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PTO Requests Comments on Initiatives to Expand Board Opportunities, Registration to Practice Criteria

In a pair of notices, the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) announced on October 18, 2022, that it is seeking public input on proposed initiatives directed at expanding opportunities to appear before the Patent Trial & Appeal Board, (Board) and expanding admission criteria for registration to practice in patent cases before the PTO. PTO Director Kathi Vidal explained that “[t]hese proposals are part of our broader initiatives to improve quality and participation.”

Regarding the expansion of opportunities to appear before the Board, the PTO requested comments on the following six questions:

  1. Are there any changes to Board rules or procedures that the PTO or the Board should make to increase opportunities to appear and/or serve as counsel and/or the lead counsel in America Invents Act (AIA) proceedings?
    1. If “yes” to question 1 as to the lead counsel, should the rules require that a non-registered practitioner have prior experience in AIA proceedings and/or have completed training before being designated as the lead counsel? What level of experience and/or type of training should be required?
  2. Should any rule or procedure revised by the PTO that permits a non-registered practitioner to be designated as the lead counsel in an AIA proceeding also require that any such non-registered practitioner be accompanied by a registered practitioner as backup counsel? If not, are there any circumstances or events that might occur during an AIA proceeding (g., the contemplated or actual filing of a motion to amend) that might warrant requiring a registered practitioner to then appear as backup counsel?
  3. Would a rule requiring that the lead counsel or backup counsel in an AIA proceeding be a registered practitioner have a significant impact on the cost of such a proceeding? If so, what would the impact be and would the impact be justified?
  4. Should any of the changes discussed above, if adopted, be implemented as a pilot program?
  5. Are there additional training and/or development programs the PTO should offer to increase opportunities for less experienced practitioners to appear as counsel and/or serve as the lead counsel in AIA proceedings?
  6. Are there any changes to the Legal Experience and Advancement Program (LEAP) that the PTO should make to increase opportunities to appear and/or serve as the lead counsel in AIA proceedings?

Regarding expanding the admission requirements to practice in patent matters before the PTO, comments on the following five topics were requested:

  1. The General Requirements Bulletin (GRB) lists three categories of scientific and technical qualifications typically used for eligibility for admission to the registration examination: (1) Category A, for specified bachelor’s, master’s and PhD degrees; (2) Category B, for other bachelor’s, master’s and PhD degrees with technical and scientific training; and (3) Category C, for individuals who rely on practical engineering or scientific experience and have passed the Fundamentals of Engineering test. The PTO is seeking comments as to acceptable degrees and whether it should add Category B degrees on a predetermined timeframe (g., every three years).
  2. Should the PTO accept [...]

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For Inherent Anticipation, How Many Is Too Many?

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board) decision that prior art disclosing a class of 957 salts could not inherently anticipate claims to a salt within the class because a skilled artisan could not “at once envisage” every class member. Mylan Pharms. Inc. v. Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp., Case No. 21-2121 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 29, 2022) (Lourie, Reyna, Stoll, JJ.)

In the underlying inter partes review, Mylan alleged that Merck’s patent claims to sitagliptin dihydrogen phosphate (DHP) with 1:1 stoichiometry were anticipated by two similar Merck publications (collectively, Edmondson). Edmondson listed 33 enzyme inhibitors (including sitagliptin) and eight preferred acids for forming salts with the inhibitors. Mylan argued that the 1:1 stoichiometry between sitagliptin and DHP (which was required by the claims) was the only possible result when sitagliptin and phosphate were reacted.

In response, Merck experts declared that Edmondson did not expressly disclose any 1:1 sitagliptin DHP salts. They also declared that non-1:1 sitagliptin phosphate salts existed and had been created using conventional protocols, and that Edmondson encompassed approximately 957 predicted salts of DP-IV inhibitors.

The Board held that Edmondson did not expressly anticipate because it did not literally disclose the 1:1 sitagliptin DHP salt and Mylan could not attempt to fill in the missing claim limitation by arguing that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSA) could “at once envisage” the “950+” salts. Merck’s evidence convinced the Board that non-1:1 sitagliptin phosphate salts “do exist and can form.”

