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Mi casa no es su Casa Azul: Fifth Circuit revives tequila infringement claim

The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated a judgment of no trademark infringement, finding that the district court erred in evaluating four likelihood-of-confusion factors, including by considering third-party use of a term absent from the senior user’s mark and discounting evidence of actual consumer confusion. Casa Tradición S.A. de C.V. v. Casa Azul Spirits, L.L.C., Case No. 24-20255 (5th Cir. Nov. 4, 2026) (Elrod, Guidry, JJ.) (Engelhardt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Casa TradiciĂłn (Clase Azul) has sold luxury tequila under the CLASE AZUL mark in the United States since 2003. Its tequila is packaged in distinctive hand-painted ceramic decanters and sold at premium prices. Casa Azul Spirits (Casa Azul) owns registrations for the CASA AZUL mark covering wine and, since 2019, alcoholic beverages other than beer. Casa Azul launched canned tequila sodas in 2022 and organic, additive-free bottled tequila in 2023. Clase Azul sued for trademark infringement under the Lanham Act and Texas law. Following a bench trial, the district court found no likelihood of confusion. Clase Azul appealed.

The Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s findings under the eight likelihood-of-confusion factors (known in the Fifth Circuit as the “digits of confusion”) and identified errors in four of them.

Strength of the mark

The Fifth Circuit found that the district court clearly erred in finding that CLASE AZUL was descriptive rather than suggestive. Although “azul” (Spanish for “blue”) could refer to the blue Weber agave plant used to make tequila, consumers must exercise imagination to make that connection. The Court also noted that “blue class,” the English translation of CLASE AZUL, does not appear in dictionaries, competitors do not need the phrase to describe tequila, and no other tequila brand uses it.

The Fifth Circuit also rejected the district court’s finding that CLASE AZUL lacked marketplace recognition, citing more than 20 years of use, annual sales exceeding $200 million, and extensive media coverage.

Addressing third-party use, the Fifth Circuit found that the district court applied the wrong legal standard by considering third-party marks containing “casa” and “azul,” rather than focusing on “clase” and “azul,” the terms in the senior user’s mark. The Court explained that third-party use of a term absent from the senior mark cannot diminish that mark’s strength. The Court rejected Clase Azul’s argument that only marks combining “clase” and “azul” were relevant, however, because third-party use of a shared component could also bear on the mark’s strength. The Court remanded for further findings on relevant third-party use, explaining that the absence of sales or survey evidence affects the weight of such evidence, not its relevance.

Similarity of the marks and products

The Fifth Circuit found no clear error in the district court’s determination that the marks, although similar in sound, differed in appearance and meaning.

The Fifth Circuit reached a different conclusion regarding the similarity of the products. It concluded that the district court erred by focusing on differences in price and marketing, including Casa Azul’s organic, additive-free positioning, rather [...]

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Seedy departure leads to trade secret liability, but fee award is trimmed

The US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a jury verdict finding willful and malicious trade secret misappropriation and declined to review the denial of summary judgment after trial because it involved factual rather than purely legal issues. The Court vacated an attorneys’ fees award, however, because the district court failed to consider the plaintiff’s overall degree of success. Wilbur-Ellis Company, LLC v. Cody Downing, Case No. 25-2865 (8th Cir. Nov. 9, 2026) (Loken, Benton, Erickson, JJ.)

Cody Downing worked as a sales representative for Wilbur-Ellis before resigning to join a competitor. Before his departure, Downing copied hundreds of files containing Wilbur-Ellis’ confidential customer purchasing information, sales forecasts, budgets, strategies, orders, inventory, and pricing information. Wilbur-Ellis sued Downing for trade secret misappropriation, breach of the duty of loyalty, and tortious interference with business relations. Downing moved for summary judgment on all claims and, at trial, moved for judgment as a matter of law on the issues of damages and causation. The district court denied his summary judgment motion on the misappropriation claims and deferred ruling on his motion for judgment as a matter of law.

