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Exploring the Latest in Intellectual Property Law
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Ordinary Meaning: “Identifying” Doesn’t Mean Detecting; It Means Identifying

by | Jan 18, 2024 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Patent Trial & Appeal Board’s decisions finding one set of challenged claims patentable and another set of challenged claims in the same patent unpatentable. The Court determined that the Board properly construed a disputed claim term and made factual findings regarding prior art that were supported by substantial evidence. Pacific Biosciences of California, Inc. v. Personal Genomics Taiwan, Inc., Case Nos. 22-1410; -1554 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 9, 2024) (Prost, Taranto, Hughes, JJ.)

Pacific Biosciences of California (PacBio) filed two petitions seeking inter partes review (IPR) of different claim groups in a patent owned by Personal Genomics Taiwan (PGI). The challenged patent is directed to an apparatus for “identifying a single biomolecule” and methods of using or making that apparatus. The petitions overlapped in terms of the challenged claims but differed in terms of the invoked prior art. PacBio’s challenge (on both anticipation and obviousness) was based principally on the Hassibi reference in one IPR and on the Choumane reference in the other.

The Board rejected PacBio’s challenge to certain claims of the patent in its decision on the first IPR, but it agreed with PacBio’s challenge to certain claims of the patent in its decision in the other. In reaching its decisions, the Board construed the term “identifying a single biomolecule” as requiring an apparatus capable of ascertaining the identity of one single individual biomolecule by examining only that biomolecule. In the first decision, the Board found that this limitation was not taught by the Hassibi reference. In contrast, in the other IPR, the Board found that this limitation was taught by the Choumane reference. Both parties appealed.

The Federal Circuit affirmed both Board decisions. First, the Court agreed with the Board’s construction that the disputed claim term (“single biomolecule”) was the ordinary meaning of the phrase in context, namely that there was no apparent reason for the inclusion of the word “single” in the claim term unless to indicate that the capability required was identification of a molecule with just that one molecule in view. The Court explained that the specification supported this understanding by repeatedly stressing that this “single biomolecule” capability was critical to the invention and by differentiating the examination of individual biomolecules from examination of an ensemble of copied biomolecules. The Court also pointed to dependent claims of the patent to provide support for the Board’s construction (in terms of claim differentiation), noting that those claims recited using the claimed apparatus for expressly described multiple-molecule examinations.

Regarding the prior issues on appeal, the Federal Circuit concluded that the Board’s factual findings were supported by substantial evidence. Turning to the Hassibi reference, the Court stated that the Board reasonably credited the testimony of PGI’s expert and the Hassibi reference itself in finding that Hassibi only disclosed the capability to ascertain the identity of a single biomolecule using a BRC assay or different assay. With respect to the Choumane reference, the Court found that the Board reasonably [...]

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Same Applicant, Similar Claims Support Obviousness-Type Double Patenting Rejection

by | Jan 4, 2024 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a Patent Trial & Appeal Board obviousness-type double patenting rejection, finding that an unexpected mechanism of action does not render the known use of a known compound nonobvious. In re: Institut Pasteur, Case No. 22-1896 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 13, 2023) (Taranto, Clevenger, Stoll, JJ.) (nonprecedential).

Institut Pasteur filed a patent application directed to peptides derived from human basic proline-rich lacrimal protein and claimed, among other things, a method for treating pain comprising of administering 10 to 300 mg/day of the peptide for seven days. The examiner rejected the claims for obviousness-type double patenting over another patent application filed by Pasteur, which was directed to diagnostic and therapeutic uses of human basic proline-rich lacrimal protein and peptides derived therefrom.

Pasteur appealed to the Board, which affirmed the examiner’s rejection. Rather than appeal the Board’s decision to the Federal Circuit, Pasteur sought continued examination of the application and modified the claims to specify that the method of treatment was for human patients, was in a dose of 1 mg/kg to 2 mg/kg at 10 to 300 mg/day, and should not induce pharmacodependence or tolerance in the patient. The examiner rejected the amended claims for obviousness-type double patenting over the same application. On appeal, the Board issued another decision agreeing with the examiner. Pasteur appealed this decision.

Pasteur argued that the Board’s second decision was unsupported by substantial evidence because the Board applied a legally flawed prima facie obviousness analysis and disregarded the secondary indicia of nonobviousness presented in a declaration submitted by Catherine Rougeot, the named inventor of the application.

