Trademark Trial & Appeal Board Archives - Page 3 of 8

Trademark Trial & Appeal Board

And All That Jazz: Trademark Used for One Service Doesn’t Permit Tacking for Others

by Kyle Sorenson, PhD | Apr 13, 2023 | Trademarks

Reversing the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board’s decision to dismiss an opposition, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit addressed the requirements for a trademark owner to employ “tacking” based on the use of a mark for one service in the context of a trademark application listing multiple services. Bertini v. Apple Inc., Case No. 21-2301 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 4, 2023) (Moore, C.J.; Taranto, Chen, JJ.)

Charles Bertini is a professional jazz musician who filed a notice of opposition to Apple’s application to register the mark APPLE MUSIC. Because the parties did not dispute that there was a likelihood of confusion between the two marks, the only disputed issue was which party’s mark was entitled to an earlier priority date. Bertini’s mark, APPLE JAZZ, had a priority date of June 13, 1985, for use in live music festivals and concerts. Apple’s mark, APPLE MUSIC, which was the subject of the opposition, had a priority date of June 8, 2015. In its application, Apple sought to register its mark for 15 broad service categories, including the production and distribution of sound recordings and the arranging, organizing, conducting and presenting of live musical performances.

Because Bertini’s mark had the earlier priority date, Apple attempted to use tacking to claim an earlier priority date to an APPLE mark used by Apple Corps. for gramophone records featuring music since August 1968. Apple purchased this mark from the Beatles’ Apple Corps. in 2007. Tacking allows a trademark owner to give a newly modified mark the priority date of its old mark, but only if both marks “create the same, continuing commercial impression so that consumers consider both as the same mark.” The Board found that Apple was entitled to tack back to use the 1968 date of use of the APPLE MUSIC mark and thus had priority over Bertini. The Board accordingly dismissed Bertini’s opposition. Bertini appealed.

The Federal Circuit first addressed the tacking standard in the context of trademark registration. The Court explained that in order to obtain an earlier priority date through tacking, an applicant must show that the old mark was associated with all of the goods and/or services listed in its application as of the proposed earlier priority date. The Court found that Apple failed to meet this burden. As of 1968, the APPLE mark was not associated with the service of “arranging, organizing, conducting, and presenting live musical performances.” Because this service was listed in Apple’s trademark application, the APPLE MUSIC mark application was not entitled to claim priority back to the priority date of the Apple Corps. APPLE mark. The Court noted that Bertini only needed to show priority of use of APPLE JAZZ for any service listed in Apple’s application to succeed in his opposition. Because the Court rejected Apple’s attempt to tack back to the 1968 priority date for all of Apple’s listed services where Apple could only show priority for one service listed in its application, Bertini met this burden. The Court also concluded [...]

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“Goods in Trade” in the Age of the Internet

by Lillian Spetrino | Apr 6, 2023 | Trademarks

The Trademark Trial & Appeal Board recently redefined what it takes in the age of the internet to meet the “goods in trade” requirement for registrability by holding that the Lens.com three-factor test is the universal legal standard for that inquiry. In re The New York Times Company, Serial Nos. 90106071, 90112154, 90112577, 90115155, 90115491, 90115337 (TTAB Mar. 30, 2023) (Lykos, J.) (precedential).

The New York Times applied to trademark six column names: “The New Old Age,” “A Good Appetite,” “Hungry City,” “Work Friend,” “Off the Shelf” and “Like a Boss.” The Examining Attorney issued a final refusal, explaining that the specimens did not demonstrate that the marks were used on separate goods in trade. The Times appealed. The question before the Board was whether the printed columns were independent “goods in trade.”

The Board reversed the refusal and held that The Times could register the marks. While past decisions had found that non-syndicated print newspaper columns failed to rise to the level of “goods in trade,” the Board reasoned that those decisions were based on the fact that such columns were only available to consumers as part of an overall purchase of a particular print publication—but in the age of the internet, that is no longer the case. The Board reasoned that determining whether a non-syndicated column is a good in trade should not depend on the format in which it is offered.

