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Jersey Boys Don’t Cry: No Copyright Protection for Facts “Based on a True Story”

by | Sep 16, 2020 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law finding that the musical Jersey Boys did not infringe a copyright held in an autobiography of band member Tommy DeVito. Donna Corbello v. Frankie Valli, et al., Case No. 17-16337 (9th Cir. Sept. 8, 2020) (Berzon, J.).

In the 1990s, Rex Woodard ghostwrote an autobiography of Tommy DeVito, one of the original members of the 1950s quartet the Four Seasons. Woodard and DeVito agreed to split the profits equally. However, shortly after finishing the book, and before finding a publisher, Woodard died. Donna Corbello, Woodard’s widow, became the successor-in-interest to the book, and she continued the search for a publisher. Almost 15 years later, Corbello still had not published the book.

DeVito’s autobiography reads as a straightforward historical account of the Four Seasons. At the beginning of the book, DeVito, as the narrator, describes his autobiography as a “complete and truthful chronicle of the Four Seasons,” and he promises not to let “bitterness taint the true story.” Corbello also sent letters to potential publishers emphasizing that the book provided a “behind-the-scenes” look at the Four Seasons. In all accounts, the book is a non-fiction, historical chronicle of events of the Four Seasons.

In 2005, the musical Jersey Boys debuted on Broadway. Jersey Boys also depicts the history of the Four Seasons from its origins in New Jersey to its induction into the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame in 1990. DeVito admitted to working with people involved in developing Jersey Boys and sharing the book with the individuals researching the history of the band.

In 2007, Corbello sued DeVito and 14 defendants, including the band members and the writers, directors and producers of Jersey Boys. The complaint included 20 causes of action, including various forms of copyright infringement. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on most of the claims. Corbello appealed. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants, vacated its assessment of costs against Corbello, and remanded for further proceedings.

On remand, the case proceeded to a jury trial where the jury found that the musical infringed the book and that use of the book was not fair use. After the verdict, the district court granted the defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, concluding that any infringement was fair use. Corbello appealed.

On appeal, the central disagreements were whether the musical was substantially similar to the book and whether the defendants copied any protectable portions of the book. The Ninth Circuit analyzed the similarities under the extrinsic test for substantial similarity. The appellate court found that each of the similarities failed because they involved only non-protectable elements of the book. Those non-protectable elements included DeVito depicting himself in the musical (a character based on a historical figure is not protected); Bob Gaudio arriving late to rehearsal, excited about a new song he just [...]

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Liability for Copyright Infringement Attaches if Conduct Exceeds Scope of License

by | Sep 2, 2020 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit revived a software owner’s copyright infringement suit because the district court erred in granting summary judgment of no infringement by failing to analyze whether the accused infringer exceeded the scope of a copyright license. Oracle America, Inc., et al. v. Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company, Case No. 19-15506 (9th Cir. Aug. 20, 2020) (Smith, J.).

Oracle owns registered copyrights for Solaris software, including copyrighted software patches. Oracle requires its customers have a prepaid annual support contract, for each server they desire to be under support, to access the software patches. Customers under a support plan can access patches through an Oracle support website.

Hewlett Packard Enterprise (HPE) provides a “one-stop-shop” for support to its customers, including HPE servers running Solaris. HPE provides this support directly and through its partners. One of HPE’s partners is Terix Computer Company. Terix arranged for joint HPE-Terix customers to have Oracle support for all of their servers through a single server support plan. Terix accomplished this by downloading Solaris software patches, using the customer’s credentials (created using a Terix-supplied credit card), to make copies for servers that were not part of the support contract.

In 2013, Oracle sued Terix for copyright infringement. The court granted Oracle summary judgment, and Terix stipulated to a judgment on the claims without admitting liability. Oracle and HPE entered into an agreement, effective May 6, 2015, to toll the statute of limitations for any claims Oracle might assert against HPE.

In 2016, Oracle sued HPE for direct copyright infringement concerning HPE’s direct support customers, and for indirect infringement concerning joint HPE-Terix customers. Oracle also sued for claims of intentional interference and unfair competition under California state law. The parties did not dispute that the tolling agreement applied, so the court considered whether the copyright infringement claims were barred for conduct before May 6, 2012. The Copyright Act provides that a copyright infringement claim is subject to a three-year statute of limitations, which runs separately for each violation. Under Ninth Circuit law, a copyright infringement claim begins to accrue “when a when a party discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, the alleged infringement.” Importantly, actual or constructive knowledge triggers the statute of limitations. The Ninth Circuit has explained that suspicion of copyright infringement places a duty on the copyright holder to investigate further into possible infringement or lose the claim.