Mylan tried to circumvent Merck’s antedation of Edmondson by asserting that it disclosed hydrates of 1:1 sitagliptin DHP, which Merck had not synthesized until months after Edmondson was published. The Board rejected this argument, noting that Edmondson only generically referred to hydrates. Since Mylan had not contested Merck’s common ownership of Edmondson’s subject matter, § 103(c)(1) applied and Edmondson became unavailable as an obviousness reference. The remaining claims to specific enantiomers and hydrates of sitagliptin DHP were deemed nonobvious because Mylan had not presented sufficient evidence to show motivation to make or reasonable expectation of success.

On appeal, the Federal Circuit found that substantial evidence supported the Board’s determinations with respect to explicit and inherent anticipation and obviousness. Mylan’s own expert had admitted that nothing in Edmondson directed a POSA to sitagliptin or to any phosphate salt. Edmondson’s disclosure of 957 potential salts was “a far cry” from the facts in the 1962 Court of Customs and Patents Appeals case In re Peterson, where a reference disclosing only 20 compounds was deemed inherently anticipatory. The Federal Circuit rejected Mylan’s antedation argument, noting that if Edmondson did not explicitly disclose 1:1 sitagliptin DHP, it could not disclose any hydrates of that compound either.

Finally, the Federal Circuit agreed with the Board that the claims to specific enantiomers or hydrates of sitagliptin DHP were nonobvious because Mylan had not shown any expected benefit to making the specific enantiomers claimed, the literature and experts for both sides reported many downsides [...]

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Cloudy Skies: PTO Director Finds Abuse and Sanctionable Conduct

The US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) Director issued a precedential opinion finding that filing an inter partes review (IPR) solely to extract payment in a settlement—without the intent to prosecute the IPR to completion—is a sanctionable abuse of process. OpenSky Indus., LLC v. VLSI Tech. LLC, IPR2021-01064 (Oct. 4, 2022) (Vidal, Dir.)

In 2019, VLSI asserted two patents against Intel. In response, Intel filed two IPRs against the allegedly infringed patents, but both IPRs were discretionally denied by the Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board) based on the advanced stage of the underlying litigation and overlapping issues. The suit proceeded, and a jury awarded VLSI more than $600 million in damages in 2021.

OpenSky Industries was founded two months after the judgment. OpenSky filed a “copycat” IPR petition based on Intel’s previous petitions (including refiling the declarations of Intel’s expert without his knowledge) targeting VLSI’s two allegedly infringed patents. The Board instituted over VLSI’s argument, noting that patentability issues were raised that had not been resolved in the district court case. Initially, OpenSky attempted to settle the IPRs with VLSI, but VLSI refused. OpenSky then reached out to Intel, offering to let Intel collaborate if it agreed to pay a success fee. Intel refused and later filed its own IPR petition and joinder motion. After Intel’s refusal, OpenSky pivoted back to VLSI, offering to “refuse[] to pay [the] expert for time at deposition so [the] expert does not appear at deposition” in return for payment. VLSI reported the scheme to the Board.

Intel was joined as a party to the OpenSky IPR proceeding in June 2022 based on its later-filed petition. Once Intel joined, OpenSky threatened to forego both deposing VLSI’s expert and filing its reply brief unless Intel paid it for its “prior work in the IPR” plus “additional remuneration.” Intel refused. While OpenSky did notice VLSI’s expert, it declined to file a Petitioner Reply brief, forcing Intel to draft the reply. Later, at VLSI’s request (OpenSky missed the request date), oral argument in the proceeding took place before the Board. OpenSky did not meaningfully participate.

While all this was unfolding, the Director sua sponte initiated an investigation to determine “[w]hat actions the Director . . . should take when faced with evidence of an abuse of process or conduct that otherwise thwarts . . . the goals of the Office and/or the AIA.” To begin the investigation, the Director sent discovery requests to each of the three parties. VLSI and Intel complied. OpenSky, by comparison, either incompletely complied with or directly refused each request. Based on those evasions, the Director sanctioned OpenSky for discovery misconduct, applying adverse inferences against OpenSky on each request.

Discovery sanctions in place, the Director moved to the central question: Did OpenSky abuse the IPR process? The Director answered yes.

First, the Director found that OpenSky’s conduct violated its duty of candor and good faith to the Board. In its negotiations with VLSI, OpenSky offered to deliberately sabotage its own petition to hinder Intel. In its negotiations with Intel, OpenSky did [...]

