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Exploring the Latest in Intellectual Property Law
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Exploring the Latest in Intellectual Property Law
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Absent Expressed Rationale of Obviousness, Federal Circuit Calls for Do-Over

by | Jan 19, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a ruling by the Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board) where, on appeal, the US Patent & Trademark Office’s (PTO) rationale for sustaining the Board’s obviousness rejection did not reflect “the reasoning or findings the Board actually invoked.” In Re Google, LLC, Case No. 22-1012 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 9, 2023) (Moore, C.J., Lourie, Prost, JJ.)

Google’s patent application covers a method of filtering search results to display age-appropriate results using a “content rating score” in combination with a predetermined threshold value to determine which results will be presented. The application discloses several ways that the threshold value can be calculated, including using the length of the search query as a proxy for the age of the user, with longer queries being associated with older users and leading to a lower threshold score (allowing more mature content to be shown).

The application received a final rejection from the examiner, who asserted that the claims would have been obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103 based on two prior art references, Parthasarathy and Rose. Parthasarathy disclosed a method to determine a content score to use for ranking results, while Rose disclosed a method to assign result importance based on query length. The examiner argued that it would be obvious to combine Rose and Parthasarathy to achieve the claimed method that recited a “predetermined threshold value” based on the number of words in a query. The examiner acknowledged that Parthasarathy did not disclose a threshold based on a number of words but found that Rose did, citing Rose’s modified relevance-ranking algorithm. He reasoned that it would have been obvious to combine Rose and Parthasarathy to achieve the claimed threshold because “analyzing a query for determining the query length and using the query length as a threshold is very well known in the art and doing so would further provide for assigning weight to a long or a short query for retrieving documents.” Google appealed the examiner’s decision to the Board, which affirmed the examiner’s rejection and adopted the examiner’s findings. Google appealed to the Federal Circuit.

On appeal, the PTO argued that because there were only two ways a person of ordinary skill in the art could modify Parthasarathy’s threshold to incorporate Rose, either of the modifications would have been obvious. However, the Federal Circuit found that this argument was not supported by the Board’s decision. The Court explained that while the Board did conclude that modifying Parthasarathy’s threshold to take into account the length of the query would have been obvious, the Board did not provide any detail as to how that would be achieved. In the absence of specific fact-based findings by the Board, the Court explained that it could not adopt the PTO’s argument, which rested on facts not found in the Board’s decision. A ruling relying on these facts would have resulted in a violation of basic administrative law principles since a court may only uphold an agency action on [...]

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ANDA Filing Alone Insufficient for Induced Infringement of Method Patent

by | Jan 5, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld a district court’s findings of invalidity and noninfringement in a Hatch-Waxman case involving two sets of method patents directed to modulating dosages of pirfenidone, a drug used to treat idiopathic pulmonary fibrosis (IPF). The Court found that the first set of patents were obvious over the prior art and standard medical practice, while the second set were not directly infringed in light of actual physician prescription practice. Genentech, Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., Case No. 22-1595 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 22, 2022) (Newman, Lourie, Prost, JJ.) (Newman, J., dissenting).

Sandoz submitted two abbreviated new drug applications (ANDAs) for approval to market a generic version of pirfenidone, which Genentech sells under the brand name Esbriet®. Genentech sued Sandoz under the Hatch-Waxman Act, asserting that Sandoz’s generic version would induce infringement of two sets of patents: one directed to modifying dosages of pirfenidone in patients with abnormal liver biomarkers (LFT patents), and the other directed to avoiding adverse interactions in patients also taking fluvoxamine (DDI patents).

The LFT patents are directed to methods of administering pirfenidone to a patient who has exhibited Grade 2 abnormalities in liver function biomarkers alanine transaminase (ALT) and/or aspartate transaminase (AST) in response to pirfenidone. The LFT patents generally recite the following administration options:

  • Temporarily reducing the dose before returning to the full dose
  • Maintaining the full dose
  • Reducing the dose
  • Temporarily discontinuing pirfenidone before returning to the full dose
  • Temporarily discontinuing pirfenidone before returning to a reduced dose.

Sandoz’s proposed label included a “Dosage Modification due to Elevated Liver Enzymes” section, which stated that if a patient exhibits grade 2 elevations of ALT and/or AST, “[t]he full daily dosage may be maintained, if clinically appropriate, or reduced or interrupted (e.g., until liver chemistry tests are within normal limits) with subsequent re-titration to the full dosage as tolerated.” Genentech argued that these instructions constituted induced infringement of the LFT patents. The district court disagreed and held that the LFT patents were obvious over the prior art and standard medical practice and that the defendant would not induce infringement because the labels “merely described” the infringing uses but did not recommend them.

