Likelihood of confusion Archives

Likelihood of confusion

No curtain call yet: Mixed verdict in patent, trademark, standing case

by Hannah Hurley | Oct 9, 2025 | Patents, Trademarks

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit addressed a wide array of issues in a long-running dispute over shower curtain technology. The Court provided important guidance on patent claim scope using intrinsic evidence, trademark standing and ownership of the mark in issue, trade dress functionality under TrafFix, and the need for district courts to provide a reviewable explanation when issuing patent infringement summary judgment based on the facts of this case. Focus Products Grp. Int’l, LLC v. Kartri Sales Co., Inc., Case No. 23-1446 (Fed Cir. Sept. 30, 2025) (Moore, Clevenger, Chen, JJ.)

The decade-long dispute started when Focus Products sent a cease-and-desist letter to Kartri Sales and its supplier, Marquis Mills International. The letter asserted patent infringement but was largely ignored. Focus Products then filed suit asserting three utility patents, two trademarks (HOOKLESS® and EZ ON), and unregistered trade dress rights in the appearance of its shower curtains.

Four months after the Supreme Court’s 2017 decision in TC Heartland v. Kraft Foods Group Brands, Kartri raised a venue objection and filed a motion to dismiss or transfer venue. The district court denied the motion, finding it to be unreasonably late, especially considering that Kartri actively conducted litigation after TC Heartland.

The district court construed several disputed claim terms. Based on its constructions, it found no triable issue of fact and granted summary judgment of patent infringement to Focus Products. However, the district court found genuine disputes of material fact regarding trademark and trade dress infringement and ordered a bench trial on those issues.

On the eve of trial, Kartri asserted unclean hands and equitable estoppel defenses. The district court denied these defenses because they were improperly raised for the first time immediately preceding trial.

After a bench trial, the district court held that:

Focus Products had standing to enforce the unregistered EZ ON mark.
Kartri infringed the mark and Focus Products’ trade dress, which was determined to be nonfunctional.
Kartri infringed Focus Products’ HOOKLESS® mark.

Accordingly, the district court awarded lost profits, reasonable royalties, attorneys’ fees, and enhanced damages for willful infringement. Kartri appealed.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Kartri’s motion to transfer venue under TC Heartland, finding Kartri’s objection untimely. Kartri waited four months after TC Heartland to raise the issue, during which time discovery had progressed significantly. The Court emphasized that venue objections must be raised seasonably and that continued litigation in the chosen forum may constitute forfeiture.

The Federal Circuit largely reversed the district court’s infringement findings, explaining that the district court erred in its claim construction because Focus Products had disclaimed shower rings with a flat upper edge during prosecution. While an affirmative disclaimer usually originates from the patent applicant, the Court found clear and unmistakable disavowal through the applicant’s acquiescence to the examiner’s species election, claim cancellation, and narrowed claim scope. This disclaimer was reinforced by the prosecution of a related asserted patent, which explicitly claimed the disclaimed feature. A patentee cannot try [...]

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Bank on it: Likelihood of confusion analysis requires factual consistency when evaluating DuPont factors

by Taylor MacDonald | Oct 2, 2025 | Trademarks

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed in part a decision by the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board and remanded for new analysis of two factors under the Dupont likelihood of confusion test. The Court emphasized that the factual determination in factor two (similarity of the parties’ goods or services) should remain consistent through the analyses for factors one and six. Apex Bank v. CC Serve Corp., Case No. 23-2143 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 25, 2025) (Moore, Hughes, Cunningham, JJ.)

CC Serve has held a registration for the word mark ASPIRE in connection with credit card services since 1998. In 2019, Apex Bank, a Tennessee-based banking chain, filed intent-to-use applications at the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) for marks incorporating ASPIRE BANK for use in “banking and financing services.” CC Serve, which partners with banks to issue and service credit cards, filed a letter of protest during Apex’s trademark prosecution. Despite CC Serve’s objections, the PTO published Apex’s marks in December 2019. CC Serve then formally opposed the marks, and the Board sustained the opposition, finding a likelihood of consumer confusion. Apex appealed.

