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Stocks, recusal, and copycats: ‘No problem’ on APJ conflict

by Courtney Seams | Nov 6, 2025 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that an administrative patent judge’s (APJ) recusal in an inter partes review (IPR) based on ownership of stock in one of the defendant’s corporations in an amount below the statutory monetary threshold was not erroneous but remanded the case for further consideration of the copying evidence. Centripetal Networks, LLC v. Palo Alto Networks, Inc., Case No. 23-2027 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 22, 2025) (Moore, Hughes, Cunningham, JJ.)

Palo Alto Networks petitioned for IPR of Centripetal’s patent. The assigned three-member Patent Trial & Appeal Board panel instituted an IPR proceeding on the petition. Cisco sought joinder to the then-pending petition. Centripetal requested rehearing of the institution decision by either the Precedential Opinion Panel or the Board panel. The Precedential Opinion Panel denied the request.

In September 2022, Centripetal learned that a member of the Board panel owned stock in Cisco. However, Centripetal did not move for recusal until December 30, 2022, when it sought recusal of the entire panel and vacatur of the institution decision.

In January 2023, the Board panel denied Centripetal’s rehearing request and granted Cisco’s joinder motion. Nevertheless, two of the three members of the panel withdrew to narrow the issues before the Board. The reconstituted panel then denied Centripetal’s motion for vacatur and held that the recusal motion was untimely, because Centripetal had been aware of the potential conflict since September 2022.

In May 2023, the Board found certain claims of Centripetal’s patent to be unpatentable as obvious. Centripetal appealed to the Federal Circuit, arguing that the Board’s decision should be vacated because the allegedly conflicted APJ recused himself only after institution and because the Board failed to address Centripetal’s copying arguments.

The Federal Circuit determined that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal, noting that the case turned on the interpretation of ethics rules and was not the first instance in which the Court reviewed a conflict-of-interest challenge involving an institution decision. The Court concluded that the Board did not abuse its discretion in determining that Centripetal’s recusal motion was untimely, as Centripetal had been aware of the potential conflict for three months before its filing.

The Federal Circuit also addressed the substance of the recusal motion and explained that the APJ’s stock holding in Cisco was less than the statutory $15,000 threshold at all times. Although Centripetal argued that different statutory provisions applied to APJs, the Court concluded that those provisions did not govern a federal employee’s personal financial holdings. Under the applicable statute, which requires recusal only when an employee owns more than $15,000 in a party, the Court found that the APJ was not required to recuse himself.

The Federal Circuit further found that Centripetal’s due process rights were not violated. The Court explained that ethics rules for Article III judges do not apply to administrative proceedings before APJs. The Court further noted that a recent (USPTO) memorandum directing the Board to avoid empaneling judges with any stock ownership in a party was not [...]

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Reframing the claim: Plain and ordinary meaning falls to lexicography

by Lauren Hong | Nov 6, 2025 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s construction of a claim, finding that the plain and ordinary meaning of a disputed term was redefined by the patentee under principles of lexicography and use of intrinsic claim construction evidence. Aortic Innovations LLC v. Edwards Lifesciences Corp., et al., Case No. 24-1145 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 27, 2025) (Prost, Reyna, Chen, JJ.)

Aortic sued Edwards Lifesciences for infringing its patents directed toward a transcatheter valve with a frame component. During claim construction, the district court determined that Aortic had acted as its own lexicographer and redefined the term “outer frame” to be “a self-expanding frame,” based on the interchangeable use of the terms “outer frame,” “self-expanding frame,” and “self-expanding outer frame” when referring to the same structure in two embodiments. Based on this construction, the parties stipulated to noninfringement of the asserted patents since Edwards’ accused valve did not have a self-expanding frame. Aortic appealed the judgment of noninfringement, challenging the district court’s construction of the claim term “outer frame.” Aortic appealed.

Aortic contended that “outer frame” should be given its plain and ordinary meaning of “positioned outside” and argued that the specification did not support limiting “outer” to require “self-expanding.” The Federal Circuit disagreed, relying on both lexicographical and specification-based grounds for its construction.

In applying principles of lexicography, the Federal Circuit reasoned that if a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) would understand that two claim terms were used consistently and interchangeably throughout a patent specification, those terms may be considered definitionally equivalent. Referring to several examples, the Court observed that Aortic used “outer frame,” “self-expanding frame,” and “self-expanding outer frame” interchangeably throughout the specification when describing the frame, and concluded that “outer frame” was properly construed to require “self-expanding.”