Oracle conceded that it had concerns about Terix and suspicions about HPE as early as 2010, but argued that HPE used fraudulent means to keep Oracle unaware of its actions, so it had no duty to inquire. The district court disagreed, finding that once Oracle had constructive knowledge, the doctrine of fraudulent concealment was no longer an option to toll the limitations. Because Oracle failed to investigate HPE, the court determined that HPE was entitled to summary judgment on the infringement claims for pre-May 6, 2012, conduct. Oracle appealed.

The Ninth Circuit explained that to prove indirect infringement, Oracle had to show that [...]

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Bugs in Space? Star Trek Plotline Does Not Infringe Tardigrade Video Game

by | Aug 27, 2020 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a district court’s pleadings-stage determination that certain Star Trek: Discovery characters and plotlines did not infringe copyrighted elements of a video game because there was not substantial similarity between protectible elements of the video game and the Discovery episodes. Abdin v. CBS Broad. Inc., Case No. 19-3160 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 17, 2020) (Chin, J.).

Between 2014 and 2017, Plaintiff Abdin posted videos and draft designs online for his sci-fi video game, Tardigrade, a puzzle-based game in which the human protagonist can travel through outer space in the warm embrace of a gigantic blue tardigrade. Tardigrades, also known as water bears, are microscopic animals capable of withstanding extreme climates—including the harsh vacuum and radiation of space. After a 2007 research study confirmed tardigrades’ spacefaring abilities, they became somewhat of a pop culture phenomenon, being featured in numerous literary works and television shows. In June 2018, Abdin registered a copyright for a distillation of his video game concept.

In the latest installment of the Star Trek series, the 2017 season of Discovery features a three-episode storyline involving a creature called Ripper that resembles a giant tardigrade. The crew of the USS Enterprise realizes that Ripper is able to act as a type of supercomputer to improve the performance of their space traveling equipment (the DASH Drive).

Abdin filed suit for copyright infringement against CBS in August 2018, alleging that the Discovery creators copied aspects of his video game, including space-traveling tardigrades. CBS filed a motion to dismiss, which was granted by the district court. The district court concluded that Abdin’s video game was not substantially similar to Discovery. Abdin appealed.

The Second Circuit reviewed the lower court’s dismissal de novo and affirmed the district court’s dismissal, finding that Abdin failed to plausibly allege substantial similarity between protectible elements of his video game and the Discovery episodes. The Court first looked to the two elements of a copyright infringement claim: (1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original. The Court explained that to satisfy the second element, Abdin must demonstrate that CBS actually copied Abdin’s work, and that a substantial similarity exists between CBS’s work and the “protectible” elements of Abdin’s work.

The Second Circuit identified three elements of Abdin’s video game that were not protectible under copyright law: facts and ideas, scènes à faire and generic character traits. First, the Court found that the scientific facts relating to tardigrades’ survivability are not copyrightable, and that Abdin’s idea of tardigrades moving through space was also unprotectible. While noting the distinction between an idea and its expression is elusive, the Court explained that Abdin’s space-traveling tardigrade was merely a generalized expression of a scientific fact. Second, the Court looked to whether any of Abdin’s otherwise protectible expressions were unprotected scènes à faire—indispensable “stock themes” in a given genre. The Court explained that space travel, supernatural forces and alien encounters are all generic themes that [...]

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Diamonds to Dust? Too Many Factual Disputes Precludes Summary Judgment

by | Aug 26, 2020 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated a district court’s summary judgment grant in favor of a fine jewelry producer for trademark infringement, counterfeiting and unfair competition because factual disputes exist around whether the accused infringer’s use of the word “Tiffany” was merely descriptive of a particular ring setting, thereby supporting a fair use defense to infringement. Tiffany and Company v. Costco Wholesale Corporation, Case Nos. 17-2798-cv, -19-338, -19-404 (2nd Cir. Aug. 17, 2020) (Livingston, J.).

In 2012, a Costco customer alerted Tiffany that she believed Costco was selling diamond engagement rings advertised as Tiffany rings. When Tiffany approached Costco about the issue in December 2012, Costco asserted that its point-of-sale displays bearing the Tiffany name referred to the diamond setting styles of its rings, and that other similar point-of-sale displays also identified common ring settings such as “bezel” or “cathedral” settings. Costco also claims that within one week after Tiffany’s December 2012 outreach, it voluntarily removed all uses of “Tiffany” from its jewelry displays and has not since used the word “Tiffany” to identify any rings or setting styles.