The Federal Circuit disagreed with Pasteur and affirmed the Board’s rejection. As for Pasteur’s argument that the Board disregarded the differences between the claims of the patent application and the claims of the other application, the Court noted that the Board “explained why each claim limitation was obvious in light of the [other application].” With respect to Pasteur’s argument that the Board improperly relied on inherency when finding one limitation of the filed application to be satisfied, the Court concluded that “[i]t is settled that inherency may supply a missing claim limitation in an obviousness analysis.”

As for Pasteur’s challenge to the Board’s consideration of the secondary indicia of nonobviousness presented in the Rougeot declaration, the Federal Circuit found that the Board’s analysis was supported by substantial evidence. The Court made clear that Pasteur failed to prove that the benefits claimed by the application were unexpected compared to the closest prior art since unexpected mechanisms of action do not ipso facto make the known use of known compounds nonobvious. The Court also noted that Federal Circuit precedent did not demand a finding of nonobviousness simply because one limitation was found to be satisfied through inherency. The Court was similarly unpersuaded by the long-felt need described in the Rougeot declaration because any need for the subject matter claimed by the patent application was already satisfied by the subject matter claimed by the other [...]

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Store This Element: Lexicography Controls Claim Term Definition Over Plain and Ordinary Meaning

by | Dec 21, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a Patent Trial & Appeal Board obviousness finding, determining that the Board properly applied the patentee’s lexicography in construing a disputed claim term and properly treated arguments raised by the parties in the reply and sur-reply briefings. ParkerVision, Inc. v. Vidal, Case No. 22-1548 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 15, 2023) (Prost, Wallach, Chen, JJ.)

Intel filed a petition for inter partes review of a patent owned by ParkerVision. The challenged patent is directed to wireless local area networks (WLANs) that use frequency translation technology and incorporate another patent that describes down-conversion utilizing down-converter modules. The challenged claim is directed to apparatuses for down-converting electromagnetic (EM) signals. Among other things, the claim recites “wherein said first and said second frequency down-conversion modules each comprise a switch and a storage element.” The Board found the challenged claim unpatentable and in doing so, construed the term “storage element” to mean “an element of a system that stores non-negligible energy from an input signal.” The Board based its construction on the description of “storage modules” in a patent incorporated by reference into the challenged patent. ParkerVision appealed.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s construction, finding that ParkerVision had acted as its own lexicographer when it defined the term “storage element” in the incorporated-by-reference patent. The Court relied on a “critical” paragraph from the incorporated-by-reference patent that states: “[s]torage modules and storage capacitances, on the other hand, refer to systems that store a non-negligible amount of energy from an input EM signal.” The Court reasoned that the term “refer to,” together with the “as used herein” language from a preceding sentence, conveyed an intent for the sentence to be definitional and applicable to the whole patent rather than to a specific embodiment. To that end, the Court reiterated that a patentee may act as its own lexicographer by crafting a definition for a claim term rather than relying on the plain and ordinary meaning of that term, and that when a patentee does so, the definition may act as a disavowal of the full scope of the plain and ordinary meaning of the term.

ParkerVision also argued that the Board impermissibly relied on arguments allegedly raised for the first time in Intel’s reply brief, and that it erred in excluding certain arguments made by ParkerVision on sur-reply. The Federal Circuit rejected both arguments. The Court reasoned that because ParkerVision proposed a new claim construction in its patent owner response, Intel was permitted to argue and present evidence of obviousness under that new construction as long as such evidence relied on the same embodiments for each invalidity ground as were relied on in the petition.

The Federal Circuit also noted that ParkerVision’s arguments on sur-reply exceeded the scope of its patent owner response. While ParkerVision’s patent owner response proposed that the “storage element” be an element of the energy transfer system and store non-negligible amounts of energy from an input EM signal, ParkerVision only argued that the [...]

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Delay Is Okay: Final Written Decisions Can Be Issued After Statutory Deadline

by | Nov 30, 2023 | ,

In a matter of first impression, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concluded that the Patent Trial & Appeal Board has the authority to issue a final written decision (FWD) in a post-grant review (PGR) proceeding after the statutory deadline has passed. Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Collegium Pharm., Inc., Case No. 22-1482 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 21, 2023) (Dyk, Hughes, Stoll, JJ.)

