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Compelling Clarity: PTO Director Explains Compelling Merits Test

US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) Director Katherine K. Vidal issued a precedential opinion clarifying the standard under which the Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board) can institute on an inter partes review (IPR) petition despite the Fintiv factors militating toward denial. CommScope Techs. LLC v. Dali Wireless, Inc., IPR2022-01242 (PTO Feb. 27, 2023) (Vidal, Dir.) (precedential).

This opinion follows the Director’s Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials memorandum (Guidance Memo) and her opinion in OpenSky Indus. v. VLSI Tech. In the guidance memo, the Director explained that when there is “compelling evidence of unpatentability,” the Board may decline to exercise its discretion to deny IPR institution.

In this case, Dali Wireless sued CommScope in the district court, alleging infringement of its patent. CommScope filed a petition to institute an IPR proceeding against the asserted patent. The Board granted the petition and instituted an IPR proceeding while the district court litigation was ongoing.

In granting the petition, the Board acknowledged that it would normally perform a Fintiv analysis to determine whether it should deny the petition in light of the parallel district court proceeding. However, considering the Guidance Memo and the “compelling invalidity challenge” presented by the petitioner, the Board skipped the Fintiv analysis and instituted on the petition. The Director instituted sua sponte review.

Recognizing some ambiguity in both OpenSky and the guidance memo, the Director made her decision precedential to clarify:

My Guidance Memo states that “the PTAB will not deny institution based on Fintiv if there is compelling evidence of unpatentability.” Although I now recognize that this instruction could be read to allow for a compelling merits determination as a substitute for a Fintiv analysis, that was not my intent. By that instruction, I intended for PTAB panels to only consider compelling merits if they first determined that Fintiv factors 1–5 favored a discretionary denial . . . . In circumstances where . . . the Board’s analysis of Fintiv factors 1–5 favors denial of institution; the Board shall then assess compelling merits. In doing so, the Board must provide reasoning sufficient to allow the parties to challenge that finding and sufficient to allow for review of the Board’s decision.

A determination of whether the petition presents a compelling merits case for invalidity requires a merits case that meets a higher standard than the “reasonable likelihood” test required by 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).

The Director found that the Board’s decision was deficient in both parts of the analysis. The Board did not perform any analysis of the Fintiv factors but instead went straight to a determination of whether the petition presented a compelling invalidity challenge. In connection with that determination, the Board failed to provide any reasoning that explained why it found the merits case presented in the petition compelling.

Finding that the Board’s reasoning was conclusory, the Director vacated the Board’s decision to institute IPR review and remanded for further proceedings consistent with her decision.

Practice Note: Less [...]

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Little Weight Given to Conclusory Expert Declaration That Repeats IPR Petition Verbatim

The US Patent & Trademark Office Director affirmed and designated as precedential a Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board) decision denying institution of an inter partes review (IPR) petition where the expert declaration presented conclusory assertions without underlying factual support and repeated verbatim the petitioner’s argument. Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2022) (Wood, Grossman, Tartal, APJs); Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624 (Feb 10, 2023) (Vidal, Dir.)

Bytemark owns a patent directed to a method and system for distributing electronic tickets. According to the patent, a user can procure and store an electronic ticket on a device such as a mobile phone, and when the user presents the ticket, the ticket taker can verify the ticket by inspecting a visual object that a human can perceive without a machine scan. In addition to using a validating visual object, the patent teaches data integrity checking to ensure that the ticket data and the software managing that ticket data on the user’s device has not been altered improperly. As to the data integrity concept, the claims of the patent recite a server that is configured to “store in a data record associated with the user account a data value indicating the fraudulent activity” (fraud limitation).

Xerox filed an IPR petition challenging certain claims of the patent as obvious over the Terrell prior art reference in combination with various secondary references. Xerox argued that Terrell disclosed that after fraudulent activity is detected, “the purchaser of the ticket could be blocked from further use of the system or pursued in respect of their potential fraud.” Xerox asserted that a skilled artisan would understand that such blocking would require recording the blocking in a data record associated with that user’s account, and would find it obvious that blocking the account of the purchaser from further use of the system would include storing a data value indicating the fraudulent activity in a data record associated with the user account.

