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Ownership

Getting to the Core of It: Assignment Clause Is Ambiguous

by Katherine Pappas | May 30, 2024 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded a district court’s grant of summary judgment, finding that the language used in an invention assignment clause was subject to more than one reasonable interpretation (i.e., ambiguous) and thus remand was necessary for further fact finding. Core Optical Tech., LLC v. Nokia Corp., Case Nos. 23-1001; -1002; -1003 (Fed. Cir. May 21, 2024) (Dyk, Taranto, JJ.) (Meyer, J., dissenting).

Core Optical filed complaints against three groups of defendants alleging patent infringement. The lead defendant, Nokia, moved for summary judgment, arguing that Core Optical did not have standing to bring the patent infringement suit. Nokia argued that by virtue of an invention assignment clause in an employment-related agreement signed in 1990, the inventor, Dr. Core, had assigned the patent rights to TRW, his employer at the time of the invention. In the agreement, Dr. Core “agreed to disclose to TRW and automatically assign to TRW all of his inventions that ‘relate to the business or activities of TRW’ and were ‘conceived, developed, or reduced to practice’ during his employment with TRW.” Nokia argued that by virtue of that earlier assignment, the subsequent assignment to Core Optical was ineffective. The agreement had a carveout from the assignment for inventions “developed entirely on [Dr. Core’s] own time” that was unrelated to his work for TRW. According to Nokia, based on the assignment, Core Optical did not have standing to assert the patent. The district court agreed and granted Nokia’s motion for summary judgment. Core Optical appealed.

The Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, following Ninth Circuit and California law relating to the underlying contract dispute and related factual determinations. Under California law, the “fundamental goal of contractual interpretation is to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties” (citing City of Atascadero v. MLPF&S (1998)). In granting summary judgment, the district court had held that the 1990 invention assignment agreement’s carveout did not encompass Dr. Core’s PhD research, which undisputedly led to the invention claimed in the patent. That finding was based in part on the TRW fellowship program that supported and enabled Dr. Core’s PhD work. However, Core Optical presented evidence that “Dr. Core was careful not to work on his PhD research while ‘on the clock’ at TRW and not to use TRW equipment, facilities, or supplies when working on his PhD research.”

The Federal Circuit disagreed with the district court that the matter was subject to resolution on summary judgment. The Court agreed with Core Optical that the “entirely-own-time” phrase did not unambiguously express a mutual intent to designate all the time Dr. Core spent performing his PhD research as his own time or, as Nokia argued, to indicate that some of the time Dr. Core spent performing his PhD research was partly TRW’s time (as the district court held). The Federal Circuit walked through the undisputed facts, including that Dr. Core sought funding from TRW for his PhD research and [...]

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Patent Venue Statute Doesn’t Apply to Third-Party Counterclaim Defendant; Acts in Furtherance of Partnership May Be Imputed to Partner for Venue Purposes

by Paul Devinsky | Mar 24, 2022 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s determination of proper venue, finding that the patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), does not apply to a third-party counterclaim defendant and that acts done by separate entities in furtherance of a partnership can be imputed to a partner for purposes of venue determination. The Federal Circuit also affirmed and reversed jury verdicts of adequate written description and patent co-ownership. BASF Plant Sci., LP v. Commonwealth Sci. and Indus. Rsch. Org., Case Nos. 20-1415; -1416; -1919; -1920 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 15, 2022) (Newman, Taranto, Chen, JJ.) (Newman, J., dissenting).

Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), a research arm of the Australian government, owns six patents directed to the engineering of plants, particularly canola, to produce specified oils not native to the plants. BASF Plant Science is a plant biotechnology company. CSIRO and BASF each explored genetic modification of familiar oilseed crop plants, such as canola, to get them to produce omega-3 long-chain polyunsaturated fatty acids (LCPUFAs), commonly known as “fish oil,” that could be fed to farm-raised fish and are beneficial to human health. In 2007, CSIRO and BASF discussed a focused collaboration and in 2008 entered into a two-year Materials Transfer and Evaluation Agreement (MTEA) to advance that goal. In 2010, following the conclusion of the MTEA, CSIRO partnered with another Australian government entity, Grains Research and Development Corporation, and private company, Nuseed, to commercialize its products. CSIRO granted Nuseed an exclusive license to CSIRO’s LCPUFA technology and patents. In 2011, BASF entered into a commercialization agreement with Cargill. BASF developed a canola seed line that it used to apply for regulatory approvals, which Cargill used in cross-breeding work. As part of the joint project, BASF deposited seeds with the American Type Culture Collection (ATCC) to support BASF’s patent applications.

