FRAND Archives - IP UPDATE

FRAND

UPC Issues First FRAND Decision

by Dr. Henrik Holzapfel and Dr. Laura Katharina Woll, LL.M. | Dec 20, 2024 | EU Update, Patents

In a landmark decision, the Unified Patent Court’s (UPC) Local Division Mannheim set standards for enforcing standard essential patents (SEPs) and for negotiating fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) licenses under SEPs. In line with the framework previously established by the Court of Justice of the European Union in Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. v. ZTE Corp., the judgment outlines the obligation on parties in FRAND negotiations. Panasonic Holdings Corp. v. Guangdong OPPO Mobile Telecommunications Corp., Ltd., OROPE Germany GmbH, Case No. UPC_CFI_210/2023; ACT_545551/2023 (Local Division Mannheim Nov. 22, 2024) (Tochtermann, J.; Bötter, J.; Brinkman, J.; Loibner, TJ.)

UK High Court Issues Landmark Global FRAND Rate Decision

by Amol Parikh | Apr 6, 2023 | EU Update, Patents

The UK High Court of Justice issued its long-anticipated decision establishing a global Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) royalty rate for a patent portfolio essential to 3G, 4G and 5G cellular technologies. InterDigital Tech. Corp. et al. v. Lenovo Group Limited, Case No. HP-2019-000032, [2023] EWHC 529 (Pat) (Mar. 16, 2023) (Mellor, J.)

InterDigital owns a portfolio of standard essential patents (SEPs) that have been declared essential to the European Telecommunications Standard Institute’s (ETSI) 3G, 4G and 5G cellular technology standards. InterDigital sought to license the SEPs to Lenovo, which implements these cellular standards in its mobile phones, tablets and PCs. After the parties could not agree on the terms under which Lenovo should take a license, InterDigital filed a lawsuit. The High Court held several technical trials in which it found that Lenovo infringed certain of the patents.

Based on the result of the technical trials, the High Court determined that InterDigital had established the right to a FRAND determination of its portfolio. The parties presented two issues regarding FRAND. The first issue was whether the InterDigital license offer was FRAND, and if not, what terms would be FRAND for a license to Lenovo of the InterDigital patent portfolio. The second issue was whether InterDigital was entitled to an injunction based on the parties’ negotiation conduct, including whether InterDigital acted as a willing licensor and whether Lenovo acted as a willing licensee.

The High Court concluded that Lenovo should pay InterDigital a FRAND rate of $0.175 per cellular unit for a worldwide license to InterDigital’s portfolio. The $0.175 rate yields a lump sum payment of $138.7 million for sales from 2007 to the end of 2023. The Court’s FRAND rate determination was closer to Lenovo’s offered rate of $0.16/unit than to InterDigital’s demand of $0.498/unit.

In determining the appropriate FRAND rate, the High Court analyzed whether InterDigital’s proposed rate was comparable to the rate in InterDigital’s other license agreements for SEPs. InterDigital argued that its license offer to Lenovo was consistent with “program rates” under which it had already licensed its SEPs to other companies. The Court, however, rejected InterDigital’s program rates as comparable because the other licenses included volume discounts ranging from 60% to 80% of InterDigital’s program rate. InterDigital argued that Lenovo was not entitled to the same type of steep volume discount and, therefore, those licenses with discounts applied were not comparable licenses for Lenovo. The Court disagreed, finding that the volume discounts applied to those licenses “do not have any economic or other justification” and that their primary purpose was to “shore up InterDigital’s chosen program rates.” The Court further observed that the primary effect of the volume discount in the other licenses was to discriminate against smaller licensees, which is exactly what FRAND is supposed to avoid.

InterDigital tried to bolster its argument that its program rate was FRAND by applying a top-down cross-check. The top-down approach starts with the cumulative value of all royalties that should be paid on FRAND [...]

Continue Reading

Supplier Can’t Complain when SEP Holder Refuses to License

by Amol Parikh | Mar 3, 2022 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined that an automotive parts supplier did not have constitutional standing to pursue an antitrust lawsuit against standard essential patent (SEP) owners that refused to directly license SEPs to the supplier on fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) terms. Continental Automotive Systems, Inc. v. Avanci, LLC et al., Case No. 20-11032 (5th Cir. Feb. 28, 2022) (Stewart, Ho, Engelhardt, JJ.)

