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Settlement wipes out exceptional-case fee award in exceptional fashion

by Dexter Hamilton | Sep 3, 2026 | Trademarks

The US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit granted the parties’ joint motion to vacate a district court’s attorneys’ fee rulings after the parties settled while the second fee appeal was pending. The Court concluded that the case presented the rare “exceptional circumstances” warranting vacatur after mootness resulting from settlement. Lontex Corp. v. Nike, Inc., Case Nos. 24-3284; -3358 (3d Cir. Aug. 20, 2026) (Chagares, C.J.; Freeman, Bove, JJ.)

The appeals arose from fee proceedings following the Third Circuit’s earlier decision in Lontex v. Nike (2024). There, the Court addressed the standard for determining whether a trademark case is “exceptional” for purposes of awarding attorneys’ fees and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the district court again found the case exceptional and awarded Lontex attorneys’ fees and costs. Nike appealed, and Lontex cross-appealed.

After oral argument and mediation, the parties settled and jointly sought vacatur of the district court’s fee rulings. The Third Circuit emphasized that settlement alone does not warrant vacatur. Because judicial decisions are presumptively correct and may have value beyond the immediate parties, vacatur following settlement remains an extraordinary equitable remedy requiring exceptional circumstances.

The Third Circuit found such exceptional circumstances in this case. Most importantly, the challenged decisions applied the legal standard established in the Third Circuit’s precedential 2024 decision in the case, which remains intact. The public therefore retained the benefit of the appellate decision establishing the governing legal principles, reducing the public interest in preserving the district court’s application of those principles on remand. Both parties also challenged the district court’s rulings, and the settlement (reached following court-encouraged mediation) conserved further judicial resources.

Balancing those considerations, the Third Circuit concluded that the benefits of settlement outweighed the remaining public interest in preserving the district court’s rulings. The case therefore presented the unusual circumstances in which vacatur following settlement is appropriate.

Now you know the limits on patent rights: Diversion of resources doesn’t establish standing

by Cecilia Choy, PhD | Sep 3, 2026 | Patents

Concluding that an organization cannot establish standing to seek prospective relief merely by alleging that it diverted resources in response to challenged conduct, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed dismissal of claims brought by inventor-advocacy organizations challenging language on the cover of issued patents because the organizations lacked both organizational and associational standing. US Inventor, Inc. v. Squires, Case No. 24-2378 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 21, 2026) (Moore, Cunningham, Kovner (sitting by designation), JJ.)

The cover of each newly issued patent includes language tracking the Patent Act, stating that the patent “grants to the persons having title to this patent the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling” the invention throughout the United States or importing the invention into the US. Three inventor advocacy organizations – US Inventor, Inventors Association of South Central Kansas, and Inventors Network of Minnesota – sued the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and its acting director, alleging that this language was misleading in light of the Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in eBay v. MercExchange.

Plaintiffs contended that eBay eliminated any absolute right of a patent owner to exclude others because injunctive relief is no longer automatic upon a finding of infringement. They sought an order requiring the USPTO to change the patent cover language, an injunction prohibiting the USPTO from representing that patent owners possess an unequivocal right to exclude, and a declaration that the existing language is unlawful. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing. Plaintiffs appealed.

The Federal Circuit affirmed, concluding that plaintiffs had not adequately alleged a real and immediate threat of future injury sufficient to support prospective injunctive or declaratory relief.

First, the Federal Circuit concluded that plaintiffs lacked organizational standing. An organization suing on its own behalf must satisfy the ordinary requirements of Article III standing, including demonstrating a concrete and imminent threat of future injury. Relying on the Supreme Court’s 2024 decision in FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, the Court explained that an organization does not suffer a cognizable injury merely because challenged conduct causes it to spend additional “time, energy, and resources on advocacy and education.”

