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IP UPDATE
Exploring the Latest in Intellectual Property Law
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IPR on Written Description? Claims Found Unpatentable Based on Lack of Entitlement to Priority Date

by | Dec 9, 2021 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board) ruling, based on a written description analysis, that certain claims were invalid as anticipated by an earlier priority application from the same family. Indivior UK Ltd. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs. S.A., Case Nos. 20-2073, -2142 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 24, 2021) (Lourie, J.) (Linn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Indivior’s patent, which issued from a fifth continuation application claiming priority back to 2009, claimed orally dissolvable films with therapeutic agents. Some of the claims recited numeric ranges, such as “about 40% wt to about 60% wt of a water-soluble polymeric matrix.” Instead of a range, one claim recited a specific amount of “about 48.2% wt” of the polymeric matrix. The patent’s specification did not expressly mention the claimed ranges or the specific 48.2% amount, but it did contain tables comprising quantities of polymer from which Indivior contended a person of ordinary skill in the art could calculate the percentage of polymer by weight.

Indivior argued that the polymer weight percentage limitations were supported by the priority application and, therefore, the patent was entitled to that priority date. Dr. Reddy’s contended that since the polymer weight percentage limitations were added later, an intervening patent publication (Myers) was prior art and anticipated the claims. Indivior did not contest that if Myers was prior art, it anticipated the claims. As a result, the Board’s decision on anticipation under 35 U.S.C. §102 turned on the priority analysis which, in turn, hinged on written description. The Board found that the tables disclosed formulations from which the “48.2% wt” could be calculated and, thus, claims reciting that limitation were not anticipated by Myers. However, the Board found that the claimed ranges (i.e., about 40% wt to about 60% wt) were not disclosed in the specification, and those claims were therefore anticipated by Meyers. Indivior appealed the Board’s anticipation finding, and Dr. Reddy’s appealed the no anticipation finding.

The Federal Circuit first analyzed the specification and concluded that there was no written description support for the broader range of “about 40% wt to about 60% wt.” The Court explained that the range was not disclosed in the specification, the specific values of 40% and 60% were not disclosed and there was another “inconsistent” teaching for weights of “at least 25%.” The Court noted that two specific tables in the specification “do not constitute ranges; they are only specific, particular examples. For written description support of a claimed range, more clarity is required.” The Court explained that “[h]ere, one must select several components, add up the individual values, determine the aggregate percentages, and then couple those aggregate percentages with other examples in the [] application to create an otherwise unstated range. That is not a written description of the claimed range.” The Court applied similar analysis in finding lack of written description for other claims reciting a slightly different range. Ultimately, the Court agreed that there was no written [...]

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Design Patent Prior Art Must Be From Same or Analogous Field as Claimed Article of Manufacture

by | Oct 14, 2021 |

Finding that the Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board) applied an erroneous interpretation of claim scope, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a Board decision upholding an examiner’s rejection of a lip implant design patent as anticipated by a non-analogous art tool. In re: SurgiSil, Case No. 20-1940 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 4, 2021) (Moore, C.J.)

SurgiSil filed a design application for a lip implant shaped like a generally cylindrical rod that tapered to a point at each end. The examiner rejected the patent as anticipated by a “stump,” an art tool of similar, almost identical, shape used for smoothing and blending areas of pastel or charcoal. SurgiSil appealed the rejection to the Board. The Board affirmed the rejection, finding that the differences in the shapes of SurgiSil’s lip implant and the art tool were minor. The Board rejected SurgiSil’s argument that the two articles of manufacture were “very different,” reasoning that it is irrelevant whether a prior art reference is analogous for anticipation purposes. SurgiSil appealed.

Reviewing the Board’s legal conclusions de novo, the Federal Circuit found that the Board erred as a matter of law. Citing 35 U.S.C. § 171(a) and the 1871 Supreme Court decision in Gorham Co. v. White, the Court explained that a design patent claim does not cover the design in the abstract, and that it is limited to the particular article of manufacture identified in the claim. The Court concluded that the claimed design was limited to a lip implant, did not cover other articles of manufacture and that the Board’s decision therefore rested on an erroneous interpretation of the claim’s scope.