During this period, BASF and CSIRO entered negotiations for BASF to take a license to CSIRO’s LCPUFA technology, but the negotiations broke down. In 2016, Nuseed sent Cargill a letter identifying multiple CSIRO patents and inviting Cargill to discuss CSIRO’s omega-3 patent portfolio. In April 2017, BASF sued Nuseed in the District of Delaware, seeking a declaratory judgment that BASF did not infringe certain CSIRO patents listed in the 2016 letter. The District of Delaware dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.

In 2017, BASF filed a declaratory judgment action in the Eastern District of Virginia against CSIRO, Nuseed and Grains Research (collectively, CSIRO). CSIRO filed an answer and counterclaims asserting infringement of the asserted patents against BASF and Cargill. BASF entered the case as a party and asserted co-ownership of the asserted patents under the MTEA. Cargill moved to dismiss the counterclaims for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue. The district court denied the motion, determining that it had personal jurisdiction over Cargill and that venue was proper. Cargill did not dispute that it had a regular and established place of business in the Eastern District of Virginia but argued that it [...]

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A Tale of Two Authors: Determining Ownership Rights of Novels Adapted for Theatre

by Tim Dunker | Sep 30, 2021 | Copyrights

The US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the district court’s opinion and order that Roberto Ramos Perea, the playwright who adapted the novels of prominent Puerto Rican author Enrique Laguerre for theatre, was not a proper copyright owner. Perea v. Editorial Cultural Inc., Case Nos. 19-2119, -2129 (1st Cir. Sept. 13, 2021) (Thompson J.) The issue before the Court was whether Editorial, a publishing company, was liable for copyright infringement after it printed and sold 20,000 copies of the theatrical adaptations of two novels (La Llamarada and La Resaca) written by Laguerre and adapted by Ramos.

In 2001, Laguerre contracted with Producciones Teatro Caribeño, authorizing Ramos to create the adaptation of La Resaca and retain the moral rights (protecting the link between Ramos and his work). The parties again contracted in 2003 for the adaptation of La Llamarada. Laguerre and Editorial entered into a contract in 2002 that gave Editorial the right to print “one edition” of the “dramatic adaptation of La Resaca” for seven consecutive years from the first printing date. Editorial received the right to print up to 25,000 copies of La Llamarada (the novel) in exchange for royalties.

During the district court action, both sides moved for partial summary judgment on the infringement claim. Editorial argued that, pursuant to the Laguerre-Caribeño contracts, Laguerre reserved the printing rights to the adaptations to himself exclusively, and Ramos therefore was not entitled to damages for infringement. Ramos argued that he owned the copyrights in the the adaptations and was entitled to recover for infringement because “(1) Laguerre authorized Ramos to create the Adaptations, therefore those creative works belong to him, or, alternatively, (2) La Resaca and La Llamarada were in the public domain when the Adaptations were written (meaning they were available for public use) and as such Laguerre’s authorization was not required.” The district court eliminated the playwright, Ramos, as the copyright owner and, following a jury trial, entered a judgment against Editorial Cultural awarding damages to Laguerre’s heirs. In dismissing Ramos’ claim, the district court exclusively relied on the language of the Laguerre-Caribeño contracts, under which Laguerre retained publishing rights. The issue on appeal involved which party owned the publishing rights to the adaptations when Editorial sold them in 2013.

The district court did not consider whether the novels were in the public domain when Ramos created his adaptations. Under the 1909 Copyright Act, works created before 1978 retained copyright protection for 28 years (plus an additional 28 years if renewed). The novels were written in 1935 (La Llamarada, not renewed) and 1949 (La Resaca, never registered in the Copyright Office). The First Circuit explained it is clear that both novels had passed into the public domain well before the contracts were signed.

Reviewing the summary judgment orders de novo, the First Circuit found that when Ramos adapted the novels into the play scripts in 2001 and 2003, Laguerre had no copyright interest in either of these novels (or any work derived from them) and [...]

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De Minimis Defense Doesn’t Protect Minimal Use of Concededly Infringing Material

by Jodi Benassi | Sep 23, 2021 | Copyrights

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant in a copyright case based on a “minimal usage” or de minimis use defense. Richard N. Bell v. Wilmott Storage Services, LLC, et al., Case Nos. 19-55882, -56181 (9th Cir. July 26, 2021) (Wardlaw, J.) (Clifton, J., and Choe-Groves, J., concurring).