With regard to using the specification as intrinsic claim construction evidence, the Federal Circuit reasoned that the specification consistently described the “outer frame” as a “self-expanding frame” and did not restrict that feature to a particular embodiment. From this, the Court concluded that the absence of any express exception or explanation would lead a POSITA to understand that the valve’s construction required a self-expanding outer frame in all embodiments.

Aortic alternatively argued that Edwards should be judicially estopped from arguing for a construction of “outer frame” that departed from its plain and ordinary meaning. Aortic asserted that Edwards had previously argued before the Patent Trial & Appeal Board that “outer frame” should be defined using its plain and ordinary meaning, but later adopted a contrary position in front of the district court, contending that the term referred only to a “self-expanding frame.” The Federal Circuit disagreed and explained that Aortic failed to sufficiently develop its judicial estoppel argument before the district court. Absent any exceptional circumstances, the Court concluded that Aortic had forfeited the argument.

Finding Aortic’s arguments unpersuasive, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment of noninfringement as to the asserted patents, upholding the district court’s construction of the disputed claim [...]

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Boss move: Disclaimer that doesn’t work can still work as a disclaimer

by Joshua Revilla | Oct 30, 2025 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s judgment of noninfringement and no invalidity for indefiniteness, concluding that the court correctly construed the claims and properly determined that the patents’ specifications and prosecution histories would enable a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSA) to ascertain the scope of the claims with reasonable certainty. Barrette Outdoor Living, Inc. v. Fortress Iron, LP, Fortress Fence Products LLC, Case Nos. 24-1231; -1359 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 17, 2025) (Moore, Linn, Cunningham, JJ.)

Barrette sued Fortress for infringing its patents directed to a fencing assembly featuring pivoting, sliding connectors that connect pickets to rails. During claim construction, the district court determined that the terms “boss,” “projection,” and “nub” should be given the same meaning and that these “boss” terms described fastener-less and integral structures, distinguishing them from prior art. The district court also held that the terms “sliding” and “causes” were not indefinite because a POSA would understand their scope.

Following the Markman hearing, Barrette stipulated that it could not prove infringement under the court’s construction of the “boss” terms because the accused products used non-integral fasteners. Fortress stipulated, under the same construction, that it could not establish invalidity for indefiniteness. Barrette appealed, and Fortress cross-appealed.

Barrette first argued that the district court erred in finding that the specification disclaimed bosses with fasteners by disparaging prior art assemblies that used them. According to Barrette, the specification did not criticize the use of fasteners but merely distinguished the prior art designs. Fortress, however, argued that the specification repeatedly criticized assemblies employing fasteners, describing prior art systems that used fasteners to join the rails as time consuming to install. In contrast, the patented invention attributes its quick installation advantage to the use of fastener-less, integral bosses.

The Federal Circuit agreed with Barrette that the specification did not clearly and unmistakably disclaim bosses that use fasteners. The Court explained that while a patent may describe multiple advantages over the prior art, not every embodiment must incorporate each of those advantages. Accordingly, claims should not be construed to require every advancement disclosed in the specification. The Court further rejected Fortress’ argument that the claimed “boss” must always achieve the benefit of quick installation. Although the asserted patents describe ease of installation as an advantage of using bosses, that benefit does not limit the term’s structural scope. A “boss,” the Court held, is not restricted to fastener-less configurations. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit determined that the district court erred in limiting the claims to fastener-less bosses.

Barrette next argued that the district court erred by concluding that the prosecution history disclaimed non-integral bosses. The Federal Circuit rejected this argument and agreed with the district court that Barrette had clearly disclaimed non-integral boss structures during prosecution. The Federal Circuit stated that Barrette clearly distinguished prior art from the “claimed integral boss” in prosecution and expressly clarified the scope of its claims.

Barrette argued that its subsequent communications with the patent office rendered any purported disclaimer [...]

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Ain’t worried about local rules: Scope of sound recording protection is narrow

by Connor M. Larson | Oct 30, 2025 | Copyrights

Addressing for the first time what evidence is required to prove infringement of a sound recording copyright, the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed a district court’s decision to grant summary judgment to the defendant, finding that the plaintiff’s copyright registration of his work as a sound recording required proof of actual sampling to establish infringement. Richardson v. Kharbouch, Case No. 24-1119 (7th Cir. Oct. 16, 2025) (Brennan, Jackson-Akiwumi, Pryor, JJ.)