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When it Comes to Method of Use Claims, Preamble Language Regarding Intended Use is Limiting

by | Aug 26, 2021 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued three separate but related rulings (two precedential, one non-precedential) affirming decisions by the Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board) regarding the validity of nine US patents and addressing the limitations of preamble language and motivation to combine. Eli Lilly Co. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals, Case Nos. 20-1876, -1877, -1878 (Fed. Cir. August 16, 2021) (Lourie, J.); Teva Pharmaceuticals v. Eli Lilly Co., Case Nos. 20-1747, -1748, -1750 (Fed. Cir. August 16, 2021) (Lourie, J.); Teva Pharmaceuticals v. Eli Lilly Co., Case Nos. 20-1749, -1751, -1752 (Fed. Cir. August 16, 2021) (Lourie, J.). These decisions come as the latest events in a dispute between Teva and Eli Lilly Company over competing products for the treatment of migraine headaches.

Teva owns nine patents directed to humanized antagonist antibodies that target calcitonin gene-related peptide. In 2018, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) first approved Teva’s version of the biologic fremanezumab (Ajovy®) and then approved Lilly’s biologics license application for galcanezumab (Emgality®) eight days later. Both drugs are part of a new class of migraine therapeutic agents called calcitonin gene-related peptide antagonists.

Lilly challenged the validity of Teva’s nine patents covering Ajovy® in a series of inter partes review (IPR) petitions, arguing that the claims were obvious. The Board instituted IPR for all nine Teva patents. The similarity of subject matter and arguments led to three separate written opinions, each addressing three of the patents. In these decisions, the Board upheld the validity of three of the patents at issue (which covered methods of treating migraines with the antibodies) but found the claims of the six other patents directed to the antibodies themselves invalid.

Lilly appealed the first Board ruling covering methods of treating migraines to the Court. Lilly argued that the Board erred by (1) “reading a result into the constructions of the preambles and the term ‘effective amount,’” which led the Board to erroneously require Lilly to prove that a skilled artisan would have had “a reasonable expectation of achieving a result that was not claimed,” and (2) applying a too-high standard when weighing evidence to determine whether a skilled artisan would have a reasonable expectation of success. Lilly contended that a claim preamble containing only a statement of purpose cannot be a claim limitation and that no weight should have been given to the preambles. Teva argued that Lilly was basing its analysis on a false dichotomy between “limiting preambles” and preambles that are mere statements of purpose.

The Federal Circuit found the claim preambles to be limiting, reasoning that claims directed to methods of using compositions “are not directed to what the method ‘is’” but rather to “what the method ‘does,’” which usually is recited in the preamble. The preambles provided the only metric by which one practicing the claim could determine whether the amount administered is an “effective amount” and provided the antecedent basis for at least one later claim term in the independent claims.

After finding the preambles to [...]

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Without More, Mere Automation is Abstract—Not Construing Interchangeable Terms Doesn’t Give Them the Cold Shoulder

by | Aug 19, 2021 |

In the latest development relating to patent eligibility of content-based identifier patents, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed decisions finding patent claims ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. PersonalWeb Techs. LLC v. Google LLC, YouTube, LLC, Case No. 20-1543 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 12, 2021) (Prost, J.) (consolidating PersonalWeb Techs. LLC v. Facebook, Inc., Case No. 20-1553, and PersonalWeb Techs. LLC, Level 3 Commc’ns. LLC v. EMC Corp., VMWare, Inc., Case No. 20-1554).

PersonalWeb sued technology companies in the Eastern District of Texas in 2011 over three of its patents. The patents were directed to data-processing systems that assign each data item a substantially unique content-based identifier, generated by hash algorithm, which changes when the content changes and is used to perform data-management functions. Several defendants successfully motioned for transfer to the Northern District of California, where their companies were headquartered and/or their employees responsible for the development of the accused products were based. After claim construction in Texas, the cases were transferred and stayed pending several inter partes reviews before the US Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board). Previous decisions before the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s findings that using hash-based identifiers for data management was disclosed in the prior art, that content-based identifiers in performing file-management functions, such as backing up files, were also known and other independently unpatentable aspects were recited in the claims. After the stay was lifted, the California court granted the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings that the remaining asserted claims were patent ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. PersonalWeb appealed.

