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Downloaded: No Relief From Stipulated Claim Construction

by | Oct 26, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled that a claim interpretation that flows naturally from the parties’ stipulated claim construction is binding on the parties even if the interpretation reads preferred embodiments out of the claims. Finjan LLC v. SonicWall, Inc., Case No. 22-1048 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 13, 2023) (Reyna, Cunningham, JJ.) (Bryson, J., dissenting).

In 2017, Finjan sued SonicWall for infringing several of Finjan’s patents related to cybersecurity technology systems that identify malicious material in downloadable content and programming code. The asserted patents included claims directed to ways to protect network-connectable devices from undesirable downloadable operations. During claim construction, the parties stipulated that a “downloadable” should be construed as “an executable application program, which is downloaded from a source computer and run on the destination computer.”

SonicWall moved for summary judgment, arguing that it did not infringe the patents because the accused devices received and inspected supposed “downloadables” as unextracted packets, which do not constitute executable files under the stipulated claim construction. The district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of SonicWall, finding that Finjan failed to offer evidence that “the accused […] products ‘ever possess a reassembled file or executable application.’” Finjan appealed.

Finjan argued that the district court’s ruling was incorrect because it impermissibly grafted additional requirements onto the stipulated claim construction, and that the district court’s interpretation was inconsistent with claim language found in other parts of the asserted patents. The Federal Circuit rejected these arguments, noting that the district court’s infringement ruling followed directly from the parties’ stipulated definition of the term “downloadables.” Under the stipulated claim construction and in accordance with Finjan’s own expert’s interpretation of the meaning of “executable,” a device “that merely receives and forwards packets without reassembling their contents does not receive a downloadable . . . because that device does not receive an executable application program.” The Court emphasized that Finjan could not challenge its earlier claim construction stipulation. Further, the Court noted that the stipulated definition of “downloadables” was derived verbatim from the specifications of two of the asserted patents.

Judge Bryson dissented for two reasons. First, he noted that the district court’s interpretation of the claims would read preferred embodiments out of the patent and effectively eviscerate from the patent’s scope any device that screens content from the internet. Second, Judge Bryson found that elsewhere in the asserted patents’ specifications it was clear that the meaning of “downloadables” used by the district court was incorrect. Contrary to the majority, Judge Bryson did not find the stipulated claim construction dispositive because Finjan merely challenged the meaning of the word “executable” within the stipulated claim construction, rather than the contents of the stipulation itself.

Practice Note: This decision offers a few helpful lessons for practitioners. First, it is important to write claims in language that is both expansive enough to encompass all intended embodiments but precise enough to survive invalidity challenges. By carefully selecting specific but broad language, and writing claims more accurately, patentees may avoid semantic noninfringement arguments. [...]

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Just How Similar Must Competing Marks Be to Survive Dismissal?

by | Oct 5, 2023 |

After a de novo review, the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part a district court’s motion to dismiss, finding the competing marks sufficiently similar to avoid dismissal, and the attorneys’ fee award. Bliss Collection, LLC v. Latham Companies, LLC, Case Nos. 21-5723; -5361 (6th Cir. Sept 21, 2023) (Mathis, Bush, JJ.) (Larsen, J., dissenting).

This case between Bliss and Latham was the latest installment in a series of cases between the children’s clothing companies after a Bliss founder left to start Latham as a competitor company. Here, Bliss sued Latham for infringement of three trademarks for Bliss’s stylized lowercase “b” logo, appearing as if stitched out in thread. Bliss sued for federal copyright infringement, federal trademark infringement, federal trade dress infringement, federal false designation of origin and misappropriation of source, federal unfair competition, trademark under Kentucky law and unfair competition under Kentucky law.

The competing marks are depicted below:

Latham moved to dismiss, and the district court dismissed the federal copyright and trade dress claims. The district court did not initially dismiss the remaining claims, but later did so after a motion for reconsideration. The district court determined that Latham was not entitled to attorneys’ fees because the case was not exceptional, and Bliss had brought the suit in good faith. Bliss appealed the federal trademark infringement, federal trade dress infringement and trademark infringement under Kentucky common law only.

The Sixth Circuit focused its analysis on whether the amended complaint properly alleged that Latham’s logo was a use of Bliss’s trademark. The Court noted that dismissal was not warranted for anything but the most extreme cases, concluded that this was not such a case and reversed.