Nevertheless, in 2013, Tiffany filed suit against Costco for trademark infringement and counterfeiting under the Lanham Act, and unfair competition in violation of New York state law, based on Costco’s sales of otherwise unbranded diamond engagement rings identified by point-of-sale signs containing the word “Tiffany.” In response, Costco raised the affirmative defense of fair use, arguing that its use of “Tiffany” on certain signage for rings was not as a source-identifying trademark, but merely to describe a particular six-prong diamond setting style. Costco also filed a counterclaim seeking to cancel certain federal trademark registrations for the TIFFANY mark as “generic” for a specific jewelry setting, and not entitled to registered trademark protection.

The district court granted Tiffany’s motion for summary judgment finding Costco liable for trademark infringement and counterfeiting as a matter of law. The district court then revised a jury’s damages award finding that Costco was liable for willful or intentional infringement to the tune of more than $21 million. Costco appealed.

On appeal, Costco argued it had successfully raised a question of material fact as to its liability for trademark infringement and counterfeiting and was entitled to present its fair use defense to a jury. The Second Circuit addressed the lower court’s trademark “likelihood of confusion” assessment under its own Polaroid factors and explained that if a factual inference must be drawn to arrive at a particular finding on a Polaroid factor, and if a reasonable trier of fact could reach a different conclusion, the district court may not properly resolve that issue on summary judgment. Here, the Court determined that Costco raised a triable question of fact as to at least three of the Polaroid factors, namely, (1) whether Costco’s customers were actually confused as to the source or affiliation of its diamond engagement rings, (2) whether Costco adopted Tiffany’s trademark in bad faith and (3) whether the relevant population of consumers was sufficiently [...]

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It’s Good to Be the Sovereign, Unless You Have an Exclusive Licensee

by | Aug 5, 2020 |

Addressing the interaction between state sovereign immunity under the 11th Amendment and joinder under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a “fractured majority” of the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit determined that an exclusive licensee could proceed with suit even though state sovereign immunity prohibited involuntary joinder of the patent owner. Gensetix, Inc. v. The Board of Regents of the University of Texas System, Case No. 19-1424 (Fed. Cir. July 24, 2020) (O’Malley, J.) (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (Taranto, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

In 2014, Gensetix indirectly licensed two patents covering cancer treatment methods from the University of Texas (UT), a state university. A subsequent confirmation between Gensetix and UT confirmed Gensetix’s exclusive license to the patents-in-suit, which required Gensetix to sue potential infringers and gave UT a secondary right to sue if Gensetix did not bring suit. The parties further agreed to cooperate regarding any infringement suit and that nothing in the agreement would waive UT’s sovereign immunity.

Three years later, Gensetix sued Baylor College of Medicine and others for patent infringement. Before filing the complaint, Gensetix asked UT, the legal patent owner, to join suit. UT declined, and Gensetix named it as an involuntary plaintiff. UT moved to dismiss itself from the lawsuit based on its sovereign immunity, and Baylor moved to dismiss because UT was a required party that could not be joined because of its sovereign immunity. The district court agreed with UT and Baylor, concluding that UT’s sovereign immunity prevented Gensetix from joining UT as a plaintiff and that the suit could not proceed without UT. Gensetix appealed.

The Federal Circuit reversed. The majority opinion, authored by Judge O’Malley, held that UT’s sovereign immunity prohibited its joinder as an involuntary plaintiff, but that Gensetix could proceed in its suit against Baylor notwithstanding UT’s absence. The Court affirmed the district court’s conclusion that UT’s 11th Amendment state sovereign immunity prohibited UT’s involuntary joinder. Reasoning that “[i]t is immaterial that there are no claims against UT, or that UT is named an involuntary plaintiff rather than an involuntary defendant,” the Court held that “Rule 19(a)(2) cannot be used to drag an unwilling UT into federal court” because “[t]he Eleventh Amendment serves to prevent ‘the indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive process of judicial tribunals’ against its will.” As for the exclusive licensee’s ability to proceed without UT, the Court explained that the district court abused its discretion by giving “controlling weight” to UT’s sovereign immunity, by failing to appreciate the alignment of interests between Gensetix and UT, and by ignoring that the license eliminated the risk of multiple suits because UT could not sue after Gensetix had done so.