The Board held that going forward, the appropriate test to apply to non-syndicated print columns or sections in printed publications or recorded media is the three-part test found in the 2012 Federal Circuit Lens.com decision. The Federal Circuit test outlines the following factors to consider when evaluating whether an applicant’s goods are “goods in trade”:

Are the goods for which registration is sought a conduit or necessary tool useful only in connection with the applicant’s primary goods or services?
Are the goods for which registration is sought so inextricably tied to and associated with the primary goods or services as to have no viable existence apart from them?
Are the goods for which registration is sought neither sold separately nor do they have any independent value apart from the primary goods or services?

Applying the Lens.com factors to the print columns, the Board concluded that the columns were “goods in trade” even though they were not syndicated.

As to the first factor, the Board found that the columns were not just a conduit or necessary tool to get to The New York Times newspaper in print. The Board reasoned that the columns were not like an instructional manual or brochure telling the reader how to navigate The New York Times print edition.

Regarding the second factor, the Board found probative that a Google search of the proposed trademarks yielded the columns for which registration was sought. The Board found that this demonstrated that each individual print column was not so “inextricably tied to and associated with The New York Times print edition of the [...]

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Actual or Potential Consumers in Related Goods Context Doesn’t Require PURE Overlap

by Benjamin Ediger, Ph.D. | Mar 23, 2023 | Trademarks

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reminded us that, in the context of related goods, the likelihood of confusion analysis does not require that actual or potential consumers of the goods be the same, but only that there be sufficient overlap. In re Oxiteno S.A. Industria e Comercio, Case No. 22-1213 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 9, 2023) (Dyk, Bryson, Prost, JJ.)

Oxiteno filed an intent-to-use trademark application for OXIPURITY, with its goods and services statement ultimately amended to include dozens of chemical products “for use in the pharmaceutical, veterinary, flavor and fragrance, and cosmetic fields.” The application was refused on likelihood of confusion grounds in view of FMC Corporation’s registered OXYPURE mark, largely because the hydrogen peroxide products covered by the OXYPURE registration moved through the same channels of trade as products recited in the Oxiteno application.

Oxiteno appealed the refusal to the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board. The Board analyzed likelihood of confusion using the DuPont factors and found the first four factors most relevant:

Factor 1: The similarity of OXIPURITY and OXYPURE. The Board concluded (as had the Examiner) that the two marks were “similar in sound, meaning and commercial impression,” and found that this factor strongly favored a likelihood of confusion.

Factor 2: The similarity of the covered goods. The Board agreed with the Examiner that the respective goods, while not the same, were sufficiently related to favor a likelihood of confusion finding.

Factor 3: The similarity of channels of trade. The Board reviewed the third-party websites that the Examiner considered particularly dispositive. The websites sold hydrogen peroxide goods covered by the OXYPURE mark and the chemicals Oxiteno intended to sell under the OXIPURITY mark. The Board concluded that the same sources manufactured FMC’s established products and Oxiteno’s intent-too-use products, and directly sold these products to largely overlapping industries.

Factor 4: “[t]he conditions under which and buyers to whom sales are made.” Of the four most relevant factors in this case, this was the only factor that the Board found to favor registration. The Board concluded that the consumers of the established and intent-to-use products would be sophisticated and not act on impulse.

Despite the potential consumers’ presumed sophistication, the Board found that factors 1 through 3 “rendered confusion likely” and thus affirmed the Examiner’s refusal. Oxiteno appealed.

Oxiteno argued that likelihood of confusion could not be found when the actual or potential consumers of the respective products covered by two marks were not the same, as with the relevant products here.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board, noting statements made by a company selling Oxiteno’s products that explained why almost every business is a potential purchaser of FMC’s OXYPURE hydrogen peroxide products. The Court also noted that FMC’s brochures stated that it sold its hydrogen peroxide products under OXYPURE and other brand names to the same key industries to which Oxiteno sold its products. The Court, therefore, concluded that substantial evidence supported that at least some [...]

