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First Amendment

Digital Rights, Digital Wrongs: The DMCA Lives On

by Keval Amin | Aug 15, 2024 | Copyrights

The US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s (DMCA) laws against bypassing digital locks and distributing circumvention tools are designed to prevent piracy and are not unconstitutionally broad. Matthew D. Green, et al. v. United States Department of Justice, et al., Case No. 23-5159 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 2, 2024) (Pillard, Henderson, Millett, JJ.)

As technology has advanced, access to copyrighted content has expanded dramatically, with billions of people now able to stream or download content instantly. In response to this digital revolution, Congress enacted the DMCA 26 years ago to address the growing threat of digital piracy and unauthorized access to copyrighted materials online. The DMCA reinforces the use of technological protection measures, or “digital walls,” to secure copyrighted works from unauthorized access. The DMCA’s anticircumvention provision prohibits bypassing these technological protections, treating such acts as akin to digital trespassing.

Matthew Green, a computer science professor at Johns Hopkins University, and Andrew Huang, a tech inventor, challenged the constitutionality of key sections of the DMCA. They argued that the DMCA’s anticircumvention and antitrafficking provisions, which prohibit the circumvention of technological protections on copyrighted works and the distribution of circumvention tools, violated their First Amendment rights. They claimed that these provisions excessively restricted their ability to engage in lawful speech, particularly in the context of fair use.

While the DMCA leaves the fair use defense intact, Green and Huang argued that the DMCA unduly restricts fair use, particularly when the DMCA prohibits activities that would otherwise be considered lawful under copyright law. The district court dismissed Green and Huang’s facial First Amendment challenges, finding that they had not demonstrated that § 1201 of the DMCA overwhelmingly restricted protected speech to the extent that it warranted facial invalidation. Green and Huang appealed.

The DC Circuit explained that the DMCA’s anticircumvention provisions primarily target conduct – specifically, the act of bypassing digital protections – rather than expression. The Court noted that such conduct is not inherently expressive and does not typically implicate the First Amendment. The Court also found that the DMCA’s anticircumvention provisions serve a legitimate and extensive purpose in preventing piracy. While Green and Huang cited examples of potential overreach, such as a teacher circumventing a DVD’s encryption for classroom use, the Court explained that these examples did not convincingly demonstrate that the statute’s unconstitutional applications outweighed its lawful ones. The Court further explained that existing exemptions, such as those allowing circumvention for educational purposes, reduce the burden on free speech.

Green and Huang also argued that § 1201(a) imposes an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech by requiring fair users to obtain exemptions from the Librarian of Congress before circumventing technological protections. They likened this process to a speech-licensing regime, claiming that it invites content and viewpoint discrimination without sufficient judicial oversight. However, the DC Circuit rejected this claim, ruling that the DMCA’s exemption process is not a prior restraint on speech. The Court reiterated and emphasized that § 1201(a) regulates conduct, [...]

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First Amendment Bowled Over by Lanham Act – Again

by Anisa Noorassa | Jan 25, 2024 | Trademarks

In response to the Supreme Court of the United States’ ruling in Jack Daniel’s, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reconsidered its 2022 decision in Punchbowl v. AJ Press and determined that Jack Daniel’s reset prior Ninth Circuit precedents regarding the interaction of First Amendment rights and the Lanham Act. The Ninth Circuit reversed its original decision and remanded the case to the district court to conduct a likelihood of confusion analysis under Lanham Act precedent. Punchbowl, Inc. v. AJ Press, LLC, Case No. 21-55881 (9th Cir. Jan. 12, 2024) (Owens, Bress, Fitzwater, JJ.)

The Ninth Circuit had previously held that despite use of the PUNCHBOWL trademark for a news service covering politics, AJ Press was not subject to liability under the Lanham Act. The PUNCHBOWL mark was registered by Punchbowl, Inc., a website specializing in online communications “with a focus on celebrations, holidays, events and memory making.” The Ninth Circuit’s original decision was based on the Court’s understanding of the Rogers test, which protected creative use of trademarks if the defendant could “make a threshold legal showing that its allegedly infringing use is part of an expressive work protected by the First Amendment.” This test was easily met if the artistic relevance of the trademark’s use was “above zero.” Shortly after the Ninth Circuit issued its initial decision, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Jack Daniel’s Properties v. VIP Products, a case that addressed the same basic underlying precedent.

