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IP UPDATE
Exploring the Latest in Intellectual Property Law
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The Name of the Game Is the Claims, Even if Specification Is Shared

by | Oct 20, 2022 |

Once again addressing the application of Alice, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit partially reversed a district court’s dismissal of several patents as subject matter ineligible for error in analyzing their claims together because of a shared specification despite different claim features. Weisner v. Google LLC, Case No. 021-2228 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 13, 2022) (Reyna, Hughes, Stoll, JJ.) (Hughes, J., dissenting in part)

Sholem Weisner sued Google for infringement of four related patents describing ways to “digitally record a person’s physical activities” and use the digital record. The patents’ common specification described how individuals and businesses can sign up for a system to exchange information (e.g., “a URL or an electronic business card”), and as they encounter people or businesses that they want recorded in their “leg history,” the URLs or business cards are recorded along with the time and place of the encounters. Google moved to dismiss the suit under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing that the patent claims were directed to ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101, and that Weisner had failed to meet the minimum threshold for plausibly pleading his claim of patent infringement under the Twombly and Iqbal standards (Twiqbal). The district court agreed and granted dismissal under Twiqbal. After holding a hearing on patent ineligibility, the district court also granted dismissal under § 101 but granted Weisner leave to amend his complaint. In his amended complaint, Weisner added infringement allegations, allegations related to patent eligibility and an “Invention Background and System Details Explained” section. Google again moved to dismiss the amended complaint based on both § 101 and Twiqbal, which the district court granted. Weisner timely appealed.

The Federal Circuit applied the Alice two-step analysis to determine whether the claims at issue were directed to a patent-ineligible concept, such as an abstract idea, and if they were, whether the elements of each claim, both individually and as an ordered combination, transformed the nature of the claim into a patent-eligible application. As discussed in the Supreme Court cases Alice and Mayo, the second step is “a search for an ‘inventive concept’—i.e., an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’”

There were four asserted patents in issue. For the first two patents, Weisner attempted to argue that the claims improved “the functioning of the computer itself” or “an existing technology process” by “[1] automatically recording physical interactions and [2] limiting what is recorded to only specific types of interactions that are pre-approved and agreed to by an individual member and a vendor member.” However, the Federal Circuit was unconvinced that this was the type of improvement found in Enfish to bring claims into the realm of inventiveness. Instead, the Court agreed with the district court that, consistent with past precedent, this was no different than travel logs, diaries, journals or calendars used to keep records of a person’s location, and that [...]

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When Are Compulsory Copyright Licenses Compulsory?

by | Oct 20, 2022 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit partially affirmed a district court’s summary judgment order holding that audiovisual recordings of live concerts do not fall within the scope of the Copyright Act’s compulsory license provision while purchasers of audio-only recordings obtain a compulsory license in the copyright of the work fixed by their predecessors/sellers. ABKCO Music, Inc. et al. v. Sagan et al., Case No. 20-3816 (2d Cir. Oct. 6, 2022) (Jacobs, Wesley, Menashi, JJ.)

In 2002, William Sagan purchased, through Norton, a collection of audio and audiovisual live concert recordings from Bill Graham Archives. All three parties are named defendants in this case. The agreement conveyed all intellectual property that the Archives held (from a transaction with Sagan) and included a disclaimer stating that record company and artist approval was required to exploit the recordings. The defendants’ subsequent purchases of other recordings contained similar limited assurance language regarding intellectual property rights. In 2006, the defendants made the entire collection publicly available online for a streaming and downloading fee. A year later, the defendants began using a third-party licensing agent to obtain compulsory licenses under 17 USC § 115 and negotiated licenses from plaintiff music publishers in the audio and audiovisual live concert recordings.

Section 115 of the Copyright Act requires persons seeking to make and distribute phonorecords of a previously published musical work to obtain a compulsory license by providing notice to the copyright owner before distribution and paying government-prescribed royalties. (§ 115(a)(1), (b), (c).) The Copyright Act defines phonorecords as “[m]aterial objects in which sounds, other than those accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed.” (§ 101.) Section 115’s substantive requirements for duplications of audio/sound recordings fixed by another include requirements that the sound be fixed lawfully, and that duplication be authorized by the copyright owner. (§ 115(a)(1).)