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Took a DNA Test, Turns Out “100% THAT BITCH” Is 100% Registrable

by Eleanor B. Atkins | Feb 16, 2023 | Trademarks

Addressing a refusal to register for failure to function as a trademark, the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board (Board) reversed, finding that the evidence of consumer perception of “100% THAT BITCH” did not demonstrate that the proposed mark is such a widespread and common expression that it failed to function as a source identifier. In re Lizzo LLC, Serial Nos. 88466264, 88466281 (TTAB Feb. 2, 2023) (Cataldo, Pologeorgis, Coggins, ATJ).

World-renowned, Grammy-winning artist Lizzo, through her company, Lizzo LLC, filed two applications to register 100% THAT BITCH for use in connection with clothing and related goods in International Class 25. The mark is a reference to a lyric (“I just took a DNA test, turns out I’m 100% that bitch”) from her chart-topping hit, “Truth Hurts.” The US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) issued an office action refusing to register the mark based on failure to function as a trademark under Sections 1, 2 and 45 of the Trademark Act. Specifically, the examining attorney asserted that the phrase is a “commonplace expression widely used by a variety of sources to convey an ordinary, familiar, well-recognized sentiment.” The PTO denied the request for reconsideration, and Lizzo appealed.

In assessing a refusal to register for failure to function as a trademark, the Board must look to consumer perception of the mark; specifically, whether the mark serves merely an ornamental or informational purpose rather than a source-identifying one. In this case, the relevant consumer consists of the general public, as there were no limitations on the channels of trade or classes of consumers identified in the applications. The examining attorney argued that the evidence demonstrated only that the mark, as used on the relevant goods, portrayed “a message of self-confidence and female empowerment used by many different entities in a variety of settings”—a message that Lizzo “did not originate[,] . . . but merely popularized.”

The Board discounted much of the evidence proffered to show that the mark was ornamental as it largely all referred to Lizzo, her music and/or her song, “Truth Hurts,” demonstrating that “consumers encountering 100% THAT BITCH on the specific types of clothing identified in the application—even when offered by third parties—associate the term with Lizzo and her music.” The Board further noted that all of the evidence regarding third-party use corresponded with the release of Lizzo’s “Truth Hurts”—a correlation that suggests the term was not widely known or used until Lizzo popularized it.

Although there was no disagreement that the proposed mark conveys a “feeling of female strength, empowerment and independence,” the Board found that the record supported that “most consumers would perceive 100% THAT BITCH used on goods in the application as associated with Lizzo rather than as a commonplace expression.” Accordingly, the Board reversed the refusal to register.

Strings Attached: No Amendment for Trademark Application in Inter Partes Opposition Proceeding

by Joshua Revilla | Feb 2, 2023 | Trademarks

The Trademark Trial & Appeal Board (Board) designated as precedential a decision denying a motion to amend and granting partial summary judgment based on a mistaken identification that did not match the goods sold using the trademark. Fender Musical Instruments Corporation v. Win-D-Fender, LLC, Opp. No. 91272326 (TTAB Sept. 22, 2022) (designated precedential Jan. 12, 2023) (Wolfson, Heasley, Cogins, ATJs) (By the Board).

Win-D-Fender applied for a trademark to register the mark EN-D-FENDER for “musical instruments.” Fender opposed this registration on grounds of nonuse, likelihood of confusion and dilution by blurring and filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground of nonuse. Win-D-Fender then filed a motion to amend the identification of goods in its application from “musical instruments” to “musical instrument accessories, namely, an ambient wind foot joint guard for flute family instruments.”

The Board first considered Win-D-Fender’s motion to amend. Under the relevant trademark rules, an application that is subject to an inter partes proceeding may only be amended if the other party consents (Fender did not) and the Board gives approval, or if the Board grants a motion to amend.