Plaintiffs relied on a similar diversion-of-resources theory, alleging that the USPTO’s patent cover language required them to devote resources to educating inventors about the effect of eBay, thereby impairing their ability to pursue their organizational missions. The Federal Circuit found those allegations insufficient.

The Federal Circuit also rejected plaintiffs’ reliance on the Supreme Court’s 1982 decision in Havens Realty v. Coleman. In Havens, the challenged conduct directly interfered with the organization’s core activities because racial steering practices caused the organization to receive false housing information that it then passed along to home seekers. Here, by contrast, plaintiffs were aware of eBay and therefore were not themselves misled by the patent cover language. Their alleged injury instead arose from their decision to educate unidentified inventors who might misunderstand that language. Rather than alleging that the USPTO directly impeded their [...]

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Floored: Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal supports appellate jurisdiction

by Taylor MacDonald | Sep 3, 2026 | Copyrights

The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed dismissal of a plaintiff’s Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) claims while vacating dismissal of its copyright infringement claims involving architectural floorplans, concluding that the Court had appellate jurisdiction despite the plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). Kipp Flores Architects, LLC v. AMH Creekside Development, LLC, Case No. 23-50750 (5th Cir. Aug. 21, 2026) (Willett, J.) (Haynes, J., concurring) (Oldham, J., dissenting).

Kipp Flores Architects (KFA) owned copyrights in architectural building plans and technical drawings that it licensed to defendants for use in constructing buildings. The licenses required defendants to include specified copyright management information (CMI) when displaying the copyrighted works. KFA and defendant American Housing Ventures (AHV) later worked with other companies to develop floorplans and technical documents for AHV’s construction projects. Those documents did not contain the required CMI. AHV subsequently provided the floorplans to the remaining defendants for use in developing another building, and those defendants used the floorplans, still without CMI, in online marketing materials.

KFA asserted claims for DMCA violations, copyright infringement, conversion, and specific performance. The district court dismissed all of KFA’s DMCA and conversion claims, along with some of its remaining claims against certain defendants. Seeking to appeal the dismissals, KFA moved under Rule 41(a)(2) to voluntarily dismiss its remaining claims, and the district court granted the motion. KFA then appealed.

The Fifth Circuit first considered whether the Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal created an appealable final judgment. Rule 41(a) permits dismissal of an action, not individual claims. The Court nevertheless concluded that the district court’s error in permitting dismissal of KFA’s remaining claims did not deprive the Fifth Circuit of appellate jurisdiction. The error was a “reversible error, not an unappealable nullity.”

The Fifth Circuit also distinguished its precedent involving Rule 41(a)(1). Unlike a Rule 41(a)(1) dismissal, which is self-effectuating, a Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal requires a court order. The district court’s order granting KFA’s motion therefore constituted a “legally operative act of dismissal” sufficient to create appellate jurisdiction.

Turning to the merits, the Fifth Circuit addressed KFA’s copyright infringement and DMCA claims. The Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act (AWCPA) protects architectural works while earlier copyright law separately protected architectural plans as pictorial, graphic, or sculptural (PGS) works. Section 120(a) of the Copyright Act creates a safe harbor for pictures or other pictorial representations of architectural works embodied in buildings located in or ordinarily visible from a public place. Although § 120(a) does not apply to rights arising solely from PGS works, the Court concluded that KFA’s floorplans could fall within the safe harbor as far as they depicted copyrighted architectural works. The Court also concluded that § 120(a) can apply to representations created before a building becomes publicly visible but distributed or displayed afterward.

The Fifth Circuit nevertheless determined that the district court erred in dismissing KFA’s infringement claim under § 120(a). KFA was not required to plead facts negating the safe harbor because § 120(a) operates as an affirmative defense. KFA’s [...]