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Sliced and Diced: PTAB Decision Remanded for Further Analysis

In an appeal from a Patent Trial & Appeal Board final written decision, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s decision to include certain evidence first presented in the petitioner’s Reply but vacated the Board’s obviousness decision for a failure to fully and particularly set out the bases for its decision. Provisur Technologies, Inc. v. Weber, Inc., Case Nos. 21-1942; -1975 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 27, 2022) (Prost, Reyna, Stark, JJ.)

Provisur Technologies owns a patent directed to classifying slices or portions cut from a food product according to an optical image of the slice. The patent explains that certain meat products, such as bacon or cold cuts, are sold in groups of slices according to particular weight requirements. The specification also teaches that the arrangement of the slices according to quality is desirable. The independent claims are directed to an image processing system arranged above a weigh conveyor that is capable of categorizing slices by determining the surface area and fat-to-lean ratios of the slices based on pixel-by-pixel image data.

Weber petitioned for inter partes review of the patent, alleging that the claims were obvious over various prior art references. Provisur, in its Patent Owner Response, disputed Weber’s assertion that the prior art references disclosed the claimed digital imaging receiving device capable of determining a surface area from pixel-by-pixel image data. During deposition of Weber’s expert, Provisur probed the expert’s knowledge of various camera models available as of the priority date. This prompted Weber to introduce a data sheet on redirect showing various models of cameras, including a comparison between those disclosed in the prior art references and those disclosed as exemplary in the patent. Provisur moved to exclude the datasheet, but the Board concluded that the evidence was highly probative and allowable because it was submitted in response to an argument that Provisur advanced in its Patent Owner Response. The Board also found that the independent claims and various dependent claims were invalid as obvious over the references cited by Weber.

Provisur appealed the admission of the datasheet and the Board’s determination on obviousness. Regarding the evidentiary issue, the Federal Circuit found that the Board did not abuse its discretion by considering the datasheet, noting that it was reply evidence responsive to Provisur’s arguments that the prior art did not disclose a digital camera: “Importantly, Weber’s invalidity theories did not change, nor did the reply fill any holes in Weber’s petition.” Furthermore, the Court observed that Provisur had an opportunity to respond both by cross-examining Weber’s expert and in a sur-reply to the Board.

Regarding the Board’s obviousness determination, Provisur argued that the Board erred by failing to explain its rationale for how the prior art combinations specifically taught the claim element of “determining a surface area of the top slice from the [pixel-by-pixel image] data [of a top slice of the stack].” Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Board must fully and particularly set out the basis upon which it reached its [...]

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The Board Is Back in Town: Arthrex Can’t Save Untimely Motions to Terminate

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board) unpatentability finding and denial of a motion to terminate, finding that the Board had already issued final written decisions that were not vacated at the time the Board denied the parties’ motion to terminate. Polaris Innovations Ltd. v. Derrick Brent, Deputy Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Deputy Director of The United States Patent and Trademark Office, Case No. 19-1483 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 15, 2022) (Prost, Chen, Stoll, JJ.)

Polaris owns two unrelated patents directed to computer memory. The first patent relates to improved control component configuration, and the second patent relates to a shared-resource system in which logical controls are used to manage resource requests. In 2016, Polaris filed a complaint accusing NVIDIA of infringing both patents. NVIDIA responded by filing petitions for inter partes review (IPR) against each patent. In 2017, the Board issued its final written decisions, finding the challenged claims of both patents unpatentable. Polaris appealed.

The Federal Circuit vacated the Board’s decision in view of Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc. (Arthrex I). On remand, the Board administratively suspended the IPR proceedings pending potential Supreme Court review of Arthrex I. During the administrative suspension, Polaris and NVIDIA filed a joint motion to terminate the proceedings. While those motions were pending, the Supreme Court vacated Arthrex I, substituting an alternative remedy for violation of the Appointments Clause in United States v. Arthrex, Inc. (Arthrex II). In view of Arthrex II, the Supreme Court vacated the Federal Circuit’s vacatur of the Board’s final written decision, thus reinstating those decisions.