The Federal Circuit reviewed the Board’s findings under the DuPont framework, which assesses likelihood of confusion based on multiple factors. Apex challenged the Board’s analysis of three specific factors:

Factor two: Similarity of the parties’ goods/services
Factor six: Strength of the prior mark in the marketplace
Factor one: Similarity of the marks themselves

The Federal Circuit upheld the Board’s finding under factor two, agreeing that “credit card services” and “banking/financing services” are highly similar based on their definitions and market overlap.

However, the Federal Circuit found fault with the Board’s analysis under factor six, which evaluates third-party use of similar marks to determine the strength of the contested mark. Apex submitted many examples of ASPIRE marks used in both the credit card and broader financial services industries. The Board, however, narrowed its focus to only those marks used in credit card services, excluding broader banking and financial services. The Federal Circuit concluded that this was inconsistent with the Board’s finding under factor two regarding the similarity of the parties’ goods and services. The Court instructed that on remand, the Board should consider third-party ASPIRE marks across both industries.

The Federal Circuit also directed the Board to revisit factor one, which assesses the similarity of the marks in light of the strength of the prior mark. Whether the strength of CC Serve’s mark is diminished when viewed in the broader financial services context could affect the “overall commercial impression” of the marks and the likelihood of confusion.

The Federal Circuit emphasized that factual determinations, particularly regarding the similarity of goods and services, must be applied consistently across the DuPont factors. The Court therefore remanded the case to the Board for reconsideration of factors one and six considering this guidance.

Solidarity: Union’s commercial use may be Lanham Act violation

by Cecilia Choy, PhD | Sep 18, 2025 | Trademarks

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded a district court’s dismissal of a Lanham Act action, finding that this case was not the rare instance where there was no plausible likelihood that a reasonably prudent consumer would be confused about the origin of the goods that allegedly bore the distinctive marks at issue. Trader Joe’s Co. v. Trader Joe’s United, Case Nos. 24-720; -2826 (9th Cir. Sept. 8, 2025) (Sanchez, Thomas, Donato, JJ.)

Trader Joe’s, a US grocery store chain, owns the red typeface logo and sells reusable tote bags and other branded goods bearing its marks. Trader Joe’s United (TJU), a labor union representing certain Trader Joe’s employees, markets (for profit) various products via its website, including reusable tote bags. Its website header features a logo that uses the distinctive red typeface and the concentric circle design in Trader Joe’s logo. The image below shows totes from Trader Joe’s (left) and TJU (right).

TJU allegedly began using Trader Joe’s marks in commerce, and Trader Joe’s sent TJU a cease-and-desist letter. Trader Joe’s noted that its demand was directed solely at TJU’s commercial use of the marks on merchandise sold to consumers on the TJU website, not the reference to Trader Joe’s to identify the union or discuss the union’s cause.

Trader Joe’s sued TJU, asserting several claims, including trademark infringement, and sought to permanently enjoin TJU from using Trader Joe’s trademarks in connection with the sale of commercial merchandise on the TJU website. Trader Joe’s also sought the destruction of all infringing merchandise and recovery of damages. TJU moved to dismiss, arguing that Trader Joe’s filed its trademark infringement complaint in retaliation over an ongoing labor dispute and asserting that there was no plausible likelihood that a consumer would believe that products sold on TJU’s website were sponsored, endorsed, or approved by Trader Joe’s.

Applying the Sleekcraft likelihood-of-confusion factors, the district court agreed with TJU and noted several differences between the marks. The district court also explained that Trader Joe’s does not sell many of the products sold on TJU’s website, including buttons, t-shirts, and mugs. The district court concluded that confusion about the origin of these products was unlikely for a reasonable consumer because TJU’s website clearly identified itself as a website of a labor union and was openly critical of Trader Joe’s labor practices. Trader Joe’s appealed.