To assess patent eligibility, the Federal Circuit applied the two-step Mayo/Alice framework. Under step one (determining whether the claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept, such as an abstract idea), the Court considered the focus of the claimed advance over the prior art and found that the claims were directed to an abstract idea. PersonalWeb contended that its claims were directed to “a substantially unique, algorithm-derived, content-based identifier for all data items in a networked computer, which allows a computer within a network containing diverse computing and storage systems to locate and distribute data without knowing either the file system of any device within the network or the conventional name of any data item.” However, the Court adopted the district court’s view, which was that the patents were directed to “(1) using a content-based identifier generated from a ‘hash or message digest function,’ (2) comparing that content-based identifier against something else, [that is,] another content-based identifier or a request for data; and (3) providing access to, denying access to, or deleting data.” Given the focus in Mayo/Alice step one of “whether the claims of the asserted patents fall within the excluded category of abstract ideas,” and citing to parallel examples from precedent cases, the Court concluded that the claims were directed to the use of an algorithm-generated content-based identifier to perform the claimed data-management functions, which include controlling access to data items, retrieving and delivering copies [...]

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If Intrinsic Evidence Provides a Clear Meaning, Just Stop

by | Aug 19, 2021 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated a final written decision of the Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board) based on its finding that the Board erred in its ultimate claim construction by relying on extrinsic evidence that was inconsistent with the intrinsic evidence. Seabed Geosolutions (US) Inc. v. Magseis FF LLC, Case No. 20-1237 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 11, 2021) (Moore, C.J.)

In April 2018, Seabed Geosolutions petitioned for inter partes review of a patent owned by Magseis directed to “seismometers for use in seismic exploration.” Every claim recited a “geophone internally fixed within” either a “housing” or an “internal compartment” of a seismometer. The Board construed this limitation to require a non-gimbaled geophone based entirely on extrinsic evidence. The Board found that the term “fixed” had a special meaning of “non-gimbaled” at the time of the invention. Based on this finding, the Board determined that Seabed had failed to prove that the challenged claims were unpatentable because the cited prior art did not disclose a non-gimbaled geophone. Seabed appealed.

The Federal Circuit reversed the Board’s claim construction of the term “fixed” because it relied on extrinsic evidence that was inconsistent with the intrinsic evidence and unnecessary to consider given the clarity of the intrinsic evidence. The Court reminded the Board that it “resort[s] to extrinsic evidence to construe claims only if it is consistent with the intrinsic evidence,” and that “[i]f the meaning of a claim term is clear from the intrinsic evidence, there is no reason to resort to extrinsic evidence,” citing prior Federal Circuit decisions.

Contrary to the special meaning found by the Board, the Federal Circuit determined that the term “fixed” carried its ordinary meaning (i.e., attached or fastened). The Court found that the term “specifies the geophone’s relationship with the housing, not the type of geophone.” As an initial matter, the specification was silent as to whether the geophone was gimbaled or not. “That silence does not support reading the claims to exclude gimbaled geophones,” in part because the specification used the term gimbaled when describing other aspects of the invention. Had the applicant intended to limit the claimed geophone, it would have done so.

Furthermore, the specification described the internal mounting of the geophone as a key feature to overcome issues with the then-conventional method of separating the geophone from the seismometer’s other components. The specification reiterated that by internally mounting the geophone, the invention was “self-contained.” The prosecution history also revealed that both the applicant and examiner understood the term to carry its plain and ordinary meaning, equating “internally fixed within” with “disposed, and electrically connected, within.” That equivalence indicates that the term was intended to describe the relationship of the geophone with the seismometer, rather than to limit the type of geophone as contemplated by the Board. Accordingly, the Court found that the intrinsic record was clear, and that the Board’s reliance on extrinsic evidence—much less extrinsic evidence that was inconsistent with the specification itself—was improper and remanded for [...]

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It’s Highlighted and Verified: Reversal of PTAB Non-Obviousness Decision

by | Jun 3, 2021 |

In a relatively unusual outcome, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board) decision finding non-obviousness in an inter partes review (IPR). Becton, Dickinson, and Co. v. Baxter Corp. Englewood, Case No. 20-1937 (Fed. Cir. May 28, 2021) (Dyk, J.)