In its Jack Daniel’s decision, the Supreme Court held that the Rogers test exception to the Lanham Act did not apply when the expressive mark was used as a mark. The Supreme Court therefore drew a line between VIP’s use of “Bad Spaniels,” a direct play on “Jack Daniel’s” that was an expressive use of a mark as a mark, and use of a mark that was expressive but not used as a trademark. The Supreme Court’s ruling prompted the Ninth Circuit to reconsider its original decision in Punchbowl.

In its new decision, the Ninth Circuit, applying the rule of Jack Daniel’s, held that the Rogers test did not apply and that AJ Press’s use of the mark “Punchbowl” was not excepted from the Lanham Act as protected First Amendment expression. Rather, AJ Press’s use of “Punchbowl” was as a mark identifying its news service.

The Ninth Circuit stressed that this was not an automatic victory for Punchbowl, however. The Ninth Circuit instructed the district court on remand to proceed with a likelihood-of-confusion analysis test under the Lanham Act – an analysis that would consider many of the factors (such as the expressive nature of the trademark’s use) that had been relevant to the application of the Rogers test.

Parody of Iconic Sneaker Isn’t Entitled to Heightened First Amendment Protection

by Karen Gover | Dec 14, 2023 | Trademarks

The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction enjoining use of a trademark and trade dress associated with an iconic sneaker design over a First Amendment artistic expression defense. Vans, Inc. v. MSCHF Product Studio, Inc., Case No. 22-1006 (2d Cir. Dec. 5, 2023) (per curiam). This case is the first time a federal appeals court has applied the Supreme Court of the United States’ recent decision in Jack Daniel’s v. VIP Products, which clarified when heightened First Amendment protections apply to expressive uses of another’s trademark and trade dress.

MSCHF Product Studio is a Brooklyn-based art collective known for provocative works that critique consumer culture. It sells its works in limited releases during prescribed sales periods called “drops.” It promoted and sold a shoe called the “Wavy Baby,” which is a distorted, corrugated version of the iconic black-and-white Vans Old Skool sneaker. MSCHF claimed that the product was a commentary on consumerism in sneakerhead culture and that the Wavy Baby shoes were not meant to be worn but were instead “collectible work[s] of art.”

MSCHF promoted the shoes using the musician Tyga. Vans sent MSCHF a cease-and-desist letter and a week later filed a six-count complaint in federal court, including a claim for trademark infringement under the Lanham Act. The following day, Vans filed a motion for a temporary restraining order, seeking to have the court enjoin the sale of the Wavy Baby shoes. Nevertheless, MSCHF proceeded with its pre-planned drop of the Wavy Baby sneakers and sold 4,306 pairs of the Wavy Baby in one hour.

About a week later, after oral argument on the temporary restraining order (TRO) motion, the district court granted Vans’s motion. The district court concluded that Vans would likely prevail in showing a likelihood of consumer confusion and rejected MSCHF’s contention that the Wavy Baby was entitled to special First Amendment protections because it was an artistic parody. MSCHF appealed.

The Second Circuit held the appeal in abeyance pending the Supreme Court’s Jack Daniel’s decision. In that case, Jack Daniel’s sued the maker of a squeaky dog toy that resembled the iconic whiskey bottle and used puns involving dog excrement in place of the actual language of the Jack Daniel’s label. In a unanimous decision, the Court clarified that special First Amendment protections (as used in the Rogers test for expressive works that incorporate another’s trademark) do not apply when a trademark is used as a source indicator—that is, “as a mark.”

The Second Circuit concluded that the Jack Daniel’s case “forecloses MSCHF’s argument that Wavy Baby’s parodic message merits higher First Amendment scrutiny” because, even though the product is a parody, the Rogers test does not apply if the mark is also used as a source identifier. The Second Circuit drew a direct parallel between Wavy Baby and the punning dog toy in the Jack Daniel’s case, noting that in both cases the infringing product evoked the protected trademark and [...]

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“TRUMP TOO SMALL” Trademark Decision Heads to Supreme Court

by Sarah Bro | Jun 15, 2023 | Cert Alert, Trademarks

The Supreme Court agreed to review the US Patent & Trademark Office’s (PTO) challenge to a February 2022 ruling by the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. In the ruling at issue, the Federal Circuit held that applying Sec. 2(c) of the Lanham Act (which bars registration of a trademark that consists of or comprises a name of a particular living individual without their written consent) may unconstitutionally restrict free speech in violation of the First Amendment in certain instances. Vidal v. Elster, Docket No. 22-704 (Supr. Ct., June 5, 2023).