The Sixth Circuit found that Latham used the accused mark “in a trademark way” (i.e., to identify goods). Then, weighing the Frisch factors to determine likelihood of confusion between the marks, the Court found that the similarity between the marks and their “impression” favored Bliss despite the fact “that the logos share no words or homophones.” Overall, the Court found that five of the eight factors favored Bliss and that two were neutral. Only the likelihood of purchaser care factor was found to favor Latham. The Court thus found that Bliss had plausibly alleged a likelihood of confusion and that its complaint stated a federal trademark infringement claim. Applying the same logic to the state trademark claims, the Court also reversed the dismissal of those claims.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the trade dress claim, however, because Bliss failed in its affirmative duty to plead facts in support of nonfunctional trade dress.

Turning to the attorneys’ fee award, the Sixth Circuit found that the mere fact that Bliss sued Latham was not sufficient to warrant an “exceptional” case finding in terms of an award for fees. The Court was also unpersuaded that the trade dress claim was worthy of a fee award [...]

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What’s Kühler Than Kühl? No Likelihood of Confusion

by | Sep 28, 2023 |

Addressing unfair competition claims under the Lanham Act, the US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit concluded that no reasonable juror would confuse an alcohol distributer’s use of the word “kühl” with use of a similar mark by a clothing company. Alfwear, Inc. v. Mast-Jägermeister US, Inc., Case No. 21-4029 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 7, 2023) (Holmes, Kelly, Carson, JJ.)

Alfwear has used the mark KÜHL on its outdoor apparel line since 1993 and has registered the mark in connection with apparel, wine and beer. Mast-Jägermeister US (MJUS), a German herbal liqueur distributor, began incorporating “kühl” into its advertisements on billboards, commercials and digital advertising in phrases such as “kühl as ice” and “drink it ice kühl.” In response, Alfwear filed suit against MJUS, asserting trademark infringement and unfair competition. The district court granted MJUS’s motion for summary judgment, finding that there was no likelihood of confusion because all but one factor for assessing likelihood of confusion supported MJUS. Alfwear appealed.

Alfwear argued that the district court erred by not concluding that MJUS’s use of the word “kühl” was likely to cause confusion with Alfwear’s use of the essentially the same word. To determine whether a likelihood of confusion exists, the following factors must be considered:

  • The degree of similarity between the marks
  • The intent of the alleged infringer in adopting its mark
  • Evidence of actual confusion
  • Similarity of products and manner of marketing
  • The degree of care likely to be exercised by purchasers
  • The strength or weakness of the marks.

The Tenth Circuit found that the two marks were not similar in sound, meaning or appearance, and that MJUS only used “kühl” in association with other MJUS marks. The Court explained that Alfwear often depicts the KÜHL mark alongside a logo of a shield-type shape containing a stylized, snow-covered mountain peak in the colors brown, black and white against a bright blue sky. In contrast, MJUS uses the word “kühl” in phrases such as “kühl shots” or “kühl as ice,” on top of a black or green background and accompanied by a combination of either the mark JÄGERMEISTER, the Jägermeister logo or images of a Jägermeister bottle.

The Tenth Circuit also found that MJUS did not intend to copy Alfwear’s mark, explaining that MJUS was not aware of Alfwear’s trademark when designing the new advertising campaign, and noting that when MJUS became aware of the trademark, MJUS intended to avoid infringement by not placing the mark on its apparel or liquor products. The Court also determined that there was insufficient evidence of actual confusion. Alfwear presented anecdotal evidence from Alfwear executives who had heard about confusion from individuals and survey evidence that demonstrated consumers experienced an approximately 30% chance of confusion. The Court found that the anecdotal evidence was de minimis and found that the survey was not designed properly because the products were not shown to survey participants as they would appear in the marketplace and used leading questions. The Court also found that the two [...]

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Standard Practice: The Public Has Right to Copyrighted Material Incorporated Into Law

by | Sep 28, 2023 |

In a case that attracted a slew of amicus curiae participation and was the most recent in the series of American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) copyright cases, the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that the noncommercial dissemination of standards, as incorporated by reference into law, constitutes fair use and thus does not support liability for copyright infringement. Am. Soc’y for Testing & Materials v. Public.Resource.Org, Case No. 22-7063 (DC Cir. Sept. 12, 2023) (Henderson, Pillard, Katsas, JJ.)

