient written description for the claimed [...]

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Beach Buggy Battle: Stipulation Insufficient to Establish Trademark Distinctiveness

The US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that a district court does not need to accept both parties’ stipulation that a mark is distinctive but instead is permitted to make an evidentiary inquiry in determining whether the mark is distinctive or generic. Moke America LLC v. Moke Int’l Ltd., Case No. 23-1634 (4th Cir. Jan. 15, 2025) (King, Groh, JJ.) (Richardson, J., dissenting).

Starting in the 1960s, British Motor Corporation (BMC) sold vehicles colloquially referred to as “Mokes” in the United Kingdom, Australia, and Portugal. By the time BMC ceased production in 1993, Mokes had garnered a small but devoted following for use as beach buggies in the United States, the Caribbean, and Australia.

In August 2015, Moke International and Moke USA sold their first vehicle using the MOKE mark and subsequently sought trademark registration. One year later, Moke America began US sales of vehicles using the MOKE mark. Both parties described their vehicles as being reengineered and redesigned versions of the BMC Moke.

The present dispute began when Moke America opposed Moke International and Moke USA’s registration based on priority use of the MOKE mark. The Trademark Trial & Appeal Board dismissed the opposition. Moke America then filed a district court complaint seeking a declaration of trademark ownership and asserting trademark infringement. Moke International and Moke USA counterclaimed for a declaration of trademark ownership and trademark infringement, as well as affirmance of the Board’s dismissal.

A party claiming ownership of a mark bears the burden of proving distinctiveness. A generic term is not distinctive. Generic terms in trademark law are those that describe a genus or class of which a particular product is a member, such as “CONVENIENT STORE retail stores, DRY ICE solid carbon dioxide, and LIGHT BEER ale-type beverages.” Generic terms can never be protected. The purpose of denying protection for these terms is to safeguard the public from having commonly used words and phrases removed from the “linguistic commons.” Certain marks that are originally distinctive may become generic through the public’s pervasive use of the term through a process known as “genericide.” Genericide occurs when the trademark ceases to identify the particular source of a product or service to the public and instead identifies a class of product or service. Common examples include ASPIRIN and ESCALATOR.

Since both parties sought ownership of the MOKE mark, the parties stipulated that the mark was distinctive and not generic. The district court found that a stipulation was insufficient and noted that the parties must set forth evidence that the mark was distinctive and not generic. The district court concluded that MOKE was once inherently distinctive but had become generic before either party sold a vehicle bearing the MOKE mark. Both parties appealed.

Seeking to overturn the district court’s finding of genericness, the parties argued that the district court was required to accept their stipulation of the MOKE mark’s distinctiveness. The Fourth Circuit disagreed, finding that blindly accepting a stipulation was incompatible with the court’s role of [...]

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What’s Shaking? Not an Interlocutory Appellate Decision on Damages

The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit dismissed and remanded a district court certified interlocutory appeal concerning the standard for calculating a reasonable royalty under the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA). The Court explained that the rate instruction issued by the district court was erroneous because the parties had not yet gone to trial and the plaintiff had not yet proven liability. Therefore, the issue of damages might never arise. Silverthorne Seismic, L.L.C. v. Sterling Seismic Servs., Ltd., Case No. 24-20006 (5th Cir. Jan. 3, 2025) (Smith, Clement, Higginson, JJ.) (Higginson, J., dissenting).

Silverthorne licensed seismic data to Casillas Petroleum Resource Partners II, LLC, an oil and gas exploration company. Under this arrangement, Silverthorne provided data to Sterling, a seismic data processer, which processed the data and sent it to Casillas. Because Sterling’s data processing required more data than what Casillas had paid for, Sterling was only permitted to forward the data that Casillas had licensed. However, Sterling sent Casillas unlicensed data, which Casillas allegedly showed to potential investors.

Silverthorne sued Sterling for trade secret misappropriation under the DTSA and sought reasonable royalties for Sterling’s improper disclosure. Shortly before trial, the district court issued an order adopting the Fifth Circuit’s definition of “reasonable royalty” in University Computing (1974), which, in this case, would have required Silverthorne to prove what the parties “would have agreed to for . . . use [of] the alleged trade secret.” University Computing predates the DTSA, which provides for reasonable royalties for “disclosure or use of a trade secret.” Silverthorne appealed the order, noting that it would not be able to prove what Sterling would have agreed to pay to use the data, since Sterling was a data processor and not an end user. The district court certified the following question for appeal:

[W]hether a plaintiff is entitled to prove reasonable royalty damages under the DTSA using willing buyer(s) detached from the parties to the litigation when willing buyers (here, oil and gas exploration companies) exist for plaintiff’s alleged trade secret (here, seismic data), but the defendant and comparable entities (here, seismic processors) do not buy or license that trade secret.

An administrative panel of the Fifth Circuit granted leave to appeal.

Majority Opinion

The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal as not involving a controlling question of law. The Court explained that interlocutory appeals are only permitted where an order involves a controlling question of law, the resolution of which would materially and immediately affect the outcome of litigation in the district court. The Fifth Circuit emphasized that a question is not controlling just because the answer would complicate a litigant’s ability to make its case or because the answer could save the parties from a post-judgment appeal. Applying these principles, the Court reasoned that damages issues generally do not control a case until the plaintiff establishes liability, unless the damages issue would be dispositive. Because Silverthorne had not yet established liability and was not barred from proving damages under the district court’s definition [...]

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