Purdue owns a patent directed to a pharmaceutical formulation meant to prevent or deter the abuse of opioid analgesics through the use of an aversive agent. On March 13, 2018, Collegium filed a PGR petition asserting that the patent claims were invalid. On September 24, 2019, Purdue filed a notice of bankruptcy and imposition of automatic stay, after which the Board stayed the PGR proceeding. The Board’s one-year deadline to issue an FWD under 35 U.S.C. § 326(a)(11) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.200(c) expired on October 4, 2019. After the bankruptcy court lifted the stay on the PGR proceeding on September 1, 2020, Purdue argued that the Board no longer had the authority to issue an FWD because the 18-month statutory deadline to do so had passed. The Board disagreed and issued an FWD finding the challenged claims unpatentable. Purdue appealed.

Purdue argued that the Board did not have authority to issue an FWD after the deadline established by 35 U.S.C. § 326(a)(11) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.200(c) had passed. Purdue advanced four arguments in favor of its proposed interpretation of § 326(a)(11):

  1. The use of “shall” and “requiring” deprives the Board of the authority to issue an FWD.
  2. The “negative words” of “not later than 1 year” and “by not more than 6 months” indicate a loss of authority.
  3. The statutory language in § 326(a)(11) requires PGR proceedings to be conducted “in accordance with” the Board’s jurisdictional grant in 35 U.S.C. § 6, and therefore the Board’s jurisdiction expires when the deadline in § 326(a)(11) expires.
  4. The exceptions in § 326(a)(11) for “good cause” and “joinder” demonstrate that those are the only limited instances where the Board may issue an FWD after the statutory deadline.

None of Purdue’s arguments persuaded the Federal Circuit. The Court reasoned that § 328(a) plainly requires the issuance of an FWD and that “[h]ad Congress meant to deprive the agency of power in § 326(a)(11), it knew how to do it” vis-à-vis the use of specific language, like the language it used in other sections of the America Invents Act (AIA), such as 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) and 35 U.S.C. § 321(c), both of which specifically deny agency power after a temporal deadline.

The Federal Circuit also considered the legislative history of § 316(a)(11), recognizing that Congress created PGR and inter partes review (IPR) proceedings when enacting the AIA to, among other things, replace the “lengthy and inefficient” reexamination proceeding. The Court reasoned that prohibiting an FWD after the statutory deadline would “force” parties to commence district court litigation—an act contrary to the purpose of the AIA, which [...]

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Wave Goodbye: Arguments Incorporated by Reference Are Waived

by | Nov 30, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Patent Trial & Appeal Board’s patentability determination, finding that the patent challenger waived an argument it attempted to incorporate by reference to another brief. Medtronic, Inc. v. Teleflex Life Scis. Ltd., Case No. 2022-1721 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 16, 2023) (Lourie, Prost, Chen, JJ.)

Teleflex owns a patent directed to a method for using a guide extension catheter with a guide catheter. Medtronic challenged the patent in two inter partes review (IPR) proceedings, arguing that certain claims were obvious in light of Ressemann and Itou and that another claim was obvious in light of Ressemann, Itou and Kataishi. Teleflex argued that Itou was not prior art because the claimed invention was conceived prior to Itou’s filing date and was either actually reduced to practice before the critical date or diligently pursued until its constructive reduction to practice date. Medtronic did not contest Teleflex’s demonstration of conception but instead challenged Teleflex’s alleged showings of both actual reduction to practice and diligence until constructive reduction to practice.

The Board ultimately found that Itou did not qualify as prior art and that Medtronic therefore had not shown that the challenged claims were unpatentable. One of the issues before the Board was whether in vivo testing was required for actual reduction to practice because the claims at issue were method claims reciting “advancing . . . a guide catheter . . . through a main blood vessel to an ostium of a coronary artery.” The Board ultimately found that no such testing was required, explaining that Medtronic “was unable to identify any legal precedent requiring in vivo performance of a claimed in vivo method to show actual reduction to practice.” According to the Board, actual reduction to practice could “be verified using a physical model that replicates the anatomy in which the method would likewise be performed in vivo.” Medtronic appealed.

Medtronic challenged the Board’s determination regarding constructive reduction to practice, arguing as follows:

In addressing diligence, the Board simply adopted its earlier erroneous diligence analysis in IPR2020-00132. Appx61–62. Therefore, if this Court vacates the Board’s diligence holding in No. 21-2356, it should likewise vacate the Board’s decision here. Appellant’s Br. at 41.