The ASTM and the other plaintiffs are private organizations that develop and promulgate standards for establishing best practices for their respective industries or products. In 2013, they brought an action for copyright infringement against Public.Resource.Org for posting their copyrighted standards (as they were referenced in agency rulemaking and incorporated into law) on its website, thereby making these materials available to the public at no cost. After the district court initially granted ASTM’s motion for summary judgment of copyright infringement and rejected Public Resource’s fair use defense, the DC Circuit reversed and remanded for further consideration the issue of whether posting the incorporated standards constituted fair use. Subsequently, the district court “found fair use as to the posting of standards incorporated into law and infringement as to the standards not so incorporated.” The plaintiffs appealed.

On appeal, the DC Circuit analyzed the following fact-intensive fair use factors:

  • The purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes
  • The nature of the copyrighted work
  • The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole
  • The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.

The DC Circuit concluded that the first three factors strongly favored holding that Public Resource’s posting of the incorporated standards constituted fair use. As to the first factor, the Court explained that in a manner similar to the one discussed by the Supreme Court of the United States in its 2021 Google v. Oracle Am. case, Public Resource’s use was for nonprofit, noncommercial educational purposes. The DC Circuit further found Public Resource’s use transformative in that it served different purposes than ASTM’s use (“provide[ing] the public with a free and comprehensive repository of the law” versus “producing standards reflecting industry or engineering best practices.”)

As to the second factor, the DC Circuit reasoned that the “nature of the copyrighted work” heavily favored fair use because the standards “fall at the factual end of the fact-fiction spectrum” and “have legal force, [such that] they . . . fall ‘at best, at the outer edge of copyright’s protective purposes.’” As to the third factor, the Court found that it strongly supported fair use because the standards had been incorporated and thus had “the force of law.”

With respect to the fourth factor, the DC Circuit recognized that Public Resource’s [...]

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Chilly Adventures: Design Patent Prior Art Comparison Applies to Article of Manufacture

by | Sep 28, 2023 |

Addressing a matter of first impression concerning the scope of prior art relevant to a design patent infringement analysis, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concluded that “to qualify as comparison prior art, the prior-art design must be applied to the article of manufacture identified in the claim.” Columbia Sportswear North America, Inc. v. Seirus Innovative Accessories, Inc., Case Nos. 21-2299; -2338 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 15, 2023) (Prost, Reyna, Hughes, JJ.)

Columbia owns a design patent that covers an ornamental design of a heat reflective material. Seirus markets and sells products (e.g., gloves) made with material that it calls HeatWave. An image of Columbia’s patented design and Seirus’s HeatWave material appear below:

Columbia Patented Design

Seirus HeatWave

Columbia sued Seirus for infringement. After the district court granted summary judgment of infringement, Seirus appealed to the Federal Circuit. The Court issued its decision in Columbia I, concluding that the district court improperly declined to consider the effect of Seirus’s logo in its infringement analysis and resolved certain issues that should have been left to the jury. The Court therefore vacated summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

On remand, the district court held a trial. Before trial, the district court limited admissible comparison prior art to “wave patterns of fabric,” declined to instruct the jury that “prior art” referred to prior designs of the claimed article of manufacture, and declined to instruct the jury that it did not need to find that any purchasers were deceived or that there was any actual or likelihood of confusion among consumers in the marketplace. Seirus was permitted to admit three prior art references that disclosed fabric, and Columbia was precluded from distinguishing the references by arguing that they did not disclose heat reflective material. The jury returned a verdict of noninfringement. Columbia appealed.

Among other things, Columbia challenged the exclusion of evidence and jury instructions concerning comparison prior art, and the jury instructions implicating Seirus’s logo.

The Federal Circuit began by discussing the appropriate prior art comparison in the context of design patent infringement. Citing its 2008 en banc decision in Egyptian Goddess v. Swisa, the Court explained that under the ordinary-observer test governing design patent infringement, prior art can help highlight distinctions and similarities between the claims and the accused design. For instance, when a claimed design is close to a prior art design, small differences between the accused design and the claim design are likely to be important. Conversely, if an accused design copied a particular feature of the claimed design that departs from the prior art, the accused design is likely to be regarded as deceptively similar to the claimed design, and thus infringing.

The question of first impression before the Federal Circuit was the proper scope of comparison prior art that [...]