In 2012, then-16-year-old Eddie Richardson created a hip-hop beat titled “*Hood* Pushin Weight” (HPW). Months later, while listening to the hit song “Ain’t Worried About Nothin” (AWAN) by Karim Kharbouch, who is better known by his stage name French Montana, Richardson believed that he recognized his own HPW beat. The next day, Richardson registered a sound recording copyright with the US Copyright Office. Richardson did not obtain a copyright registration for his musical composition. After Richardson’s attempts to negotiate with French Montana and his representatives failed, Richardson filed a copyright infringement lawsuit.

The district court conducted two rounds of summary judgment briefing. In both rounds, neither party complied with a local rule that required each side to respond to the opposing party’s statement of material facts. The court, in its discretion, declined to deem the unopposed facts admitted. After French Montana’s reply brief in the first round included a “passing comment” on the nature of Richardson’s copyright, raising a potentially dispositive issue, the district court ordered supplemental briefing.

In the second round of briefing, the district court determined that because Richardson had registered his copyright as a sound recording rather than a musical composition, he was required to show duplication or sampling, not mere imitation. Finding no such evidence, the court granted summary judgment in favor of French Montana. The district court then awarded costs to French Montana but denied attorneys’ fees. Richardson appealed the grant of summary judgment and the court’s decision not to enforce the local rules against French Montana while French Montana cross-appealed the denial of attorneys’ fees.

Richardson argued that the district court abused its discretion by failing to deem his unopposed factual statements admitted under the local rules. The Seventh Circuit found no abuse of discretion by the district court, reasoning that because neither party complied with the local rules, the district court acted appropriately in declining to enforce them against only one side.

The Seventh Circuit also affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of French Montana, explaining that “sound recording copyrights only protect those sounds that directly or indirectly recapture the actual sounds fixed in the recording from infringement.” Mere imitation, even if indistinguishable to the listener, is not infringement, and Richardson failed to present evidence of actual duplication of the sound recording.

Finally, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of attorneys’ fees to French Montana. Although there is a “strong presumption in favor of awarding fees in copyright infringement cases,” the Seventh Circuit held that the district court properly applied the four-factor Fogerty [...]

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Enablement: Skilled artisan’s knowledge no substitute for adequate written description

by Jolie B. Schenerman | Oct 30, 2025 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the US International Trade Commission’s (Commission) decision that a water filtration patent was invalid for lack of written description and enablement because the scope of the asserted claim was not enabled by the patent’s specification. Brita LP v. International Trade Commission, Case No. 24-1098 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 15, 2025) (Prost, Reyna, Chen, JJ.)

Brita filed a complaint at the Commission alleging that Vestergaard Frandsen and Helen of Troy infringed its water filtering patent. The main dispute focused on the patent’s only independent claim, which in part recites a “gravity-fed water filter, comprising filter media including at least activated carbon and a lead scavenger” that achieves a “Filter Rate and Performance (FRAP) factor of about 350 or less.” The patent identifies several types of filter media, including carbon filters.

The administrative law judge (ALJ) construed the term “filter usage lifetime claimed by a manufacturer or seller of the filter” to mean “the total number of gallons of water that a manufacturer or seller has validated can be filtered before the filter is replaced.” Based on this construction, the ALJ issued an initial determination finding that the asserted claims met the written description and enablement requirements.

Brita sought review of the initial determination before the full Commission. On review, the Commission reversed the ALJ’s finding of a violation, concluding that the “filter usage” term was indefinite, the asserted claims lacked adequate written description, and the claims were not enabled with respect to non-carbon block filters. Brita appealed.

To satisfy the written description requirement, a patent must demonstrate that the inventor was in possession of the claimed invention at the time of filing. This means the specification must adequately support each claim. In this case, the Federal Circuit found that the specification only supported carbon block filters meeting the claimed FRAP factor, not the broader category of “filter media” as claimed. As a result, the Court found that the asserted claims failed the written description requirement.

The Federal Circuit emphasized that the patent specification failed to support the broad claim language because of its narrow focus on carbon block filters. Specifically, the specification:

Described only carbon blocks, with other filter media mentioned solely as tested examples for FRAP factor
Provided specific formulations for carbon blocks only
Illustrated only carbon block filters in the figures
Made clear distinctions between carbon blocks and other filter types.

The Federal Circuit found persuasive the inventor’s testimony that only carbon block filters were created to meet the FRAP factor.

