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Keyword bidding alone doesn’t constitute trademark infringement

by Jolie B. Schenerman | Aug 13, 2026 | Trademarks

Addressing trademark infringement arising from online advertising, the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that purchasing a competitor’s trademark as a keyword (keyword bidding), without displaying or otherwise referencing the mark in the resulting advertisement, does not constitute trademark infringement because the behind-the-scenes use is not likely to confuse consumers. The Court nevertheless upheld the jury’s infringement finding based on the defendant’s visible use of the protected mark in advertising copy, product descriptions, and customer communications. Deltona Transformer Corporation v. The NOCO Company, Case No. 24-13590 (11th Cir. Aug. 4, 2026) (Lagoda, Kidd, Newsom, JJ.)

Deltona Transformer Corporation manufactures vehicle battery chargers that charge a battery to capacity and then maintain the charge without overcharging it. Deltona owns federally registered trademarks for BATTERY TENDER and DELTRAN BATTERY TENDER. One of Deltona’s founders coined the term “battery tender,” drawing on the maritime use of “tender” for a vessel that services or supplies another vessel.

The NOCO Company makes similar battery chargers. Beginning in 2014, NOCO promoted its products using “battery tender” in several ways, including bidding on the term as a search keyword, placing the term in advertisements and product descriptions, and referring to its products as battery tenders in communications with customers and marketing firms. Deltona sued for federal and state trademark infringement and unfair competition. A jury found for Deltona and awarded damages, and the district court later ordered disgorgement of NOCO’s profits and entered a permanent injunction. NOCO appealed.

NOCO first argued that Deltona’s marks were generic and therefore unprotectable. The Eleventh Circuit disagreed. Federal registration provided prima facie evidence of validity, and the Court concluded that “battery tender” was at least descriptive (and potentially suggestive) because “tend” metaphorically rather than literally describes what the charger does. The Court further concluded that a reasonable jury could find secondary meaning based on Deltona’s decades of use, advertising, promotion, and industry recognition.

The Eleventh Circuit also rejected NOCO’s argument that “battery tender” had subsequently become generic. Although NOCO introduced survey evidence indicating that many respondents understood the term as identifying a type of product rather than a brand, the survey was not conclusive, and the jury was entitled to weigh it against the remaining evidence supporting trademark significance.

Turning to infringement, the Eleventh Circuit addressed for the first time whether purchasing another party’s trademark as an online advertising keyword can itself constitute infringement. The Court concluded that it cannot in circumstances such as those presented here. Keyword bidding occurs “behind the scenes,” meaning consumers do not see the purchased keyword and instead see the resulting advertisement. Accordingly, likelihood of confusion depends on what the consumer sees in the advertisement, not on the invisible mechanism that caused the advertisement to appear.

The result was different where NOCO visibly used Deltona’s marks. NOCO used “battery tender” and similar language in the text of advertisements, including advertisements describing NOCO products as battery tenders. The Eleventh Circuit found sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that these uses were likely to [...]

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Safety-enhancing color is functional, not protectable as trademark

by Taylor MacDonald | Aug 13, 2026 | Trademarks

The US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed cancellation of a trademark covering chartreuse-colored water hoses, finding that the color was functional because it improved visibility and therefore enhanced safety. The Court also affirmed a $3 million attorneys’ fee award based on the trademark owner’s lack of candor before the United States Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO), litigation conduct, and continued reliance on an incorrect interpretation of the functionality standard. Weems Industries, Inc. d/b/a Legacy Manufacturing Co. v. Teknor Apex Co., Case No. 25-2956 (8th Cir. July 30, 2026) (Colloton, Arnold, Grasz, JJ.)

Weems Industries sued competing water hose manufacturer Teknor Apex for trademark infringement and other claims. Weems asserted a federally registered trademark covering the chartreuse color used on its water hoses. Teknor countered that the color was functional and sought cancellation of the registration. Teknor also requested attorneys’ fees.