In 2015, the music publishers sued defendants for copyright infringement of 197 musical works posted online without valid compulsory licenses. The music publishers alleged that the defendants did not obtain compulsory licenses for audiovisual works as required by § 115 and that the defendants failed to comply with § 115 substantive compulsory licensing requirements for audio-only works. Defendants argued implied license and equitable estoppel as affirmative defenses. The publishers sought damages and a permanent injunction pursuant to the Copyright Act.

The district court, on summary judgment, ruled that the defendants had no valid license authorizing the reproduction and distribution of the musical works in either audio or audiovisual format, that the defendants had neither an implied license nor any basis for estoppel, and that Sagan (a principal in several of the defendant streaming services) was liable for direct infringement. The district court denied the publishers’ request for an injunction but granted the publishers an award of attorneys’ fees. The defendants appealed from the summary judgment order and the order granting fees and costs. The plaintiffs cross-appealed denial of an injunction.

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that the defendants infringed each musical work [...]

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Hold That Generic, Please: Supreme Court Grants Emergency Request to Stay Federal Circuit’s Mandate

by | Oct 6, 2022 |

In a rare action by the Supreme Court of the United States, Chief Justice Roberts granted Novartis’s emergency request for a stay of a mandate from the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which had found a Novartis patent invalid for lack of adequate written description and would have permitted generic versions of Novartis’s multibillion-dollar blockbuster drug Gilenya to enter the market. For more information on the Federal Circuit’s prior decisions, click here and here. Novartis Pharms. v. HEC Pharm. Co., Misc. Docket 21A272 (Supr. Ct. Sept. 29, 2022) (Roberts, Chief Justice).

Novartis sued HEC and several other generic companies for infringement of a patent directed to methods of treating remitting multiple sclerosis with fingolimod or a fingolimod salt at a daily dose of 0.5 mg without an immediately preceding loading dose. In a split panel decision issued in January 2022 and authored by former Judge O’Malley with current Chief Judge Moore dissenting, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that the patent was not invalid for insufficient written description of the claimed 0.5 mg daily dose or the no-loading dose negative limitation. HEC petitioned for panel rehearing. Judge O’Malley retired in March 2022, and a new panel granted HEC’s petition. The new panel now included Judge Hughes, who joined with Chief Judge Moore in the majority opinion. Judge Linn (who had joined with now retired Judge O’Malley in the original panel majority) was now the dissenter. The split panel vacated its prior decision and reversed the district court’s judgment. The new majority held that silence cannot support a later-added claim limitation that precludes loading doses. In dissent, Judge Linn argued that the majority applied a heightened written description standard requiring, not only a “reason to exclude,” but also a showing that the negative limitation was “necessarily excluded.”

On September 27, 2022, the Federal Circuit denied Novartis’s motion to stay the mandate pending a forthcoming decision on a petition for certiorari. Novartis filed an emergency application directed to Chief Justice Roberts, and two days later Justice Roberts issued an Order staying issuance of the Federal Circuit mandate (which would have issued on October 4, 2022) and ordered HEC to respond to Novartis’s emergency application.

Practice Note: The Supreme Court is currently considering another petition for certiorari resulting from a divided Federal Circuit decision on the question of whether a patent specification must expressly disclose a claim limitation to satisfy the written description requirement. Juno Therapeutics, Inc. v. Kite Pharma., Inc., Case No. 21-1566.



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No Second Bite at the Apple: Dismissal under Duplicative-Litigation Doctrine

by | Sep 22, 2022 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s dismissal of a second case between the same parties and asserting the same patent under the duplicative-litigation doctrine. Arendi S.A.R.L. v. LG Elecs. Inc., Case No. 2021-1967 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 7, 2022) (Prost, Chen, Stoll, JJ.)

Arendi sued LG and others for infringement of several patents. Pursuant to Delaware’s local rules requiring identification of accused products, Arendi identified hundreds of LG products as infringing four asserted claims of the patent relevant on appeal. For those accused products, Arendi provided one “exemplary” infringement claim chart for LG’s Rebel 4 phone. LG objected to Arendi, stating that it should have provided charts for all accused products.