A jury found that Downing willfully and maliciously misappropriated Wilbur-Ellis’ trade secrets and awarded about $200,000 in damages. The district court subsequently awarded almost $450,000 in attorneys’ fees. Downing renewed his motion for judgment as a matter of law, which the lower court denied. Downing appealed the denial of his summary judgment motion on the misappropriation claims, the denial of his renewed motion, and the award of attorneys’ fees.

Post-trial review of summary judgment motion

The Eighth Circuit explained that denial of summary judgment is generally not reviewable after trial unless the motion presents a purely legal issue. The district court had found genuine disputes of material fact as to each of the four elements of Wilbur-Ellis’ misappropriation claims. Downing argued that the fixed factual record rendered the district court’s ruling purely legal. The Court disagreed, explaining that Downing’s sufficiency of the evidence arguments would require it to review the pretrial record, assess the evidence and permissible inferences, and determine whether a reasonable jury could find for Wilbur-Ellis. Because that inquiry did not present a “purely legal issue,” the Court declined to review the denial of summary judgment.

Attorneys’ fees

The Eighth Circuit vacated the award of attorneys’ fees, finding that the district court abused its discretion by failing to consider Wilbur-Ellis’ overall degree of success. Relying on the 1983 US Supreme Court decision in Hensley v. Eckerhart, the Eighth Circuit explained that although fees attributable to unsuccessful claims generally should be excluded, segregation may be impracticable when successful and unsuccessful claims arise from a common core of facts or related legal theories. The Eighth Circuit found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision not to segregate fees because Wilbur-Ellis’ claims were factually related. However, that determination did not relieve the district court of its separate obligation to evaluate whether the overall results obtained justified the fees awarded.

The Eighth Circuit [...]

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Flattery will get you nowhere: Copying and industry praise defeat obviousness challenge

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Patent Trial & Appeal Board’s decisions finding that Google failed to establish obviousness of certain challenged claims. The Court found that secondary considerations of nonobviousness, including evidence of copying and industry praise, outweighed Google’s evidence of obviousness. Google LLC v. DDC Technology, LLC, Case Nos. 25-1315; -1316; -1330 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 5, 2026) (Reyna, Hughes, Stark, JJ.)

DDC owns three patents directed to virtual reality viewers for use with smartphones. Google petitioned the Board for inter partes review (IPR) of those patents, asserting that the challenged claims were obvious over a combination of two prior art references. Although the Board found that the combined references taught every limitation of certain claims and that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine those references with a reasonable expectation of success, the Board nevertheless concluded that evidence of copying and industry praise outweighed Google’s evidence of obviousness. Google appealed.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s determination of nonobviousness and clarified the role of secondary considerations in the obviousness inquiry. As for the copying factor, the Federal Circuit explained that copying requires replication of a specific product, as opposed to merely showing that competing products fall within the same patent claims. Copying may be established through internal documents, direct evidence of replication, or evidence of access to and substantial similarity to the patented product. The Court rejected Google’s argument that the Board had improperly compared the products to the challenged claims rather than each other, noting that the Board directly compared Google’s viewer with DDC’s viewer and inventor Patrick Buckley’s prototype and found substantial similarity.

Next, Google attacked DDC’s industry praise evidence consisting of emails from Google engineers responding to videos of Buckley’s prototype with comments such as “[t]hat button is genius.” Google contended that these statements were biased compliments arising from a prospective business relationship rather than genuine industry praise. The Federal Circuit disagreed, explaining that the engineers were commenting on a third party’s prototype, and that the Board had accounted for the engineers’ potential lack of impartiality by discounting one response as mere politeness and recognizing that the business relationship reduced the probative value of the other two responses.

Google further argued that its “strong” prima facie case of obviousness outweighed DDC’s “marginal” evidence of secondary considerations. The Federal Circuit disagreed, citing two major reasons. First, the Federal Circuit clarified that the four-factor framework established by the US Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere requires analysis of all four factors governing obviousness, including secondary considerations of nonobviousness. This analysis must be conducted regardless of the strength of the prior art showing, although weak objective evidence may not overcome a substantially stronger showing of obviousness.