The district court agreed with Teknor, finding that chartreuse served a functional purpose because the bright color made hoses more visible against dark grass and therefore improved product safety. The district court also concluded that Weems had not established acquired distinctiveness in the color. It cancelled the registration and awarded Teknor approximately $3 million in attorneys’ fees. The district court based the fee award on three categories of conduct: Weems’ lack of candor before the USPTO, its conduct during the litigation and trial, and its continued reliance on an incorrect interpretation of trademark functionality. Weems appealed.

The Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s functionality determination for clear error. A product feature is functional and therefore not subject to trademark protection if it is essential to the product’s use or affects the product’s cost or quality. The Court explained that a feature that improves product safety may affect product quality and therefore be functional.

The record contained substantial evidence supporting the district court’s finding that chartreuse improved hose visibility. Weems’ own promotional materials described the visibility and safety benefits of the color. The record also included patent-related materials describing the utility of chartreuse and expert testimony addressing the color’s visibility.

The Eighth Circuit rejected Weems’ argument that a feature is functional only if it improves the mechanical operation of the product. Functionality, the Court explained, is not limited to whether a feature makes a product operate better. A feature that improves safety can also affect product quality and therefore fall within the functionality doctrine.

The Court also rejected Weems’ argument that chartreuse should remain protectable because Teknor could have selected a different highly visible color for its hoses. The availability of alternative colors did not require a competitor to design around a functional safety feature. Because the Court affirmed the finding that chartreuse was functional, it did not need to address whether the color had acquired distinctiveness.

The Eighth Circuit next considered the attorneys’ fee award. The Lanham Act permits fee awards in “exceptional cases,” which courts evaluate based on the totality of the circumstances. A case may be exceptional because of the substantive weakness of a party’s [...]

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Unplugged: Claim construction errors, presumption of harm short-circuit preliminary injunction

by Yuhe Liu, PhD | Aug 13, 2026 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated a preliminary injunction, finding that the district court improperly imported a spatial limitation into the claim term “backplate” and erroneously treated the structural term “pin” as a means-plus-function limitation. The Court also reiterated that in preliminary injunction proceedings, a strong showing of validity and infringement does not give rise to a presumption of irreparable harm. Socket Solutions, LLC v. Import Global, LLC, Case No. 25-1121 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 4, 2026) (Moore, C.J.; Prost, J.; Seeborg, Distr.J. (sitting by designation)).

Socket Solutions owns a patent directed to an indoor electrical outlet cover designed to conceal an outlet’s contact openings while permitting continued use of the outlet. Socket Solutions sued Import Global, alleging that Import Global’s Neat Socket product infringed. Socket Solutions also moved for a preliminary injunction. Adopting a magistrate judge’s reports and recommendations, the district court granted the injunction, barring Import Global from making, using, selling, offering to sell, or importing the accused product. Import Global appealed.

The Federal Circuit first addressed the district court’s construction of “backplate.” The district court construed the term as the component of the cover opposite the frontplate that included at least one set of electrical prongs. Import Global argued that the backplate instead referred to the portion of the cover closest to the wall outlet.

The Federal Circuit rejected both constructions because each imposed a spatial relationship not required by the specification. Looking to the written description, the Court explained that the backplate was used to define the thickness of the outlet cover. The Court therefore construed “backplate” as the component that, together with the frontplate, formed the cover such that the cover’s maximum thickness was measured between the frontplate and that component at the cover’s central portion. The Court also declined to require the backplate itself to include electrical prongs. Because the asserted claim separately recited that limitation, incorporating it into the construction of “backplate” would improperly render other claim language superfluous.

The Federal Circuit next concluded that the district court erred by construing “pin” as a means for making an electrical connection between a wire and a corresponding prong, effectively treating the term as a means-plus-function limitation under Section 112(f). Because the claim did not use the word “means,” the presumption against application of Section 112(f) applied. The Court found that the presumption was not overcome because the specification described a “pin” structurally, and the parties agreed that a skilled artisan would understand a pin to identify structure.