Becton petitioned the Board for IPR of Baxter’s pre-America Invents Act (AIA) patent, directed to a system for preparing patient-specific doses and a method for telepharmacy. The Board decided that the patent claims were not shown to be invalid as obvious, but also found that Baxter’s secondary considerations evidence was “weak.” Becton appealed based on two contested limitations: a verification limitation and a highlighting limitation. The Federal Circuit reversed the Board, concluding that the challenged claims were obvious and explained that weak evidence of secondary considerations could not overcome the strong showing of obviousness.

First, the Federal Circuit decided that the Board erred in finding that a prior art reference that taught a remote pharmacist may verify a dose preparation did not render obvious a claimed method where a remote pharmacist must verify. The reference made clear that a non-pharmacist could not further process work without the verification step. Baxter’s own expert witness conceded that, in accordance with the teachings of the prior art, a non-pharmacist would be disciplined for continuing to process dose preparation without authorization. The Court concluded there was no significant difference between the teaching in the prior art reference and Baxter’s verification requirement.

Second, the Federal Circuit decided that the Board erred in finding that the “highlighting” limitation as it relates to a set of drug preparation steps on a computer was non-obvious. In what it characterized as a “close case,” the Board decided that a prior art reference’s teachings highlighting patient characteristics when dispensing repackaged medication did not make obvious highlighting, in a drug formulation context, prompts for additional information. Citing KSR v. Teleflex, the Court explained that the “combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.” The reference taught highlighting in terms of various inputs and information delivered. Becton’s expert testified that one of ordinary skill would understand from the reference that other information, such as prescription order information, could be displayed on the user interface. Baxter’s expert did not contradict Becton’s expert. Because “a person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton,” the Board erred in using that one reference as the only source for what one of ordinary skill would consider.

Lastly, Baxter unsuccessfully argued that under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(e)(2), one of the patent references was ineligible as prior art. Sec. 102(e)(2) provides that a prior art reference may be a “patent granted” on another’s application filed in the United States before the invention by the applicant. Baxter argued that since the claims of the reference were cancelled after a 2018 IPR, the reference no longer qualified as a “patent granted” [...]

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Arthrex Argument May Be Available in Round Two

by | May 20, 2021 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that a party did not waive the Patent Trial & Appeal Board’s (Board) constitutionality argument by raising it for the first time in its opening brief because the Court’s decision in Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc. was issued after the party sought rehearing. New Vision Gaming v. SG Gaming, Inc., Case Nos. 20-1399, -1400 (Fed. Cir. May 13, 2021) (Moore, J.) (Newman, J. concurring in part, dissenting in part)

New Vision appealed two covered-business method (CBM) review final written decisions in which the Board found that all claims of the patents, as well as its proposed substitute claims, were directed to patent ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. In its opening brief before the Federal Circuit, New Vision requested the Court vacate and remand the Board’s decisions in light of Arthrex. SG Gaming argued New Vision had waived its right to a challenge under Arthrex since it raised it for the first time on an appeal. The Court disagreed, finding that New Vision had not waived its ability to challenge the Board’s decision under Arthrex since Arthrex was issued after the Board’s final written decisions and after New Vision sought Board rehearing. The Court vacated the Board’s final written decisions in the CBMs and remanded for further proceedings consistent with Arthrex without reaching the merits or any other issues.

In her partial dissent, Judge Pauline Newman agreed that Arthrex applied and vacating the Board’s final written decisions was appropriate. She also argued that another threshold issue (venue) should have been resolved, rendering the remand under Arthrex unnecessary and unwarranted. Additionally, Judge Newman agreed with New Vision that since the parties agreed to a different forum for dispute resolution in their license agreement, compliance with the parties’ patent license agreement would be appropriate. Under that agreement, if “any dispute” arose, jurisdiction would be “exclusive” in the appropriate federal or state court in the state of Nevada. New Vision filed suit in the federal district court in Nevada before SG filed CBM petitions before the Board. The Board stated it “[does] not discern, nor has Patent Owner pointed to, any portions of chapter 32 or § 18 of the AIA, or authority otherwise, that explicitly provide for a contractual estoppel defense,” in its decision and proceeded to a final decision despite the forum selection agreement.