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A prescription for liability: Injunction in gray-market drug case based on material differences

by Ian J. Howard | Aug 27, 2026 | Life Sciences, Trademarks

Affirming a preliminary injunction, the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that companies importing foreign-market pharmaceuticals for domestic patients were likely liable for trademark infringement, and that healthcare administrators and pharmacy benefit managers that continued facilitating those transactions despite reason to know of the infringement were likely liable for contributory infringement. Gilead Sciences, Inc. v. Meritain Health, Inc., Case No. 25-1828 (4th Cir. Aug. 13, 2026) (Agee, Harris, Keenan, JJ.)

Gilead sued a group of companies involved in filling US patient prescriptions for the HIV drug Biktarvy® with a Gilead-branded version of the drug intended for Turkey. Gilead alleged that the defendants’ importation and distribution of the Turkish-market product infringed its trademarks under the Lanham Act. In addition to suing companies directly involved in sourcing and supplying the prescriptions, Gilead sued Meritain Health, the third-party administrator of the relevant healthcare plan, and ProAct, a pharmacy benefit manager, for contributory infringement.

Shortly after filing suit, Gilead moved for a temporary restraining order and then a preliminary injunction enjoining the defendants from importing gray-market versions of Biktarvy®. The district court granted the requested relief, finding that Gilead had demonstrated a likelihood of success on its direct infringement claims against certain defendants and its contributory infringement claims against others. Meritain, ProAct, and the other defendants appealed.

The defendants first argued that the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) precluded Gilead’s Lanham Act claims. Although the Turkish version of Biktarvy® was not US Food and Drug Administration approved, Gilead did not premise its trademark claims on that fact. The Fourth Circuit therefore concluded that adjudicating Gilead’s claims did not require enforcement or interpretation of the FDCA.

The defendants also challenged the district court’s likelihood-of-confusion finding, emphasizing that Gilead itself manufactured the Turkish version of Biktarvy® and that the product bore authentic Gilead trademarks. The Fourth Circuit disagreed, explaining that goods bearing a genuine trademark may nevertheless be considered nongenuine for trademark purposes if they materially differ from the authorized domestic product or are sold outside the trademark owner’s quality-control procedures.

Although the Turkish and US versions of Biktarvy® were chemically identical, the Fourth Circuit found material differences between them. Among other things, the Turkish product contained foreign-language labeling and lacked certain warnings and patient information provided with the US version. The Turkish product also was not transported through Gilead’s quality-control system. Those differences were sufficient to support the district court’s finding of material differences.

The Fourth Circuit also rejected Meritain and ProAct’s challenges to the contributory infringement ruling. The Court explained that contributory infringement does not require actual knowledge of another party’s infringement. Liability may arise where a defendant knew or should have known of the infringement and nevertheless continued supplying products or services that facilitated it.

The Fourth Circuit further rejected Meritain and ProAct’s argument that contributory infringement required proof that they exercised control over the direct infringers. In doing so, the Court declined to adopt the Ninth Circuit’s control requirement. The Fourth Circuit also concluded that even if [...]

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Off the mark: NPE licensees must comply with patent marking for pre-suit damages

by Keval Amin | Aug 27, 2026 | Patents

Affirming dismissal of a patent infringement complaint and an award of attorneys’ fees, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reiterated that a nonpracticing entity (NPE) seeking pre-suit damages cannot disregard its licensees’ obligations under the patent marking statute, and that a pattern of abusive litigation conduct supports an exceptional case finding under 35 U.S.C. § 285. VDPP, LLC v. Volkswagen Group of America, Inc., Case No. 24-2226 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 19, 2026) (Moore, Lourie, Cunningham, JJ.)

VDPP, an NPE, sued an auto manufacturer for infringement of a patent directed to electrically controlled spectacles. The district court dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) and denied leave to amend as futile. Because VDPP sought pre-suit damages, it was required to plead compliance with 35 U.S.C. § 287(a), including compliance by its licensees.

VDPP had entered into 11 settlement agreements that included patent licenses, but its proposed amended complaint did not allege that any licensee had marked its products. Instead, VDPP relied on its status as an NPE and asserted that it had no products of its own to mark. VDPP appealed the district court’s dismissal and fee award.