The Federal Circuit rejected Socket Solutions’ proposed purely functional construction as too broad because not every structure capable of connecting a wire to a prong is necessarily a pin. It likewise rejected Import Global’s proposed “mechanical system” construction as unsupported by the specification. Finding neither lexicography nor disavowal, the Court concluded that “pin” should receive its plain and ordinary meaning.

Finally, the Federal Circuit addressed the district court’s irreparable harm analysis. Although the Court did not decide whether Socket Solutions had established irreparable harm, [...]

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Not even a thread left: Single reference anticipation, missing claim limitation entitle defendant to JMOL

by Tyler Jackson | Aug 6, 2026 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a judgment of infringement, concluding that the asserted patent claims were anticipated by a single prior art reference and that the accused products did not satisfy a limitation under the district court’s claim construction. As a result, the Court concluded that the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) of both invalidity and noninfringement. Board of Regents of the University of Texas v. Boston Scientific Corp., Case Nos. 24-2062; -2063 (Fed. Cir. July 27, 2026) (Taranto, Bryson, Cunningham, JJ.)

The Board of Regents of the University of Texas (UT) owns a patent directed to a composition containing at least one biodegradable polymer fiber that includes one or more dispersed therapeutic agents. The claimed invention may be used with commercially available stents to deliver drugs at the site where the stent is placed.

In 2017, UT sued Boston Scientific Corporation (BSC), alleging that BSC’s drug-eluting coronary stent systems infringed UT’s patent. Following claim construction, the case proceeded to trial. The jury found that BSC willfully infringed the asserted claims and rejected BSC’s argument in its motion for JMOL that the claims were anticipated by a prior art reference known as Song. The jury awarded damages to UT. The district court subsequently set aside the willfulness finding as legally unsupported but otherwise upheld the verdict. BSC appealed the infringement and validity rulings, and UT cross-appealed the district court’s decision overturning the willfulness verdict.

The Federal Circuit reversed the judgment for UT, finding that BSC was entitled to JMOL that the asserted claims were invalid as anticipated and, independently, that BSC did not infringe.

Addressing anticipation, the Federal Circuit concluded that Song disclosed each limitation of the asserted independent claim. Song taught the claimed biodegradable polymer fiber and disclosed the claimed “second phase” limitation. The Court explained that Song’s noncontiguous drug phases satisfied the requirement for discrete drug-containing regions.

The asserted dependent claims added limitations expressed in Markush-group form. Because Song disclosed at least one member of each claimed Markush group, the Federal Circuit concluded that those claims were also anticipated. The Court further found that Song disclosed the claimed release of a drug at varying rates.

The Federal Circuit separately concluded that BSC was entitled to JMOL of noninfringement. Under the district court’s claim construction, the asserted claims required a “thread-like” structure. The Court determined that UT’s evidence did not establish the presence of such a structure in BSC’s accused stent coatings.

UT’s infringement theory relied on sections of the coating that had been artificially separated for purposes of analysis. The Federal Circuit concluded that no reasonable jury could characterize those artificially isolated portions as the claimed thread-like structure. BSC therefore was entitled to JMOL of noninfringement.

Irreparable harm? Don’t bury your trade secret

by Jodi Benassi | Aug 6, 2026 | Trade Secrets

The US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction, finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the plaintiff’s asserted harms, including lost profits and injury from the alleged trade secret injury, could be adequately remedied through monetary damages. Revenue Management Solutions, LLC v. Commerce Bank, Case No. 25-3159 (8th Cir. July 23, 2026) (Gruender, Benton, Erickson, JJ.)

Revenue Management Solutions (RMS) licensed to Commerce Bank software that processes and organizes records and payment information. Commerce marketed the software under the name RemitConnect. Under the parties’ license agreement, Commerce received access to RMS’s confidential software and source code but was prohibited from copying or disclosing the software or source code, reverse engineering the software, or creating derivative works based on RMS’s proprietary technology.