Although both conclusions commanded a majority, they were different majorities. In a separate opinion, Judge Taranto agreed that UT could not be joined, but would also have held that Republic of Philippines v. Pimentel—a Supreme Court case requiring dismissal of claims where an absent [...]

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“Salacious” Content Doesn’t Bar Discovery in Copyright Infringement Suit

by | Jul 30, 2020 |

The US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit preserved discovery options for copyright owners fighting online piracy when it reversed the district court’s refusal to allow a subpoena of an alleged online infringer’s internet service provider. The DC Circuit found that the district court abused its discretion by relying heavily on the copyright owner’s litigation history and the nature of its films rather than the relevant legal standards under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Strike 3 Holdings, LLC v. John Doe, Subscriber Assigned IP Address 73.180.154.14 (DC Cir. July 14, 2020) (Rao, J.).

Strike 3 is a producer and online distributor of adult films. Like most of its industry peers, the company faces significant online piracy that is often facilitated by peer-to-peer file sharing. To combat this infringement, Strike 3 regularly files copyright infringement lawsuits against “John Doe” defendants based on the internet protocol (IP) address (and the associated physical address) tied to an online infringer’s illegal file sharing and downloads.

In 2018, Strike 3 filed a copyright infringement lawsuit against the IP address 73.180.154.14 John Doe subscriber located in the District of Columbia after the IP address was associated with 22 instances of infringement in the course of one year. To properly identify the defendant and serve the complaint, Strike 3 also filed a Rule 26(d)(1) motion seeking leave to subpoena Comcast, the subscriber’s internet service provider, for records identifying the John Doe IP address subscriber. But, in applying a multifactor balancing test adopted by the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Arista Records v. Doe, the district court denied Strike 3’s discovery motion on grounds that Strike 3’s need for the subpoenaed information was outweighed by defendant’s right to be anonymous, which the court found to be notably relevant given the risk of defendant misidentification and the “particularly prurient pornography” at issue.

On appeal, the DC Circuit acknowledged the district court’s broad discretion over the structure, timing and scope of discovery. In Strike 3’s case, however, the DC Circuit found that three aspects of the lower court’s analysis were an abuse of this broad discretion.

First, it was improper and “not supported by the relevant legal standards” for the district court to treat the pornographic content of Strike 3’s copyrighted works as relevant to its entitlement to early discovery. None of the supporting case law suggests that a potentially non-infringing defendant’s privacy interests vary depending on the content of the copyrighted work at issue. The Court warned that a plaintiff’s ability to defend its copyrights cannot turn on a court’s subjective view of the copyrighted material, and held that the content of a copyrighted work is per se irrelevant to a Rule 26(d)(1) motion seeking discovery to identify an anonymous infringer.

The district court’s second abuse of discretion was in its conclusion that, even if the discovery request was granted, Strike 3 could not “identify a copyright infringer who can be sued” for purposes of stating a plausible claim against the [...]

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Knock It Off, Knockoffs? Ninth Circuit Affirms Trade Dress Rights but Not Fame

by | Jul 9, 2020 |

Taking on issues of functionality and fame relating to trade dress rights, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s judgment after a jury trial on claims of infringement and dilution of trade dress rights in furniture. The Ninth Circuit distinguished utilitarian functionality from aesthetic functionality, and reaffirmed the high burden on the proponent of dilution to establish that the mark has become a “household name.” Blumenthal Distributing, Inc. DBA Office Star v. Herman Miller, Inc., Case Nos. 18-56471, -56493 (9th Cir. June 25, 2020) (Korman, J.).

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Trademark Claim for Profit Damages Means No Jury Trial

by | Jun 11, 2020 | ,

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a denial of a jury trial demand in a trademark infringement lawsuit where only a claim of disgorgement of profits was at issue. JL Beverage Company, LLC v. Jim Beam Brands Co., Beam Inc., Case No. 18-16597 (9th Cir. May 27, 2020) (Wallace, J.) (Friedland, J., concurring).

JL sued Jim Beam for trademark infringement. JL manufactured and sold vodka in bottles featuring stylized depictions of lips. Jim Beam also sells vodka in bottles featuring stylized depictions of lips. JL alleged that consumers would confuse its “Johnny Love Vodka” lip mark with Jim Beam’s Pucker line of flavored vodka products.