On remand to the Board, Polaris argued that the Board should grant Polaris’s then-pending motion to terminate. The Chief Administrative Law Judge responded that termination was not appropriate because the Supreme Court’s decision meant that the “final written decision in each of these cases is not vacated, and it is not necessary for the Board to issue a new final written decision in either of these cases.” Polaris filed a request for Director rehearing. The Director denied rehearing. Polaris appealed.

Polaris argued that the Board erred by failing to grant the joint motions to terminate filed in both proceedings before the Board on remand. Relying on 35 U.S.C. § 317, the Federal Circuit explained that motions to terminate should be granted “unless the Office has decided the merits of the proceeding before the request for termination is filed.” The Court found that the Board had already decided the merits of the cases in final written decisions that were not vacated at the time the Board made its decision denying Polaris’s motions to terminate. The Court therefore affirmed the Board’s decision that termination was inappropriate.

Polaris also raised two claim construction arguments. Polaris argued that the Board misconstrued the term “memory chip” in the IPR involving one of the challenged patents and misconstrued the term “resource tag buffer” in the IPR involving the [...]

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PTO Switches to New Public Search Tools, New PTAB Filing System

The US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) will replace four legacy tools—Public-Examiner’s Automated Search Tool, Public-Web-Based Examiner’s Search Tool, Patent Full-Text and Image Database (PatFT) and Patent Application Full-Text and Image Database (AppFT)—with the new Patent Public Search Tool (PPUBS) on September 30, 2022. The PTO first announced the transition to the new tool in February 2022.

Existing links to US patents and US pre-grant publications in PatFT and AppFT will be terminated following the retirement of these services. US patents and US pre-grant publications can be directly accessed via PPUBS, and links for direct document access to US patents and US pre-grant publications can be set up on a webpage or document. According to the PTO, PPUBS provides more convenient, remote and robust full-text searching of all US patents and US pre-grant publications. PPUBS also streamlines the search process for users, provides alternatives for existing services and incorporates new features. Step-by-step instructions for performing these functions can be found here.

The PTO also announced that as of October 11, 2022, the Patent Trial & Appeal Board E2E system used for electronically filing all documents related to Inter Partes and Post Grant reviews, Transitional Program for Covered Business Mmethod Patents, and Derivation Proceedings will be replaced by the Patent Trial & Appeal Tracking System (P-TACTS) platform. The E2E system will be unavailable starting at 5:00 pm EDT on October 9, 2022, through 11:00 pm EDT on October 10, 2022 (which is a federal holiday). For more information about the platform migration and how to register to use P-TACTS, click here.




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Claim at Issue Must Be Substantively Allowable to Qualify for PTA

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed two district court decisions, finding that a patent owner who only partially prevailed in one of two appeals was not entitled to any additional patent term adjustments (PTAs) from the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) under 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(1)(C) during the pendency of their district court appeals. SawStop Holding LLC v. Vidal, Case No. 2021-1537 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 14, 2022) (Newman, Linn, and Chen, JJ.)

SawStop owns two patents directed to saws with a safety feature that stops a power-saw blade upon contact with flesh. During prosecution of the application for one of the patents, SawStop appealed an obviousness rejection to the Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board). The Board affirmed the obviousness rejection but on new grounds. The patent ultimately issued after SawStop amended the claim at issue to overcome the obviousness rejection.

Similarly, during prosecution of the application for the second patent, independent claim 1 was rejected as being anticipated and for obviousness-type double patenting while dependent claim 2 was rejected as anticipated. SawStop appealed the rejections. The Board affirmed both rejections of claim 1 but reversed the rejection of claim 2. SawStop subsequently challenged the Board’s anticipation rejection of claim 1 before the US District Court for the District of Columbia, which reversed the anticipation rejection. SawStop did not challenge the obviousness-type double patenting rejection. On remand to the Board, SawStop cancelled claim 1 and rewrote claim 2 as an independent claim. A patent subsequently issued.

Since issuance of both patents was delayed by appeals before allowance, SawStop requested PTAs under Section 154(b)(1)(C):

Subject to the limitations under paragraph (2), if the issue of an original patent is delayed due to … (iii) appellate review by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board or by a Federal Court in a case in which the patent was issued under a decision in the review reversing an adverse determination of patentability, the term of the patent shall be extended 1 day for each day of the pendency of the proceeding, order, or review, as the case may be.