In 2018, Commerce began developing its own software, RemitConnect 2.0. By 2025, RMS observed a decline in Commerce’s use of the licensed version of its software. Suspecting that Commerce had reverse engineered and copied its software, RMS moved for a preliminary injunction to prohibit Commerce from using RemitConnect 2.0. The district court denied the motion, concluding that RMS failed to present sufficient evidence of irreparable harm. RMS appealed.

RMS argued that the district court failed to recognize the irreparable harm resulting from Commerce’s misappropriation of its trade secrets. RMS asserted claims under the Defend Trade Secrets Act and the Missouri Uniform Trade Secrets Act, identifying two categories of trade secrets: sets of input-output data and segregation logic. According to RMS, Commerce misappropriated those trade secrets in developing RemitConnect 2.0.

The Eighth Circuit noted that the district court did not expressly discuss RMS’s trade secrets in its irreparable-harm analysis. The Court explained that RMS itself framed its alleged harm primarily as lost profits, referring to the misuse and disclosure of its trade secrets only in passing through a few parenthetical references. By characterizing its injury in terms of lost profits, RMS permitted the district court to conclude that any potential harm could be adequately remedied by an award of damages. The Eight Circuit thus concluded that the district court did not clearly err in finding that RMS failed to demonstrate irreparable harm.

Practice note: Although the loss, misuse, or disclosure of trade secrets may constitute irreparable harm, a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief should clearly articulate how the alleged misappropriation causes harm that cannot be adequately remedied by monetary damages. Framing the injury primarily as lost profits or another quantifiable economic loss may undermine the argument that preliminary injunctive relief is necessary.

Book of wisdom has limits: Can’t impute knowledge of later-arising facts to hypothetical negotiation

by Ashley K. Justice | Jul 30, 2026 | Copyrights

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated in part a US Court of Federal Claims damages award, finding that the court erred in applying the book of wisdom in its damages analysis and assessing noncompensatory damages against the government. 4DD Holdings, LLC, et al. v. United States, Case No. 2024-1996 (Fed. Cir. July 16, 2026) (Hughes, Prost, Stark, JJ.)

4DD licensed TETRA software to the US Department of Defense and the US Department of Veterans Affairs to improve interoperability among existing military healthcare databases. Under the license, the government was permitted to make only a single backup copy of TETRA. 4DD later discovered that the government had made thousands of unauthorized copies of the software and sued for copyright infringement. During discovery, 4DD learned that the government had deleted TETRA copies from its development and test center and had destroyed evidence related to those copies. 4DD moved for sanctions.

The Court of Federal Claims imposed about $1.1 million in sanctions, found that the government had exceeded the scope of the licenses by hundreds of thousands of Federator cores and Studio seats, and awarded about $12.7 million in damages based on a hypothetical negotiation rather than the parties’ license agreement. In assessing the parties’ bargaining positions, the claims court relied in part on the fact that TETRA was never implemented, had no established profitability, and faced competition from a less expensive software product. 4DD appealed.

4DD argued that the claims court should have calculated damages using the royalty rates established in the parties’ license agreement, which it contended would have resulted in an award amount between $3 billion and $5 billion. The Federal Circuit disagreed, explaining that 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b), which provides for “reasonable and entire compensation,” does not require a particular methodology for calculating copyright damages. Although a reasonable royalty may be based on an established royalty rate, it may also be determined through a hypothetical negotiation. The Court explained that the relevance of prior license agreements depends on the extent to which they are economically comparable to the infringing use. Because the government’s licensed use differed materially from the scope of its infringing use, the Federal Circuit concluded that the claims court did not abuse its discretion in determining damages through a hypothetical negotiation rather than by simply applying the parties’ license rates.

4DD also argued that the claims court misapplied the book of wisdom doctrine by imputing to the government (at the time of the hypothetical negotiation) knowledge of its later decision to abandon the TETRA project. The Federal Circuit agreed. The Court explained that although later-occurring facts may be considered to reduce uncertainty and illuminate the value that existed at the time of the hypothetical negotiation, they may not be used to impute knowledge of unforeseeable future events that affect the value of the license. Here, the court’s claims improperly relied on the government’s subsequent change in leadership and resulting decision to discontinue the project before TETRA was implemented to diminish 4DD’s bargaining [...]