The Ninth Circuit concluded that when the allegations were viewed in the light most favorable to Trader Joe’s, the district court erred when applying the fact-specific likelihood-of-confusion test. To prevail on a trademark infringement claim, Trader Joe’s would need to establish that it had a protectible ownership interest in the mark and that TJU’s use of the mark was likely to cause consumer confusion. To determine whether a reasonably prudent consumer [...]

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Kissing cousins? SUNKIST and KIST deemed confusingly similar

by Sydney E. McDermott | Jul 31, 2025 | Trademarks

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a Trademark Trial & Appeal Board decision, concluding that there was a likelihood of confusion between the marks KIST and SUNKIST when used in connection with soft drinks. Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Intrastate Distributors, Inc., Case No. 24-1212 (Fed. Cir. July 23, 2025) (Prost, Taranto, Stark, JJ.)

For at least 90 years, Sunkist has offered soft drinks under the SUNKIST trademark both directly to consumers and through its licenses. Intrastate Distributors Inc. (IDI) purchased the KIST brand and proceeded to use the KIST mark for soft drink and sparkling water products. The KIST mark was active for about a decade before being cancelled in 2013. In 2019, IDI filed intent-to-use trademark applications for the KIST mark both in standard characters and in a stylized character form for “[s]oft drinks, namely, sodas and sparkling water; concentrates and syrups for making soft drinks.” Sunkist opposed the registration, arguing the KIST mark was likely to cause confusion with the SUNKIST mark.

Focusing its analysis on the SUNKIST standard character mark, the Board determined that all DuPont factors other than similarity of the marks favored likelihood of confusion. The Board found that the marks were not sufficiently similar because they conveyed different commercial impressions. According to the Board, while SUNKIST referenced the sun, the KIST mark referenced a kiss, relying on the image of lips that appear next to the KIST mark. The Board therefore found no likelihood of confusion between IDI’s marks and the registered SUNKIST marks. Sunkist appealed.

The Federal Circuit began by emphasizing that the KIST mark was not a design mark and the image of lips did not always appear beside the mark. The Court relied on the following image in its opinion, noting that “[n]one of the bottles include a lips image or reference a kiss” and instead “emphasize flavors.”

The Federal Circuit noted that the record contains no evidence concerning the degree of consumer exposure to the mark with the image of lips versus without lips. The Court found that the Board relied too heavily on the KIST mark’s appearance alongside an image of lips, and ultimately determined that substantial evidence did not support the finding that the mark referenced a kiss. The Court noted that while some of the SUNKIST marks contained a sun, many were standard character marks that did not include a sun. The Court thus concluded that substantial evidence did not support a finding that the similarity of the marks favored no likelihood of confusion.

Since the Board had previously found that the remaining DuPont factors favored likelihood of confusion and the Federal Circuit determined that the similarity of the marks also favored likelihood of confusion, the only remaining consideration was actual confusion. Although Sunkist had not proven instances of actual confusion, the Court noted that its precedents had never required actual confusion, [...]

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Clean bill of health: Only domestic activities count when analyzing likelihood of confusion

by Hannah Hurley | Jul 24, 2025 | Trademarks

Affirming a summary judgment decision finding no trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that the district court properly focused on domestic activity with regard to the allegedly infringing trademark. Doctor’s Best, Inc. v. Nature’s Way Products, LLC, Case No. 24-2719 (9th Cir. July 15, 2025) (Paez, Ikuta, Nelson, JJ.) (Ikuta, J., concurring).

Doctor’s Best (DB) manufactures nutritional supplements under the mark NATURE’S DAY at its California facility. Although the products bear English labels compliant with US regulations, they are marketed and sold exclusively in China, South Korea, and Taiwan.