The Federal Circuit explained that it did not vacate the diligence holding in the prior decision, so Medtronic’s condition precedent had not been met. Medtronic nevertheless urged the Court to decide the diligence question. The Court refused, finding that Medtronic improperly incorporated by reference an argument from another brief. The Court explained that it would be fundamentally unfair to allow Medtronic to use incorporation by reference to exceed the word limit on briefs. The Court observed that parties pursuing appeals must make certain strategic decisions concerning what material to include in their opening briefs, and here, Medtronic affirmatively chose not to include developed arguments on diligence. The Court therefore found that Medtronic waived its challenge to the Board’s diligence finding. With the diligence issue waived and conception stipulated, the Court affirmed [...]

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Distinguishing Drinkware—Provisional Priority Determined Differently in Pre- and Post-AIA Patents

by | Nov 30, 2023 | ,

In a precedential final written decision, the Patent Trial & Appeal Board concluded that a patent does not need to contain a claim supported by a provisional application’s disclosure to draw priority to that provisional for prior art purposes post America Invents Act (AIA). Penumbra, Inc. v. RapidPulse, Inc., IPR2021-01466, paper 34 (PTAB Mar. 10, 2023) (designated precedential Nov. 15, 2023) (Melvin, Cotta, Wisz, APJs).

Penumbra filed an inter partes review (IPR) petition targeting a patent directed to a “thrombectomy system,” which is a system for removing blood clots in the brain. Penumbra challenged the claims on four different grounds, and each included the Tiegen reference. Therefore, the petition would fail if the Tiegen reference was not prior art.

The challenged patent was filed on July 18, 2019, and drew priority to a provisional application filed on October 24, 2018. Tiegen drew priority to two provisional applications—one dated December 12, 2018, and another dated July 24, 2018. Whether Tiegen was prior art thus depended on whether the challenged patent could draw priority to its provisional application, and whether Tiegen could draw priority to its July 24, 2018, provisional. RapidPulse challenged Tiegen on both bases.

First, the Board assessed the proper priority date for the challenged patent. The Board explained that in order for the patent to draw priority to its provisional application, that provisional application had to provide written support for the challenged patent’s claims. Penumbra argued that the challenged patent’s provisional application did not have written support for the claimed “prevent[ing] forward flow.” RapidPulse responded, arguing that the disclosure of a “minimal amount of momentum from the fluid column” disclosed the claimed “preventing forward flow.” Forward flow generates momentum from the fluid column, so minimizing momentum required preventing fluid flow, according to RapidPulse. RapidPulse also pointed to embodiments that had substantially no forward flow from the distal end of the system.

Penumbra responded by explaining that the provisional application required forward flow in some embodiments, and nothing in the specification stated that the flow should be prevented. The Board agreed, explaining that the provisional application included embodiments with forward flow, and while the provisional recited some embodiments with small amounts of forward flow, the provisional did not indicate that the low forward flow was significant. The Board observed that “one cannot disclose a forest in the original application, and then later pick a tree out of the forest.”

Having determined that the priority date of the challenged patent was July 18, 2019, the Board turned to the priority date of Tiegen. The Board distinguished the present case over Dynamic Drinkware, a 2015 US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit case. Dynamic Drinkware states that for prior art purposes, a prior art patent can only draw priority to a provisional application if the prior art patent contains a claim supported by that provisional application. The Board explained that Dynamic Drinkware does not apply post-AIA. Instead, the Board found that, based on the language of AIA 35 [...]

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Status Quo Has Few Defenders at PREVAIL Act Senate Subcommittee Hearing

by and | Nov 16, 2023 | ,

On November 8, 2023, the US Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Intellectual Property heard testimony from four witnesses on the proposed Promoting and Respecting Economically Vital American Innovation Leadership (PREVAIL) Act. Although the PREVAIL Act includes several provisions regarding transparency and independence, its thrust is its dramatic alteration of Patent Trial & Appeal Board post-grant review (PGR) and inter partes review (IPR) proceedings, including their relationship to co-pending district court litigation, with the goal of incentivizing innovation by reducing costs and making such challenges less likely to be successful.

We previously reported on the provisions of the proposed PREVAIL Act when it was introduced. The biggest changes under consideration include the introduction of a standing requirement, a heightened burden of proof from preponderance-of-the-evidence to clear-and-convincing evidence, a stronger estoppel to thwart costly and unnecessary co-pending actions in court and at the Board, and the separation of the Board’s institution and decision-making functions.

Three witnesses spoke in favor of the PREVAIL Act before the subcommittee, emphasizing that the Board failed to live up to the purposes and intentions of the America Invents Act (AIA). These witnesses were Representative Lamar Smith, a co-sponsor of the AIA; Michelle Armond, co-founder of the law firm Armond Wilson LLP and a practitioner before the Board; and Joseph Kiani, founder of Masimo Industries.