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Late arrival: Fourth Circuit remands after mootness raised for first time on appeal

by Nicholas J. DiRoberto | Jul 30, 2026 | Trademarks

The US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit remanded an insurance coverage dispute for the district court to determine whether settlement of the underlying lawsuit eliminated any concrete interest in the declaratory judgment action and rendered the case moot. Covington Specialty Insurance Company v. Omega Restaurant & Bar, LLC, Case No. 24-1364 (4th Cir. July 20, 2026) (Wilkinson, Wynn, Berner, JJ.)

Covington Specialty Insurance issued a commercial general liability policy to Omega Restaurant & Bar, which operated a nightclub in Virginia Beach, Virginia. The policy provided coverage for certain personal and advertising injuries.

In September 2020, several professional models sued Omega in Virginia state court, alleging that Omega used their images in advertisements without authorization. Omega removed the action to the US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.

In May 2021, Covington filed a separate action in the same district seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Omega in connection with the models’ lawsuit. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.

While the declaratory judgment action was pending, Omega settled the underlying lawsuit. Under the settlement, Omega consented to entry of a $155,000 judgment and assigned to the models its rights and claims against Covington under the insurance policy. The record did not show that Omega informed the district court presiding over the coverage action that the settlement had occurred.

The district court subsequently granted summary judgment for Covington and denied Omega’s cross-motion. The court found that the policy did not cover the injuries alleged in the underlying complaint and concluded that Covington had neither a duty to defend nor a duty to indemnify. Omega appealed.

Omega argued that the district court erred because the underlying complaint alleged conduct that potentially fell within the policy’s coverage. Covington responded by arguing for the first time that the settlement had rendered the dispute moot.

The Fourth Circuit explained that mootness is jurisdictional because Article III limits federal courts to deciding live cases and controversies. A case becomes moot when the parties no longer retain a legally cognizable interest in the outcome and the court cannot grant meaningful relief. The relevant inquiry is whether the parties retain any concrete interest, however small, in the litigation’s outcome.

Although Covington did not raise mootness until more than two years after the settlement, the Fourth Circuit explained that a jurisdictional objection cannot be waived or forfeited. The timing of the argument, however, left the appellate record insufficiently developed because the district court had never considered the effect of the settlement.

The record did not establish whether any cognizable interest remained in the coverage dispute or whether Covington had withdrawn or otherwise abandoned its defense of Omega in the underlying action. Without those facts, the Fourth Circuit could not determine whether the case remained live.

The Fourth Circuit therefore remanded for the district court to determine whether the settlement rendered the declaratory judgment action moot. It did not reach the merits of the coverage dispute and left Omega free [...]

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It’s a wrap: Constructive discovery under copyright statute of limitations

by Vincent Li, PhD | Jul 30, 2026 | Copyrights

The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed summary judgment dismissing a copyright infringement claim as untimely, finding that the extensive publicity surrounding the accused works, combined with the copyright owner’s ties to Italy and the local art community, meant that a reasonably diligent owner should have discovered the alleged infringement years before filing suit. Hayden v. Koons, Case No. 25-498-cv (2d Cir. July 21, 2026) (Chin, Sullivan, Lee, JJ.)

Michael Hayden, a US artist who lived and worked primarily in Italy from about 1980 to 2007, created a Styrofoam sculpture depicting a serpent wrapped around boulders for Italian performer and politician Ilona Staller. In 1988, Hayden sold the sculpture to Diva Futura, Staller’s production company, for approximately $900. The parties did not execute a written agreement or discuss copyright ownership or third-party use. Hayden designed the sculpture as a platform for Staller’s live performances and film productions.