Nature’s Way Products (NWP), owner of the long-standing US trademark NATURE’S WAY, opposed DB’s attempt to register NATURE’S DAY in the United States, citing potential consumer confusion. After NWP sent a cease-and-desist letter, DB preemptively sued for a declaratory judgment of noninfringement. NWP counterclaimed for trademark infringement under Sections 32 and 43(a) of the Lanham Act.

In June 2023, the Supreme Court held in Abitron Austria GmbH v. Hetronic Int’l, Inc. that the Lanham Act’s infringement provisions apply only to domestic “use in commerce.” DB moved for summary judgment, arguing that its only domestic activity – transporting products within the US – did not create a likelihood of confusion among US consumers. The district court agreed, finding that DB’s domestic transport of Nature’s Day products was insufficient to support a claim of infringement. The court concluded that no reasonable jury could find that this conduct would confuse US consumers and granted summary judgment in favor of DB. NWP appealed.

NWP argued that any domestic use in commerce, however minimal, triggered the full likelihood-of-confusion analysis, even if confusion occurred abroad. The Ninth Circuit rejected this interpretation, holding that Abitron requires courts to first identify domestic use before evaluating confusion. The Court found that DB’s manufacturing and transport activities were the only relevant domestic conduct.

Turning to likelihood of confusion, the Ninth Circuit applied the eight-factor test set forth in its 1979 decision in AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats:

Strength of the mark
Proximity or relatedness of the goods
Similarity of the marks
Evidence of actual confusion
Marketing channels used
Type of goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser
Defendant’s intent in selecting the mark
The likelihood of expansion of the product lines

Reviewing the Sleekcraft factors, the Ninth Circuit concluded that no genuine dispute existed as to the likelihood of confusion. DB’s products were sold exclusively overseas while NWP’s products were sold only in the US. The Court emphasized that confusion must occur among domestic consumers to be actionable under the Lanham Act, and that did not occur here.

In a concurring opinion, Judge Ikuta agreed with the outcome but clarified that DB’s transport of products constituted a domestic use in commerce. However, she found no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether that use caused domestic confusion, reiterating that Abitron excludes extraterritorial confusion from the analysis.

RAW Confusion? No Error Where Trial Court Declines to Clarify Agreed Jury Instruction

by Connor M. Larson | May 8, 2025 | Trademarks

The US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed a district court’s jury verdict that found trade dress infringement and liability under state deceptive practices law, and the court’s order entering a nationwide permanent injunction. The Seventh Circuit found the district court’s agreed jury instruction accurate and determined that there was no error in refusing to further clarify the instruction for the jury. Republic Techs. (NA), LLC v. BBK Tobacco & Foods, LLP, Case No. 23-2973 (7th Cir. Apr. 25, 2025) (Hamilton, Scudder, Lee, JJ.)

Republic Technologies and BBK Tobacco are competitors in the business of organic, hemp-based rolling papers for cigarettes. Republic manufactures and markets its own papers under the name OCB, and BBK markets papers manufactured by others, including its house brand, RAW. After BBK formally requested that Republic change its OCB trade dress to avoid potential confusion with the RAW trade dress, Republic sued for a declaratory judgment of noninfringement, unfair competition, and deceptive advertisement under the federal Lanham Act, Illinois common law, and the Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (IUDTPA). BBK filed a counterclaim for trade dress infringement and copyright infringement.

At trial, the parties agreed on the jury instruction for the Lanham Act false advertising claim. However, during deliberations, the jury asked for clarification on the definition of “consumer.” Over Republic’s objection, the district court answered the jury’s question by stating that “the answers are contained in the instructions,” and directed the jury “to refer to and review all the instructions.” The jury returned a mixed verdict, finding against Republic on the federal false advertising claims but finding for Republic on its common law and IUDTPA claims. Republic then sought, and the district court granted, a permanent injunction that set limitations on the statements BBK was permitted to make in its advertisements.