The Federal Circuit affirmed. Although a patentee that does not make or sell patented products may not have products of its own to mark, its licensees remain subject to § 287’s marking requirements. The Court rejected VDPP’s attempt to distinguish licenses granted through settlement agreements, explaining that a settlement license is no different for marking purposes from any other patent license. The Court noted that all 11 settlement agreements were structured as licenses and that one expressly stated that the licensee had no obligation to mark. Because VDPP could not plausibly allege that it made reasonable efforts to ensure compliance by its licensees, the Court affirmed the denial of leave to amend as futile.

The Federal Circuit also affirmed the district court’s exceptional case determination and fee award under § 285. The district court relied on several aspects of VDPP’s litigation conduct, including seeking future damages and injunctive relief on an expired patent, failing to disclose relevant settlement agreements despite being reminded of them, and advancing positions the district court characterized as frivolous.

The Federal Circuit rejected VDPP’s argument that conduct must independently satisfy Rule 11 before it may support an exceptional case finding. It also concluded that the district court properly considered VDPP’s broader pattern of filing patent infringement suits followed by low-value settlement demands, noting that such a pattern is relevant to an exceptional case determination where adequate evidence of an abusive litigation strategy is presented.

The Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal as to sanctions imposed on VDPP’s counsel for lack of jurisdiction. VDPP’s counsel’s notice of appeal listed only VDPP as the appellant, and the counsel’s name appeared only incidentally within a description of the orders being appealed. Corrected notices filed more than 90 days after entry of the orders came too late. The Court also rejected VDPP’s argument that it had standing to contest its own counsel’s [...]

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Resolution impossible: Lower resolution prior art is analogous art to higher resolution claims

by Vincent Li, PhD | Aug 27, 2026 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Patent Trial & Appeal Board’s decision finding that prior art disclosing a low-resolution system was analogous prior art to claims directed to a high-resolution system for purposes of obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103. The Nielsen Company (US), LLC v. TVision Insights, Inc., Case No. 2025-1371 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 14, 2026) (Dyk, Reyna, Bissoon, JJ.)

Nielsen owns a patent related to audience measurement systems that use cameras to capture images of viewers watching media content. The specification describes a “people counter” that may use low-resolution images to detect audience members and a “person identifier” that uses high-resolution images for facial recognition.

TVision petitioned for inter partes review (IPR), asserting two grounds of obviousness, both of which relied on a scientific publication by Tian as part of the asserted prior-art combinations. The Tian publication, titled “Evaluation of Face Resolution for Expression Analysis,” disclosed experimental results evaluating facial-expression analysis using lower-resolution images “down-sampled from the originals.” The Board held that all challenged claims were obvious on both grounds. Nielsen appealed.

A central issue was whether the Board erred in concluding that Tian qualified as analogous art. Two tests define the scope of analogous art: whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, and if not, whether the reference is still reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved. In its petition, TVision asserted that Tian was in the same field of endeavor as Nielsen’s patent. Nielsen responded that Tian was neither in the same field of endeavor nor reasonably pertinent. The Board ultimately concluded that Tian was reasonably pertinent analogous art without reaching the field of endeavor prong. Nielsen argued that the Board violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by applying the reasonably pertinent test when TVision’s petition only argued that Tian was in the same field of endeavor, depriving Nielsen of adequate notice and an opportunity to respond.

The Federal Circuit rejected Nielsen’s APA argument on three independent grounds:

The Court explained that although the two analogous-art tests are separate, the evidence and analysis relevant to them may overlap. The Court also explained that an analogous-art theory need not be expressly stated and may instead be implicit in the petition. Here, TVision’s discussion of Tian’s analysis of images for head detection and pose estimation placed Nielsen on notice that reasonable pertinence was at issue.
Nielsen had an opportunity to address reasonable pertinence and in fact addressed both analogous-art prongs in its Patent Owner Response.
Nielsen conceded that it could not identify any evidence or argument that it had been prevented from presenting. Accordingly, even if there had been a notice error, it was harmless.