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Watermelon Sugar: Candy Shape and Color Deemed Functional

by | Sep 21, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld a district court’s decision that a candymaker cannot trademark the shape and colors of watermelon candy, finding that the combined colors and shape of the candy are functional because they help signal to consumers that the candies have a watermelon flavor. PIM Brands Inc. v. Haribo of America, Inc., Case No. 22-2821 (3rd Cir. Sept. 7, 2023) (Chagares, Bibas and Matey, JJ)

PIM is a leading confectionary company that introduced its Sour Jacks Wedges, a chewy gummy candy, in the early 2000s.

PIM obtained a federal trademark registration in “the shape of a wedge for candy, with an upper green section with white speckles, followed by a narrow middle white section and followed by a lower red section with white speckles.”

Haribo, a well-known German confectionery company, introduced its own watermelon-flavored sweet treat in 2019. Like the Sour Jacks Wedges, Haribo’s candy is red, white and green, with an elongated watermelon wedge shape. PIM sued Haribo for trademark and trade dress infringement under the Lanham Act and for unfair competition under New Jersey common law, alleging that Haribo copied PIM’s Sour Jacks Wedges design.

Haribo countered that PIM’s trade dress was functional and requested that the district court cancel PIM’s trademark. Haribo claimed that it designed its chewy candy’s shape and colors to match its flavor (watermelon) and that PIM’s trademark should not have been granted since it closely resembled an actual slice of watermelon. The district court agreed, finding that PIM’s trademark design was functional and not protectable since PIM’s combination of colors and shape helps identify the candy’s watermelon flavor. PIM appealed.

PIM acknowledged that the coloring of its watermelon candy was functional since it identified the candy’s flavor. However, PIM argued that the candy’s wedge shape identified the brand and challenged the district court’s decision because it did not consider the wedge shape in isolation from the colors when assessing functionality.

The Third Circuit rejected PIM’s argument, concluding that each feature of the candy’s trade dress serves a single function, which is to identify its flavor, and therefore is ineligible for trademark protection. The Court explained that a design is functional if it is useful for anything beyond branding. The Court cited to its 2021 decision in Ezaki Glico v. Lotte International America, explaining that “[e]ven if the design chosen both promotes a brand and also ‘makes a product work better,’ it is functional and unprotectable.” The Court went on to explain that if design choices (e.g., shape and color) serve the same function (e.g., identifying the flavor), they should be considered together.

PIM further argued that its Sour Jacks Wedges do not match exactly with watermelon, noting that the bottom could be more curved and have a thinner band of darker green, the wedge could be wider, the point could be sharper and a deeper red, and there could be black seeds. [...]

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Uncompleted Building Sold in Bankruptcy Doesn’t Infringe Architect’s Copyright

by | Aug 24, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a district court’s ruling that there was no actionable infringement where an uncompleted building sold under the authority of a bankruptcy court was later completed. Cornice & Rose International, LLC v. Four Keys, LLC et al., Case No. 22-1976 (8th Cir. Aug. 11, 2023) (Loken, Shepard, Kelly, JJ.) (per curiam). The Court explained that the architectural copyright claims were precluded by the bankruptcy court’s order approving the sale.

McQuillen Place Company retained Cornice & Rose, an architectural firm, to design a building. Cornice created technical drawings for the building and obtained copyrights for its drawings and for the building itself, the tangible embodiment of its design work. When the building was 90% complete, McQuillen halted construction and filed for bankruptcy. During liquidation proceedings, the trustee moved to sell the building to the lender, First Security Bank & Trust Company. Cornice objected to the sale on various grounds, including that its copyright protection in the building itself would be infringed by an order authorizing the sale. In response, First Security Bank suggested language to protect the parties, which the court incorporated into its order authorizing the sale of the uncompleted building, as follows:

Copyright: So long as the Purchaser, or its assignee, or its architect or agents do not use the Plans or Drawings or any work in which Cornice & Rose International, LLC (“C & R”) holds a valid copyright (the C & R Intellectual Property), the Purchaser, or its assignee, may use and occupy the Property, develop the Property, and complete the existing interior and exterior of the Property, free and clear of existing and future claims of C & R, whether for copyright infringement or otherwise. The Purchaser, or its assignee, or its architect or agents may not use the C &R Intellectual Property without first making arrangements satisfactory to C & R for the use of the C & R Intellectual Property. Nothing contained herein shall preclude future claims of copyright infringement resulting from the improper or unauthorized use of the C & R Intellectual Property by the Purchaser, or its assignee, or any third parties.