Continental supplies telematic control units that are embedded in connected cars. The telematic control units provide wireless connectivity using 2G, 3G and 4G cellular standards, allowing users to stream music, navigate to destinations and call for emergency assistance directly from cars. Nokia, PanOptis, and Sharp all claim to own or license SEPs essential to the 2G, 3G, and 4G cellular standards set by standard-setting organizations (SSO). In order to facilitate patent licensing, these individual patent holders (along with many others) entered into an agreement with Avanci, which acts as a licensing agent for the patent holders. Under the agreement, Avanci may sell patent licenses only to car manufacturers or original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), both of which are downstream from Continental in the supply chain. The agreement permits the patent holders to individually license their SEPs to suppliers such as Continental at FRAND rates.

Continental unsuccessfully sought a license from Avanci at FRAND rates. According to Avanci, licenses were available to Continental on FRAND terms from individual SEP holders, and Continental did not need SEP licenses since Avanci sells licenses to OEMs that incorporate Continental’s products. Continental sued Avanci and the individual patent holders, arguing that Avanci’s refusal to sell a license to Continental on FRAND terms constituted anticompetitive conduct in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.

Avanci moved to dismiss the complaint. As to the threshold issue of constitutional standing, Continental presented two theories of injury that it asserted conferred standing. Continental’s first theory of injury was that if Avanci and the individual patent holders succeeded in licensing the OEMs at non-FRAND rates, the royalties owed on those licenses might be passed through to Continental via indemnity agreements. Continental’s second theory of injury was that Avanci and the individual patent holders declined to provide Continental with a license on FRAND terms, and this denial of property was sufficient injury to establish standing. The district court rejected Continental’s first theory but accepted the second theory, finding that Continental’s unsuccessful attempts to obtain licenses on FRAND terms was an injury that conferred constitutional standing. Even though the district court found that Continental had constitutional standing, it dismissed Continental’s Sherman Act claims for lack of antitrust standing and for failure to plausibly plead certain elements. Continental appealed.

The Fifth Circuit concluded that neither of Continental’s theories of injury were sufficient to confer constitutional standing. As to the first alleged injury, the Court agreed with the district court and found that was too speculative since it depended on several layers of decisions by the OEMs—namely, decisions to accept non-FRAND licenses and then invoke indemnification rights against [...]

Continue Reading

Fifth Circuit Affirms Jury Verdict on Willing Licensee FRAND Commitment

by Lisa P. Rumin and Anthony S. Ferrara | Sep 30, 2021 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed a jury verdict finding that a standard essential patent (SEP) owner did not breach its commitment to license its SEPs on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms. The ruling establishes not only that willing licensee disputes can be subject to jury adjudication, but also that in willing licensee disputes, traditional patent damages factors such as apportionment are not required, since willing licensee disputes are based in contract law rather than patent law. HTC Corp. et al. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson et al., Case No. 19-40566 (5th Cir. Aug. 31, 2021) (Elrod, J.) The panel concluded that the district court properly instructed the jury on the meaning of FRAND and did not err in granting a post-trial declaratory judgment in the SEP owner’s favor.

Ericsson holds patents that are essential to the 2G, 3G, 4G and WLAN wireless communication standards and made a commitment to the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) to license those SEPs on FRAND terms. In order to minimize the risk of anticompetitive behavior, standards setting organizations such as ETSI may exclude patented technology from their standards if an SEP holder does not commit to license the patent on FRAND terms.

HTC makes smartphones that implement Ericsson’s SEPs. In 2016, Ericsson and HTC were engaged in negotiations to renew their third licensing agreement. Negotiations broke down, and HTC filed a lawsuit alleging that Ericsson breached its commitment to provide a license on FRAND terms. HTC argued that Ericsson’s royalty rate should be based on the smallest salable patent-practicing unit (SSPPU) of HTC’s smartphones—specifically, the baseband processor component—rather than the net sales price of the entire end-user device. Ericsson counterclaimed for a declaration that it had complied with its FRAND obligation. Ericsson argued that its offer to HTC was fair and reasonable because its licenses to other similarly situated device makers were also based on the value of the end-user product, not just the smallest salable unit. After an earlier Fifth Circuit decision (applying French law) determined that the ETSI intellectual property rights policy contained no express language requiring SEP holders to base royalties on the SSPPU. The Court also noted that the prevailing industry standard has been to base FRAND licenses on the end-user device. Thus, a “reasonable person” would not interpret Ericsson’s FRAND commitment to mean that it must base its SEP royalties on the SSPPU.

The case proceeded to trial, and a Texas jury found that Ericsson did not breach its FRAND commitment. The district court also granted a declaratory judgment in Ericsson’s favor following trial, concluding that Ericsson’s offers were FRAND. HTC appealed to the Fifth Circuit, challenging the district court’s exclusion of several of its proposed jury instructions and the declaratory judgment in Ericsson’s favor. At trial, the district court had instructed the jury that whether a license is FRAND “will depend on the totality of the particular facts and circumstances,” and that “there is no fixed or required methodology for setting or calculating [...]