Bytemark responded that Terrell, at most, taught blocking a ticket purchaser from further use of the Terrell system based on potential fraud, but nowhere indicated that this would be achieved by using a data value indicating fraudulent activity, as opposed to some other manner of blocking a user, such as deleting the user’s account or reporting the user for fraud. Bytemark further argued that Xerox’s argument that a skilled artisan would find the fraud limitation obvious was conclusory and an improper attempt to use a skilled artisan’s common knowledge to supply a wholly missing claim limitation without evidentiary support.

The Board agreed with Bytemark, finding that Xerox did not provide sufficient evidence or persuasive reasoning to support either of Xerox’s arguments. The Board explained that Terrell taught blocking the purchaser rather than the account of the purchaser and that it was far from clear that blocking the purchaser would “require” recording the blocking in a record in the purchaser’s account, as opposed to deleting the purchaser’s account altogether. The Board noted that the [...]

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Review Delayed Is Not Review Denied

Considering whether the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) Director must complete review of the Patent Trial & Appeal Board’s (Board) inter partes review (IPR) decision within the statutory deadline for a final written decision, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concluded that the statute imposes no such requirement. CyWee Group Ltd. v. Google LLC et al., Case Nos. 20-1565, -1567 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 8, 2023) (Prost, Taranto, Chen, JJ.).

In 2018, Google filed two IPR petitions challenging certain claims of CyWee’s patents. The Board issued its final written decisions in January 2020, determining that all challenged claims were unpatentable for obviousness. CyWee appealed to the Federal Circuit in March 2020. In addition to challenging the patentability decision, CyWee challenged the appointment of Board administrative patent judges (APJs) as unconstitutional in view of the Appointments Clause. In March 2021, the Court affirmed the Board’s decisions and rejected CyWee’s constitutional challenge. The Court issued its mandate on June 10, 2020.

Eleven days later, the Supreme Court of the United States issued its decision in United States v. Arthrex, Inc., holding that APJs’ power to render final patentability decisions unreviewable by an accountable principal officer gave rise to an Appointments Clause violation but this violation could be remedied by, among other things, remanding to the acting PTO Director to decide to rehear the case. In response to a request from CyWee, the Federal Circuit recalled the mandate and remanded “for the limited purpose of allowing CyWee the opportunity to request Director rehearing of the final written decisions,” and required CyWee to inform the Court within 14 days of any decision denying rehearing. On remand, the Commissioner for Patents denied rehearing and ordered that the already-issued final written decisions were final decisions of the PTO. CyWee appealed.

CyWee contended that the post-Arthrex, mandated review by the PTO Director was untimely—and thus violative of due process—because the PTO Director did not have the ability to review the institution decision and final written decision within their respective three-month and one-year statutory deadlines. The Federal Circuit disagreed, calling CyWee’s contentions “meritless.” Rather, the Court found that because the PTO Director had permissibly delegated to the Commissioner for Patents authority to render institution and final decisions to the Board, those decisions were timely so long as the PTO Director’s delegees rendered them within the statutorily prescribed periods. By contrast, the PTO Director’s final review authority—a constitutional necessity born from Arthrex—has no similar statutory deadline.

CyWee also argued that the PTO Director’s later review was too late to satisfy a general requirement that the PTO Director consider the effect of regulations on the PTO’s ability to timely complete instituted IPRs. The Federal Circuit rejected this argument too, finding that even if the statute imposed a general timeliness requirement that was subject to judicial review, nothing about the process afforded to CyWee would have violated such a requirement.

With a different spin on the timeliness issue, CyWee also argued that the Board’s extension [...]

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Contingent Statement Doesn’t Unequivocally Abandon Defense of Challenged Claims

The Director of the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) initiated a sua sponte review of the Patent Trial & Appeal Board’s (Board) adverse judgments in multiple related inter partes review (IPR) proceedings. The PTO Director ultimately ordered that the judgments be vacated and remanded for further consideration. Apple Inc. v. Zipit Wireless, Inc., IPR2021-01124; -01125; -01126; -01129 (Dec. 21, 2022) (Vidal, Dir.)