Second, the Federal Circuit distinguished the burden-shifting imposed during patent prosecution from IPR proceedings. During prosecution, an examiner’s prima facie showing of unpatentability shifts the burden of coming forward with evidence to the applicant. The Federal Circuit explained that this burden-shifting framework does not [...]

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It’s OK to keep some things close to your vest at trade secret pleading stage

The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed a dismissal of a Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) claim at the pleading stage, finding that a plaintiff need not disclose every detail of its trade secret to state a claim. The Court also found that misappropriation does not require exact copying but includes use of proprietary information to accelerate development of a competing product. SS&C Tech. Holdings, Inc. v. Arcesium LLC, Case No. 25-2049 (2d Cir. Nov. 3, 2026) (Sack, Livingston, Carney, JJ.)

SS&C owns Geneva, a portfolio accounting software platform used by financial institutions. In 2015, SS&C’s predecessor entered into an agreement authorizing Arcesium to sublicense Geneva and provide related services to customers. The agreement restricted Arcesium’s use of Geneva’s proprietary information and prohibited its use to develop competing products. While operating under the agreement, Arcesium developed its own competing portfolio accounting platform, Trinity, and a separate interface, Nautilus, that allegedly enabled continued access to Geneva after the license expired. SS&C alleged that Arcesium used Geneva’s proprietary data models, integration layer, and software functionality to develop these products. SS&C also pointed to internal communications discussing Geneva’s functionality, the accelerated development of Trinity, and Arcesium’s representations to customers that Trinity could replicate Geneva’s capabilities.

The district court dismissed SS&C’s misappropriation claims, finding that although SS&C adequately alleged the existence of trade secrets, it failed to plausibly allege that Arcesium misappropriated them. SS&C appealed.

Pleading a trade secret

Arcesium argued that SS&C failed to identify its alleged trade secrets with sufficient specificity, asserting that the complaint described only broad categories of information accessible to licensed users. The Second Circuit rejected that argument, explaining that a complaint need only identify the alleged trade secrets with sufficient detail to provide notice of the basis for the claim and permit the defendant to ascertain their boundaries. SS&C satisfied that standard by identifying Geneva’s executable software, integration layer, application programming interfaces, and data model, and explaining their functions.

The Second Circuit also rejected Arcesium’s argument that providing licensed customers with access to Geneva undermined its trade secret protection. The Court explained that disclosure to third parties does not necessarily destroy trade secret protection when the information is shared subject to confidentiality obligations. SS&C’s licensing restrictions and nondisclosure agreements sufficiently alleged reasonable measures to maintain secrecy.

Misappropriation

The Second Circuit also emphasized that misappropriation is not limited to exact copying. Citing to the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit’s decision in Oakwood Laboratories v. Thanoo (2021), the Second Circuit explained that “use” may include exploiting trade secrets to accelerate research and development, improve competing products, or solicit customers.

Applying that interpretation, the Second Circuit found that SS&C plausibly alleged misappropriation through Arcesium’s use of Geneva’s proprietary functionality to develop Trinity and Nautilus. The allegations included Arcesium’s replication of Geneva’s data models and integration layer, reliance on Geneva’s functionality to resolve technical problems, and development of competing software on an accelerated timeline.

The Second Circuit explained that these allegations must be considered collectively rather [...]

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Criminal counterfeiters beware: Second Circuit affirms prison sentence, restitution for counterfeit trafficking

The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a 24-month prison sentence and more than $111,000 in restitution for trafficking in counterfeit luxury goods, finding that the defendant’s supervisory role and the value of the counterfeit goods supported sentencing enhancements. The Court also concluded that harm to intangible trademark rights can support restitution under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), including expenses incurred investigating the counterfeiting. United States v. Sow, Case No. 25-2621-cr (2d Cir. Nov. 3, 2026) (Leval, Wesley, Bianco, JJ.)

Adama Sow pleaded guilty to trafficking counterfeit goods after law enforcement seized more than 80,000 items bearing counterfeit luxury trademarks from storage units she rented at a Manhattan facility. At a sentencing hearing, the district court heard testimony from two storage facility employees concerning Sow’s role in the operation and from an expert retained by the affected luxury brands concerning the value of the counterfeit goods.