Win-D-Fender filed its application via the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). In a TEAS application, only the goods listed in the proper field can be considered for the identification of goods and broadening the scope of the identification is not permitted. In Win-D-Fender’s application, the only goods listed in the “Identification” field were “musical instruments.” Win-D-Fender argued that its application included a miscellaneous statement reading, “For Musical Instrument Accessories namely a wind guard mounted to a flute.” The Board determined, however, that the description was not in the proper field and therefore was not considered in the identified goods. The Board explained that the TEAS Plus instructions warn applicants to not use the TEAS Plus “Identification” field if it does not contain an accurate listing of the goods and services and to instead use the TEAS Standard filing option. The Board noted that although the identification of “musical instruments” may have been a mistake, it is settled that an established identification cannot later be expanded. The Board concluded that Win-D-Fender was limited to amendments that would narrow or clarify the type of “musical instruments.”

Win-D-Fender also argued that musical instrument accessories would fall under the general umbrella of musical instruments. The Board stated that while musical instruments may use accessories, the accessories themselves are not musical instruments and are not encompassed in the “musical instrument” class. The Board, therefore, denied the motion to amend the identification of goods.

The Board next considered Fender’s motion for summary judgment on the ground of nonuse. An application based on use of the mark in commerce is void if the mark was not used in commerce in connection with the goods identified in the application. As the Board had already decided, Win-D-Fender’s mark was limited to musical instruments and did not include accessories. Fender specifically pointed to an interrogatory response in which Win-D-Fender stated that the products sold under the [...]

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“Open Sesame” Without Translation Won’t Open Door to Trademark Registration

by Courtney Seams | Feb 2, 2023 | Trademarks

The Trademark Trial & Appeal Board (Board) addressed, for the first time, whether an applicant is required to submit an English translation for a word that is created by spelling out the pronunciation of Chinese characters using Latin characters. The Board concluded that the mark required an English translation and upheld the examining attorney’s refusal to register the mark because there was no translation submitted. In re Advanced New Technologies Co., Ltd., Application No. 86832288 (TTAB Jan. 12, 2023) (Bergsman, Taylor, Heasley, ATJs).

Advanced New Technologies sought to register the mark ZHIMA for several goods and services classes. Advanced has a co-pending application for a mark using Chinese characters, where Advanced stated that “[t]he non-Latin characters in the mark translate to ‘ZHIMA’ and this means ‘SESAME’ in English.” According to Advanced, “the Chinese characters [] pronounced ZHIMA mean ‘sesame,’ but ‘Zhima’ itself has no meaning.” The application for ZHIMA was assigned to Advanced by Alibaba Group Holding Limited. Ali Baba is the hero of an Arabian Nights story who opens the door to a thieves’ den using the magical phrase “open sesame.” The use of the Chinese word for “sesame” on goods thus creates an impression that these goods and services bring customers access to something previously unattainable.

Under 37 C.F.R. § 2.32(a)(9), a trademark application must contain an English translation when the mark includes non-English wording. To determine whether a mark includes non-English wording and its meaning, the examining attorney may use dictionaries and search engines. If the examining attorney discovers that the mark contains non-English wording, the applicant must submit a translation. Following this statutory framework, the examining attorney in this case relied on the Chinese English Pinyin Dictionary, which translates “zhi ma” as “sesame” in English and required Advanced to submit a translation that “ZHI MA” means “sesame” in English.

Advanced argued that individuals fluent in English and Chinese would not transliterate “ZHI MA” back into its Chinese character counterparts, which actually do translate to “sesame.” In response, the examining attorney provided at least eight dictionary definitions where “zhima” was defined as “sesame.” Advanced then argued that the dictionaries were defining the Chinese characters, not the English transliteration because “ZHIMA” itself has no meaning in English.