As the litigation proceeded, the parties agreed on eight products as representative but, despite LG’s repeated objection, Arendi did not provide claim charts for any additional products during fact discovery. Instead, Arendi’s opening expert report on infringement provided claim charts for seven non-Rebel 4 representative products for the first time. LG moved to strike those portions of the expert report. The district court granted that motion. Arendi did not supplement its claim charts in response to the court’s order and instead filed another complaint in Delaware, thus creating a second concurrent case asserting the same patent against LG. After the district court granted LG’s motion to dismiss the second suit, Arendi appealed.

The Federal Circuit explained the standard for assertion of the duplicative-litigation doctrine, which “prevents plaintiffs from ‘maintain[ing] two separate actions involving the same subject matter at the same time in the same court … against the same defendant.’” Whether two cases involve the same subject matter depends on the extent of factual overlap of the asserted patents and accused products. There was no dispute that the same patent was asserted in both cases, but Arendi disputed that the cases involved the same accused products, citing the district court’s order striking its expert report as evidence that the non-Rebel 4 products were not at issue in the first case.

Like the district court, the Federal Circuit disagreed. The Court distinguished between accusing products and satisfying discovery obligations regarding those products. Arendi listed the non-Rebel 4 products in its disclosure of accused products, served interrogatories about them, received discovery on them and included non-Rebel 4 products in its expert report. Thus, even though Arendi “failed to fulfill its discovery obligations” as to those products, which made its expert report untimely, the non-Rebel 4 products were still accused, at issue and litigated in the first case. Thus, dismissal of the second case under the duplicative-litigation doctrine was not an error.

Practice Note: In a footnote, the Federal Circuit acknowledged the similarity of the duplicative-litigation doctrine to res judicata (claim preclusion). Although both doctrines involve an inquiry into whether claims in the second suit are repetitious, unlike res judicata, the duplicative-litigation doctrine does not require a final judgment in the first case.



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Too Quick to Be Lit—Need to Serve That Complaint First

by | Sep 22, 2022 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed a default judgment and monetary award in favor of the plaintiff, which was issued in a case where the plaintiff filed (but never served) an amended complaint in a copyright infringement action. The Court concluded that the amended complaint stated a new claim for relief but was not properly served on the defendants in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Anthony Campbell v. Rayshawn Bennett et al., Case No. 21-10978 (11th Cir. Sept. 7, 2022) (Wilson, Branch, Lagoa, JJ.) (Lagoa, J. concurring)

In 2015, Anthony Campbell (professionally known as Rackboy Cam) wrote and recorded a song called “Everything Be Lit,” and registered his copyright with the US Copyright Office in February 2017. Later, in 2018, Rackboy Cam filed suit against June James, Rakim Allen, Rayshawn Bennett (professionally known as YFN Lucci) and Think It’s a Game Records (TIG) for copyright infringement based on Bennett’s 2016 recording and release of a similar song, “Everyday We Lit.” The complaint alleged infringement under 17 U.S.C. §§ 106 and 501 and sought “an award of … actual damages, trebled, as well as all profits Defendants derived from infringing the Plaintiff’s Copyright in the Work,” statutory damages and injunctive relief.

James and Allen failed to respond to the initial complaint and the district court entered a default against them. Rackboy Cam later filed an amended complaint, requesting for the first time an award of actual damages in the form of “all profits Defendants derived, jointly and severally,” from the infringing work. In the amended complaint, Rackboy Cam did not request statutory damages. As before, James and Allen did not respond. Rackboy Cam ultimately settled with the other defendants, and they were dismissed from the action.

The district court ultimately entered a default judgment against James and Allen, awarding almost $1.5 million in profits, jointly and severally, as well as prejudgment interest, a permanent injunction, a perpetual 50% running royalty against future infringement and costs to Rackboy Cam.

James moved the district court to set aside the default, arguing that he was not properly served with the initial complaint—an argument rejected by the district court. The district court concluded that because James defaulted prior to the filing of the amended complaint, and since the amended complaint did “not allege or request new or additional relief from Allen and James,” the plaintiff was not required to have served it on James under Fed. R. Civ. P. 5. Rackboy Cam then moved for entry of a default judgment and requested the above award. The district court granted the motion and James appealed.

The issue before the Eleventh Circuit was whether the amended complaint contained a new claim for relief—joint and several liability for profits—and whether Rackboy Cam was therefore required to serve the amended complaint.

Under Rule 5, service of a pleading filed after the initial complaint is not required on a party who is in default for failing to appear, unless the pleading asserts a [...]

