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No Estoppel in the Name of Different Interests and Claims

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that 35 USC § 314(d) did not bar its review of a Patent Trial & Appeal Board determination that a petitioner was not estopped from maintaining inter partes review (IPR) proceedings since the alleged estoppel-triggering event occurred post-institution. Uniloc 2017 LLC v. Facebook Inc., Case Nos. 19-1688, -1689 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 9, 2021) (Chen, J.)

Facebook and WhatsApp (collectively, Facebook) filed two IPR proceedings challenging certain claims of Uniloc’s patents. Apple also filed a petition challenging a subset of claims of the patent. Facebook subsequently filed a third petition that was substantively identical to Apple’s petition and also filed a motion to join Apple’s IPR. LG Electronics filed petitions identical to Facebook’s three petitions and also filed motions to join Facebook’s IPRs. The Board instituted Facebook’s third petition and granted Facebook’s motion to join Apple’s IPR. The Board then instituted Facebook’s original IPRs and ordered the parties to “brief the applicability, if any, of 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(1)” against Facebook, in light of the soon-to-be-issued final written decision for Apple’s IPR. At the time, LG’s petition and motion to join Facebook’s IPRs had not been decided.

In response to the Board’s order, Facebook argued that it should not be estopped under § 315 from challenging the patentability of any claim upon the issuance of a final written decision in Apple’s IPR. Facebook argued that if the Board did find it estopped, Facebook should be able to continue as a petitioner against one of the claims, which it never challenged, in Apple’s IPR. Facebook also argued that if LG’s IPR petition was granted and LG was joined as a party to its first IPR, the IPR should proceed as to all challenged claims (regardless of whether Facebook was found estopped) because LG was not a party in Apple’s IPR. Uniloc responded, arguing that once the Board issued a final written decision in Apple’s IPR, Facebook would be estopped as to all claims challenged in its first IPR and the Board must terminate that proceeding. Uniloc also argued that allowing LG to join the IPR would create inefficiency and confusion.

The Board ultimately instituted LG’s IPR petitions and granted LG’s motion to join Facebook’s IPRs. In its Patent Owner Responses to the original Facebook IPR petitions, Uniloc argued that LG should be barred from maintaining the first Facebook IPR once the Board issued a final written decision in the Apple IPR because LG was estopped as a real party in interest (RPI) or privy to Facebook. A few months later, the Board issued a final written decision in the Apple IPR upholding the patentability of all challenged claims. The Board’s decision in the first Facebook IPR found that Facebook was estopped under § 315(e)(1) as to claims also challenged in Apple’s IPR, but not other claims since § 315(e)(1)’s estoppel provisions apply only to grounds that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised “with respect to that claim.”

In its final [...]

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PTO: Board to Align Indefiniteness Approach in AIA and District Court Proceedings

On January 6, 2021, US Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) Director Andrei Iancu, Commissioner for Patents Andrew Hirshfeld and Chief Administrative Patent Judge Scott Boalick issued a memorandum to the members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board to align the Board’s approach when deciding indefiniteness issues under 35 USC § 112 in America Invents Act (AIA) post-grant proceedings more closely with district court proceedings. The memo was issued under the PTO director’s authority to set forth binding agency guidance to govern the Board’s interpretation of statutory provisions. The memo cited to similar recent changes to the approach to claim construction in such proceedings, and stated that aligning “the indefiniteness approach [used] in AIA post-grant proceedings [to district court proceedings] will promote consistency and efficient decision making among coordinate branches of government that decide similar issues in co-pending proceedings.” The instructed approach, per the Supreme Court of the United States’ 2014 decision in Nautilus, applies to post grant review (PGR) and inter partes review (IPR) proceedings, but not to indefiniteness (or claim construction) issues decided outside the context of AIA reviews.

Post-AIA 35 USC § 112(b) (and pre-AIA § 112, second paragraph) require that “[t]he specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.” Claims not meeting this requirement are invalid for indefiniteness and may be determined indefinite during PTO examination, on appeal from examination and during AIA post-grant proceedings. In 2014 the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit approved the PTO’s long-standing approach to assessing indefiniteness during patent prosecution in its per curiam In re Packard decision that “[a] claim is indefinite when it contains words or phrases whose meaning is unclear.” At the time, this approach was used agency-wide to analyze questions of indefiniteness, in complement with the office’s broadest reasonable interpretation approach to claim construction.

Despite the Supreme Court’s decision in Nautilus that a claim is unpatentable for indefiniteness if the claim, read in light of the specification delineating the patent and the prosecution history, fails to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention, the PTO reaffirmed its intent to follow Packard in examination (whether original, appeals or reexamination). In 2018, in the interest of consistency and efficiency, the PTO changed its claim construction standard for post-grant trial proceedings to review a claim of a patent, or a claim proposed in a motion to amend, from the broadest reasonable interpretation to the same Phillips standard that would be used to construe the claim in a district court action.

The memorandum noted that there has been some confusion as to whether the Packard or Nautilus standard should apply in AIA proceedings. While parties to such proceedings argued for one or the other, neither the Board nor the Federal Circuit ruled as to which standard applied. Now, in the interest of clarity, consistency and efficiency, and to “lead to greater [...]

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