On BBK’s counterclaim of trade dress infringement, the jury found that Republic’s trade dress for its OCB papers infringed BBK’s trade dress for its RAW papers. Republic moved for judgment as a matter of law of noninfringement and for a new trial on its false advertising claim based on the disputed answer to the jury’s question. The court denied both motions. Both parties appealed.

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed on all issues. First, the Seventh Circuit ruled that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its response to the jury’s question or in denying the request for a new trial because a trial judge’s responsibility is to strike “a balance between giving the jury all it needs but without unnecessary detail” and the judge’s answer in this case did not result in the prejudice necessary for a reversal.

Second, the Seventh Circuit reviewed the evidence presented to the jury concerning the trade dress infringement claim and determined that substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict and the verdict was not irrational. Republic argued that it was not reasonable to confuse the OCB packaging with the RAW packaging “given the prominent display of the brand names in great big letters [...]

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Opposers Beware: Your Own Mark May Not Be Protectable

by Connor M. Larson | Apr 17, 2025 | Trademarks

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board’s dismissal of an opposition to the registration of the marks IVOTERS and IVOTERS.COM while also noting that the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) might want to reconsider whether it permits registration of those marks. Heritage Alliance v. Am. Policy Roundtable, Case No. 24-1155 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 9, 2025) (Prost, Taranto, Stark, JJ.)

American Policy Roundtable (APR), a publisher of campaign and political information since June 2010, filed applications to register the marks IVOTERS and IVOTERS.COM for “providing a web site of information on current public policy issues, political campaigns and citizen concerns related to political information” after the PTO approved the marks for publication. Heritage filed an opposition.

Since the 2008 US presidential election season, Heritage has published online voter guides under the names “iVoterGuide” and “iVoterGuide.com” (the iVoters marks). Without a valid registration but having priority of use, Heritage filed an opposition asserting its common law rights in the iVoters marks.

The Board considered Heritage’s opposition but ultimately found that Heritage’s mark was not distinctive. The Board first considered whether the iVoters marks were inherently distinctive and determined they were not just descriptive but “highly descriptive.” The Board next considered whether the iVoters marks had acquired distinctiveness through secondary meaning but found that the record evidence Heritage submitted was inadequate to support a finding that the iVoters marks had any source-identifying significance. Heritage appealed.

On appeal, Heritage argued that the Board had erred by finding the iVoters marks to have neither inherent nor acquired distinctiveness and that the Board violated the anti-dissection principle by evaluating the individual components of the marks instead of the marks as a whole. The Federal Circuit disagreed. The Court found the Board’s determination that the iVoters marks were highly descriptive to be supported by substantial evidence because the prefix “i” generally refers to something internet based. Heritage chose not to challenge the Board’s finding that “VoterGuide” and “.com” were not distinctive, a ruling the Court characterized as “facially reasonable.”

The Federal Circuit also disagreed with Heritage’s argument that the Board improperly evaluated the marks’ individual components. The Court found the Board properly considered the marks as a whole through its determination that the iVoters marks “on their face refer to online voter guides” and because no evidence demonstrated that the combination of the individual components conveyed “any distinctive source identifying impression contrary to the descriptiveness of the individual parts.”

Heritage argued that the Board had erred in its determination that notwithstanding over five years of use, the iVoters marks did not have statutory acquired distinctiveness. Under Section 2(f) of the Lanham Act, registration applicants may submit evidence that a mark has acquired distinctiveness because as a consequence of extensive use and promotion of the mark, consumers now directly associate the mark with the applicant as the source of those goods. Heritage argued that the Board should have accepted its five-plus years of continuous use as prima facie [...]

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When Analyzing Likelihood of Confusion, It’s Not Just Location, Location, Location

by Abigail A. Rubinstein | Apr 3, 2025 | Trademarks

The US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated a district court’s decision finding no infringement that focused on only the geographic distance between the physical locations of the two users without considering the factors bearing on any likelihood of confusion. Westmont Living, Inc. v. Retirement Unlimited, Inc., et al., Case No. 23-2248 (4th Cir. Mar. 18, 2025) (Niemeyer, Benjamin, Berner, JJ.)