Both parties briefed the forum selection question, with New Vision citing the Federal Circuit 2019 decision in Dodocase VR v. MerchSource in which a case was removed from the Board based on an agreed choice of forum. SG countered that the Board’s rejection of choice of forum is an unreviewable “institution” decision under Thryv vs. Click-to-Call. Andrei Iancu, the Director of the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), intervened in the appeal, arguing that the Board’s decision is “final and nonappealable” under 35 U.S.C. § 324(e). As to the Board’s “conduct” in declining to [...]

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Prosecution History Prevents Patent Owner from “Intercepting” Win on Appeal

by | May 20, 2021 |

In reviewing whether the Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board) correctly interpreted the meaning of “intercepting” in the context of Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) technology, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that the claim language and prosecution history supported the Board’s decision. The Court thus affirmed the Board’s construction and subsequent finding of obviousness. Uniloc 2017 LLC v. Apple Inc., Case Nos. 20-1403, -1404 (Fed. Cir. May 12, 2021) (Prost, C.J.)

Uniloc owns a patent directed to a system and method for using various VoIP features, such as caller-ID, call waiting, multi-line service, and different levels of service quality known as the “codec specification.” The patent explains that in order to generate revenue for these features, service providers must maintain control over which subscribers have paid for these additional features. To achieve that control, the system employs an enforcement mechanism that sits between the sender of the communication and the intended recipient. The enforcement mechanism ensures that both parties are authorized to use the particular features by intercepting the signaling message, determining whether the client is authorized, and filtering the signaling message based on the authorization. The majority of the claims require authorization related to only one service type. However, one of the claims (claim 18) requires authorization related to at least two service types.

Apple filed a petition for inter partes review (IPR), alleging that all claims of the patent were invalid as obvious over a prior art patent referred to as Kalmanek. Kalmanek discloses signaling messages that are routed through at least one “gate controller,” which can authenticate the identity of the calling party and authorize the services sought. The services include at least caller-ID and enhanced levels of call quality. Kalmanek’s process is accomplished by sending a SETUP message, which the calling party sends to the gate controllers and then to the intended recipient. After receipt, the called party sends a SETUPACK message along a return path to the gate controllers and then to the caller.

During the IPR, Apple asserted that the term “intercepting” a signaling message associated with the call, as recited in all independent claims, should be interpreted to mean “the signaling [message] is received by a network entity located between the endpoints of the call.” Uniloc disagreed and argued that the term should be interpreted as excluding the receipt of a signaling message by the intended recipient of the message. The Board agreed with Apple’s construction and subsequently found that all terms were invalid as obvious with the exception of claim 18. With respect to claim 18, the Board concluded that Apple failed to meet its burden to show that Kalmanek disclosed authorization related to a codec service. Furthermore, the Board opined that even assuming Apple had properly advanced such an argument, it would have lost on the merits.

On appeal, Uniloc challenged the Board’s construction of the “intercepting” term, and Apple cross-appealed the Board’s finding with respect to the non-obviousness of claim 18. The Federal Circuit affirmed [...]

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If You Can’t Build it, They Won’t Come: No Obviousness Based on Fanciful Engine Design

by | Apr 29, 2021 |

Reaffirming that a person of ordinary skill in the art must have been able to actually create a disclosure at the time of invention in order for it to serve as an obviousness reference, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a decision by the Patent Trial & Appeal Board (the Board) in an inter partes review (IPR), concluding that a patent covering certain turbofan engine technology was not rendered obvious by a prior art publication that could not be realized into practice. Raytheon Techs. Corp. v. General Electric Co., Case No. 20-1755 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 16, 2021) (Chen, J.)

The issue on appeal was relatively straightforward. In an IPR, GE challenged as obvious a Raytheon patent that covered a specific design of geared gas turbine engine that provided for a “power density” higher than previously invented turbine engines. The patent defined “power density” as a “sea-level-takeoff thrust” divided by the engine turbine volume. During the IPR, GE relied on a 1987 NASA technical memorandum as art and argued that the reference, which envisioned superior performance characteristics based on an advanced engine that was made entirely of composite materials, rendered the challenged claims obvious. The parties did not dispute that this engine was unattainable in 1987, and may still be impossible today, because the envisioned composite materials do not yet (and may never) exist. The memorandum disclosed several performance factors, but not power density, sea-level-takeoff thrust or turbine volume. Nonetheless, GE argued, and the Board agreed, that the memorandum disclosed performance parameters that would have permitted an ordinarily skilled artisan to derive power densities that would have fallen within the range claimed in Raytheon’s patent.