The DDI patents are directed to methods for avoiding adverse interactions between pirfenidone and fluvoxamine and generally involve the steps of discontinuing fluvoxamine or modifying the dose of pirfenidone and continuing fluvoxamine. Sandoz’s proposed label warned of the adverse interactions between pirfenidone and fluvoxamine and stated that fluvoxamine should be discontinued prior to administering pirfenidone or the dose of pirfenidone should be reduced. Genentech similarly argued that these instructions constituted induced infringement of its DDI patents, but the district court held that there was insufficient evidence for infringement because Genentech had not shown that a patient would actually be prescribed both pirfenidone and fluvoxamine in practice.

Genentech appealed the district court’s holdings with respect to both the LFT and DDI patents.

LFT Patents

The Federal Circuit first observed that “varying doses in response to the occurrence [...]

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No Mulligans Here: PTO Rewinds Reexamination Based on Estoppel

by | Dec 8, 2022 |

The US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) terminated a pending ex parte reexamination after finding that the challenger was estopped because the prior art references could have been raised in a prior inter partes review (IPR). In re Tyler, Reexam. No. 90/014,950 (PTO Nov. 15, 2022).

In 2017, GITS Manufacturing filed two IPR petitions against a patent owned by G.W. Lisk after Lisk asserted the patent against GITS in district court. In 2018, the Patent Trial & Appeal Board issued final written decisions in each IPR, finding some claims unpatentable and maintaining the patentability of other claims. The Federal Circuit affirmed both IPR decisions in 2021.

In February 2022, the PTO initiated an ex parte reexamination of one of the patents based on a request filed by GITS. The reexamination proposed multiple grounds of unpatentability based on four prior art references that were not involved in the IPRs. GITS included a lengthy discussion and an expert declaration describing the prior art searches GITS performed in support of the certification that it was not estopped under 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(l) from asserting the grounds in the reexamination. Lisk filed a petition to vacate the reexamination proceeding, alleging that GITS was estopped because the reexamination references reasonably could have been raised in the previous IPRs. Lisk’s petition was supported by its own expert declaration describing prior art searches that a skilled searcher would have conducted.

A party is estopped under § 315(e)(1) from requesting a reexamination proceeding based on grounds that the party “raised or reasonably could have raised” during an IPR. The legislative history of § 315(e) defines “reasonably could have raised” as “prior art which a skilled searcher conducting a diligent search reasonably could have been expected to discover.” The PTO cited legislative history stating that “reasonably could have raised” does not require a “scorched-earth search,” leaving open the possibility that a diligent search may not discover a particular reference. But the PTO also distinguished the search an examiner or lawyer may conduct from the more robust search that a skilled searcher is assumed to conduct prior to filing a petition for a IPR proceeding.

The PTO evaluated each of the four references in GITS’s reexamination grounds based on the criteria described above. Two of the references were patent documents available in commercial databases that a skilled searcher could be expected to find. The third reference was a “seminal textbook” that GITS itself stated was used in the field to train those of skill in the art. The textbook reference was also found through standard citation searching of the patent at issue. The fourth reference was provided by a publisher that GITS stated “was an established publisher that was well known to those interested in the field,” and which maintained an online searchable database of its publications. The PTO determined that the fourth reference would have been found by a reasonably diligent search, despite the fact that a subscription fee was required to search the database.

The PTO also weighed [...]

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Delayed Disclaimer: Patent Owner Arguments Made during IPR Not a Claim Limiting Disclaimer in That Proceeding

by | Nov 29, 2022 |

Repeating a conclusion from an earlier non-precedential opinion in VirnetX, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board) need not accept a patent owner’s arguments as a disclaimer in the very same inter partes review (IPR) proceeding in which those arguments are made. CUPP Computing AS v. Trend Micro Inc., Case Nos. 2020-2262, 2020-2263, 2020-2264, at *11 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 16, 2022) (Dyk, Taranto, Stark, JJ.)