Westmont Living, a California corporation that operates several retirement communities and assisted living facilities on the West Coast, sued Retirement Unlimited, a Virginia corporation that operates retirement communities and assisted living facilities on the East Coast, for trademark infringement. Westmont, which operates and markets its facilities using the mark WESTMONT LIVING, alleged that Retirement opened a new facility using the name The Westmont at Short Pump for services identical to those provided by Westmont.

The district court entered summary judgment for Retirement. The district court acknowledged that many factors are potentially relevant to determining the likelihood of confusion, but it concluded that because the parties’ physical facilities were located “in entirely distinct geographic markets,” as a matter of law “consumer confusion [was] impossible.” The district court based its holding on the Second Circuit’s 1959 decision in Dawn Donut v. Hart’s Food Stores, which held that when parties use their marks in separate and distinct markets, there can be no likelihood of confusion. Westmont appealed.

The Fourth Circuit found that the district court failed to address the parties’ competitive marketing, the locations from which they solicit and draw their customers, the scope of their reputations, and any of the nine factors for determining likelihood of confusion in the Fourth Circuit under its 2021 decision in RXD Media v. IP Application Dev. The Court explained that while not every factor necessarily needs to be considered in the analysis, the district court erred by relying solely on the fact that the parties’ physical facilities were on opposite coasts, without considering the many other factors that might bear on whether Westmont had shown a likelihood of confusion.

The Fourth Circuit disagreed with the district court’s reliance on Dawn Donut, explaining that the case stands for a narrow principle that where businesses use the same mark in physically distinct geographical markets, and their marketing and advertising are confined to those markets, there won’t be a likelihood of confusion. Given increased potential customer mobility, the internet, and the reduced influence of local radio and newspaper advertising, it is far less likely today that two businesses would operate in such physically distinct geographical markets as when the Dawn Donut rule was promulgated. In this case, both parties advertised nationwide on the internet. The Court noted that it may be especially difficult for a casual consumer to distinguish between the two companies when engaging in online research about retirement living, and the physical distance of the parties’ facilities does not eliminate that risk. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court’s reliance on only the geographic distance between the physical facilities of the two companies [...]

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Zone of Natural Expansion Is a Shield, Not a Sword

by Hannah Hurley | Mar 27, 2025 | Trademarks

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld a Trademark Trial & Appeal Board decision to partially cancel trademarks, ruling that an opposition challenger could not use the zone of natural expansion doctrine to claim priority because the doctrine is strictly defensive. Dollar Financial Group, Inc. v. Brittex Financial, Inc., Case No. 23-1375 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 19, 2025) (Prost, Taranto, Hughes, JJ.)

Dollar Financial Group (DFG) is a loan financing and check cashing business that has used the mark MONEY MART since the 1980s. In 2012, DFG expanded and started using the mark in connection with pawn brokerage and pawn shop services. DFG registered MONEY MART for these new services in 2014. Brittex petitioned to cancel the registration on several grounds, including that the registrations were improperly issued in violation of the Lanham Act, which bars registration of a mark that “so resembles . . . a mark or trade name previously used in the United States by another and not abandoned, as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d). Brittex has operated pawn shops under the names Money Mart Pawn and Money Mart Pawn & Jewelry since the 1990s and claimed prior common law rights to the MONEY MART mark for pawn services.

The Board ruled in favor of Brittex, finding that Brittex had priority over DFG for pawn services due to its earlier use of the mark. The Board also determined that DFG could not rely on the zone of natural expansion doctrine to establish priority because this doctrine is purely defensive and does not grant a proactive right to register a mark on an expanded line of goods or services. The Board also concluded that there was a likelihood of confusion between the marks, given their high similarity and the overlapping nature of the services provided by both parties. DFG appealed.