In 1989, Koons hired Staller to pose with him for photographs taken on her sets, including Hayden’s serpentine sculpture. Koons later used the photographs to create works in his Made in Heaven series. Three works were at issue: Made in Heaven (1989), Jeff and Ilona (Made in Heaven) (1990) and Jeff in the Position of Adam (1990), each depicting Koons and Staller posing on Hayden’s sculpture.

The Made in Heaven series drew substantial international attention. The works appeared in magazines, and Jeff and Ilona (Made in Heaven) was exhibited at the Venice Biennale. Publicity surrounding the series continued for decades.

Hayden asserted that he did not discover Koons’ use of the sculpture until 2019, when a business partner sent him an Italian article concerning unrelated litigation that included an image of Made in Heaven. Hayden registered the sculpture with the US Copyright Office later that year and filed suit against Koons in December 2021, alleging copyright infringement, removal, or falsification of copyright management information under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) and false authorship under the Visual Artists Rights Act.

The district court granted summary judgment for Koons, finding Hayden’s copyright claim untimely. Hayden appealed.

Under 17 U.S.C. § 507(b), a copyright claim must be filed within three years after it accrues. In the Second Circuit, a copyright claim accrues under the discovery rule when the copyright owner actually discovers, or with due diligence should have discovered, the infringement. The parties agreed that Hayden lacked actual knowledge before 2019. The dispute centered on whether he should have discovered the alleged infringement earlier.

Hayden argued that constructive discovery required inquiry notice and actual knowledge of facts suggesting probable infringement. The Second Circuit rejected that proposed standard. The Court explained that inquiry notice may help identify when a reasonable plaintiff would have begun investigating, but it is not itself the governing standard for constructive discovery. The Court also declined to require actual knowledge of triggering facts, reasoning that doing so would collapse constructive discovery into actual discovery.

The Second Circuit explained that the proper inquiry is whether the defendant identified sufficient facts [...]

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In vitro data, broad dosage ranges fail to enable patient-treatment claims

by Lisette Donewald | Jul 23, 2026 | Life Sciences, Patents

Clarifying the enablement standard for pharmaceutical method-of-treatment claims, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a post-verdict grant of judgment as a matter of law (JMOL), finding patents directed to daily administration of a “unit dosage” to cancer patients invalid for lack of enablement. The Court concluded that the specification’s in vitro data and broad dosage ranges – some exceeding the maximum tolerated dose in humans – did not provide sufficient guidance for translating the disclosed results into a workable patient-dosing regimen. Wyeth LLC v. AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP, Case No. 24-2325 (Fed. Cir. July 9, 2026) (Lourie, Linn, Hughes, JJ.)

Pharmaceutical and healthcare company Wyeth owns patents directed to methods of treating gefitinib- and/or erlotinib-resistant non-small cell lung cancer (NSCLC) by administering a daily “unit dosage” of an irreversible epidermal growth factor receptor (EGFR) inhibitor. A jury found that competitor AstraZeneca, which markets the irreversible EGFR inhibitor Tagrisso® (osimertinib), induced infringement and awarded Wyeth $107.5 million in damages. After trial, however, the district court granted AstraZeneca’s renewed JMOL motion, finding the asserted claims invalid for lack of enablement.

Wyeth appealed, arguing that the district court improperly changed its construction of “unit dosage” after trial, applied that revised construction in its enablement analysis, and improperly granted JMOL on enablement grounds.

The dispute centered on the construction of “unit dosage,” which the district court defined as “physically discrete units suitable as unitary dosage for the subject, each unit containing a predetermined quantity of active material calculated to produce the desired therapeutic effect.” Wyeth argued that the claims required only the identification of compounds capable of inhibiting EGFR activity. AstraZeneca countered that, because the claims expressly required daily administration to a patient, they necessarily required a dosage regimen suitable for human treatment.

The Federal Circuit agreed with AstraZeneca, finding that the claims “plainly require the daily administration of a unit dosage to a patient to achieve a therapeutic effect in treating g/e-resistant NSCLC, not merely the identification of compounds capable of inhibiting EGFR activity in vitro.”