In 2018, Steve Elster filed an application to register the mark TRUMP TOO SMALL for use on t-shirts, in reference to a 2016 Republican presidential primary debate exchange between then-candidate Donald Trump and Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL). The PTO examining attorney and subsequently the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board refused registration of the mark on grounds that it clearly referred to former President Trump, and that Elster did not have written consent to use former President Trump’s name, in violation of Sec. 2(c) of the Lanham Act. On Elster’s appeal, the Federal Circuit ruled that the Board’s refusal to register the trademark TRUMP TOO SMALL for use on t-shirts involved content-based discrimination that was not justified by a compelling or substantial government interest.

Following PTO Director Vidal’s January 2023 petition for a writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court granted cert and will consider whether the First Amendment allows content-based but viewpoint-neutral restrictions on which trademarks may be registered—and in this case, the PTO’s restriction on marks that consist of or comprise a name identifying a particular living individual (such as former President Donald Trump) except by their written consent.

The issue on which cert was granted: Whether the refusal to register a trademark under 15 U.S.C. § 1052(c) violates the free speech clause of the First Amendment when the mark contains criticism of a government official or public figure.

On the Border of Art and Trademark: First Amendment Trumps the Lanham Act

by Anisa Noorassa | Dec 8, 2022 | Trademarks

The US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit weighed trademark rights against free speech considerations and found that the First Amendment protected use of an artistic work that was not deliberately misleading. MGFB Properties Inc. et al. v. 495 Productions Holdings LLC et al., Case No. 21-13458 (11th Cir. Nov. 29, 2022) (Luck, Brasher, Hull, JJ.) (Brasher, J., concurring).

The suit was brought by MGFB Properties, Flora-Bama Management and Flora-Bama Old S.A.L.T.S. (collectively, the plaintiffs). The plaintiffs own and operate the Flora-Bama Lounge, Package and Oyster Bar on the Florida-Alabama border. The lounge has been in business since 1964 and is well known in the region. The plaintiffs registered their trademark FLORA-BAMA in 2013.

Viacom and 495 Productions (collectively, the defendants) produce reality television series, such as the hit 2009 series Jersey Shore. In light of Jersey Shore’s success, the defendants produced several spinoffs. In 2016 the defendants decided to develop a new spinoff based on “southern beach culture” and chose the term “Floribama” to describe “relaxing Florida beaches with the down-home Southern vibe of Alabama.” The defendants were aware of the name’s connection to the Florabama Lounge but used the term regardless to identify a specific stretch of the Gulf Coast (the Florida and Alabama coasts) and inserted dialogue into the show to explain the term. The show’s logo emphasized its connection to the Jersey Shore franchise:

The plaintiffs argued that the defendants’ use of “Floribama” was a violation of the Lanham Act and caused unfair confusion and damage to their brand. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. Plaintiffs appealed.

The Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court’s judgment that the defendants’ First Amendment rights as the creators of an artistic work outweighed the plaintiffs’ interest in their trademark and in avoiding confusion around their brand: “[c]reative works of artistic expression are firmly ensconced within the protections of the First Amendment.” In reaching its outcome, the Court applied the 1989 Rogers v. Grimaldi test.

Under the first prong of the Rogers test, “an artistically expressive use of a trademark will not violate the Lanham Act unless the use of the mark has no artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever.” Here, the Eleventh Circuit found that the defendants’ use of the term “Floribama” to describe the geographic area featured in Floribama Shore and the subculture of that region satisfied the first element of the Rogers test. The Court held that it was sufficient for the defendants’ use of “Floribama” to be relevant to their show, even if the term was not “necessary” to production of the show.

Under the second prong of the Rogers test, the Eleventh Circuit found that the defendants’ use of “Floribama” was not explicitly misleading “as to the source or content of the work” such [...]

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First Amendment Punches Out Alleged Lanham Act Violation

by Anisa Noorassa | Nov 29, 2022 | Trademarks

Addressing the balance between trademark rights under the Lanham Act and the First Amendment right to protected expression, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court judgment finding that the defendant’s use of the term “Punchbowl” was not a Lanham Act violation because it was expressive and not misleading as to its source. Punchbowl, Inc. v. AJ Press, LLC, Case No. 21-55881 (9th Cir. Nov. 14, 2022) (Ownes, Bress, Fitzwater, JJ.)