Richard Bell took a photo of the Indianapolis skyline and published it on various websites. Eleven years later, he registered the photo with the US Copyright Office. Bell later conducted an online reverse image search of his photo to identify potential infringers and subsequently filed more than 100 copyright infringement lawsuits. One of the sites on which Bell found the photo was VisitUSA.com. The image was only available to those who had conducted a reverse image search or knew the precise web address to the photo. Wilmott Storage Services purchased VisitUSA.com in 2012. In 2018, Bell notified Wilmott that it was displaying the photo without his permission. Wilmott removed the photo in response to Bell’s request. In 2019, Wilmott continued to display a copy of the photo, but at a slightly different address than before. Wilmott explained that its webmaster was supposed to remove the photo but instead only changed the file name. Wilmott subsequently removed the photo.

Bell sued Wilmott for copyright infringement in 2018, asserting that Wilmott infringed his right to “display the copyrighted work publicly” by making it accessible to the public on Wilmott’s server. Assuming infringement, Wilmott filed for summary judgment based on the affirmative defenses of de minimis use, fair use and the statute of limitations. The district court granted summary judgment to Wilmott on the de minimis use defense. Although Wilmott conceded that an identical copy of the photo was hosted on its server, the district court found no infringement. Bell appealed.

The Ninth Circuit noted that it had not previously addressed the issue of whether one “publicly displays” a work where it is accessible only to members of the public who either possess the specific pinpoint address or who perform a particular type of online search—here, a reverse image search. Applying Ninth Circuit precedent from Perfect 10, the Court concluded that Wilmott publicly displayed the photo.

The Ninth Circuit also found that there was no place for an inquiry into whether there was de minimis copying because the “degree of copying” was total since the infringing work was an identical copy of the copyrighted photo. The Court explained that it and a majority of other circuits do not view the de minimis doctrine as a defense to infringement but rather as an answer to the inquiry whether an infringing work and copyrighted work are substantially similar so as to make the copying actionable. The Court reiterated that the de minimis defense applies to the amount of copying, not to the extent of the defendant’s use of the infringing work. The Court also explained that the de minimis copying defense is [...]

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Publisher’s Co-Authorship Claim Arises Under Copyright Act, Invoking Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction

by Paul Devinsky | Aug 19, 2021 | Copyrights

The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed a district court’s dismissal of a copyright authorship dispute, finding that the district court had exclusive jurisdiction over the case because a book publisher’s claim of co-authorship arose under the federal Copyright Act, not state contract law. Di Angelo Publ’ns, Inc. v. Kelley, Case No. 20-20523 (5th Cir. Aug. 12, 2021) (Higginbotham, J.)

Makeup artist Jentry Kelley and Di Angelo Publications entered into a publishing contract for Kelley’s cosmetics book. Kelley provided Di Angelo with an initial three-page manuscript, which Di Angelo claimed it then transformed into a book while communicating and collaborating with Kelley. The book listed Kelley only as the holder of the book’s copyright. After an initial 1,000-copy print run, Kelley asked Di Angelo to prepare an updated or revised version of the book for sale. Di Angelo claimed it had prepared the updated work when it discovered that Kelley was attempting to work directly with Di Angelo’s printer to reduce the costs she would incur selling the revised edition, which violated the parties’ contract.

After unsuccessful overtures to the printer, Kelley filed a complaint in Harris County, Texas, asking for rescission of the parties’ contract because Di Angelo intentionally misled her regarding publishing costs and overcharged her for publishing services. Kelley alleged that she was the sole copyright owner and that Di Angelo did not develop or have any intellectual property rights in connection with the book. Di Angelo counterclaimed for breach of contract, among other claims, and sought a declaratory judgment that Kelley failed to substantially perform under the contract. Di Angelo alleged that Kelley had prevented it from selling the updated edition of the book.