The Federal Circuit also affirmed the Commission’s finding that the claims were invalid for lack of enablement. Under the Federal Circuit’s 1988 In re Wands decision, enablement requires that a person of ordinary skill in the art be able to make and use the invention without undue experimentation. The Court found no reversible error in the Commission’s conclusion that undue experimentation would be required for filters other than carbon blocks to meet the claimed FRAP factor. The [...]

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When patent law meets free speech: Anti-SLAPP appellate jurisdiction

by Jodi Benassi | Oct 30, 2025 | Trade Secrets

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit determined that it had jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal from a district court’s denial of a California anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) motion in a trade secret and inventorship case, finding such a denial was immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. On the merits, the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the district court’s decision. IQE, plc v. Newport Fab, LLC, DBA Jazz Semiconductor, et al., Case No. 24-1124 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 15, 2025) (Hughes, Stark, Wang, JJ.)

IQE sued Jazz Semiconductor, Tower Semiconductor, and other entities and individuals (collectively, Tower) for violation of the Defend Trade Secrets Act, correction of inventorship under 35 U.S.C. § 256, and five claims arising under California state law, including trade secret misappropriation and intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. Tower moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim and simultaneously filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the claims for misappropriation and intentional interference arising under state law. The district court denied Tower’s motion to strike. Tower appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The Ninth Circuit determined that under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) the Federal Circuit would have had jurisdiction at the time the appeal was filed. The Ninth Circuit explained that the Federal Circuit had subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal because the complaint asserted a claim for correction of inventorship, a cause of action arising under federal patent law. The Ninth Circuit further concluded that the Federal Circuit had appellate jurisdiction under Ninth Circuit law since the denial of an anti-SLAPP motion is an immediately appealable order under the collateral order doctrine. The Ninth Circuit therefore transferred the appeal to the Federal Circuit.

The Federal Circuit noted that the appeal raised a jurisdictional question of first impression: whether the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction over an appeal from a district court’s denial of an anti-SLAPP motion before entry of final judgment. The Federal Circuit agreed with the Ninth Circuit that it has subject matter jurisdiction over claims created by federal patent law. The Federal Circuit noted that appellate jurisdiction typically is limited to a final decision by the district court, but the collateral order doctrine provides a narrow exception that allows an interlocutory appeal when a trial court’s order affects rights that will be irretrievably lost in the absence of an immediate appeal. The Court analyzed the three collateral order factors and determined that an anti-SLAPP motion to strike under California law fits squarely within the collateral order exception to the final judgment rule.

IQE argued that jurisdiction was improper for two reasons:

IQE filed an amended complaint after Tower’s appeal, suggesting the district court must revisit the motion.
Some circuits have held that state anti-SLAPP statutes conflict with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Federal Circuit rejected both arguments, finding the amended complaint improper under Ninth Circuit precedent and deferring to the Ninth Circuit’s view that California’s anti-SLAPP law applies in federal court. [...]

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Power outage: Assignment doesn’t include future improvements

by Sydney E. McDermott | Oct 23, 2025 | Patents

In a pair of related rulings, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed two decisions from two different agencies involving the same patent. The Court ultimately found that the International Trade Commission (ITC) correctly identified the owner of the asserted patent, and that the Patent Trial & Appeal Board correctly determined that the asserted patent was unpatentable. Causam Enterprises, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, Case No. 23-1769 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 15, 2025) (Taranto, Chen, Stoll, JJ.); Causam Enterprises, Inc. v. ecobee Techs. ULC, Case No. 24-1958 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 15, 2025) (Taranto, Chen, Stoll, JJ.)

Causam initiated a complaint before the ITC, alleging that certain importers infringed its patent directed to technology for reducing electrical utilities power demands. The asserted patent claims priority as a continuation-in-part of a parent patent application. Although the face of the asserted patent lists Causam as the assignee, the parent application was assigned to another entity a decade earlier, along with “all patents which may be granted therefor” and “all divisions, reissues, continuations, and extensions thereof.” The assignment did not expressly include continuations-in-part.

The chief administrative law judge (ALJ) issued an initial determination that Causam was not the owner of the asserted patent and that no infringement had occurred. Causam subsequently requested a review of the initial determination by the full Commission. The Commission adopted the ALJ’s findings of noninfringement but declined to adopt the findings regarding ownership. Causam appealed.