Apple filed six petitions for IPR, all of which were instituted and assigned to the same panel of Administrative Patent Judges. After institution, Zipit filed responses to two of the IPRs, but not the other four companion IPRs. The Board held a hearing in the two IPRs for which Zipit filed responses. At the end of the hearing, Zipit’s counsel was asked with reference to the four companion IPRs whether Zipit was “not contesting if a final written decision or adverse judgment was entered with respect to those IPRs.” The counsel responded, “correct . . . if the board determines that [Apple has] met their burden of proof with respect to those claims Zipit hasn’t filed any opposition.” Based on this exchange, the Board determined that Zipit abandoned the contests and entered adverse judgments.

The PTO Director initiated review under the interim process for Director review §§ 13, 22, which allows sua sponte Director review, explaining that notice would be given to parties of the proceedings if such a review was initiated. Upon review, the PTO Director did not consider the counsel’s statements to be an “unequivocal abandonment of the contest of these proceedings.” In an IPR, a petitioner has the “burden of proving a proposition of unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence” and the “burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” The PTO Director’s interpretation of Zipit’s statements was that “non-opposition was contingent on the Board determining that [Apple] met its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged claims are unpatentable.”

The PTO Director thus vacated the Board’s adverse judgments and remanded the proceedings to the panel to issue either an order clarifying whether Zipit indeed abandoned the contest or a final written decision addressing the patentability of the challenged claims.




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Applying Collateral Estoppel in IPRs

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit considered whether a dependent claim invalidated by collateral estoppel also invalidates its parental independent claim. Google LLC v. Hammond Devel. Int’l, Inc., Case No. 21-2218 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 8, 2022) (Moore, C.J.; Chen, Stoll, JJ.)

The dispute began when Hammond Development sued Google, alleging that Google infringed several of Hammond’s patents on automated voice response systems. In response, Google filed multiple inter partes reviews (IPRs), one of which targeted Hammond’s ’483 patent. In that proceeding, the Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board) held that all claims of the ’483 patent were obvious. Hammond did not appeal the decision in this IPR, which then became final, but only after Google filed an IPR against another of Hammond’s patents—the ’816 patent. The ’816 and ’483 patents are in the same family and share the same specification. In the later-filed IPR, the Board found claims 14 through 19 of the ’816 patent nonobvious and patentable. Google appealed.

Claim 14 is an independent claim and claim 18 depends from it. The parties agreed that the patentability of both claims rose and fell together. On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Google argued that claim 18 was invalid under the doctrine of collateral estoppel based on the prior art that rendered claim 18 of the ’483 patent invalid.

A party seeking to invoke collateral estoppel must show the following:

  • The issue is identical to one decided in the first action.
  • The issue was actually litigated in the first action.
  • Resolution of the issue was essential to a final judgment in the first action.
  • The party against whom collateral estoppel is being asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first action.

Because the parties had agreed that all but the first of the elements of collateral estoppel were met, collateral estoppel would apply if the issues of patentability were identical between the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims. The Federal Circuit found that slight differences in the claim language of the involved patents were immaterial because they related only to the number of application servers, and Google’s expert had credibly testified that distributing software applications across multiple servers was well known in the art and obvious. Hammond did not mount a substantive challenge to the expert evidence. As the Court noted, “collateral estoppel may apply even if the patent claims ‘use slightly different language to describe substantially the same invention,’ so long as ‘the differences between the unadjudicated patent claims and adjudicated patent claims do not materially alter the question of invalidity.’”

Google also attacked the validity of independent claim 14 of the ’816 patent. Although Google’s attack against claim 14 was based on a different combination of references (as compared to claim 18), the Federal Circuit apparently applied collateral estoppel to find claim 14 invalid as well, citing an agreement between the parties that “if claim 18 is unpatentable, then independent claim 14 is as well.”

Finally, Google argued that dependent [...]

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No Mulligans Here: PTO Rewinds Reexamination Based on Estoppel

The US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) terminated a pending ex parte reexamination after finding that the challenger was estopped because the prior art references could have been raised in a prior inter partes review (IPR). In re Tyler, Reexam. No. 90/014,950 (PTO Nov. 15, 2022).

In 2017, GITS Manufacturing filed two IPR petitions against a patent owned by G.W. Lisk after Lisk asserted the patent against GITS in district court. In 2018, the Patent Trial & Appeal Board issued final written decisions in each IPR, finding some claims unpatentable and maintaining the patentability of other claims. The Federal Circuit affirmed both IPR decisions in 2021.