Smith testified that Congress enacted the AIA because it recognized the potential for Board proceedings to be abused, and according to Smith, that is exactly what has happened. Each of the three witnesses testified that well-funded litigants have exploited Board procedures to overwhelm small businesses by forcing them into expensive duplicative proceedings in multiple forums. For example, Kiani posited that the Board posed an existential threat to startups, attributing findings of invalidity against his company’s patents to the AIA’s invalidation-friendly procedures.

Armond explained to the subcommittee how the PREVAIL Act would streamline Board proceedings and harmonize them with district court and International Trade Commission (ITC) litigation. According to Armond, in the wake of the AIA, both the Board and district courts have failed to offer uniform standards for deciding whether to stay a proceeding in their forum pending resolution of a parallel proceeding in the other. The PREVAIL Act would resolve this problem by requiring litigants to select only one forum in which they may raise their invalidity arguments. Armond argued that using the same clear-and-convincing-evidence standard in Board review proceedings and other litigation would harmonize the Board with district courts and the ITC by ensuring that different forums reach the same invalidity decision.

Joseph Matal, former US Patent & Trademark Office interim director and acting solicitor, and current principal of Clear IP, LLC, was the lone dissenting witness at the hearing. According to Matal, the PREVAIL Act’s proposal to require a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard in Board review proceedings is misguided because Board judges possess the requisite agency expertise to second-guess patent examination decisions. Additionally, Board judges often have more time to evaluate the patents and more information than the examiner. According to Matal, [...]

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PTO Director Requests Input on Patent Trial & Appeal Board Decision Regarding Duty of Candor

by | Nov 9, 2023 |

On May 3, 2023, the Patent Trial & Appeal Board granted a motion for sanctions brought by Spectrum Solutions LLC against Longhorn Vaccines & Diagnostics LLC.[1] The resulting sanctions order canceled five Longhorn patents. The Board found that Longhorn failed to meet its duty of candor by selectively and improperly withholding material results inconsistent with its patentability arguments directed to the canceled claims covering chemical compositions, collection systems and methods for biological specimen collection, including preserving biological samples, killing pathogens and preventing nucleic acid degradation. Now, US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) Director Katherine Vidal has initiated sua sponte review of the Board’s sanctions order.

In her order issued October 27, 2023, the Director authorized further briefing by both parties, as well as amicus curiae briefs in response to the Board’s decision and analysis for the Director’s review. The Director particularly seeks input on the following issues in the context of situations where relevant factual evidence has been withheld during an America Invents Act proceeding:

  • Which PTO regulations are implicated? Do such regulations include 37 C.F.R. § 1.56?
  • Is it an appropriate sanction for the Board to deem the claims unpatentable in its written decision? Is such a sanction proportionate to the harm caused by the party, taking into account the integrity of the patent system?
  • What other sanctions are appropriate, either in addition to or in place of applying adverse judgment in a final written decision to deem claims unpatentable?

Amicus briefs (of no more than 20 pages) limited to the issues and questions identified above should be submitted to Director_PTABDecision_Review@uspto.gov no later than four weeks after the October 27, 2023, entry date of the order.

For further details, see Order (Paper 133) in each of the listed IPR proceedings.

________________________________________________________________________________

[1] See IPR2021-00847 (US 8,084,443), IPR2021-00850 (US 8,293,467), IPR2021-00854 (US 8,669,20), IPR2021-00857 (US 9,212,399) and IPR2021-00860 (US 9,683,256).



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Go With the Flow: “A” Still Means “One or More”

by | Oct 26, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a claim construction that was adopted during an inter partes review (IPR) because the Patent Trial & Appeal Board erred in construing the contested limitation as limited to a single sample rather than including the possibility of plural samples. ABS Global, Inc. v. Cytonome/ST, LLC, Case No. 22-1761 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 19, 2023) (Reyna, Taranto, Stark, JJ.)