Continue Reading

Standard Essential Patent Licensing Practices Do Not Violate Antitrust Laws

by Anthony S. Ferrara and Lisa P. Rumin | Aug 26, 2020 | Antitrust

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated a district court decision that found Qualcomm’s patent licensing practices violate antitrust laws and reversed a permanent, worldwide injunction against several of Qualcomm’s business practices. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Qualcomm Inc., Case No. 19-16122 (9th Cir. Aug. 11, 2020) (C.J. Callahan).

Qualcomm sells modem chips that are incorporated into cellular handsets (i.e., smartphones) made by companies such as Samsung, Huawai, Apple and others. Qualcomm also holds a number of standard essential patents (SEPs) implemented by modem chips that are essential to cellular communication standards. A core part of Qualcomm’s business model is that it only licenses its SEPs to smartphone makers, i.e., its original equipment manufacturer (OEM) customers, not to rival modem chip suppliers—even though its rivals’ chips practice Qualcomm’s SEPs. Doing this allows Qualcomm to maximize its profits by charging royalty rates based on the value of the end-product smartphones rather than just the modem chip. In addition, Qualcomm will not supply modem chips to OEM customers unless they first pay to license Qualcomm’s SEPs (“no license, no chips”). OEMs must pay this licensing fee to Qualcomm even if they source chips from another supplier.

In January 2017, the FTC filed suit against Qualcomm in the Northern District of California, alleging that Qualcomm’s licensing practices violate the antitrust laws and unfairly protect its monopoly power as a modem chip supplier. Following a two-week bench trial, the district court issued a lengthy opinion ruling in favor of the FTC and ordering extensive injunctive relief requiring Qualcomm to change its business practices. The court made a number of findings, including: (1) Qualcomm’s refusal to license its SEPs to rival chipmakers violates both its FRAND commitments to standard-setting organizations (SSOs) and an antitrust duty to deal; (2) Qualcomm’s royalty rates for its SEPs are unreasonably high because they are based on the value of end products and (3) Qualcomm’s royalties, in conjunction with its “no license, no chips” policy, imposes an anticompetitive “surcharge” on the price of its rivals’ chips. Qualcomm appealed.

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision in its entirety and vacated the injunctive relief which had been ordered, finding that Qualcomm’s licensing practices amount to “hypercompetitive,” not anticompetitive, behavior. The Court recognized that Qualcomm’s licensing practices are designed to maximize its profits, but concluded that they do not unfairly distort competition within the modem chip markets. According to the Court, the district court improperly extended the reach of the antitrust laws in issuing its injunction.

The Ninth Circuit addressed and rejected each of the district court’s findings. First, the Court concluded that Qualcomm does not have an antitrust “duty to deal” with its rival chipmakers. The Court emphasized that the Supreme Court has recognized only a narrow exception to the general rule that a business need not deal with its competitors, and concluded that the exception was not met here. The Court also concluded that whether Qualcomm breached a FRAND commitment to license its SEPs to rivals was [...]

Continue Reading

German Competition Authority Files Amicus Brief in SEP Litigation

by Dr. Henrik Holzapfel | Jul 1, 2020 | Patents

In 2019, Nokia filed a series of patent infringement complaints against Daimler before several German courts. Nokia alleged that connected cars made by Daimler infringed Nokia’s patents. Nokia considered the relevant patents as essential for certain wireless communication standards. Nokia v. Daimler, Case No. 2 O 34/19 (Mannheim District Court). On 18 June 2020, the litigation took a surprising turn: The German competition authority, the Federal Cartel Office (FCO), filed an amicus curiae brief with the relevant patent infringement courts (FCO docket no. P-66/20). (more…)

District Court Violated Ericsson’s Right to Trial by Jury in Setting FRAND Rate

by Anthony S. Ferrara | Jan 8, 2020 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated a district court decision setting license rates for standard-essential patents (SEPs), holding that the district court deprived the patent owner of its constitutional right to trial by jury. TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings Ltd. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, Case Nos. 8-1363, -1732 (Fed. Cir., Dec. 5, 2019) (Chen, J.).

Ericsson holds a number of patents that are essential to the 2G, 3G and 4G mobile communications standards set by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI). As a member of ETSI, Ericsson has agreed to license its SEPs to implementers of the ETSI standards on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms. TCL manufactures mobile devices that implement the ETSI standards.

(more…)