On appeal, the Federal Circuit agreed with Raytheon, concluding that the imaginary engine of the NASA memorandum could not serve as an invalidating reference. In reversing the Board, the Federal Circuit reiterated two bedrock principles of obviousness law:

  • An obviousness reference must be enabled by the knowledge of an ordinarily skilled artisan at the time of the invention (but need not be self-enabling).
  • An invention cannot be rendered obvious by a non-self-enabling reference if no other prior art evidence or reference enables the non-self-enabling reference.

In addition, when a reference’s enablement is challenged, the party offering the reference bears a burden to establish that the reference, itself or in combination with other contemporaneous knowledge, was enabled.

Applying these principles here, the Federal Circuit determined that GE had not met its burden to show that the memorandum was indeed enabled. The Board, wrongly in the Court’s view, focused solely on whether an ordinarily skilled artisan was taught the parameters to ascertain a power density, rather than whether the prior art disclosed a turbofan engine possessing the requisite power density. Finding no evidence in the record to conclude that “a skilled artisan could have made the claimed turbofan engine with the recited power density,” the Court reversed.

Practice Note: Although this case does not break new obviousness ground, it reinforces the general [...]

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No Second Bite at the Apple: Injury Must Be Imminent and Non-Speculative to Support Standing

by | Apr 15, 2021 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled that a party did not have Article III appellate standing to obtain review of a final ruling of the Patent Trial & Appeal Board because the underlying district court proceedings had been dismissed with prejudice after a settlement and license agreement were reached. Apple Inc. v. Qualcomm Inc., Case Nos. 20-1561; -1642 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 7, 2021) (Moore, J.)

After Qualcomm sued Apple in district court, Apple filed petitions for inter partes review (IPR) of the asserted patent claims. The Board instituted on both petitions but found that Apple did not prove the challenged claims were obvious. Apple appealed the Board’s final written decisions finding non-obviousness.

While the IPR proceedings were pending, the parties settled their litigation worldwide. The settlement included a license to Apple and payment of royalties to Qualcomm. The parties filed a joint motion to dismiss Qualcomm’s district court action with prejudice, which the district court granted.

At the Federal Circuit, Qualcomm argued that Apple waived any argument to establish its appellate standing by failing to address or submit supporting evidence in its opening brief. However, the Federal Circuit exercised its discretion to reach the issue of standing, explaining that the issue of standing was fully briefed, there was no prejudice to Qualcomm, and the question of standing impacted these and other appeals. Qualcomm sought leave to file a sur-reply addressing Apple’s evidence and arguments on standing, and agreed that if its motions to file a sur-reply were granted, it would not suffer any prejudice, and that evaluating the evidence may resolve standing in other pending cases. The Court granted Qualcomm leave to file a sur-reply.

Apple argued that it had appellate standing based on its ongoing payment obligations that conditioned certain rights in the license agreement, the threat that Apple would be sued for infringing the two patents-at-issue after the expiration of the license agreement, and the estoppel effects of 35 USC § 315 on future challenges to the validity of the asserted patents. The Federal Circuit disagreed.

LICENSE RIGHTS

Distinguishing the 2007 Supreme Court case MedImmune v. Genentech (where standing was found based on license agreement payment obligations after analyzing evidence for injury in fact or redressability), the Federal Circuit explained that Apple did not allege that the validity of the patents-at-issue would affect its contract rights and ongoing royalty obligations. The license agreement between the parties involves tens of thousands of patents. Apple did not argue or present evidence that the validity of any single patent (including the two patents-at-issue) would affect its ongoing payment obligations, or identify any related contractual dispute that could be resolved through determining the patents-at-issue’s validity. Accordingly, the Court concluded that Apple failed to establish Art. III standing under MedImmune.

THREAT OF POST-LICENSE SUITS

Apple’s second argument was based on the possibility that Qualcomm might sue Apple for infringing the patents-at-issue after the license expired. The Federal Circuit found the mere possibility of any such suit [...]

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