On the merits, the Federal Circuit found that substantial evidence supported the Board’s determination that Tian was reasonably pertinent analogous art. The Court rejected Nielsen’s attempt to limit the analysis to prior art that an ordinarily skilled artisan would reasonably search to address the problems specifically identified in [...]

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Ministerial requirements aren’t enough: Post-AIA prior art priority requires § 112 written description support

by Dexter Hamilton | Aug 20, 2026 | America Invents Act, Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated a Patent Trial & Appeal Board final written decision finding challenged claims obvious, concluding that the Board applied the wrong legal standard in determining whether an asserted prior art reference could obtain the filing date of an earlier provisional application based only on satisfaction of “ministerial requirements.” Dental Monitoring SAS v. Align Technology, Inc., Case No. 25-1752 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 10, 2026) (Lourie, Stall, Taranto, JJ.)

Dental Monitoring owns a patent directed to a method for acquiring and analyzing an image of a patient’s dental arch. Align Technology petitioned for inter partes review (IPR) of the patent based on three references: Salah, Carrier, and Maninis.

Carrier’s status as prior art was central to the dispute. Carrier claimed priority to a provisional application filed before the effective filing date of Dental Monitoring’s patent, but Carrier’s nonprovisional application was filed afterward. Thus, Carrier qualified as prior art only if it could obtain the benefit of its provisional application’s filing date under America Invents Act (AIA) § 102(d)(2).

Dental Monitoring argued that under the Federal Circuit’s 2015 decision in Dynamic Drinkware v. National Graphics, Carrier could rely on the provisional filing date only if the provisional provided written description support for at least one claim of Carrier. The Board disagreed, concluding that Dynamic Drinkware addressed only pre-AIA law. Instead, relying on its precedential decision in Penumbra v. RapidPulse, the Board determined that a reference patent receives the filing date of an earlier application for AIA prior art purposes if it satisfies the “ministerial requirements” of §§ 119 and 120 and the earlier application describes the subject matter relied upon in the reference. Because Carrier’s provisional described the relied-upon subject matter, the Board treated Carrier as prior art as of the provisional filing date.

On the merits, the Board found the claims unpatentable as obvious over a combination of three references. Dental Monitoring appealed.

The Federal Circuit reviewed the statutory question de novo, concluding that §§ 102(d)(2), 119(e)(1), and 112(a) foreclosed the Board’s ministerial requirements approach.

Section 102(d)(2) provides that a patent or patent application may be effectively filed for prior art purposes as of an earlier application’s filing date if it is “entitled to claim a right of priority” under § 119 or the benefit of an earlier filing date under § 120. Section 119(e)(1), in turn, permits a nonprovisional application to claim priority to a provisional only when the invention disclosed in the later application is disclosed in the provisional “in the manner provided by” § 112(a). The Federal Circuit therefore concluded that § 102(d)(2) incorporates § 112(a)’s substantive written description requirement. The Court also found further support in the phrase “entitled to claim a right of priority,” because an applicant would only be “entitled to claim priority” by fulfilling the statutory requirements, including § 112’s written description requirement.

Align argued that Dynamic Drinkware did not apply because its analysis was limited to the pre-AIA version of § [...]

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Keyword bidding alone doesn’t constitute trademark infringement

by Jolie B. Schenerman | Aug 13, 2026 | Trademarks

Addressing trademark infringement arising from online advertising, the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that purchasing a competitor’s trademark as a keyword (keyword bidding), without displaying or otherwise referencing the mark in the resulting advertisement, does not constitute trademark infringement because the behind-the-scenes use is not likely to confuse consumers. The Court nevertheless upheld the jury’s infringement finding based on the defendant’s visible use of the protected mark in advertising copy, product descriptions, and customer communications. Deltona Transformer Corporation v. The NOCO Company, Case No. 24-13590 (11th Cir. Aug. 4, 2026) (Lagoda, Kidd, Newsom, JJ.)