The examining attorney modified the required translation statement to state that “ZHIMA is a transliteration of Chinese characters that means ‘sesame’ in English.” However, Advanced still refused to submit a translation, claiming that it was not required because there are no Chinese characters in the ZHIMA mark and the meaning of the Chinese characters cannot attach to a mark without them. The examining attorney provided information from many news articles where “zhima” was translated as “sesame.” For example, in articles referencing a Chinese version of Sesame Street, “Sesame” was translated as “Zhima.” The examining attorney also produced multiple websites discussing “zhima” products, all of which were sesame products.

The Board found that the many examples where “zhima” was translated as “sesame” by third parties demonstrated that ZHIMA was not an original [...]

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Deleting Goods from Registration Subject to Cancellation During Audit May Result in Adverse Judgment

by Eleanor B. Atkins | Jan 26, 2023 | Trademarks

The Trademark Trial & Appeal Board (Board) addressed, for the first time, whether the deletion of goods and services as a result of a post-registration audit during a cancellation proceeding triggers Trademark Rule 2.134 and found that it does. The Board required the respondent to show cause as to why its deletion of certain goods from the challenged registration should not result in an adverse judgment. Ruifei (Shenzhen) Smart Technology Co., Ltd. v. Shenzhen Chengyan Science and Technology Co., Ltd., Cancellation No. 92077931 (TTAB Jan. 12, 2023) (Lykos, Lynch, Larkin, ATJ)

Ruifei (Shenzhen) Smart Technology petitioned to cancel a trademark that was registered to Shenzhen Chengyan Science and Technology Co., Ltd. (Chengyan) based on abandonment and fraud. Ruifei thereafter filed a motion for leave to amend its pleadings and concurrently filed a motion for partial summary judgment. Finding that Chengyan did not contest the motion for leave to amend, the Board granted Ruifei’s motion and accepted the proposed amended petition to cancel. The summary judgment motion, however, was deferred, pending Chengyan’s response to the instant order.

After the cancellation proceeding was initiated, Chengyan filed a Section 8 Declaration of Use in connection with the contested registration and received a post-registration office action audit. In response to the audit, Chengyan deleted some of the goods from the contested registration’s identification.

Ruifei mentioned the amendment to the contested registration in its motion for partial summary judgment. The Board, having been made aware of the deletion of goods, held that the amendment raised new issues requiring Chengyan’s input before it could consider the motion for partial summary judgment.

Without the written consent of a petitioner, a respondent’s deletion of goods or services from a registration subject to a pending cancellation action typically would result in judgment against the respondent under Trademark Rule 2.134. The purpose of this rule is to prevent respondents in cancellation proceedings from avoiding judgment by cancelling certain goods or services to render the cancellation action moot.

Trademark Rule 2.134(b) provides respondents with the opportunity to explain why certain goods or services were cancelled under Section 8 to avoid judgment being entered against them:

After the commencement of a cancellation proceeding, if it comes to the attention of the . . . Board that the respondent has permitted its involved registration to be cancelled under section 8 . . . an order may be issued allowing respondent . . . to show cause why such cancellation . . . should not be deemed to be the equivalent of a cancellation by request of respondent without the consent of the adverse party and should not result in entry of judgment against respondent.

The Board had not previously considered a situation in which goods or services were deleted as a result of a post-registration audit but held that the “same concerns . . . and [] policies underlying Trademark Rule 2.134(b) apply.” Accordingly, the Board granted Chengyan 20 days to file a response showing why its deletion of certain goods should not [...]

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Press # For Options, but Not for a Trademark Registration

by Brennen Baylor | Nov 29, 2022 | Trademarks

In a precedential opinion addressing the most fundamental requirement for trademark protection, the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board (Board) affirmed the US Patent & Trademark Office’s (PTO) refusal to register a “#” based mark on the ground that it fails to function as a mark. In re Pound Law, LLC, Ser. No. 87724338 (TTAB Nov. 9, 2022) (Adlin, Lynch, Larkin, ATJ)

Pound Law, claiming acquired distinctiveness under Section 2(f) of the Lanham Act, sought to register #LAW as a mark for providing legal services and legal referral services to consumers seeking a lawyer where legal representation or referral is initiated by phone. During prosecution, the Examining Attorney refused registration on the ground that #LAW failed to function as a service mark, reasoning that a consumer would only understand that dialing #LAW would put them in contact with some legal service provider, but not specifically Pound Law. Pound Law appealed.