Following partial summary judgment in favor of Kelley, including on the declaratory judgment claim, Di Angelo filed suit in the Southern District of Texas. Di Angelo disputed Kelley’s claim to exclusive copyright ownership and asserted a single claim for relief: A declaration that Di Angelo owned the copyright in the two editions of the book, as well as any derivative works, and had rights in their printing and distribution. Additionally,Di Angelo alleged that it acquired copyrights in the books by “writing, editing, planning and taking all photographs and making all illustrations, and planning, designing, and arranging the layout” of the book. Kelley moved to dismiss Di Angelo’s declaratory relief claim, characterizing the suit as an end-run around the Harris County rulings against Di Angelo and arguing that there was no federal jurisdiction because Di Angelo’s claim was premised solely on Kelley’s alleged breach of the contract, which was governed by Texas law. Di Angelo responded that resolution of the authorship dispute required the district court to interpret federal copyright law, including definitional and ownership provisions, which the state court lacked jurisdiction to address. The district court agreed with Kelley on the jurisdictional question and granted the motion to dismiss. Noting that the parties’ contract referred to Kelley as the “author,” the district court found that that Di Angelo’s claim [...]

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Employee Agreement of What “Shall Be” is Future Promise, Not Present Assignment

by Paul Devinsky | Aug 12, 2021 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concluded that university bylaws did not automatically effectuate a present automatic assignment of patent rights and affirmed the district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of standing by the transferee. Omni MedSci, Inc. v. Apple Inc., Case No. 20-1715 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 20, 2021) (Linn, J.) (Newman, J., dissenting).

Upon joining the faculty of the University of Michigan, Dr. Mohammed Islam executed an employment agreement assenting to abide by the university’s bylaws. The bylaws provide, in relevant part, that patents obtained by university staff that are supported directly or indirectly by university funds “shall be the property of the University.” In 2012, Dr. Islam took an unpaid leave of absence and filed several provisional patent applications. After he returned to the university in 2013, he filed non-provisional patent applications claiming priority to the 2012 provisional applications. Once those applications issued as patents, he assigned the patent rights to the plaintiff, Omni MedSci.

In 2018, Omni initiated a patent infringement action against Apple asserting certain patents, including one in the family of patents that Islam assigned to Omni. Apple moved to dismiss, arguing that Omni lacked standing to assert the patents-in-suit because the university—not Omni—owned the patents-in-suit. Apple argued that the university’s bylaws automatically transferred legal title to Dr. Islam’s patents to the university, leaving Dr. Islam with nothing to assign. Therefore, Omni had no standing to assert the patents.

The US District Court for the Eastern District of Texas denied the motion to dismiss and transferred the action to the Northern District of California. The California court certified the standing question to the Federal Circuit.

In this interlocutory appeal, the Federal Circuit considered whether the university bylaws automatically assigned the patent rights to the university. The Court explained that a patent assignment clause may presently assign a to-be-issued patent automatically—in which case no further acts to effectuate the assignment are necessary—or may merely promise to assign the patent in the future. The issue in the appeal was which type of assignment was intended by the “shall be the property of the University” language in the bylaws—i.e., whether it was “a statement of an intended outcome [or] a present assignment.” Analyzing the university bylaws, the Court agreed with the district court that the bylaws did not automatically assign the patent rights to the university and therefore did not negate Dr. Islam’s assignment of the patent rights to Omni.

The Federal Circuit concluded that the bylaw language “is most naturally read as a statement of intended disposition and a promise of a potential future assignment, not as a present automatic transfer. … It does not purport to effectuate the present transfer of a present or future right.”

In dissent, Judge Pauline Newman noted that at the district court, Dr. Islam only argued that he was not subject the bylaw obligation since the patent applications were filed without university support. However, the district court did not rule on that issue and [...]

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Employment Agreement Assignment Provisions Don’t Reach Post-Employment Inventions

by Paul Devinsky | May 6, 2021 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit rejected a biotechnology company’s argument that assignment provisions in its employment agreements granted ownership rights in post-employment inventions. Bio-Rad Laboratories, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, Case No. 20-1785 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 29, 2021) (Taranto, J.)

10X filed an International Trade Commission (ITC) complaint against Bio-Rad, alleging that Bio-Rad’s microfluidic systems infringed 10X’s gene sequencing patents. Bio-Rad raised an affirmative defense alleging that it co-owned the asserted patents because two of the named inventors, formerly employed by Bio-Rad and its predecessor QuantaLife before forming 10X, conceived the ideas embodied in the patents while they were still employed by Bio-Rad. The two inventors had executed employment agreements, including provisions requiring disclosure and assignment of intellectual property created during their employment with Bio-Rad. The two inventors left Bio-Rad and formed 10X several months before the earliest conception date of the asserted patents.