The district court applied a two-level sentencing enhancement based on Sow’s supervisory role and a 20-level enhancement based on the value of the counterfeit goods, which it determined exceeded $9.5 million but did not exceed $25 million. These enhancements resulted in an advisory sentencing guidelines range of 70 to 87 months’ imprisonment. The district court nevertheless imposed a substantially reduced sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment and ordered Sow to pay $111,419.32 in restitution to the luxury brands for expenses associated with the expert’s investigation and testimony. Sow appealed.

Sow argued that 28 U.S.C. § 994(j) favored a noncustodial sentence because she was a first-time offender convicted of a nonviolent crime. The Second Circuit rejected that argument, explaining that § 994(j) directs the Sentencing Commission to recognize the general appropriateness of noncustodial sentences for certain first-time offenders but does not require courts to impose such sentences. The Second Circuit found that the district court properly considered the relevant sentencing factors, including the seriousness and duration of Sow’s counterfeiting operation, and exercised its discretion by imposing a sentence substantially below the advisory guidelines range.

The Second Circuit also affirmed both enhancements. The storage facility employees testified that Sow directed at least one assistant who regularly handled merchandise and performed tasks on her behalf. Although Sow challenged the testimony as unreliable and based partly on hearsay, the Court explained that sentencing courts may consider hearsay evidence bearing sufficient indicia of reliability. The employees’ firsthand observations and the district court’s credibility findings supported the supervisory role enhancement.

The Second Circuit likewise upheld the district court’s valuation enhancement. The district court credited expert testimony estimating the street value of the seized counterfeit goods and reduced that estimate by 10% to account for sales in locations such as Canal Street rather than traditional retail stores. The valuation was supported by evidence linking the seized goods to Sow and financial records reflecting millions of dollars flowing through her bank accounts. The Second Circuit found that the district court’s methodology provided a reasonable estimate of the counterfeit goods’ value.

Sow argued that the luxury brands had not established [...]

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The whey forward: Losing product-of-nature defense doesn’t make case exceptional

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed an attorneys’ fee award, finding that the district court erred in treating Supreme Court precedent on the patent eligibility of isolated natural products as dispositive of a dispute where additional issues regarding the claimed compositions’ characteristics and utility were involved. The Federal Circuit concluded that the patentee’s unsuccessful eligibility arguments were not exceptionally meritless under 35 U.S.C. § 285. ChromaDex, Inc. v. Elysium Health, Inc., Case No. 25-1227 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 30, 2026) (Prost, Chen, Stoll, JJ.) (nonprecedential).

ChromaDex and the Trustees of Dartmouth College (collectively, ChromaDex) owned patents directed to dietary supplement compositions containing isolated nicotinamide riboside (NR), a form of vitamin B3, formulated for oral administration to increase nicotinamide adenine dinucleotide (NAD+) biosynthesis. NR occurs naturally in cow’s milk, but only in trace amounts bound to a whey protein that prevents its bioavailability. Milk nevertheless increases NAD+ biosynthesis through another compound, tryptophan.

ChromaDex sued Elysium Health for patent infringement. The district court granted summary judgment that the asserted claims were ineligible under § 101 because they were directed to a product of nature, and the Federal Circuit affirmed (ChromaDex I).

Elysium subsequently sought attorneys’ fees under § 285, arguing that ChromaDex had pursued its infringement claims without meaningfully addressing the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, which held that merely isolating naturally occurring DNA does not render it patent eligible. The district court agreed, characterizing Myriad as dispositive and faulting ChromaDex for citing the decision only once in its summary judgment opposition. The district court awarded Elysium more than $9.1 million in attorneys’ fees, including $3.9 million incurred before the claim construction hearing. ChromaDex appealed.

The Federal Circuit concluded that the district court erred by treating Myriad as resolving the entire eligibility dispute. Although Myriad established that isolating NR from milk was insufficient, standing alone, to confer patent eligibility, ChromaDex had advanced a broader argument. Relying on the Supreme Court’s 1980 decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty and the Federal Circuit’s 2019 decision in Natural Alternatives International v. Creative Compounds, ChromaDex argued that isolating NR made it bioavailable, giving the claimed compositions markedly different characteristics and significant utility compared with naturally occurring milk. ChromaDex also supported its position with expert testimony.