In February 2022, the PTO initiated an ex parte reexamination of one of the patents based on a request filed by GITS. The reexamination proposed multiple grounds of unpatentability based on four prior art references that were not involved in the IPRs. GITS included a lengthy discussion and an expert declaration describing the prior art searches GITS performed in support of the certification that it was not estopped under 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(l) from asserting the grounds in the reexamination. Lisk filed a petition to vacate the reexamination proceeding, alleging that GITS was estopped because the reexamination references reasonably could have been raised in the previous IPRs. Lisk’s petition was supported by its own expert declaration describing prior art searches that a skilled searcher would have conducted.

A party is estopped under § 315(e)(1) from requesting a reexamination proceeding based on grounds that the party “raised or reasonably could have raised” during an IPR. The legislative history of § 315(e) defines “reasonably could have raised” as “prior art which a skilled searcher conducting a diligent search reasonably could have been expected to discover.” The PTO cited legislative history stating that “reasonably could have raised” does not require a “scorched-earth search,” leaving open the possibility that a diligent search may not discover a particular reference. But the PTO also distinguished the search an examiner or lawyer may conduct from the more robust search that a skilled searcher is assumed to conduct prior to filing a petition for a IPR proceeding.

The PTO evaluated each of the four references in GITS’s reexamination grounds based on the criteria described above. Two of the references were patent documents available in commercial databases that a skilled searcher could be expected to find. The third reference was a “seminal textbook” that GITS itself stated was used in the field to train those of skill in the art. The textbook reference was also found through standard citation searching of the patent at issue. The fourth reference was provided by a publisher that GITS stated “was an established publisher that was well known to those interested in the field,” and which maintained an online searchable database of its publications. The PTO determined that the fourth reference would have been found by a reasonably diligent search, despite the fact that a subscription fee was required to search the database.

The PTO also weighed [...]

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Construing the Construction: Federal Circuit Chips Away at IPR Win

Addressing claim construction issues in inter partes review (IPR) proceedings before the Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board), the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed an obviousness finding as to some claims but reversed and remanded an obviousness finding as to another claim because of a claim construction error. VLSI Technology LLC v. Intel Corporation, Case Nos. 21-1826, -1827, -1828 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 15, 2022) (Chen, Bryson, Hughes, JJ.)

VLSI owns a patent directed to a technique for alleviating the problems of defects caused by stress applied to bond pads of an integrated circuit. Bond pads are a portion of an integrated circuit that sit above interconnected circuit layers and are used to attach the chip to another electronic component, such as a computer or motherboard. When a chip is attached to another electronic component, forces are exerted on the chip’s bond pad, which can result in damage to the interconnect layers. The patent discloses improvements to the structures of an integrated circuit that reduce the potential for damage to the interconnect layers when the chip is attached to another electronic component while also permitting each of the layers underlying the pad to be functionally independent in the circuit.

VLSI filed suit against Intel alleging infringement of the patent. During claim construction, the district court construed the claim term “force region” to mean a “region within the integrated circuit in which forces are exerted on the interconnect structure when a die attach is performed.” Before the district court’s construction but after the suit was filed, Intel filed petitions for IPR of the patent and advocated in its petitions for the same construction of “force region” that the district court ultimately adopted.

VLSI did not contest Intel’s construction, but it later became apparent that the two parties disagreed over the meaning of “die attach,” which formed part of the construction. Intel argued that the term “die attach” refers to any method of attaching a chip to another electronic component, including a method known as wire bonding, which was taught by a prior art reference included in Intel’s petitions. VLSI argued that the term refers to a method of attachment known as “flip chip” bonding and does not include wire bonding. In the Board’s final written decisions, it did not address the term “die attach,” but found that “force region” was not limited to flip chip bonding and subsequently found the challenged claims invalid as obvious. The Board also construed a second disputed term “used for electrical interconnection not directly connected to the bond pad,” which is recited in only one claim of the patent, in favor of Intel, and subsequently found that claim unpatentable. VLSI appealed.