CUPP Computing is the owner of three related patents each entitled “systems and methods for providing security services during power management mode.” After CUPP sued Trend Micro for patent infringement, Trend Micro filed petitions for IPR against all three patents, asserting that several claims of CUPP’s patents were obvious over two prior art references. The Board instituted all three IPR and found all challenged claims unpatentable as obvious. CUPP appealed.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s conclusions. The principal issue concerned CUPP’s argument that the Board erred in claim construction. In CUPP’s view, all of the evidence required the claimed “security system processor” be remote from a “mobile device processor.” The Court rejected CUPP’s arguments. Starting with the claims, the Court found that they simply required that the two processors be different. Although some claims required the security system to send a wake signal to or communicate with the mobile device, that language did not support CUPP’s remoteness construction. As the Court explained, just as an individual can send a note to oneself via email, a unit of the mobile device can send signals to and communicate with the same device. Indeed, some of the claims teach communication via an internal port of the mobile device, which was consistent with a preferred embodiment disclosed in the specification in which the two processors could be within the same mobile device.

The Federal Circuit then addressed CUPP’s disclaimer arguments. The Court agreed with the Board that CUPP’s statements made during the original prosecution were far from clear and unmistakable, being susceptible to several reasonable interpretations that are contrary to CUPP’s construction. The Court also agreed with the Board that CUPP’s arguments during the Trend Micro IPRs do not qualify as a disclaimer for purposes of claim construction. While a disclaimer made during an IPR proceeding is binding in subsequent proceedings, the “Board is not required to accept a patent owner’s arguments as disclaimer when deciding the merits of those arguments.”

As the Federal Circuit explained, expanding the application of disclaimers to the proceedings in which they are made—as CUPP proposed—is rife with problems. IPR proceedings are more similar to district court litigation than they are to initial examination, and it is well established that disclaimers in litigation are not binding in the proceeding in which they are made. Further, CUPP’s proposal would effectively render IPR claim amendments unnecessary, as patent owners would be free to change the scope of their claims retrospectively without regard to the protections provided by the IPR claim amendment process, such as [...]

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Sleep Better: Amendments Proposed during IPR Deemed Proper and Valid

by | Nov 29, 2022 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Patent Trial & Appeal Board’s (Board) finding that proposed amendments made during an inter partes review (IPR) are valid and proper despite the inclusion of changes not related to patentability issues raised in the petition. Nat’l Mfg., Inc. v. Sleep No. Corp., Case No. 21-1321 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 14, 2022) (Stoll, Schall, Cunningham, JJ.)

We’ve likely all seen the commercials promising a proven quality of sleep. Sleep Number is the owner of numerous patents, including several directed to methods for adjusting “the pressure in an air mattress ‘in less time and with greater accuracy’ than previously known.” The patents state this is achieved by taking pressure measurements at the valve enclosure and applying a pressure adjustment factor that is iteratively revised using an “adjustment factor error.” The patent states that this method allows for monitoring the pressure of the air mattress without the need to turn off the pumps.

American National Manufacturing challenged the validity of the patents in an IPR proceeding, claiming that most were rendered obvious by the prior art of Gifft in view of Mittal and Pillsbury and that six of the dependent claims requiring a “multiplicative pressure adjustment factor” would have been obvious in further view of Ebel. Gifft disclosed an air-bed system using valve assembly pressure to approximate the air chamber pressure and Mittal and Pillsbury both disclosed using additive offsets to improve accuracy. Ebel disclosed using both additive and multiplicative components to accurately measure the actual pressure in an inflating or deflating air bag.

The Board agreed with American National that it would have been obvious to combine Gifft, Mittal and Pillsbury and that the resulting combination rendered most of the claims obvious, but it also noted that the combination failed to show that a “skilled artisan would have applied Ebel’s multiplicative factors” to the prior art. However, in each proceeding Sleep Number filed a motion to amend the claims contingent on a finding that the challenged claims were unpatentable. The proposed claims included the “multiplicative pressure adjustment factor” that the Board had determined was not unpatentable along with other non-substantive changes.

American National took issue with these amendments, arguing they were legally inappropriate, non-enabled because of an error in the specification and lacked written description support. The Board disagreed. American National appealed. Sleep Number cross-appealed the Board’s finding of obviousness.

The Federal Circuit found that the proposed amendments were not improper even though some of the changes were non-substantive changes to address consistency issues. The Court pointed out that “once a proposed claim includes amendments to address a prior art ground in the trial, a patent owner also may include additional limitations to address potential § 101 or § 112 issues, if necessary.” The Court rejected American National’s argument that permitting such amendments creates an “asymmetrical” and “unfair” proceeding “by allowing the patent owner and the Board to address concerns that may be proper for [an] examination or reexamination proceeding, but that [...]