Pound Law argued that the Examining Attorney improperly applied a per se rule against mnemonic or vanity telephone number marks as being incapable of functioning as a mark identifying the source of goods or services. In response, the Examining Attorney asserted that the PTO refused registration only after engaging in a specimen-based determination tailored to the #LAW mark. The Examining Attorney argued that, based on the manner of using the mark with a telephone, a consumer would regard #LAW only as a means of contacting Pound Law and concluded that #LAW does not indicate the source of legal services to be rendered, only a means by which legal services might be obtained.

To assess whether #LAW conveys an informational message or functions as a source identifier, the Board considered whether the nature of #LAW affects consumer perception of the asserted mark. The Board cited examples #LAW or #law being used throughout the legal industry, including as a hashtag in social media content. The Board reasoned that, in the context of social media, a hashtag functions as a searchable keyword, not as a source identifier. Pound Law argued that it ran radio advertisements vocalizing #LAW as “pound law” to explain to consumers that the asserted mark is not a hashtag.

The Board did not find Pound Law’s evidence persuasive, explaining that Pound Law’s radio advertising was insufficient to instill Pound Law as the source of the legal services in a consumer’s mind since “there is no correct pronunciation of a trademark, and consumers may pronounce a mark differently than intended by the brand owner.” The Board also pointed to evidence of Pound Law’s “extensive visual-only advertising,” which does not distinguish the use of an octothorpe as specifically a pound sign on a telephone keypad as opposed to a hashtag used on social media platforms. The Board concluded that many consumers would understand and pronounce #LAW as a hashtag (i.e., vocalized as “hashtag law”) “given the prevalence of social media and hashtags.” On this point, the Board highlighted “quite persuasive” evidence of numerous examples from the record showing third parties—e.g., law firms, legal [...]

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Up in Smoke: TTAB Dismisses E-Cigarette Opposition, Provides Guidance for Effective Evidence and Testimony

by Sarah Bro | Nov 10, 2022 | Trademarks

In a precedential opinion, the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board (Board) dismissed an opposition filed against an application for registration of a logo mark containing the word “SMOKES,” finding no likelihood of confusion with the opposer’s registered mark SMOK. The Board cited the dissimilarity of the marks and the weakness of the common mark element SMOK, as well as a lack of evidence that the parties’ trade channels overlapped. Shenzhen IVPS Technology Co. Ltd. v. Fancy Pants Products, LLC, Opp. No. 91263919 (Oct. 31, 2022) (precedential) (Goodman, Pologeorgis, English, ATJ). The decision was rendered without a brief, testimony or evidence filed by the trademark applicant.

Fancy Pants Products filed an application to register a logo mark (depicted above) that included the stylized word “SMOKES.” The application record disclaimed “smokes,” meaning that Fancy Pants conceded that the word “smokes” was not inherently distinctive for its applied-for goods: “[c]igarettes containing tobacco substitutes … with a delta-9 THC concentration of not more than 0.3% on a dry weight basis,” i.e., a description for hemp-derived products eligible for federal registration in accordance with the 2018 Farm Bill. Shenzhen IVPS Technology opposed registration of Fancy Pants’ mark on the ground of likelihood of confusion with Shenzhen’s alleged rights in the trademark SMOK. In support of the opposition, Shenzhen pleaded ownership of 11 registered SMOK and SMOK-variant marks for electronic cigarettes, parts and components (among other goods) and related retail services.

Fancy Pants did not take testimony or introduce any evidence during its testimony period, nor did it file a brief. The Board noted, however, that Fancy Pants was not required to make these submissions because Shenzhen bore the burden of proving its entitlement to a statutory cause of action and its trademark “likelihood of confusion” claim by a preponderance of the evidence.