The Board granted PTA “for the delay incurred in the successful reversal of the rejection of claim 2” of the second patent but denied additional PTA for both patents resulting from the appeals. SawStop filed suits in the US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, challenging the Board’s decision. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the PTO in both suits. SawStop then appealed to the Federal Circuit.

The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that SawStop was interpreting Section 154(b)(1)(C) too broadly. SawStop argued in part that any examiner rejection overturned on appeal qualified as “a reversal of a determination of patentability.” The Court rejected this argument, explaining that the Board’s adverse determination of unpatentability remained before and after the appeal to the Board. That is, “the reversal of a ‘determination of patentability’ requires a determination that the claim in question is substantively allowable, not just free of [...]

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CAFC Pulls Final Loose Thread in Nike-Adidas Patent Row

Issuing a third and final decision, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board) decision invalidating the last remaining claim of a Nike footwear textile patent. Nike, Inc. v. Adidas AG, Case No. 21-1903 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 1, 2022) (Prost, Chen, Stoll, JJ.) (non-precedential)

Adidas filed for inter partes review of a patent owned by Nike relating to a knitted shoe upper. After lengthy litigation, including two prior appeals to the Federal Circuit, all claims of the Nike patent were invalidated except for one substitute claim. In its second appeal, Nike successfully argued that the Board did not provide Nike an opportunity to respond to a patentability issue raised sua sponte by the Board, which included reference to a knitting textbook. On remand from the second appeal, the parties were given the opportunity to brief the Board on this new reference and argue which party bears the burden of persuasion for the patentability issue raised sua sponte by the Board.

On the merits, the Board determined that the knitting textbook did teach the disputed limitation, agreeing with adidas that a skilled artisan would have understood the textbook to teach the contested limitation, and that there was adequate reason to combine the textbook’s teachings with those of the other prior art references. The Board also concluded that the burden of persuasion must fall on the Board itself when it raised the patentability issue sua sponte. Nike appealed, arguing that the Board effectively placed the burden of persuasion on Nike.

The Federal Circuit first addressed the burden of persuasion as it relates to the grounds first raised by the Board. The Court found that the Board juxtaposed its arguments with adidas’s and that they both relied on the same disclosures and arguments. Because the Board and adidas’s arguments mirrored each other, the Court found it unnecessary to determine whether the petitioner or the Board bears the burden of persuasion. The Court also rejected Nike’s argument that the Board effectively shifted the burden to Nike by stating in its opinion that Nike’s arguments were “unpersuasive” and “inadequate.” The Court cited to its 2016 holding in In re Magnum Oil Tools International, in which it explained that the Board’s language is not the concern but rather the actual placement of the burden of persuasion. The Court found that both the Board and adidas met the burden, and that the burden was not shifted to Nike.

Turning to the Board’s obviousness determinations, the Federal Circuit rejected all of Nike’s arguments. First, Nike argued that the knitting textbook did not teach the claimed method of creating apertures in the fabric by omitting stitches. The Court found that the Board relied on specific disclosures in the reference describing the use of empty needles to product “loop displacement.” Nike also argued that there was no motivation to combine the textbook reference with the other two references and that the Board could not rely on “common sense” [...]

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It Can Take Three Appeals to Make a Claim Construction Go “Right”—or Three Bites by Apple

In a nonprecedential opinion on remand from the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and a US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) Director-granted request for review, the Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board) reconstrued claim terms it had previously construed in consideration of the patent specification, prosecution history and Federal Circuit construction of similar terms in a related case. Apple Inc. v. Personalized Media Communications, LLC, IPR2016-00754, IPR2016-01520 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 8, 2022) (Turner, APJ.)

In March 2016, Apple filed a petition to institute an inter partes review (IPR) against a patent (’635 patent) owned by Personalized Media Communications, LLC (PMC). After PMC filed its Patent Owner Preliminary Response (POPR), the Board instituted the IPR on some, but not all, of Apple’s requested grounds. Per Board procedure, PMC filed its Patent Owner Response (POR) and a contingent motion to amend its patent’s claims. In response, Apple filed a reply and an opposition to the contingent motion, and PMC filed a reply to Apple’s opposition. After oral argument the Board issued a Final Written Decision (754-FWD) finding all challenged claims unpatentable and denying the contingent motion to amend. PMC first sought rehearing of the Board’s decision and, after rehearing was denied, appealed the Board’s decision to the Federal Circuit.