On appeal, VLSI raised a number of procedural and substantive challenges to the Board’s construction of the two disputed terms. VLSI argued that the Board failed to acknowledge and give appropriate weight to the district court’s construction of “force region.” The Federal Circuit dismissed this argument, as there was ample evidence in [...]

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Delayed Disclaimer: Patent Owner Arguments Made during IPR Not a Claim Limiting Disclaimer in That Proceeding

Repeating a conclusion from an earlier non-precedential opinion in VirnetX, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board) need not accept a patent owner’s arguments as a disclaimer in the very same inter partes review (IPR) proceeding in which those arguments are made. CUPP Computing AS v. Trend Micro Inc., Case Nos. 2020-2262, 2020-2263, 2020-2264, at *11 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 16, 2022) (Dyk, Taranto, Stark, JJ.)

CUPP Computing is the owner of three related patents each entitled “systems and methods for providing security services during power management mode.” After CUPP sued Trend Micro for patent infringement, Trend Micro filed petitions for IPR against all three patents, asserting that several claims of CUPP’s patents were obvious over two prior art references. The Board instituted all three IPR and found all challenged claims unpatentable as obvious. CUPP appealed.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s conclusions. The principal issue concerned CUPP’s argument that the Board erred in claim construction. In CUPP’s view, all of the evidence required the claimed “security system processor” be remote from a “mobile device processor.” The Court rejected CUPP’s arguments. Starting with the claims, the Court found that they simply required that the two processors be different. Although some claims required the security system to send a wake signal to or communicate with the mobile device, that language did not support CUPP’s remoteness construction. As the Court explained, just as an individual can send a note to oneself via email, a unit of the mobile device can send signals to and communicate with the same device. Indeed, some of the claims teach communication via an internal port of the mobile device, which was consistent with a preferred embodiment disclosed in the specification in which the two processors could be within the same mobile device.

The Federal Circuit then addressed CUPP’s disclaimer arguments. The Court agreed with the Board that CUPP’s statements made during the original prosecution were far from clear and unmistakable, being susceptible to several reasonable interpretations that are contrary to CUPP’s construction. The Court also agreed with the Board that CUPP’s arguments during the Trend Micro IPRs do not qualify as a disclaimer for purposes of claim construction. While a disclaimer made during an IPR proceeding is binding in subsequent proceedings, the “Board is not required to accept a patent owner’s arguments as disclaimer when deciding the merits of those arguments.”

As the Federal Circuit explained, expanding the application of disclaimers to the proceedings in which they are made—as CUPP proposed—is rife with problems. IPR proceedings are more similar to district court litigation than they are to initial examination, and it is well established that disclaimers in litigation are not binding in the proceeding in which they are made. Further, CUPP’s proposal would effectively render IPR claim amendments unnecessary, as patent owners would be free to change the scope of their claims retrospectively without regard to the protections provided by the IPR claim amendment process, such as [...]

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Sleep Better: Amendments Proposed during IPR Deemed Proper and Valid

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Patent Trial & Appeal Board’s (Board) finding that proposed amendments made during an inter partes review (IPR) are valid and proper despite the inclusion of changes not related to patentability issues raised in the petition. Nat’l Mfg., Inc. v. Sleep No. Corp., Case No. 21-1321 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 14, 2022) (Stoll, Schall, Cunningham, JJ.)

We’ve likely all seen the commercials promising a proven quality of sleep. Sleep Number is the owner of numerous patents, including several directed to methods for adjusting “the pressure in an air mattress ‘in less time and with greater accuracy’ than previously known.” The patents state this is achieved by taking pressure measurements at the valve enclosure and applying a pressure adjustment factor that is iteratively revised using an “adjustment factor error.” The patent states that this method allows for monitoring the pressure of the air mattress without the need to turn off the pumps.

American National Manufacturing challenged the validity of the patents in an IPR proceeding, claiming that most were rendered obvious by the prior art of Gifft in view of Mittal and Pillsbury and that six of the dependent claims requiring a “multiplicative pressure adjustment factor” would have been obvious in further view of Ebel. Gifft disclosed an air-bed system using valve assembly pressure to approximate the air chamber pressure and Mittal and Pillsbury both disclosed using additive offsets to improve accuracy. Ebel disclosed using both additive and multiplicative components to accurately measure the actual pressure in an inflating or deflating air bag.