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Ordinary Observer Conducts Product-by-Product Analysis in View of Prior Art

by | Nov 3, 2022 |

In one of two concurrent opinions concerning the same design patent case, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated a district court’s entry of a preliminary injunction after concluding that the court had failed to properly consider the accused products separately and in view of the prior art when determining the plaintiffs’ likelihood of success. ABC Corp. I v. P’ship & Unincorporated Ass’ns Identified on Schedule “A”, Case No. 22-1071 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 28, 2022) (Dyk, Taranto, Stoll, JJ.)

Hangzhou Chic Intelligent Technology and Unicorn Global (collectively, the plaintiffs) own four patents claiming designs for handle-less, two-wheeled, motorized, stand-on vehicles commonly referred to as “hoverboards.” Urbanmax, GaodeshangUS, Gyroor-US, Fengchi-US, Jiangyou-US, Gyroshoes and HGSM (collectively, the appellants) sell Gyroor-branded hoverboards. In 2020, the plaintiffs sued the appellants for patent infringement and sought a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. As explained here, the district court granted the preliminary injunction in 2020, but thereafter invited the plaintiffs to file a second motion for a preliminary injunction in light of unsuccessful motions by Fengchi-US, Urbanmax and Gyroor-US to dissolve the 2020 preliminary injunction for lack of notice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a). Heeding the court’s advice, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a second preliminary injunction on August 24, 2021.

The primary issue before the district court concerning the 2021 preliminary injunction was whether the plaintiffs had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits that the accused products infringed the plaintiffs’ patents in light of certain prior art hoverboards. The prior art included a hoverboard with an hourglass-shaped body, which was a significant feature of the patented designs and the majority of the accused products. Despite the similarities between the prior art board and the claimed designs, the plaintiffs generally disregarded the prior art in their analysis. After comparing the four accused products as a group to the claimed designs, the plaintiffs’ expert opined that the accused products infringed the asserted patents based in large part on their similar hourglass bodies, in addition to other features.

The appellants’ expert countered that “the attention of the hypothetical ordinary observer will be drawn to those aspects of the claimed design that differ from the prior art,” rather than the hourglass shape, and that the additional ornamental features of the accused products were not substantially similar to the claimed designs. While the district court acknowledged that “resolving this expert dispute will likely require a trial,” it nonetheless concluded that the plaintiffs had demonstrated likelihood of success and entered the preliminary injunction order. The appellants filed a notice of appeal.

On appeal, the Federal Circuit concluded that the lower court had erred in four material respects:

  • Applying the wrong legal standard
  • Failing to conduct the ordinary observer analysis in view of the prior art
  • Failing to apply the ordinary observer analysis on a product-by-product basis
  • Crafting an overbroad injunction.

First, the Federal Circuit took issue with the district court’s entry of a preliminary injunction despite its [...]

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For Inherent Anticipation, How Many Is Too Many?

by | Oct 13, 2022 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board) decision that prior art disclosing a class of 957 salts could not inherently anticipate claims to a salt within the class because a skilled artisan could not “at once envisage” every class member. Mylan Pharms. Inc. v. Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp., Case No. 21-2121 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 29, 2022) (Lourie, Reyna, Stoll, JJ.)

In the underlying inter partes review, Mylan alleged that Merck’s patent claims to sitagliptin dihydrogen phosphate (DHP) with 1:1 stoichiometry were anticipated by two similar Merck publications (collectively, Edmondson). Edmondson listed 33 enzyme inhibitors (including sitagliptin) and eight preferred acids for forming salts with the inhibitors. Mylan argued that the 1:1 stoichiometry between sitagliptin and DHP (which was required by the claims) was the only possible result when sitagliptin and phosphate were reacted.

In response, Merck experts declared that Edmondson did not expressly disclose any 1:1 sitagliptin DHP salts. They also declared that non-1:1 sitagliptin phosphate salts existed and had been created using conventional protocols, and that Edmondson encompassed approximately 957 predicted salts of DP-IV inhibitors.

The Board held that Edmondson did not expressly anticipate because it did not literally disclose the 1:1 sitagliptin DHP salt and Mylan could not attempt to fill in the missing claim limitation by arguing that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSA) could “at once envisage” the “950+” salts. Merck’s evidence convinced the Board that non-1:1 sitagliptin phosphate salts “do exist and can form.”