Cornice filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that under its contract with McQuillen, the license for the use of the building was conditioned on full, complete and timely payment. Because that had not occurred, there was no license for the construction of the building and, therefore, the building was an infringing copy of the architectural work. The following day the bankruptcy court denied the motion. Cornice filed an appeal, which the bankruptcy court dismissed under 1 U.S.C. §363(m) because the sale had been completed.

While the appeal was pending, the trustee sold the building, and First Security Bank assigned its interest to Four Keys, which hired various companies to finish the building. Cornice then sued First Security Bank, its president, Four Keys and others for copyright infringement by finishing the building as an infringing derivative work. Cornice sought a declaratory judgment [...]

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Noncompulsory Counterclaims Don’t Confer Appellate Jurisdiction

by | Aug 17, 2023 | , ,

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit determined that it does not have appellate jurisdiction to review noncompulsory patent counterclaims in a case otherwise unrelated to the originally asserted patents. Teradata Corp. v. SAP SE, Case No. 22-1286 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 1, 2023) (nonprecedential) (Lourie, Taranto, Hughes, JJ.)

Teradata makes and sells data warehouse systems and services. SAP develops and sells software. The two companies began collaborating while SAP was simultaneously developing its own database (HANA) and component software. SAP eventually informed Teradata that it would stop selling certain Teradata products. Teradata sued SAP, alleging misappropriation of trade secrets on the theory that SAP used Teradata’s proprietary information to create HANA. Teradata also alleged various antitrust violations, arguing that SAP “illegally tied” HANA and HANA’s supporting software. In response, SAP filed counterclaims against Teradata for allegedly infringing SAP patents related to database organization and optimization. On Teradata’s motion, the district court agreed to sever one of the four patent infringement claims but allowed the others to proceed. The district court reasoned that Teradata’s claims and SAP’s counterclaims all arose from “the same transaction or occurrence,” namely SAP’s development of HANA.

The district court granted summary judgment to SAP on Teradata’s antitrust and technical trade secret claims and stayed proceedings on Teradata’s business trade secret claim and to Teradata on SAP’s patent counterclaims. Teradata appealed to the Federal Circuit.

SAP moved to transfer the appeal to the Ninth Circuit. The Federal Circuit denied the motion but instructed the parties to address the jurisdictional issue in the merits brief. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) grants the Federal Circuit exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final decisions in which a party claims or asserts a compulsory counterclaim related to patents. As it relates to this case, the issue was whether SAP’s patent infringement counterclaims were “compulsory,” meaning SAP would be unable to later sue on these patent infringement allegations “if it did not press them in this action.”

The Federal Circuit began by looking at Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 13(a), which states that a counterclaim is “compulsory” if it arises from the same transaction or occurrence as a plaintiff’s claim. The Court explained that it uses three tests to determine whether the transaction or occurrence is sufficiently related between the claim and counterclaim:

  1. Whether the legal and factual issues are substantially the same
  2. Whether the evidence will be substantially the same
  3. Whether there is “a logical relationship between the claim and the counterclaim.”

Taken together, these tests essentially ask if there is substantial overlap between what the plaintiff and the defendant must establish to succeed on the claim and counterclaim, respectively.

The Federal Circuit found that the first two tests clearly weighed against SAP’s counterclaim being compulsory. While an understanding of the accused products and alleged trade secrets would be necessary for both the claim and the counterclaim, “same-field overlap” is not enough to make the issues or necessary evidence “substantially the same.”

As to the third test, the Federal Circuit found [...]

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Personal Jurisdiction? Selling Products via Interactive Website Will Do It

by and | Jul 13, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded a district court’s dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction, deciding that the sale of a product via an interactive website provides sufficient “minimum contacts” to support jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in a state where the defendant causes the product to be delivered. Herbal Brands, Inc. v. Photoplaza, Inc., Case No. 21-17001 (9th Cir. July 5, 2023) (Graber, Clifton, Christen, JJ.)

Herbal Brands sells health, wellness, fitness and nutrition products directly to consumers and through authorized third-party retailers in Arizona. Photoplaza sold Herbal Brands products through two e-commerce storefronts without Herbal Brands’ permission. Herbal Brands sent three cease-and-desist letters, stating that Photoplaza’s sales harmed Herbal Brands in Arizona. Herbal Brands accused Photoplaza of trademark infringement and unfair competition under the Lanham Act, false advertising under the Lanham Act and tortious interference with contracts and business relationships under Arizona law. The district court granted Photoplaza’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Herbal Brands appealed.