The Board agreed with American National that it would have been obvious to combine Gifft, Mittal and Pillsbury and that the resulting combination rendered most of the claims obvious, but it also noted that the combination failed to show that a “skilled artisan would have applied Ebel’s multiplicative factors” to the prior art. However, in each proceeding Sleep Number filed a motion to amend the claims contingent on a finding that the challenged claims were unpatentable. The proposed claims included the “multiplicative pressure adjustment factor” that the Board had determined was not unpatentable along with other non-substantive changes.

American National took issue with these amendments, arguing they were legally inappropriate, non-enabled because of an error in the specification and lacked written description support. The Board disagreed. American National appealed. Sleep Number cross-appealed the Board’s finding of obviousness.

The Federal Circuit found that the proposed amendments were not improper even though some of the changes were non-substantive changes to address consistency issues. The Court pointed out that “once a proposed claim includes amendments to address a prior art ground in the trial, a patent owner also may include additional limitations to address potential § 101 or § 112 issues, if necessary.” The Court rejected American National’s argument that permitting such amendments creates an “asymmetrical” and “unfair” proceeding “by allowing the patent owner and the Board to address concerns that may be proper for [an] examination or reexamination proceeding, but that [...]

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Cloudy Skies: PTO Director Finds Abuse and Sanctionable Conduct

The US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) Director issued a precedential opinion finding that filing an inter partes review (IPR) solely to extract payment in a settlement—without the intent to prosecute the IPR to completion—is a sanctionable abuse of process. OpenSky Indus., LLC v. VLSI Tech. LLC, IPR2021-01064 (Oct. 4, 2022) (Vidal, Dir.)

In 2019, VLSI asserted two patents against Intel. In response, Intel filed two IPRs against the allegedly infringed patents, but both IPRs were discretionally denied by the Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board) based on the advanced stage of the underlying litigation and overlapping issues. The suit proceeded, and a jury awarded VLSI more than $600 million in damages in 2021.

OpenSky Industries was founded two months after the judgment. OpenSky filed a “copycat” IPR petition based on Intel’s previous petitions (including refiling the declarations of Intel’s expert without his knowledge) targeting VLSI’s two allegedly infringed patents. The Board instituted over VLSI’s argument, noting that patentability issues were raised that had not been resolved in the district court case. Initially, OpenSky attempted to settle the IPRs with VLSI, but VLSI refused. OpenSky then reached out to Intel, offering to let Intel collaborate if it agreed to pay a success fee. Intel refused and later filed its own IPR petition and joinder motion. After Intel’s refusal, OpenSky pivoted back to VLSI, offering to “refuse[] to pay [the] expert for time at deposition so [the] expert does not appear at deposition” in return for payment. VLSI reported the scheme to the Board.

Intel was joined as a party to the OpenSky IPR proceeding in June 2022 based on its later-filed petition. Once Intel joined, OpenSky threatened to forego both deposing VLSI’s expert and filing its reply brief unless Intel paid it for its “prior work in the IPR” plus “additional remuneration.” Intel refused. While OpenSky did notice VLSI’s expert, it declined to file a Petitioner Reply brief, forcing Intel to draft the reply. Later, at VLSI’s request (OpenSky missed the request date), oral argument in the proceeding took place before the Board. OpenSky did not meaningfully participate.

While all this was unfolding, the Director sua sponte initiated an investigation to determine “[w]hat actions the Director . . . should take when faced with evidence of an abuse of process or conduct that otherwise thwarts . . . the goals of the Office and/or the AIA.” To begin the investigation, the Director sent discovery requests to each of the three parties. VLSI and Intel complied. OpenSky, by comparison, either incompletely complied with or directly refused each request. Based on those evasions, the Director sanctioned OpenSky for discovery misconduct, applying adverse inferences against OpenSky on each request.

Discovery sanctions in place, the Director moved to the central question: Did OpenSky abuse the IPR process? The Director answered yes.

First, the Director found that OpenSky’s conduct violated its duty of candor and good faith to the Board. In its negotiations with VLSI, OpenSky offered to deliberately sabotage its own petition to hinder Intel. In its negotiations with Intel, OpenSky did [...]

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