Ownership of a patent is a threshold requirement for asserting Article III standing, and the complainant bears the burden of establishing standing in the pleadings. On appeal, the Commission and the ITC respondents argued that ownership of the asserted patent did not need to be decided for standing purposes as Causam had pleaded ownership in its complaint. The Federal Circuit disagreed, emphasizing that, as an Article III court, it is required to consider Article III’s standing requirements, even if the ITC is not. Because the issue turned on contract interpretation and did not require underlying factual findings, the Federal Circuit reviewed the standing issue de novo.

The Federal Circuit ultimately determined that the omission of the term “continuation-in-part” from the assignment agreement meant that the asserted patent was not included in the assignment and thus Causam had ownership of the asserted patent. The ITC respondents argued that the inclusion of “continuation” language was sufficient to encompass both continuations and continuations-in-part. The Court rejected this argument, noting that adopting such a position would effectively “insert words into the contract that the parties never agreed to,” particularly because continuations and continuations-in-part (which by definition include new matter not found in the priority application) are widely understood to be distinct concepts within patent law.

The Federal Circuit noted that such a distinction is especially significant in the context of patent assignments. In the case of continuations, recordation of the assignment of the parent patent or application is effective as to a child patent. In contrast, the same is not true for a continuation-in-part, meaning that [...]

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We’ve got standards: No issue preclusion for facts that must be proven under higher standard

by Ashley K. Justice | Oct 23, 2025 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated a summary judgment finding claims invalid, on grounds that the district court erred in applying issue preclusion based on factual findings in an inter partes review (IPR) that held other claims invalid. Inland Diamond Products Co. v. Cherry Optical Inc., Case No. 24-1106 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 15, 2025) (Prost, Reyna, Chen, JJ.)

In 2020, Inland Diamond filed a patent infringement suit against Cherry Optical asserting dependent claims of two patents. A year prior, in 2019, the Patent Trial & Appeal Board had determined that the independent claims on which the asserted dependent claims depended were unpatentable in two IPRs. During these 2019 IPRs, the Board determined that the claims now asserted at the district court were not unpatentable. The Board decision was not appealed.

The district court granted Cherry’s motion for summary judgment that the asserted claims were invalid for obviousness. The district court concluded that issue preclusion applied, so Cherry did not have to perform an independent invalidity analysis for limitations of what the district court termed unpatentable claims contained in the asserted claims. The district court’s analysis focused on limitations added by the asserted claims. The district court permitted Inland to defend the asserted claims’ validity because those claims had been adjudicated as not unpatentable in the 2019 IPRs.

Relying on issue preclusion and Cherry’s asserted prior art, the district court granted summary judgment that the asserted claims were invalid for obviousness. Inland appealed.

The Federal Circuit reversed, explaining that the district court erred in applying issue preclusion based on two 2024 decisions, ParkerVision and Kroy. In both decisions, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s holding for erroneous application of issue preclusion based on the Board’s factual findings. The Federal Circuit explained that facts proven under the Board’s then-lower standard of proof for unpatentability (preponderance of the evidence) cannot have issue-preclusive effects under the district court’s clear and convincing standard. The Federal Circuit distinguished cases where a claim has already been found unpatentable or invalid; in those situations, issue preclusion bars the assertion of those claims.

Applying this principle, the Federal Circuit reasoned that since the prevailing standard of proof for challenging patentability in 2019 in an IPR was lower and Inland’s asserted claims had never been determined invalid or unpatentable, the district court erred in giving issue-preclusive effect to the Board’s 2019 findings. To grant summary judgment, a district court must find that the patent challenger carried its burden under the clear and convincing standard separate from the Board’s factual findings. The Federal Circuit noted that to meet the higher standard, the evidence may be the same or similar to the evidence that led the Board to find that certain claims were unpatentable by a preponderance of the evidence.

Associational standing requires concrete, non-speculative harm

by Taylor MacDonald | Oct 16, 2025 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court decision dismissing a lawsuit against the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) for lack of associational standing since no member of the association had standing to sue. US Inventor, Inc. v. United States Patent and Trademark Office, Case No. 24-1396 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 3, 2025) (Lourie, Reyna, Stark, JJ.)

US Inventor and National Small Business United (collectively, the plaintiffs) jointly filed a petition for rulemaking at the USPTO to amend the regulations that control the USPTO’s discretion to institute inter partes review (IPR) or post-grant review (PGR) proceedings. The plaintiffs proposed five instances in which the USPTO would have no discretion to institute an IPR or PGR. Separately, the USPTO issued a request for public comments regarding institution discretion two months after the plaintiffs filed their petition.