The Federal Circuit explained that rejecting ChromaDex’s eligibility arguments in ChromaDex I required analysis beyond Myriad. In particular, the Court considered whether the claims required a particular quantity of isolated NR, whether they attributed increased NAD+ biosynthesis to the isolated NR, and whether the district court’s construction of “isolated” necessarily required bioavailability. The Court also considered that milk itself increases NAD+ biosynthesis through tryptophan. None of these issues was resolved by Myriad alone.

Regarding the attorneys’ fee award, the Federal Circuit emphasized that an unsuccessful legal position does not necessarily make a case exceptional under § 285. The relevant inquiry is the substantive strength of the party’s position, not whether it ultimately prevailed. Because ChromaDex’s eligibility arguments required substantive analysis and [...]

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Forum contacts must be linked to alleged trade secret misappropriation to establish personal jurisdiction

The US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of federal and state trade secret misappropriation claims against three out-of-state defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding that although the defendants purposefully directed activities toward Colorado, the plaintiffs failed to establish that their alleged injuries arose out of or related to those contacts. Flux Drive Inc. v. Rong, Case Nos. 25-1308; 26-1013; -1292 (10th Cir. Oct. 30, 2026) (Matheson, McHugh, Federico, JJ.)

Flux Drive alleged that a former senior design engineer, Michael Sparks, conspired with John Qiang Rong, Rong’s wife Leigh Wang, and Zyrcon Global Strategies to misappropriate proprietary technology related to industrial drive equipment and transfer it to PRD Technologies, a Chinese manufacturer. According to Flux, Rong facilitated the alleged scheme by serving as a technical liaison between Sparks and PRD, transmitting a master services agreement under which Sparks performed engineering work for PRD, and helping provide financing to Sparks.

Rong and Wang, both Illinois residents, maintained that Rong merely assisted with communications between Sparks and PRD, and that the $23,000 transferred to Sparks’ Colorado bank account was a short-term bridge loan that was repaid within a month.

Flux sued in the District of Colorado, asserting claims under the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA), the Colorado Uniform Trade Secrets Act, and several common law theories. Rong, Wang, and Zyrcon moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court granted the motion and subsequently awarded the defendants attorneys’ fees under Colorado Revised Statutes § 13-17-201, which mandates reasonable attorneys’ fees when certain tort actions are dismissed on a pretrial motion under Rule 12(b). Flux appealed both the dismissal and the fee awards.

The Tenth Circuit first addressed whether the defendants had sufficient contacts with Colorado to support specific personal jurisdiction. The Court explained that the DTSA does not independently authorize nationwide service of process and that Flux therefore had to establish personal jurisdiction under Colorado law and constitutional due process principles.

The Tenth Circuit concluded that Flux had made a prima facie showing that the defendants purposefully directed activities toward Colorado. Rong repeatedly communicated with Sparks, knowing that Sparks resided in Colorado; Sparks testified that Rong was someone to whom he was expected to report; and the defendants transferred $23,000 to Sparks’ Colorado bank account. Those contacts were sufficient to satisfy the purposeful-direction requirement at the preliminary stage.

Flux nevertheless failed to establish that its claims arose out of or were related to those contacts. Although Rong allegedly transmitted the master services agreement, Flux did not explain how that agreement facilitated the theft of its trade secrets. Similarly, Flux offered no evidence that the $23,000 loan was used to purchase equipment employed in the alleged misappropriation, or that the defendants knew or controlled how the funds would be used. The Tenth Circuit emphasized that allegations of a supervisory relationship or participation in a broader scheme, without a factual connection between the forum contacts and the claimed injuries, were insufficient to establish specific jurisdiction. It therefore [...]

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Ownership of compilation doesn’t mean ownership of individual copyrights

The US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment of noninfringement, finding that ownership of a copyright in a compilation does not confer rights in its individual components and that a subsequent copyright assignment remains subject to a previously granted irrevocable oral license. Center for Gestalt Development, Inc. v. Bowman, Case No. 25-3336 (7th Cir. Oct. 26, 2026) (Scudder, Pryor, Maldanado, JJ.)