Mylan tried to circumvent Merck’s antedation of Edmondson by asserting that it disclosed hydrates of 1:1 sitagliptin DHP, which Merck had not synthesized until months after Edmondson was published. The Board rejected this argument, noting that Edmondson only generically referred to hydrates. Since Mylan had not contested Merck’s common ownership of Edmondson’s subject matter, § 103(c)(1) applied and Edmondson became unavailable as an obviousness reference. The remaining claims to specific enantiomers and hydrates of sitagliptin DHP were deemed nonobvious because Mylan had not presented sufficient evidence to show motivation to make or reasonable expectation of success.

On appeal, the Federal Circuit found that substantial evidence supported the Board’s determinations with respect to explicit and inherent anticipation and obviousness. Mylan’s own expert had admitted that nothing in Edmondson directed a POSA to sitagliptin or to any phosphate salt. Edmondson’s disclosure of 957 potential salts was “a far cry” from the facts in the 1962 Court of Customs and Patents Appeals case In re Peterson, where a reference disclosing only 20 compounds was deemed inherently anticipatory. The Federal Circuit rejected Mylan’s antedation argument, noting that if Edmondson did not explicitly disclose 1:1 sitagliptin DHP, it could not disclose any hydrates of that compound either.

Finally, the Federal Circuit agreed with the Board that the claims to specific enantiomers or hydrates of sitagliptin DHP were nonobvious because Mylan had not shown any expected benefit to making the specific enantiomers claimed, the literature and experts for both sides reported many downsides [...]

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Sliced and Diced: PTAB Decision Remanded for Further Analysis

by | Oct 6, 2022 |

In an appeal from a Patent Trial & Appeal Board final written decision, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s decision to include certain evidence first presented in the petitioner’s Reply but vacated the Board’s obviousness decision for a failure to fully and particularly set out the bases for its decision. Provisur Technologies, Inc. v. Weber, Inc., Case Nos. 21-1942; -1975 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 27, 2022) (Prost, Reyna, Stark, JJ.)

Provisur Technologies owns a patent directed to classifying slices or portions cut from a food product according to an optical image of the slice. The patent explains that certain meat products, such as bacon or cold cuts, are sold in groups of slices according to particular weight requirements. The specification also teaches that the arrangement of the slices according to quality is desirable. The independent claims are directed to an image processing system arranged above a weigh conveyor that is capable of categorizing slices by determining the surface area and fat-to-lean ratios of the slices based on pixel-by-pixel image data.

Weber petitioned for inter partes review of the patent, alleging that the claims were obvious over various prior art references. Provisur, in its Patent Owner Response, disputed Weber’s assertion that the prior art references disclosed the claimed digital imaging receiving device capable of determining a surface area from pixel-by-pixel image data. During deposition of Weber’s expert, Provisur probed the expert’s knowledge of various camera models available as of the priority date. This prompted Weber to introduce a data sheet on redirect showing various models of cameras, including a comparison between those disclosed in the prior art references and those disclosed as exemplary in the patent. Provisur moved to exclude the datasheet, but the Board concluded that the evidence was highly probative and allowable because it was submitted in response to an argument that Provisur advanced in its Patent Owner Response. The Board also found that the independent claims and various dependent claims were invalid as obvious over the references cited by Weber.

Provisur appealed the admission of the datasheet and the Board’s determination on obviousness. Regarding the evidentiary issue, the Federal Circuit found that the Board did not abuse its discretion by considering the datasheet, noting that it was reply evidence responsive to Provisur’s arguments that the prior art did not disclose a digital camera: “Importantly, Weber’s invalidity theories did not change, nor did the reply fill any holes in Weber’s petition.” Furthermore, the Court observed that Provisur had an opportunity to respond both by cross-examining Weber’s expert and in a sur-reply to the Board.

Regarding the Board’s obviousness determination, Provisur argued that the Board erred by failing to explain its rationale for how the prior art combinations specifically taught the claim element of “determining a surface area of the top slice from the [pixel-by-pixel image] data [of a top slice of the stack].” Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Board must fully and particularly set out the basis upon which it reached its [...]

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Not a Well-Crafted Housing: Product-by-Process Claim Element Isn’t Limiting

by | Aug 25, 2022 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a ruling that certain claims reciting a “housing . . . being cast in one piece” should be construed as a product-by-process claim element and affirmed the subsequent finding of invalidity of all challenged claims. Kamstrup A/S v. Axioma Metering UAB, Case No. 21-1923 (Aug. 12, 2022) (Reyna, Mayer, Cunningham, JJ.)

Kamstrup owns a patent directed to an ultrasonic flow meter housing in the form of a monolithic polymer structure that is cast in one piece. The patent specification explains that the invention can be fabricated with fewer steps compared to existing meters, since only a single step is used to form the monolithic polymer structure. Axioma petitioned for inter partes review of all claims of the patent, and the Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board) found each claim unpatentable as either obvious or anticipated.