Punchbowl is an online communications company that provides “online events and celebration invitations and greeting cards” as part of its subscription-based service. Punchbowl has used the mark Punchbowl® since 2006 and the mark was registered with the US Patent & Trademark Office in 2013. Punchbowl describes itself as “The Gold Standard in Online Invitations & Greeting Cards,” and uses the logo of a punch bowl ladle:

Punchbowl filed suit claiming that AJ Press infringed on Punchbowl’s mark through its subscription-based online news publication Punchbowl News. Punchbowl News covers “insider” political topics and reports on events in Washington, DC, and derives its name from the use of the term “punchbowl” by the Secret Service to refer to the US Capitol building. As such, the Punchbowl News logo comprises of an overturned image of the US Capitol filled with purple punch and the slogan “Power. People. Politics.”

AJ Press argued that its use of the term “Punchbowl” was protected under the First Amendment and did not violate the Lanham Act. The district court granted summary judgment to AJ Press, concluding that its use of the name “Punchbowl” did not give rise to liability because it constituted protected expression and was not explicitly misleading as to its source. Punchbowl appealed.

Traditionally, the likelihood of confusion test is used for claims brought under the Lanham Act. When artistic expression is at issue, however, that test fails to account for the full weight of the public’s interest in free expression. If the product involved is an expressive work, courts generally apply a gateway test, grounded in background First Amendment concerns, to determine whether the Lanham Act applies. One approach was set forth in the Second Circuit’s 1989 decision in Rogers v. Grimaldi to determine whether First Amendment concerns were strong enough to outweigh the need to protect a mark. The Rogers test requires the defendant to first “make a threshold legal showing that its allegedly infringing use is part of an expressive work protected by the First Amendment.” Once this threshold is satisfied, the Lanham Act will not apply unless the plaintiff can establish that “the defendant’s use of the mark (1) is not artistically relevant to the work or (2) explicitly misleads consumers as to the source or the content of the work.”

The [...]

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Supreme Court to Consider First Amendment Protection for Parody Dog Toy

by Eleanor B. Atkins | Nov 29, 2022 | Cert Alert, Trademarks

The Supreme Court of the United States has agreed to consider the scope of protection afforded by the First Amendment to commercial parody products that feature the unauthorized use of another party’s trademark(s). Jack Daniel’s Properties, Inc. v. VIP Products LLC, Case No. 22-148 (Supr. Ct. Nov. 21, 2022) (certiorari granted). The questions presented are as follows:

Whether humorous use of another’s trademark as one’s own on a commercial product is subject to the Lanham Act’s traditional likelihood-of-confusion analysis, or instead receives heightened First Amendment protection from trademark-infringement claims.
Whether humorous use of another’s mark as one’s own on a commercial product is “noncommercial” under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(C), thus barring as a matter of law a claim of dilution by tarnishment under the Trademark Dilution Revision Act.

This is the second time Jack Daniel’s has filed a petition for certiorari in connection with this case. The Supreme Court first considered the matter in January 2021, following the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s decision to vacate and remand the district court’s finding of trademark infringement, reverse the judgment on dilution and uphold the validity of Jack Daniel’s trademark and trade dress rights.

The case then returned to the district court, which granted summary judgment to VIP Products. The Ninth Circuit affirmed and then Jack Daniel’s filed its second petition for certiorari.

The Supreme Court will seek to settle the long-standing split amongst the US Courts of Appeal regarding the proper analysis for parody in trademark infringement and dilution claims and the scope of protection afforded to it via the First Amendment.

“TRUMP TOO SMALL” Trademark Decision Leaves Big Questions

by Sarah Bro | Mar 10, 2022 | Trademarks

Revisiting jurisprudence touching on the Lanham Act and the First Amendment from the Supreme Court’s decisions in Matal v. Tam and Iancu v. Brunetti, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that applying Sec. 2(c) of the Lanham Act (which bars registration of a trademark that consists of or comprises a name of a particular living individual without their written consent) may, in certain instances, unconstitutionally restrict free speech in violation of the First Amendment. In this instance, the Federal Circuit found that the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board’s (Board) refusal to register the trademark “TRUMP TOO SMALL” for use on t-shirts involved content-based discrimination that was not justified by a compelling or substantial government interest. In re: Steve Elster, Case No. 20-2205 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 24, 2022) (Dyk, Taranto, Chen, JJ.)