Dr. Frederick Perls, a pioneer of gestalt therapy, authored an unpublished article titled “Psychopathology of Awareness.” In 1991, his widow’s estate granted the Center for Gestalt Development exclusive rights to publish a collection of Perls’ unpublished manuscripts, including the “Psychopathology” article. The Center did not publish the collection until 2021. Meanwhile, Charles Bowman and Jean-Marie Robine published the article in a 2019 book accompanied by commentary from other gestalt therapists. In 2019 or 2020, Perls’ children, who had inherited the copyright in the article, orally authorized Bowman and Robine to use the article in exchange for royalties. In 2021, the children settled a separate lawsuit with the Center by assigning their rights in the article to the Center for the duration of the litigation. The Center sued Bowman and Robine for copyright infringement. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Bowman and Robine, finding that the Center’s original rights extended only to the collection and that its subsequent acquisition of the article’s copyright was subject to the earlier oral license. The Center appealed.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed, explaining that the Copyright Act distinguishes between ownership of a compilation and ownership of the individual works the compilation contains. Under § 103(b), a compilation copyright protects only the original material contributed by the compiler, such as the selection, coordination, or arrangement of the underlying works. Section 201(c) further provides that copyright in an individual contribution is distinct from copyright in the collective work as a whole. Relying on the US Supreme Court’s decisions in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. (1991) and New York Times Co. v. Tasini (2001), the Seventh Circuit explained that the Center’s 1991 agreement conveyed rights in the collection’s “selective curation,” not in the article standing alone. Because Bowman and Robine reproduced only the article, rather than the collection, their use did not infringe the Center’s compilation copyright.

The Seventh Circuit next addressed the Center’s acquisition of the article’s copyright in 2021. By that time, Perls’ children had already granted Bowman and Robine a nonexclusive oral license to publish the article. The Court explained that although § 204(a) of the Copyright Act, sometimes called the Statute of Frauds, requires transfers of copyright ownership to be in writing, nonexclusive licenses are exempt from that requirement under § 101. The license was also irrevocable because Bowman and Robine had paid royalties in exchange for permission to use the article. Accordingly, the Center acquired the article’s copyright subject to the existing license and could not revoke Bowman and Robine’s authorization to continue publishing it.

The Seventh Circuit also rejected the Center’s argument [...]

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Computer metadata corroborates conception

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a Patent Trial & Appeal Board decision finding that Google failed to establish unpatentability of challenged claims because the patent owner successfully antedated the asserted prior art reference using inventor testimony corroborated by metadata. Google LLC v. Valtrus Innovations Ltd., Case No. 2024-1945 (Fed Cir. Oct. 19, 2026) (Hughes, Cunningham, Burroughs, JJ.)

Valtrus owns a patent directed to methods for merging search results from multiple search engines. Google petitioned for inter partes review (IPR) of the patent, asserting four grounds for obviousness. Each ground relied on the same primary prior art reference, Bushee. Although Bushee was filed about five weeks before the application for Valtrus’ patent, the patent was governed by pre-America Invents Act (AIA) law. Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) permitted Valtrus to antedate Bushee by establishing conception before Bushee’s filing date and reasonably continuous diligence from just before that date until Valtrus filed its patent application.

Valtrus submitted an inventor declaration, original invention disclosure documents, and associated Microsoft Word metadata to establish conception before Bushee’s filing date. The Board found that the disclosure documents and metadata corroborated the inventor’s testimony, and that Valtrus had demonstrated reasonably continuous diligence through the filing of its patent application. The Board determined that Bushee was not prior art under pre-AIA § 102(e) and that Google had failed to establish the unpatentability of any challenged claim. Google appealed.