The Board construed the claim term “being cast in one piece” to be a product-by-process claim element. Kamstrup did not present any evidence showing that this claim element provided structural or functional differences distinguishing the housing itself from the prior art, and therefore the Board determined that the housing element was not entitled to patentable weight. The Board subsequently invalidated the independent claim and various dependent claims based on a prior art meter having a housing. The Board also found the remaining dependent claims to be invalid based on two additional references, which the Board determined were sufficiently analogous to flow meter technology to merit consideration in its obviousness analysis.

On appeal, Kamstrup challenged the Board’s product-by-process construction. The Federal Circuit explained that product-by-process claiming is designed to enable an applicant to claim an otherwise patentable product that resists definition other than by the process by which it is made. Where a product-by-process claim element is implicated, structural and functional differences distinguishing the claimed product from the prior art must be shown in order for that claim element to be relevant (limiting) to the anticipation or obviousness inquiry. If no structural or functional differences are shown, the element is given no patentable weight. Turning to the claim element at issue, the Court found that the plain meaning of the term “housing . . . being cast in one piece” implicated a product-by-process interpretation since it described the structure “being” cast in a particular way. The Court also affirmed the Board’s finding of invalidity because Kamstrup failed to identify any disclosure in the specification, prosecution history or extrinsic evidence of any structural or functional differences between the housing element as claimed and the prior art.

Kamstrup also argued that the two secondary prior art references were not analogous prior art because they fell within the field of “medical devices for thermodilution,” and therefore they should not be included in an obviousness analysis. The Federal Circuit disagreed, finding that the references were directed to “sensing or measuring fluid flow and fluid flow characteristics such as temperature,” which is related to “flow meters that include different types of sensors.”



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Prior Art Citation to Inventors’ Report Not “By Another” for § 102(e)

by | Aug 25, 2022 | ,

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that a prior art patent’s summarization of a report authored by the inventors of a patent challenged under inter partes review (IPR) did not constitute a disclosure “by another” under pre-America Invents Act § 102(e). LSI Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of Minnesota, Case No. 21-2057 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 11, 2022) (Dyk, Reyna, Hughes, JJ.)

The Regents of the University of Minnesota (UMN) sued LSI Corporation and Avago Technologies (collectively, LSI) for infringement of a patent related to methods for reducing errors in binary data sequences. LSI petitioned for IPR, challenging several claims of the asserted patent and arguing that they were anticipated by two prior art references, Okada and Tsang. Tsang made reference to a “Seagate Annual Report” that was published by the inventors of the asserted patent, and which was later embodied in the patent’s application.

The Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board) found that one of the challenged claims was anticipated by Okada. The Board also found that LSI had not shown that the other challenged claims were rendered unpatentable by either Okada or Tsang and further rejected an invalidity (anticipation) theory first raised by LSI during oral arguments as untimely (while noting that the argument failed even if timely raised). The Board determined that the Tsang reference was not “by another” under § 102(e) because LSI’s petition relied solely on material that was originally disclosed in the inventor’s Seagate Annual Report. LSI appealed the Board’s determinations relating to invalidity based on Okada or Tsang.

The Federal Circuit noted that LSI did not challenge the Board’s untimeliness determination and rejected LSI’s argument that it did not need to because the Board nevertheless reached a merits decision on the argument. The Court cited to its 2016 decision in Intelligent Bio-Systems v. Illumina Cambridge, which held that “the Board’s rejection of arguments on the ground that they were newly raised in a reply brief was not an abuse of discretion even though the Board went on to address the merits.”

Turning to the § 102(e) issue, the Federal Circuit first explained that an invention is anticipated under § 102(e) if the invention is described in a patent application filed “by another,” but a patent owner may overcome such anticipation by establishing that the relevant prior art disclosure describes the owner’s invention. Describing the history of the Tsang reference and the patent under review, the Court explained that the inventors originally submitted a Seagate Annual Report to Seagate, a UMN collaborator. Tsang, a Seagate employee, received the report and quickly filed a patent application for an improvement on the methods described in the report. This application listed only Tsang as inventor and made direct reference to the Seagate Annual Report.

The Federal Circuit then addressed whether LSI’s IPR petition relied on Tsang’s improvement to the inventors’ report or simply on Tsang’s summary of the inventors’ report. The Court explained that while LSI’s petition relied on both Tsang’s summary of the [...]

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