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Implied Copyright License to Photographs of Artist Formerly Known as Prince

by | Sep 15, 2022 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld a ruling that a marketer had an implied copyright license to distribute marketing materials containing digital copies of photographs of the late musical artist Prince. Beaulieu v. Stockwell, Case No. 21-3833 (8th Cir. Aug. 30, 2022) (Gruender, Benton, Grasz, JJ.)

Allen Beaulieu was Prince’s personal photographer for five years, taking thousands of photos during multiple world tours. Beaulieu registered a copyright for these photos in 1984. In 2014, Beaulieu decided to publish a book of his photos. He hired (and entered into contracts with) Thomas Crouse to write and publish the book and Clint Stockwell to assist in scanning and storing digital copies of the photos. There was significant interest in the book after Prince’s death in 2016. In May 2016, Beaulieu gave Stockwell an unknown number of uncatalogued photos to be digitized. At about the same time, Stockwell sent a press packet containing a digital photo slideshow and press release to potential investors, including Charles Sanvik.

The collaboration with Stockwell and the others eventually fell apart, and Beaulieu demanded his photos back. Beaulieu’s lawyer retrieved some of the photos from Stockwell’s home, but Beaulieu did not make an inventory of the photos that were returned. Beaulieu sued Stockwell, Crouse and Sanvik for copyright infringement (among various other property torts). The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims and found that Stockwell had an implied license to create and distribute the press release containing Beaulieu’s photos. Beaulieu appealed.

Addressing Beaulieu’s copyright claim, the Eighth Circuit focused on the district court’s finding of an implied license. An implied license is an affirmative defense to a copyright infringement claim. The Court explained that a nonexclusive implied license may be found where a person requests the creation of a work, the creator makes the particular work and delivers it to the person who requested it, and the licensor intends that the licensee-requestor copy and distribute the work. The Court also explained that such an implied license could be implied from conduct. The Court recounted the details of the contract between Beaulieu and Stockwell, which included provisions permitting the use of the digital photos for “promotional and marketing” purposes. The Court also noted that Beaulieu was informed of the marketing plans and was sent drafts of the marketing emails, including the digital photo slideshow, to which Beaulieu did not object. The Court found that Beaulieu’s receipt of these materials, along with his continuing interactions with the collaborators thereafter, implied his approval of the marketing plan and demonstrated an implied license to the photographs.



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Present-Tense Claim Terms Not Sufficient to Require Actual Operation

by | Sep 15, 2022 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a US International Trade Commission (Commission) decision that found no violation of Section 337 due to noninfringement. The Court disagreed with the Commission that the use of present-tense claim terms required actual operation to be shown to prove infringement, but nevertheless affirmed the Commission’s finding because the patentee failed to establish that the accused products were capable of carrying out the claimed functionality. INVT SPE LLC v. ITC, Case No. 20-1903 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 31, 2022) (Newman, Taranto, Chen, JJ.)

In 2018, INVT filed a complaint at the Commission alleging a Section 337 violation by various cell phone companies. INVT asserted that five of its patents were infringed by the 3G and LTE networking standards used by mobile devices (such as cell phones) to communicate with base stations (such as cell phone towers). INVT withdrew two of the asserted patents during the course of the investigation, and the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued an initial determination holding that there was no Section 337 violation because none of the three remaining patents were infringed. The Commission did not disturb that decision on review, and INVT appealed on two of the three asserted patents in June 2020.

Briefing during the appeal was extended several times, and as a result, oral argument did not occur until November 2021. The Federal Circuit then asked for supplemental briefing regarding whether there could be any relief on one of the patents scheduled to expire in March 2022. The Court ultimately issued its decision at the end of August 2022, more than two years after the appeal was filed.

In its decision, the Federal Circuit first held that the appeal was moot as to the expired patent. For the remaining patent, the dispute over infringement resolved to the question of whether the claims required actual operation or could instead be met by mere capability. On that point, the Court reversed the ALJ’s determination that the claims required actual operation. According to the Court, the present-tense claim language used (i.e., “a data obtaining section that demodulates and decodes”) was not significantly different from the sort that is usually interpreted to merely require capability (e.g., “for demodulating and decoding”). But the Court then held that the actual operation of the base stations was relevant to determining whether the accused mobile devices were capable of performing one of the particular claimed functions. The Court thus affirmed the finding of no infringement because INVT had failed to show that the base stations actually operated in a way that would allow the mobile devices to be capable of carrying out the claimed functionality.