The Board first looked at what trademark rights Shenzhen could properly rely on in the opposition proceeding in view of the rights pleaded. As a result of Shenzhen’s errors in the presentation of its trademark registrations into the record with respect to verifying the current status and title of the registrations, the Board found that 10 of Shenzhen’s 11 pleaded trademark registrations were not properly made of record. Nevertheless, Shenzhen was allowed to rely on common law rights for these 10 SMOK-variant trademarks since Fancy Pants failed to object to Shenzhen’s evidence of common law use.

Having determined the scope of the trademark rights at issue, the Board turned to the issue of priority in Shenzhen’s alleged trademarks. Priority over Fancy Pants’ mark was not at issue with respect to Shenzhen’s one properly pleaded §2(f) trademark registration for the SMOK mark that was made of record (and the goods and services covered thereby). As to Shenzhen’s common law rights in its alleged family of the other 10 SMOK-variant marks, the Board explained that Shenzhen first had to establish that it even owned a “family” of marks—i.e., marks that share a “recognizable common characteristic” [...]

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Long Live the Kingpin: No Abandonment Based on Nonuse During Drug Sanctions Period

by Amol Parikh | Oct 13, 2022 | Trademarks

In a precedential decision, the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board (Board) dismissed an opposition, finding that the trademark applicant’s long period of nonuse due to government sanctions was excusable nonuse and not abandonment. ARSA Distributing, Inc. v. Salud Natural Mexicana S.A. de C.V., Opposition No. 91240240, 91243700 (TTAB Sept. 28, 2022) (Taylor, Greenbaum, English, ATJ)

Salud sought a trademark registration of the standard character mark EUCALIN for “pharmaceutical products, namely, vitamin supplements, nutritional supplement made with a syrup with jelly base, honey base, and with a mixture of plants with propolis base, and herbal remedies in the nature of herbal supplements,” and the composite mark set forth below for “herbal supplements; nutritional supplements; vitamin supplements.”

ARSA opposed the registration, alleging prior common law use of the mark EUCALIN for “dietary and nutritional supplements.” ARSA argued that its sales and advertising of its EUCALIN product from 2008 to October 6, 2015, and October 9, 2017, established that ARSA had used its EUCALIN mark long before the constructive use filing dates of Salud’s application. Thus, ARSA had priority of use of the EUCALIN mark on nutritional and dietary supplements.

In response, Salud asserted it had priority in the EUCALIN mark based on use since 1999. Salud argued that between 1999 and October 2008, ARSA was Salud’s US distributor and, therefore, all goodwill for any EUCALIN-labeled product went to Salud as the supplier of the goods and products.

ARSA asserted that there was no distribution agreement between the parties, but even if Salud “could have reasonably claimed rights based on some alleged distribution agreement before 2008,” Salud “has long since abandoned any rights it would have had.” ARSA asserted that Salud was legally banned from conducting business in the United States between October 2, 2008, and May 2015 because it was declared a Specially Designated Narcotics Trafficker (SDNT). ARSA argued that Salud failed to produce any evidence establishing that it had concrete plans or intent to resume use between 2008 and 2015.

The Board found that there was no clear manufacturing-distribution agreement between the parties, and therefore there was a rebuttable presumption that the manufacturer (Salud) owned the mark. The Board explained that the following six factors are considered in determining which party has superior rights:

Which party created and first affixed the mark to the product
Which party’s name appeared with the trademark on packaging and promotional materials
Which party maintained the quality and uniformity of the product, including technical changes
Which party the consuming public believes stands behind the product (g., the party to which customers direct complaints and contact for correction of defective products)
Which party paid for advertising
What a party represents to others about the source or origin of the product.

The Board concluded that, on the balance, the factors favor Salud. The Board explained that the first, second, third and sixth factors favored Salud because it created the mark and product, maintained quality control [...]

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