Reviewing the Board’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for substantial evidence, the Federal Circuit affirmed. Google argued that the invention disclosure documents and accompanying metadata could not independently corroborate the inventor’s testimony because both were entirely within the inventor’s control. The Federal Circuit disagreed, relying on its 2025 decision in Global Health Solutions v. Selner, which recognized that automatically generated metadata is independent of an inventor’s own statements and documents. Assuming without deciding the metadata’s authenticity, the Court explained that the Microsoft Word metadata was not authored by the inventor and contained authorship and timestamp information consistent with his asserted conception date. The Court distinguished such metadata from unwitnessed inventor-created documents, which cannot independently corroborate conception testimony, and noted Google’s acknowledgment at oral argument that corroboration need not come from a human source. Applying the rule of reason, the Court concluded that substantial evidence supported the Board’s finding that the disclosure documents and metadata corroborated the inventor’s testimony.

Google also challenged the Board’s finding that the inventor exercised reasonably continuous diligence in reducing the invention to practice. The Federal Circuit explained that although reasonable diligence must be established throughout the critical period, it need not be perfectly continuous, and evidence of activity on each day of the diligence period is unnecessary if the record provides a satisfactory explanation for any gaps. Google disputed only the approximately 11 business days between August 8 and August 27, 2001, when the patent application was filed. The Court found substantial evidence supporting diligence during that period, including the time required to mail the last inventor’s signed [...]

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Headnote to self: Third Circuit rejects fair use defense for AI training

The US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed a grant of partial summary judgment in favor of Thomson Reuters, finding that Westlaw’s editorial headnotes were copyrightable and that use of those headnotes to train an artificial intelligence (AI) legal-research platform did not constitute fair use. Characterizing the dispute as “no more than an ordinary copyright case,” the Court emphasized that its decision did not resolve broader questions concerning generative AI training. Thomson Reuters Enterprise Centre GmbH v. ROSS Intelligence Inc., Case No. 25-2153 (3d Cir. Sept. 29, 2026) (Restrepo, Montgomery-Reeves, Bove, JJ.)

Thomson Reuters operates Westlaw, a legal-research platform that provides judicial opinions accompanied by editor-written headnotes summarizing key points of law. Although judicial opinions are not copyrightable, Thomson Reuters claimed copyright protection in the headnotes, which its editors prepare under detailed guidelines requiring them to identify and summarize significant legal principles in concise standalone statements.

ROSS developed a non-generative-AI legal-research platform designed to respond to users’ legal questions by identifying relevant passages from about 10 million judicial opinions. To train its platform, ROSS retained LegalEase Solutions to prepare about 25,000 memoranda, each containing a legal question and four to six responsive judicial opinions. LegalEase used thousands of Westlaw headnotes to formulate the questions. ROSS intended to compete directly with Westlaw and marketed its platform at comparable prices.

Thomson Reuters sued ROSS for copyright infringement. The district court granted partial summary judgment, finding that 2,243 headnotes identified by Thomson Reuters’ expert were sufficiently original to warrant copyright protection and that ROSS’s use of those headnotes was not fair use. The district court certified the originality and fair use issues for interlocutory appeal.

The Third Circuit first addressed copyrightability. Applying the “extremely low” originality threshold established in the Supreme Court’s 1991 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. decision, the Third Circuit concluded that the headnotes contained sufficient creativity because editors exercised judgment in selecting which legal principles to summarize and how to express them. The Third Circuit rejected ROSS’s argument that copyright protection would effectively grant Thomson Reuters a monopoly over the law, explaining that judicial opinions remained freely available. The Court also rejected ROSS’s merger doctrine argument, finding that the underlying legal principles could be expressed in many ways.

Turning to fair use, the Third Circuit considered the four statutory factors under 17 U.S.C. § 107:

  • As to the purpose and character of the use, the Court found ROSS’s use commercial and, at most, minimally transformative because both platforms served the same purpose, which was helping users locate relevant legal materials. Although ROSS used the headnotes to train its AI platform rather than displaying them, it could have relied on freely available judicial opinions instead. This factor weighed against fair use.
  • The nature of the copyrighted work weighed slightly in ROSS’s favor because the headnotes primarily conveyed factual information and legal principles. The Court noted, however, that this factor generally carries limited weight.
  • The amount and substantiality of the portion used weighed against fair use [...]

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