Alexander Ott appeared for respondent ZTE at the Commission in this matter.



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IPR Estoppel Applies to Claim Not Addressed During Pre-SAS Proceeding

by | Sep 1, 2022 |

In the companion district court case to the Supreme Court’s 2019 Thryv v. Click-to-Call decision regarding the scope of review for inter partes review (IPR) decisions, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit addressed what it characterized as “a rather unusual set of circumstances” to find that the accused infringer was estopped from challenging in district court the validity of a claim for which the Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board) had refused to institute IPR. Click-to-Call Techs. LP v. Ingenio, Inc., Case No. 22-1016 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 17, 2022) (Stoll, Schall, Cunningham, JJ.)

Click-to-Call filed suit against Ingenio alleging patent infringement of 16 claims. Ingenio filed a petition for IPR challenging the 16 claims and one additional dependent claim. The Board only partially instituted the IPR, and in its final written decision addressed and found persuasive un-patentability grounds based on a Dezonno reference but refused to consider grounds based on a Freeman reference (leaving one of the asserted claims unaddressed). Ingenio had successfully requested a stay of the district court suit pending resolution of the IPR. During the appeal of the Board’s decision regarding the IPR, the Supreme Court in SAS Institute, Inc. v. Iancu, overruled the practice of partial institutions. However, Ingenio never sought remand under SAS for the Board to consider its challenge to the unaddressed asserted claim.

After the IPR appeal had run its course, the district court lifted the stay and Ingenio moved for summary judgment of invalidity. Ingenio argued that the unaddressed asserted claim (which was the only asserted claim not found unpatentable in the IPR) was invalid based on the same Dezonno reference that Ingenio had used against the other asserted claims. Click-to-Call argued that 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) estopped Ingenio from raising this invalidity ground. Click-to-Call also moved to amend its selection of asserted claims to add two additional claims that were not at issue in the IPR. The district court found that Dezonno anticipated the unaddressed asserted claim and denied Click-to-Call leave to amend its asserted claims. Click-to-Call appealed.

Click-to-Call argued that Ingenio was estopped from asserting invalidity of the unaddressed asserted claim. The Federal Circuit agreed and found that IPR estoppel applied. Specifically, the Court found that district court erred by only analyzing common law issue preclusion, focusing on whether the argument had been “actually litigated” instead of following the language of IPR estoppel under § 315(e)(2), which estops grounds that “reasonably could have [been] raised.” The Court found that the statutory language precluded Ingenio from arguing that Dezonno anticipated the unaddressed asserted claim. The Court explained that Ingenio’s IPR petition included not only a challenge to the unaddressed asserted claim based upon Freeman, but also unpatentability challenges to other claims based on Dezonno. The Court viewed this as evidence of Ingenio’s awareness of Dezonno as an anticipatory ground that it “reasonably could have raised” in the IPR. The Court was unpersuaded by Ingenio’s arguments that there was no estoppel with regard [...]

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Yes, and It Counts! Single Purchase in Forum Establishes Personal Jurisdiction over Infringer

by | Sep 1, 2022 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed exercise of personal jurisdiction over a foreign online retailer for a trademark infringement claim where the trademark owner purchased the only allegedly infringing article sold in the forum. NBA Properties, Inc. v. HANWJH, Case No. 21-2909 (7th Cir. Aug. 16, 2022) (Ripple, Scudder, JJ.)

NBA Properties owns the trademarks for the National Basketball Association (NBA) and NBA teams. HANWJH is a China-based online retailer that sells allegedly infringing NBA branded products on a well-known e-commerce site. HANWJH offered 205 allegedly infringing products that were available for purchase in Illinois, the forum state. HANWJH’s only online order in Illinois was made by an investigator for NBA Properties who purchased a pair of basketball shorts for delivery to an Illinois address. The shorts were delivered to the Illinois address before NBA Properties filed suit against HANWJH.