The Ninth Circuit noted that Photoplaza failed to submit any evidence to contradict the jurisdictional allegations in the complaint. The Court found that under its three-part test, Photoplaza had sufficient minimum contacts with Arizona to warrant personal jurisdiction:

  1. Photoplaza purposefully directed its activities at the forum.
  2. Herbal Brands’ harm arose out of Photoplaza’s contacts with Arizona.
  3. Exercise of jurisdiction over Photoplaza would be reasonable.

The second and third prongs of the Ninth Circuit’s test were easily resolved. Herbal Brands’ claimed harm rose out of and related to Photoplaza’s conduct of selling the products to Arizona residents. The Court referred to its 2004 holding in Schwarzenegger regarding a plaintiff’s burden to establish jurisdiction, whereupon the burden shifts to the defendants under the seven-factor balancing test of Freestream Aircraft (2018). The Court found that Photoplaza did not meet its burden to present a compelling case that exercising jurisdiction would be unreasonable.

The bulk of the Ninth Circuit’s decision focused on the first prong (purposeful availment), which applies when “a case sounds in tort,” such as claims of trademark infringement, false advertising and tortious interference with business relationships, each of which requires an intentional tortious or “tort-like” act. Referring to the effects test from the 1984 Supreme Court decision in Calder v. Jones, the Ninth Circuit explained that Photoplaza purposefully directed its activities toward the forum if it (1) committed an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm that Photoplaza knew was likely to be suffered in the forum state. Related to the Calder test’s first and third prongs, Photoplaza’s product sales to Arizona residents were intentional acts, and the cease-and-desist letters informed Photoplaza that its actions caused harm in Arizona.

Regarding the “express aiming” prong, the Ninth Circuit explained that when a website itself is the only jurisdictional contact, the analysis turns on whether the site had a forum-specific focus or whether the defendant exhibited an intent to cultivate an audience in the forum. The Court explained that [...]

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Not on the Merits: Claim Preclusion Doesn’t Bar Inducement Claims After Direct Infringement Case

by | Jul 13, 2023 |

Applying Seventh Circuit law to determine whether the dismissal of patent infringement claims should be upheld on the basis of claim preclusion, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a district court ruling that the claims were precluded by res judicata. Inguran, LLC v. ABS Global, Inc., Case No. 22-1385 (Fed. Cir. July 5, 2023) (Lourie, Bryson, Reyna, JJ.)

At the district court, ABS argued that a previous infringement suit brought by Inguran precluded it from bringing the instant suit. At issue was whether the previous suit asserting direct infringement of Inguran’s “GSS technology” used to create “single-sexed semen straws” barred the current suit, which alleged that ABS induced third parties to infringe upon the same technology by entering into licensing agreements with these third parties. The district court agreed with ABS. Inguran appealed.

To successfully assert claim preclusion under Seventh Circuit law, a party must meet the following three-factor test:

  1. An identity of the parties or their privies in the first and second lawsuits
  2. An identity of the cause of action
  3. A final judgment on the merits in the first suit.

The Federal Circuit’s analysis focused on the second requirement. In determining whether there was an identity of the cause of action, the Court examined whether the second claim was based on the same set of transactional facts as the earlier litigation between the parties. In patent infringement cases, the general rule is that res judicata does not bar the assertion of new rights acquired during the previous action, which could have been litigated but were not (i.e., claims that arose while the litigation was ongoing but after the original complaint was filed).

The Federal Circuit determined that the transactional facts between the present case and the previous litigation were different because the cases respectively centered around theories of induced infringement by third parties and direct infringement. As the Court noted, “The evidence needed to support these two claims (induced infringement vs direct infringement) is different.” To allege and prove induced infringement, Inguran needed to establish additional facts beyond what it asserted in the previous case to show direct infringement. As the Court noted, an “induced infringement claim rests on evidence and elements beyond those required by direct infringement.” Although minimal evidence regarding the activities of the third parties was part of the record in the previous litigation, the parties ultimately stipulated that direct infringement occurred. The issue of induced infringement, however, was never presented to the jury.

The Federal Circuit held that although both cases implicated similar facts, including extensive discussions of the “GSS technology,” the direct infringement allegations could not reasonably serve to bar later allegations regarding the actions of third-party licensees. The Court accepted Inguran’s argument that any induced patent infringement claim it might have brought at the time of the earlier case would have been based on speculation: “[w]e agree with ST that it could not have asserted an inducement claim during ABS I.” The Court therefore rejected the district [...]

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