The ITC administrative law judge rejected Bio-Rad’s co-ownership defense, concluding that Bio-Rad had not shown the inventive concept of the asserted patents was conceived before the inventors left Bio-Rad. The administrative law judge also found that Bio-Rad infringed 10X’s patents and that 10X satisfied the technical domestic industry requirement by practicing the asserted patents. The ITC affirmed the administrative law judge’s determinations and also found that the asserted claims were not invalid for indefiniteness. Bio-Rad appealed.

Bio-Rad argued, among other things, that the ITC erred in not finding co-ownership of the asserted patents based on the assignment provisions. Bio-Rad also contended that during their employment at Bio-Rad, the two inventors had conceived the ideas that contributed to the inventions reflected in the 10X patents, and the invention assignment provisions of their employment agreement required assignment of their interest to Bio-Rad.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the ITC. On the co-inventorship issue, the Court adopted the ITC’s conclusion and found that Bio-Rad had no ownership interest in the asserted patents, explaining that the assignment provisions did not apply to ideas developed during employment solely because the ideas ended up contributing to a post-employment patentable invention. The Court found that the language was limited to a grant of actual intellectual property, i.e., subject matter protectable as a patent created during the term of employment with Bio-Rad. The Court reasoned that a person’s work that contributes, even significantly, to a later patentable invention does not create protectable intellectual property until a patentable invention is made, and that therefore, the assignment provisions did not reach the ideas that Bio-Rad alleged were conceived during the inventors’ Bio-Rad employment.

The Court also noted policy reasons for limiting the reach of the assignment provisions, including the difficult compliance issues raised by requiring assignment of rights in post-employment inventions. The Court explained that such provisions might deter a former employee from pursuing work related to their prior work, or deter a potential future employer from hiring that individual to work in an area similar to that in which they had prior experience. The Court also agreed with the ITC’s conclusion that [...]

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US Courts Can Compel Parties to Transfer Ownership of Foreign Patents

by Alexander P. Ott | Dec 17, 2020 | Patents

Addressing a district court decision agreeing to transfer ownership of certain US patents, but declining to do likewise for the related foreign patents, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit explained that US courts have authority to compel litigants before them to transfer ownership of their patents and held that ownership of the foreign patents should have been transferred as well. SiOnyx LLC v. Hamamatsu Photonics K.K., Case Nos. 19-2359, 20-1217 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 7, 2020) (Lourie, J.).

In 1998, a professor at Harvard discovered a process for creating black silicon with unique properties and launched a company, SiOnyx, to commercialize the invention. SiOnyx eventually met with Hamamatsu, a manufacturer of silicon-based photodetector devices, and entered into a nondisclosure agreement (NDA) to share confidential information to explore a potential joint venture. SiOnyx provided information to Hamamatsu under the NDA, but the joint venture plans never came to fruition, and Hamamatsu allowed the agreement to lapse. A short time later, Hamamatsu began marketing photodetector devices using black silicon and applied for foreign patents covering its products, along with related US patents. SiOnyx sued Hamamatsu for breach of contract, infringement of a SiOnyx patent and for ownership of Hamamatsu’s patents.

The case ultimately went to trial and led to a jury verdict in SiOnyx’s favor on breach of contract and infringement. The jury also found that one of SiOnyx’s employees had contributed to the inventions claimed by Hamamatsu’s patents. Based on that inventorship finding, the district court transferred sole ownership of the US patents to SiOnyx pursuant to an NDA provision retaining intellectual property rights for confidential information shared under the agreement. The district court also treated the ownership transfer as an equitable remedy in view of Hamamatsu’s breach of the agreement. However, the district court declined to transfer ownership of the foreign patents because it questioned its authority to do so. Both parties appealed.

On appeal, the Federal Circuit first disposed of most of the appellate issues as being resolved by the jury verdict. Regarding ownership of the patents, Hamamatsu argued that the jury finding of co-inventorship by SiOnyx’s employee, rather than sole inventorship, implied that Hamamatsu employees also contributed to the invention and thus warranted partial ownership. The Court rejected this argument because it found that Hamamatsu had not shown that its contribution was derived from confidential information shared under the NDA and thus did not trigger any ownership rights under the agreement. The Federal Circuit also reasoned that Hamamatsu’s inventive contribution would not bar the equitable relief imposed by the district court. As for the foreign patents, the Court agreed with SiOnyx that the same grounds that led to transfer of the US patents also warranted transfer of the foreign patents, and reiterated that US courts have authority to compel the parties properly before them to transfer ownership of their patents.

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