Similarly, in July 2016, Apple filed another petition against the same PMC patent. After considering PMC’s POPR, the Board instituted an IPR on some of Apple’s requested grounds. PMC again filed a POR and a contingent motion to amend, to which Apple filed a reply and opposition (to which PMC filed its reply and Apple a sur-reply). Again, the Board held an oral hearing and issued a Final Written Decision (FWD) finding all challenged claims unpatentable and denying the contingent motion to amend. PMC again sought rehearing of the Board’s decision and, after rehearing was denied, appealed the Board’s decision to the Federal Circuit.

On appeal of each proceeding, PMC moved, and the Federal Circuit granted remand in light of and consistent with the 2021 Supreme Court decision in U.S. v. Arthrex, Inc., where a five-justice majority found that the appointment of Board administrative patent judges was unconstitutional and a seven-justice majority concluded that the remedy was to vest the PTO Director with authority to overrule Board decisions.

On remand to the PTO, PMC filed a request for director review, which the Commissioner for Patents (performing the functions and duties of the PTO Director) granted. The Commissioner’s Granting Order agreed with PMC’s argument that the Board, in these two cases, had construed the claim terms “encrypted” and “decrypted” in a manner that could include “scrambling and descrambling operations on digital information, but could also include … on analog information” and was inconsistent with the Federal Circuit’s partial reversal of the Board’s construction in yet another IPR proceeding (755-IPR regarding another related PMC patent) between Apple and PMC. As to the related patent IPR, the Federal Circuit ultimately construed “encrypted digital information transmission including encrypted information” as “… limited [...]

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PTO Director Lays Out Limits on “Roadmapping” as Factor for Discretionary IPR Denials

Exercising its discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), the Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board) denied institution of two inter partes reviews (IPRs) based on its understanding of its own precedential 2017 decision in Gen. Plastic Indus. Co. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha. US Patent & Trademark Office Director Kathi Vidal subsequently reversed the Board’s ruling in a precedential sua sponte decision clarifying how to apply the seven factors set forth in General Plastic. Code200, UAB v. Bright Data, Ltd., IPR2022-00861; -00862, Paper 18 (PTAB Aug. 23, 2022) (Vidal, Dir. of PTO).

In General Plastic, the Board addressed the practice of filing seriatim petitions attacking the same patent, where each petition raises a new ground for invalidity. The Board considers the General Plastic factors when determining whether to deny IPR institution to ensure efficient post-grant review procedures and prevent inequity. The seven factors are as follows:

  1. Whether the same petitioner previously filed a petition directed to the same claims of the same patent
  2. Whether at the time of filing of the first petition the petitioner knew of the prior art asserted in the second petition or should have known of it
  3. Whether at the time of filing of the second petition the petitioner had already received the patent owner’s preliminary response to the first petition or had received the Board’s decision on whether to institute review in the first petition
  4. The length of time that elapsed between the time the petitioner learned of the prior art asserted in the second petition and the filing of the second petition
  5. Whether the petitioner provided adequate explanation for the time elapsed between the filings of multiple petitions directed to the same claims of the same patent
  6. The finite resources of the Board
  7. The requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11) to issue a final determination no later than one year after the date on which the PTO Director notices institution of review.

In denying institution in this case, the Board explained that the petitioner’s failure to stipulate that it would not pursue the same grounds in district court “weigh[ed] strongly in favor of exercising discretion to deny institution and outweigh[ed] the fact that the Board did not substantively address the merits of the prior petition.” Director Vidal disagreed, reasoning that when a first petition is not decided on its merits, a follow-on petition affords a petitioner the opportunity to receive substantive consideration. Director Vidal further explained that factor 1 “must be read in conjunction with factors 2 and 3.” Application of factor 1 in a vacuum strips context from a petitioner’s challenges and creates an inappropriate bright-line rule for denying institution.

Proper application of the General Plastic factors requires consideration of the potential for abuse by a petitioner. Director Vidal noted the problem of “roadmapping” raised in General Plastic (i.e., using one or more Board decisions to create a roadmap for follow-on filings until the petitioner finds a ground that results in institution). A denial decision based solely on the [...]

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