After JL failed to provide a computation of actual damages during discovery, Jim Beam sought to limit the damages JL could seek at trial. The district court found that JL’s failure prevented Jim Beam from preparing a responsive case and granted Jim Beam’s motion to exclude JL’s claims for actual damages. Jim Beam further argued that JL may not recover a royalty because 1) it is not appropriate in situations, like this one, where the parties did not have a previous royalty agreement and 2) as with actual damages, JL never identified a means of calculating a reasonable royalty or produced evidence upon which a fact finder could determine such a royalty. Again, the court agreed, and limited JL’s damage claims to equitable disgorgement of Jim Beam’s profits, as provided under the Lanham Act.

Without claims for actual damages or royalties, Jim Beam moved to strike JL’s demand for a jury trial. Since the Lanham Act does not afford the right to a jury trial, the district court considered whether the Seventh Amendment affords such a right in a trademark dispute. The Seventh Amendment provides that “[i]n Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.” The district court found controlling law in Ninth Circuit precedent Fifty-Six Hope Road Music, which held that that the Seventh Amendment does not afford the right to a jury calculation of profits for two reasons: disgorgement is an equitable remedy, and the specific issue of profit determination cannot be said to be traditionally tried by a jury. The district court denied JL’s demand for a jury trial, held a two-day bench trial and ultimately determined that Jim Beam did not infringe JL’s marks. JL appealed the district court’s order granting Jim Beam’s motion to strike its jury trial demand and the district court’s judgment.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order and judgment, finding no error in the court’s likelihood of confusion analysis on any of the factors, nor in its denial of the jury trial.

In a concurring opinion, Judge Friedland wrote separately to address the tension between the Court’s holdings in Fifty-Six Hope Road Music (a trademark case) and Sid & Marty Krofft (a copyright case). In Krofft, the Ninth Circuit found a right to a jury trial in a copyright case where there was only a claim [...]

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Copyright Office, Not Courts, Determines Validity of Registrations Containing Inaccurate Information

by | Jun 10, 2020 |

With the validity of a copyright registration at issue, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded a district court’s judgment after a jury trial and award of attorney’s fees in favor of the plaintiff in a copyright infringement action, holding that the district court was required to request the Register of Copyrights to advise whether inaccurate information, if known, would have caused the Register to refuse registration of the plaintiff’s asserted copyright. Unicolors, Inc. v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz, L.P., (9th Cir. May 29, 2020) (Bea, J.).

The appeal to the Ninth Circuit arose from a copyright infringement action brought by Unicolors, a company that creates designs for use on textiles and garments, against the global fast-fashion retail giant, H&M Hennes & Mauritz (H&M). After a jury found substantial similarity between a design created by Unicolors in 2011 and a design printed on a skirt and jacket sold by H&M four years later, the Ninth Circuit was tasked with examining the threshold issue of whether Unicolors actually holds a valid copyright registration for the 2011 design, which is a precondition to bringing its copyright infringement suit.

The garment design that Unicolors claimed to be infringed by H&M is one of 31 separate designs comprising a “single-unit registration.” To register a collection of works as a “single unit” under the Copyright Act, however, the works must have been first sold or offered for sale in “a single unit of publication.” On this point, H&M argued that the collection of works identified in Unicolors’s asserted copyright registration were sold separately instead of together and at the same time, which required the court to find Unicolors’s copyright registration invalid.

In its examination of the “rarely disputed” issue of whether a copyright is properly registered, the Ninth Circuit found the district court’s rationale for denying H&M’s petition to be “flawed.” First, the Court flatly rejected the district court’s requirement that H&M demonstrate that Unicolors intended to defraud the Copyright Office at the time of its application filing, and pointed to the Ninth Circuit’s 2019 ruling in Gold Value Int’l Textile, Inc. v. Sanctuary Clothing, LLC, where it clarified that there is no such intent-to-defraud requirement for copyright registration invalidation (and in doing so, rejected a series of Ninth Circuit cases that imply an opposite conclusion).

Second, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the plain meaning of “single unit,” under the Copyright Act’s provision for the registration of a collection of published works as a single unit, requires that the registrant first published the works in a singular, bundled collection. Therefore, the Court explained that the district court further erred in concluding that Unicolors’s application for copyright registration did not contain inaccuracies despite the inclusion of the company’s own designated “confined designs,” which, according to testimony and evidence in the proceeding, were sold separately and exclusively to individual customers and were not first sold together and at the same time with the rest of the works in the single unit registration.

With this underlying [...]

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