The Federal Circuit agreed that Brittex had established priority because it was the first to use the MONEY MART mark in connection with pawn services. The Court also rejected DFG’s zone of natural expansion argument, reiterating that the doctrine is defensive and cannot be used to establish priority offensively.

The doctrine of natural expansion, as explained in Orange Bang v. Ole Mexican Foods (TTAB 2015), states that:

[T]he first user of a mark in connection with particular goods or services possesses superior rights in the mark as against subsequent users of the same or similar mark for any goods or services which purchasers might reasonably expect to emanate from it in the normal expansion of its business under the mark.

However, the doctrine does not give the senior mark user an offensive or proactive use.

The Federal Circuit also addressed DFG’s argument regarding the doctrine of tacking, which allows trademark holders to make minor modifications to their own mark while retaining the priority position of the older mark. Tacking is generally permitted [...]

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No Bull: Historically Generic Term Can Become Non-Generic

by Amit Kumar Saha, PhD | Mar 20, 2025 | Trademarks

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed Trademark Trial & Appeal Board rulings, finding that a previously generic term was not generic at the time registration was sought because at that time the mark, as used in connection with the goods for which registration was sought, had achieved secondary meaning. Bullshine Distillery LLC v. Sazerac Brands, LLC, Case Nos. 23-1682; -1900 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 12, 2025) (Moore, C.J.; Reyna, Taranto, JJ.)

In 2015 Bullshine sought to register the trademark BULLSHINE FIREBULL for its line of “[a]lcoholic beverages except beers.” Sazerac, the owner of the FIREBALL marks used for liqueurs and whiskey, opposed registration. Sazerac argued that the registration of BULLSHINE FIREBULL would likely cause consumer confusion due to its similarity to Sazerac’s FIREBALL marks. Bullshine counterclaimed, asserting that the term “fireball” had become generic and was commonly used to describe a type of alcoholic drink, thus invalidating Sazerac’s claim to exclusivity.

The Board found that the FIREBALL mark was not generic either at the time of registration nor at the time of trial, and that BULLSHINE FIREBULL was not likely to cause confusion with Sazerac’s marks. The Board determined that the FIREBALL mark was “commercially strong but conceptually weak,” that the respective marks of Sazerac and Bullshine were dissimilar when considered in their entireties, and that Bullshine did not act in bad faith in choosing its marks. The Board denied Sazerac’s opposition to the BULLSHINE FIREBULL mark as well as Bullshine’s counterclaim that the FIREBALL mark was generic. Both parties appealed.

Bullshine argued that the Board applied the incorrect legal standard in finding FIREBALL not generic and that consequently, the finding of non-genericness (upon consideration of secondary meaning) was erroneous. Bullshine argued that since “fireball” was a generic term prior to Sazerac’s registration (as both parties agreed), that fact should have precluded Sazerac’s registration, and the Board erred in considering evidence of secondary meaning. Bullshine argued that if a term was generic at any time prior to registration, it remains generic, regardless of how it might be understood at the time of registration (i.e., once generic, always generic). Sazerac argued that the time to assess genericness is at the time of registration. The Federal Circuit agreed with Sazerac.

The Federal Circuit explained that the genericness inquiry is ultimately guided by “what consumers would think at the time of registration,” and that this ruling is supported by the statutory scheme of the Lanham Act. The Court explained that the Lanham Act, in addition to preventing registration of generic terms, also provides for cancellations of marks “[a]t any time,” and even marks with incontestable statuses can be challenged based on genericness. Therefore, Congress intended that the analysis of whether a term is generic can change over time, and Bullshine’s argument was inconsistent with the statute. This conclusion follows from the legal premise that impression of consumers is “necessarily contemporaneous with the time of registration.”

Bullshine cited the 1961 CCPA decision in Weiss Noodle in support of its argument that [...]

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