Deltona Transformer Corporation manufactures vehicle battery chargers that charge a battery to capacity and then maintain the charge without overcharging it. Deltona owns federally registered trademarks for BATTERY TENDER and DELTRAN BATTERY TENDER. One of Deltona’s founders coined the term “battery tender,” drawing on the maritime use of “tender” for a vessel that services or supplies another vessel.

The NOCO Company makes similar battery chargers. Beginning in 2014, NOCO promoted its products using “battery tender” in several ways, including bidding on the term as a search keyword, placing the term in advertisements and product descriptions, and referring to its products as battery tenders in communications with customers and marketing firms. Deltona sued for federal and state trademark infringement and unfair competition. A jury found for Deltona and awarded damages, and the district court later ordered disgorgement of NOCO’s profits and entered a permanent injunction. NOCO appealed.

NOCO first argued that Deltona’s marks were generic and therefore unprotectable. The Eleventh Circuit disagreed. Federal registration provided prima facie evidence of validity, and the Court concluded that “battery tender” was at least descriptive (and potentially suggestive) because “tend” metaphorically rather than literally describes what the charger does. The Court further concluded that a reasonable jury could find secondary meaning based on Deltona’s decades of use, advertising, promotion, and industry recognition.

The Eleventh Circuit also rejected NOCO’s argument that “battery tender” had subsequently become generic. Although NOCO introduced survey evidence indicating that many respondents understood the term as identifying a type of product rather than a brand, the survey was not conclusive, and the jury was entitled to weigh it against the remaining evidence supporting trademark significance.

Turning to infringement, the Eleventh Circuit addressed for the first time whether purchasing another party’s trademark as an online advertising keyword can itself constitute infringement. The Court concluded that it cannot in circumstances such as those presented here. Keyword bidding occurs “behind the scenes,” meaning consumers do not see the purchased keyword and instead see the resulting advertisement. Accordingly, likelihood of confusion depends on what the consumer sees in the advertisement, not on the invisible mechanism that caused the advertisement to appear.

The result was different where NOCO visibly used Deltona’s marks. NOCO used “battery tender” and similar language in the text of advertisements, including advertisements describing NOCO products as battery tenders. The Eleventh Circuit found sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that these uses were likely to [...]

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Safety-enhancing color is functional, not protectable as trademark

by Taylor MacDonald | Aug 13, 2026 | Trademarks

The US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed cancellation of a trademark covering chartreuse-colored water hoses, finding that the color was functional because it improved visibility and therefore enhanced safety. The Court also affirmed a $3 million attorneys’ fee award based on the trademark owner’s lack of candor before the United States Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO), litigation conduct, and continued reliance on an incorrect interpretation of the functionality standard. Weems Industries, Inc. d/b/a Legacy Manufacturing Co. v. Teknor Apex Co., Case No. 25-2956 (8th Cir. July 30, 2026) (Colloton, Arnold, Grasz, JJ.)

Weems Industries sued competing water hose manufacturer Teknor Apex for trademark infringement and other claims. Weems asserted a federally registered trademark covering the chartreuse color used on its water hoses. Teknor countered that the color was functional and sought cancellation of the registration. Teknor also requested attorneys’ fees.

The district court agreed with Teknor, finding that chartreuse served a functional purpose because the bright color made hoses more visible against dark grass and therefore improved product safety. The district court also concluded that Weems had not established acquired distinctiveness in the color. It cancelled the registration and awarded Teknor approximately $3 million in attorneys’ fees. The district court based the fee award on three categories of conduct: Weems’ lack of candor before the USPTO, its conduct during the litigation and trial, and its continued reliance on an incorrect interpretation of trademark functionality. Weems appealed.

The Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s functionality determination for clear error. A product feature is functional and therefore not subject to trademark protection if it is essential to the product’s use or affects the product’s cost or quality. The Court explained that a feature that improves product safety may affect product quality and therefore be functional.