Steve Elster filed a US trademark application in 2018 for the mark “TRUMP TOO SMALL” (a reference to a 2016 Republican presidential primary debate exchange between then- candidate Donald Trump and Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL)) for use on shirts. The US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) examining attorney, and subsequently the Board, refused registration of the mark on grounds that it clearly referred to former President Trump, and that Elster did not have written consent to use former President Trump’s name in violation of Sec. 2(c) of the Lanham Act. Sec. 2(c) requires such consent when a trademark identifies a “particular living individual.” Elster argued that his trademark aimed to convey that some features of former President Trump and his policies were diminutive and appealed the Board’s holding that Sec. 2(c) is narrowly tailored to advance two compelling government interests, namely, protecting an individual’s rights of privacy and publicity and protecting consumers against source deception.

The Federal Circuit started with a brief primer on relatively recent decisions in which the Supreme Court found certain provisions of Sec. 2(a) to be improper viewpoint discrimination because they barred registration of trademarks that were disparaging or comprised of immoral or scandalous matter. The Federal Circuit found that while neither Tam nor Brunetti resolved Elster’s appeal pertaining to Sec. 2(c), the cases did establish that a trademark represents private, not government, speech entitled to some form of First Amendment protection, and that denying a trademark registration is akin to the government disfavoring the speech being regulated. The Court then examined whether Sec. 2(c) could legally disadvantage the specific “TRUMP TOO SMALL” speech at issue in Elster’s case, and whether the government has an interest in limiting speech on privacy or publicity grounds if that speech involves criticism of government officials.

The Federal Circuit did not decide the matter on whether a trademark is a government subsidy, avoiding the somewhat varying opinions of the Supreme Court on that issue. Instead, the Federal Circuit found that Elster’s mark constituted speech by a private party for which the registration restriction must be tested by the First Amendment. Regardless of whether strict or intermediate scrutiny is applied [...]

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Don’t Be So Dramatic: True Crime Docudrama Doesn’t Violate Right of Privacy

by Eleanor B. Atkins | Jul 29, 2021 | Uncategorized

Addressing the tension between the First Amendment and the right to privacy under New York law, the New York Supreme Court Appellate Division, Third Department, unanimously held that despite being partially fictionalized, a movie based on true events did not violate the privacy rights of the film’s subjects. Porco v. Lifetime Entertainment Services, LLC, Case No. 531681 NY Supr. Ct, Appellate Div. Third Judicial Dept, June 24, 2021) (Fitzgerald, J.)

Christopher Porco was tried and convicted for the murder of his father and attempted murder of his mother in 2011. Lifetime Entertainment created a movie inspired by the events titled, Romeo Killer: The Chris Porco Story. Porco and his mother sued to stop the broadcast, alleging that the film (and related promotional materials) violated their rights of privacy under New York law.

Both parties moved for summary judgment on liability, with Lifetime arguing that the movie did not violate the plaintiffs’ right to privacy “because it depicted newsworthy events to which the use of their names was reasonably related.” The New York Supreme Court denied both motions, finding that questions of fact remained as to whether the depiction of events was “so materially and substantially fictitious as to give rise to liability.” The parties cross-appealed.

New York’s statutory right of privacy (Civil Rights Law §§ 50 and 51) prohibits the unauthorized use of “a living person’s name, portrait or picture . . . for advertising or trade purposes.” On appeal, the Court recognized the tension with the First Amendment, as the right of privacy does not prohibit reporting on “newsworthy events or matters of public interest, even if the reports were produced with profit in mind.” This “newsworthiness exception” is inapplicable, however, in situations where the “newsworthy or public interest aspect . . . is merely incidental to its commercial purpose” or “where the purported aim of the work is to provide biographical information of obvious public interest, but the content is substantially fictionalized.”

Porco argued that the film, a docudrama, fell within the latter category. The New York Supreme Court noted that the events depicted were “indisputably” newsworthy, but Porco contended that the movie was an “invented biography” that had “no purpose at all beyond the actionable one of exploiting their names and likenesses for profits.” The Court held that the film did not violate Porco’s rights of privacy, despite containing some fictionalizations, for two reasons. First, based on a review of materials such as the real police and media interviews with Porco and excerpts from his criminal trial, the Court concluded that the film was “broadly accurate.” Second, the film did not mislead viewers or present itself as wholly truthful, because it included the statement “based on a true story” at the beginning of the film and stated at the end that it was a “dramatization in which some names have been changed, some characters are composites and certain other characters and events have been fictionalized.” Accordingly, the Court reversed the lower court’s denial of Lifetime’s motion for [...]

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