ABS and Genus plc (collectively, ABS) filed a petition to institute an IPR on a patent owned by Cytonome. The patent claims microfluidic devices for particle (e.g., cells, molecules and other particles of interest) processing. The claimed devices exploit the principles of laminar flow to hydrodynamically focus particles at a certain point along the flow path for inspection or other purposes. The claimed devices are capable of hydrodynamically focusing the flow of a particle-containing fluid (the sample fluid) by abutting the sample fluid on more than one side with a fluid that does not contain particles (the sheath fluid). Generally, the faster the sheath fluid flows relative to the sample fluid the more the sample fluid’s corresponding cross-section is compressed. Figure 3A of the patent is an example of how the claimed devices use sheath fluid (SF) to focus a sample fluid (S) along a channel (CL):

ABS’s petition argued that the challenged claims were anticipated or obvious at least in view of a prior publication that taught devices with a split sample stream. The Board disagreed, construing the challenged patent claims as directed to a single sample stream and concluding that ABS failed to demonstrate why those of ordinary skill—in view of the art cited in ABS’s petition—would have modified the prior art split sample stream into the claimed single sample stream. ABS appealed.

The Federal Circuit found that the Board erred in construing the challenged claims. In construing the independent claim as being limited to a single sample stream, the Board focused on two limitations: “an inlet configured to receive a sample stream” and “a fluid focusing region configured to focus the sample stream….” In limiting the claim to a single sample stream, the Board relied on the definite article preceding the second recitation of “sample stream” and noted that a plural-allowing interpretation would be inconsistent with a dependent claim that further requires the focusing fluid to be “introduced into the flow channel symmetrically with respect to a centerline of the sample stream.”

The Federal Circuit reversed the Board’s claim construction, concluding that the dependent claim was not inconsistent with a plural-streams interpretation for the independent claim and that the Board committed two errors in construing both claims. First, the Board did not properly apply what the Court refers to as the “general rule,” which is applicable to open-ended “comprising” claims that recite “a” or “an” before a noun. The Court explained that such a limitation should be construed to mean one or more unless context sufficiently indicates otherwise. Second, [...]

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Decoding Algorithms: Structural Sufficiency for Means-Plus-Function Claim Judged From Skilled Artisan’s Perspective

by | Oct 19, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reiterated that in the context of construing computer-implemented means-plus-function limitations, if the specification discloses some arguable algorithm, even if a party contends that the algorithm is inadequate, the sufficiency of the purportedly-adequate structure disclosed in the specification must be evaluated in light of the knowledge possessed by a skilled artisan. Sisvel International S. A. v. Sierra Wireless, Inc., Case No. 22-1493 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 6, 2023) (Moore, Clevenger, Chen, JJ.)

Sisvel owns a patent directed to methods of channel coding when transmitting data in radio systems. The patent uses techniques called “link adaptation” and “incremental redundancy,” which are alleged to provide improvement over prior channel coding techniques. Sierra filed a petition for inter partes review (IPR) challenging certain claims as obvious over the Chen reference by itself and challenging those and other claims as obvious over the combination of the Chen and Eriksson references or the combination of the Chen and GSM references. The Patent Trial & Appeal Board found that some challenged claims were obvious based on Chen alone and that other claims were patentable over the proposed combination of references. Both parties appealed.

Sisvel appealed the Board’s unpatentability finding, arguing that Chen failed to disclose a second puncturing pattern. Sisvel also argued that the Board did not provide a sufficiently detailed explanation to support its finding that Chen disclosed the claimed “combining” limitation and ignored Sisvel’s rebuttal arguments. The Federal Circuit disagreed with Sisvel on both counts and affirmed the Board’s determination. Regarding the second puncturing pattern, the Court found that the independent claim required a “first puncturing pattern” and a “second puncturing pattern,” and that Chen expressly described that its coded transmissions are “generated by using punctured codes” and that “[p]uncturing reduces the number of code symbols to be retransmitted.” Therefore, the Court found that substantial evidence supported the Board’s finding that Chen taught a second puncturing pattern. Regarding the “combining” limitation, the Court affirmed the Board’s decision and concluded that Chen’s disclosure of “accumulating the code symbols from the transmitted and retransmitted coded data blocks,” also referred to in Chen as “interleaving,” taught the “combining” limitation. Overall, the Court determined that the Board’s analysis was sufficiently detailed, adequately addressed Sisvel’s related arguments and was supported by substantial evidence.

Sierra appealed the patentability finding, arguing that the Board’s finding that a skilled artisan would not have been motivated to combine Chen and the GSM references was not supported by substantial evidence. Sierra also argued that the Board erroneously found insufficient corresponding structure in the specification for the term “means for detecting.” The Federal Circuit concluded that substantial evidence supported the Board’s finding of a lack of motivation to combine Chen and the GSM references, but that the Board erred in analyzing the “means for detecting” limitation. Regarding motivation to combine, the Court explained that although an IPR petitioner has a low burden of explaining why a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine various references to form [...]

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