The record contained substantial evidence supporting the district court’s finding that chartreuse improved hose visibility. Weems’ own promotional materials described the visibility and safety benefits of the color. The record also included patent-related materials describing the utility of chartreuse and expert testimony addressing the color’s visibility.

The Eighth Circuit rejected Weems’ argument that a feature is functional only if it improves the mechanical operation of the product. Functionality, the Court explained, is not limited to whether a feature makes a product operate better. A feature that improves safety can also affect product quality and therefore fall within the functionality doctrine.

The Court also rejected Weems’ argument that chartreuse should remain protectable because Teknor could have selected a different highly visible color for its hoses. The availability of alternative colors did not require a competitor to design around a functional safety feature. Because the Court affirmed the finding that chartreuse was functional, it did not need to address whether the color had acquired distinctiveness.

The Eighth Circuit next considered the attorneys’ fee award. The Lanham Act permits fee awards in “exceptional cases,” which courts evaluate based on the totality of the circumstances. A case may be exceptional because of the substantive weakness of a party’s [...]

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Unplugged: Claim construction errors, presumption of harm short-circuit preliminary injunction

by Yuhe Liu, PhD | Aug 13, 2026 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated a preliminary injunction, finding that the district court improperly imported a spatial limitation into the claim term “backplate” and erroneously treated the structural term “pin” as a means-plus-function limitation. The Court also reiterated that in preliminary injunction proceedings, a strong showing of validity and infringement does not give rise to a presumption of irreparable harm. Socket Solutions, LLC v. Import Global, LLC, Case No. 25-1121 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 4, 2026) (Moore, C.J.; Prost, J.; Seeborg, Distr.J. (sitting by designation)).

Socket Solutions owns a patent directed to an indoor electrical outlet cover designed to conceal an outlet’s contact openings while permitting continued use of the outlet. Socket Solutions sued Import Global, alleging that Import Global’s Neat Socket product infringed. Socket Solutions also moved for a preliminary injunction. Adopting a magistrate judge’s reports and recommendations, the district court granted the injunction, barring Import Global from making, using, selling, offering to sell, or importing the accused product. Import Global appealed.

The Federal Circuit first addressed the district court’s construction of “backplate.” The district court construed the term as the component of the cover opposite the frontplate that included at least one set of electrical prongs. Import Global argued that the backplate instead referred to the portion of the cover closest to the wall outlet.

The Federal Circuit rejected both constructions because each imposed a spatial relationship not required by the specification. Looking to the written description, the Court explained that the backplate was used to define the thickness of the outlet cover. The Court therefore construed “backplate” as the component that, together with the frontplate, formed the cover such that the cover’s maximum thickness was measured between the frontplate and that component at the cover’s central portion. The Court also declined to require the backplate itself to include electrical prongs. Because the asserted claim separately recited that limitation, incorporating it into the construction of “backplate” would improperly render other claim language superfluous.

The Federal Circuit next concluded that the district court erred by construing “pin” as a means for making an electrical connection between a wire and a corresponding prong, effectively treating the term as a means-plus-function limitation under Section 112(f). Because the claim did not use the word “means,” the presumption against application of Section 112(f) applied. The Court found that the presumption was not overcome because the specification described a “pin” structurally, and the parties agreed that a skilled artisan would understand a pin to identify structure.

The Federal Circuit rejected Socket Solutions’ proposed purely functional construction as too broad because not every structure capable of connecting a wire to a prong is necessarily a pin. It likewise rejected Import Global’s proposed “mechanical system” construction as unsupported by the specification. Finding neither lexicography nor disavowal, the Court concluded that “pin” should receive its plain and ordinary meaning.

Finally, the Federal Circuit addressed the district court’s irreparable harm analysis. Although the Court did not decide whether Socket Solutions had established irreparable harm, [...]

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