Eventually, the USPTO denied the petition, citing redundancy with the request for public comment. The USPTO assured the plaintiffs that their request would be considered as a public comment.

In response, the plaintiffs filed a complaint in federal court claiming that the USPTO had committed three errors:

The USPTO’s assurance that the plaintiffs’ requests would be considered “in unspecified ‘future rulemaking’” violated its duty to conclude the matter in an appropriate amount of time, as required by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
Under the APA, the USPTO failed to state adequate grounds for denial.
The USPTO violated the America Invents Act (AIA) by “fail[ing] to promulgate notice-and-comment rulemaking.”

The USPTO filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing. The district court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiffs had neither organizational nor associational standing. The plaintiffs appealed.

Because the issue of associational standing was not specific to patent law, the Federal Circuit applied the law of the US Circuit Court for the District of Columbia, which reviews standing de novo.

Of the three requirements for associational standing (standing of at least one associational member, applicability of the issue to the association’s purposes, and individual member participation not required for the claim or relief), only the first was at issue.

The Federal Circuit concluded that since no member of the plaintiffs’ organizations had standing to sue, the plaintiffs themselves did not have associational standing. The Court noted that the plaintiffs had failed to claim anything more than speculative harm to any member resulting from the USPTO’s denial of plaintiffs’ petition. The Court found the “risk” of patent cancellation during an IPR or PGR proceeding insufficiently “actual or imminent” to afford any member standing to sue.

The Federal Circuit explained that a requisite third-party action outside of the plaintiffs’ control would need to occur before any harm to the plaintiffs’ members could be concretely realized. Third-party actions, including the filing of a petition for an IPR or PGR proceeding, the USPTO’s institution of such proceeding, and the USPTO’s ultimate decision in such proceeding, constitute multiple steps in the chain of events that might result in harm [...]

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Damages? Apportionment among licensed properties is essential, $10 million award reduced to $1

by Dexter Hamilton | Oct 9, 2025 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court decision excluding a damages expert’s testimony and reducing a jury’s $10 million damages award to nominal damages. The Court found that the plaintiff failed to put forth evidence from which a jury could reasonably determine damages without speculation. Rex Medical, L.P. v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., Intuitive Surgical Operations, Inc., Intuitive Surgical Holdings, LLC, Case No. 24-1342 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 8, 2025) (Dyk, Prost, Stoll JJ.)

Rex Medical sued Intuitive for patent infringement. Initially, Rex asserted two related patents directed to systems for stapling tissue during surgery. Intuitive filed a petition for inter partes review (IPR) against one of the patents, and Rex withdrew it from the case.

Rex’s damages expert then opined that a hypothetical negotiation for a license to the remaining patent would have resulted in a $20 million payment. As support, he cited a prior settlement agreement between Rex and Covidien in which Rex asserted both patents before dropping the remaining asserted patent here from that case. Rex and Covidien ultimately settled, with Covidien paying $10 million to license both of the originally asserted patents alongside “eight other U.S. patents, seven U.S. patent applications and nineteen patents or applications from countries outside the United States.”

Intuitive moved to preclude Rex’s expert’s testimony regarding the Covidien license, and the district court granted the motion. Nonetheless, the jury returned an infringement verdict and granted $10 million in damages. Intuitive filed a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL). The district court denied the motion with respect to infringement and validity, but agreed on damages, reducing the award to $1. Rex appealed, challenging the exclusion of its expert’s testimony and the reduction of the damages award.

The Federal Circuit first addressed the exclusion of the expert testimony, reviewing for abuse of discretion. The Court noted that “[w]hen relying on comparable licenses to prove a reasonable royalty, we require a party to ‘account for differences in the technologies and economic circumstances of the contracting parties.’” The district court had held that Rex’s expert failed to adequately address the extent to which the patent dropped from this case and other patents included in the Covidien license contributed to the value of the license. As the Federal Circuit explained, the expert did not allocate the payment between the licensed patents and applications. Thus, the Federal Circuit ruled that the district court did not err in excluding the testimony.

Second, the Federal Circuit addressed the reduction in damages. Rex argued, and the Court agreed, that the reduction was in essence a grant of JMOL of no damages. The Court reviewed for abuse of discretion and described how, at trial, Rex relied primarily on the Covidien license and lay witness testimony to prove damages. While the lay witness testified that the focus of the Covidien license was both of the patents originally asserted here, the Court noted that the patent remaining at issue in this case had been dropped from [...]

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