NBA Properties sued HANWJH for trademark infringement and counterfeiting under 15 U.S.C. § 1114 and false designation of origin under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) in the Northern District of Illinois. NBA Properties sought and received a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, including a temporary asset restraint on HANWJH’s bank account. After HANWJH failed to timely answer the complaint, NBA Properties moved for default judgment. HANWJH moved to dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing the following:

  • Operating a website is not sufficient on its own to establish personal jurisdiction.
  • A single transaction by the plaintiff cannot support the exercise of personal jurisdiction.
  • Even if the exercise of personal jurisdiction were otherwise appropriate, such exercise would offend the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

The district court denied HANWJH’s motion to dismiss and entered a default. HANWJH failed to object to the motion for default judgment, and the district court entered a final judgment. HANWJH appealed.

The Seventh Circuit reviewed the “minimum contacts” International Shoe criterion before turning to a more recent line of cases applying this standard to online retailers. Citing its 2020 decision in Curry v. Revolution Laboratories, the Court noted that the minimum contacts requirement is satisfied if “the defendant reasonably could foresee that its product would be sold in the forum.” The Court reasoned that allowing customers to order products from a website to the forum and then fulfilling an order to the forum can form the basis of personal jurisdiction—even when the only orders to the forum were made by the plaintiff, as long as the orders were made before filing suit. Applying these principles, the Court found that HANWJH had purposefully directed conduct at Illinois by establishing an online store, demonstrating a willingness and capacity to ship goods to Illinois and intentionally shipping an infringing product to an Illinois address. The Court explained that it was irrelevant that only a single allegedly infringing article was sold in Illinois and that it was purchased by the plaintiff, because the proper focus of the analysis was on HANWJH’s purposeful conduct. The Court also concluded that HANWJH’s [...]

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Single T-Shirt Sale Can’t Clothe Bare-Bones Personal Jurisdiction Claim

by | Aug 18, 2022 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a district court’s dismissal of a trademark infringement suit for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding that the trademark owner failed to allege that the alleged infringer could reasonably anticipate being hauled into court in Missouri. Brothers and Sisters in Christ, LLC v. Zazzle, Inc., Case No. 21-1917 (8th Cir. Aug. 2, 2022) (Smith, Benton, Kelly, JJ.)

Brothers and Sisters in Christ (BASIC) is a Missouri-based clothing company that owns the trademark “love happens.” Zazzle is a California-based online retailer. BASIC sued Zazzle in a Missouri district court for trademark infringement, alleging that Zazzle used its nationally available website to advertise and sell goods in Missouri. BASIC further alleged that in 2019, Zazzle sold and shipped a t-shirt bearing a purportedly infringing “love happens” logo to at least one Missouri resident. The district court granted Zazzle’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). BASIC appealed.

Reviewing the issue de novo, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The Court explained that because the Lanham Act does not authorize nationwide personal jurisdiction, the Court was required to apply Missouri’s long-arm statute and the federal due process clause. Given that Missouri’s long-arm statute authorizes personal jurisdiction over defendants who engage in, among other things, the transaction of any business or the commission of a tortious act within the state, the Court’s inquiry focused on whether exercising personal jurisdiction over Zazzle comported with the due process clause. Because BASIC did not allege that Zazzle was subject to general personal jurisdiction in Missouri (i.e., BASIC did not allege that Zazzle was “essentially at home” in the forum state), the question instead turned on whether BASIC had sufficiently pled facts to support a claim of specific personal jurisdiction.

The Eighth Circuit explained that specific personal jurisdiction existed over Zazzle for the purposes of BASIC’s trademark infringement claims if Zazzle had certain minimum contacts with the forum state and BASIC’s claims arose out of or related to those contacts. For specific jurisdiction to apply, the underlying controversy must be connected to the defendant’s activities in the forum state; unconnected activities directed to the forum state, no matter how numerous or systematic, cannot convey specific personal jurisdiction. The Court used a five-factor test previously set forth in Whaley v. Esebag to conduct its analysis: “(1) the nature and quality of [defendant’s] contacts with the forum state; (2) the quantity of such contacts; (3) the relation of the cause of action to the contacts; (4) the interest of the forum state in providing a forum for its residents; and (5) convenience of the parties.”

The Eighth Circuit found that the behavior alleged by BASIC (Zazzle’s operation of a national website that sells and ships goods to Missouri combined with a single specific instance of an allegedly infringing t-shirt being sold and shipped to a Missouri consumer) was insufficient to support a specific jurisdiction claim. Zazzle’s website availability and sales unrelated to the use [...]

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