The Federal Circuit rejected Wyeth’s contention that the district court had effectively imported US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval requirements into the enablement inquiry. The Court emphasized that enablement did not require proof of regulatory-grade safety or efficacy. Because the claims required daily administration to patients, however, the specification had to teach a skilled artisan how to arrive at a workable human-dosing regimen without undue experimentation.

The Federal Circuit determined that the specification failed to do so, as it disclosed only three exemplary compounds (EKB-569, HKI-357, and HKI-272), described their in vitro activity, and provided only broad projected dosage ranges (1-1,000 mg and 2-500 mg) without explaining how to translate those ranges into effective human dosing.

The trial record reinforced the lack of enablement. AstraZeneca presented unrebutted testimony, including from Wyeth’s own experts and co-inventors, that at least two disclosed compounds could not be administered within the claimed dosage ranges without exceeding the maximum tolerated dose in humans. One co-inventor testified that the [...]

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Specificity matters: Eighth Circuit rejects broad trade secret claims

by Jodi Benassi | Jul 23, 2026 | Trade Secrets

The US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a district court’s summary judgment against a trade secret plaintiff, finding that the plaintiff’s broad descriptions of confidential business information failed to identify its alleged trade secrets with sufficient specificity. Wilbur-Ellis Company v. Gompert, et al., Case Nos. 25-1577; -1682 (8th Cir. July 7, 2026) (Shepard, Erickson, Grasz, JJ.)

Wilbur-Ellis, an international marketer and distributor of agricultural products, specialty chemicals, and ingredients, sued four former employees after they left to join competitor J.R. Simplot Company, alleging breach of the duty of loyalty, trade secret misappropriation under the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) and the Nebraska Trade Secrets Act (NTSA), and tortious interference with business relationships. During discovery, the district court denied Wilbur-Ellis’s requests to compel discovery from both Simplot and the former employees, concluding that Wilbur-Ellis had not identified its alleged trade secrets with sufficient specificity to justify the requested discovery. After denying Wilbur-Ellis’s request to delay summary judgment pending additional discovery, the district court granted summary judgment to the former employees on the trade secret and tortious interference claims and on most of the duty-of-loyalty claims. Wilbur-Ellis appealed.

Discovery orders affirmed

Wilbur-Ellis argued that the district court improperly prevented it from obtaining discovery from Simplot by requiring it to identify its alleged trade secrets with greater specificity before permitting third-party discovery.

The Eighth Circuit disagreed, finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Wilbur-Ellis’s motion to compel. The Eighth Circuit noted that the district court had identified several concerns, including that Wilbur-Ellis’s trade secret disclosure was extremely broad, appeared to treat nearly everything the former employees encountered as a trade secret, and raised concerns that the requested third-party discovery would amount to a fishing expedition. The Court emphasized that Wilbur-Ellis did not dispute those findings on appeal or that it had sought third-party discovery before exhausting discovery from the former employees.

Trade secret claims fail for lack of specificity and evidence

Wilbur-Ellis also argued that the district court improperly granted summary judgment on its DTSA and NTSA claims. The Eighth Circuit disagreed, concluding that Wilbur-Ellis failed to present sufficient evidence that it possessed protectable trade secrets or that the defendants misappropriated them. The Court explained that Wilbur-Ellis relied on broad descriptions of categories of information – such as customer information, financial information, and business strategy – without identifying the specific trade secrets allegedly taken, who misappropriated them, or how they were misappropriated. The Court further found that, although Wilbur-Ellis identified its password-protected SeedWare database as confidential, it failed to produce evidence that the defendants improperly acquired, disclosed, or used any information contained in the database. Because Wilbur-Ellis failed to connect its allegations to specific trade secrets or admissible evidence of misappropriation, the Court found summary judgment was appropriate.

Duty of loyalty claims

Wilbur-Ellis next argued that the district court improperly granted summary judgment on its breach of the duty of loyalty claims. The Eighth Circuit disagreed, finding that Wilbur-Ellis failed to present admissible evidence that [...]

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