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Federal Circuit Tosses Shaw: IPR Estoppel Applies to All Grounds That Reasonably Could Have Been Raised

March 2022 Update: The Federal Circuit has issued an errata to this decision. Read about it here.

Addressing inter partes review (IPR) estoppel after the Supreme Court of the United States’ 2018 decision in SAS Institute, Inc. v. Iancu, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit overruled its decision in Shaw Industries Group v. Automated Creel Systems, stating that the only plausible reading of 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) estops a party from raising all claims and grounds that reasonably could have been included in the party’s petition for IPR. The Court also rejected the district court’s two-tier damages model as contrary to customary patent damages calculations. California Institute of Technology v. Broadcom Limited, Case Nos. 20-2222; 21-1527 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 4, 2022) (Lourie, Linn, Dyk, JJ.) (Dyk, J., dissenting in part).

Background

California Institute of Technology (Caltech) filed suit against Broadcom and Apple, alleging patent infringement directed to the generation and repetition of information in a wireless data transmission system. Wireless transmission systems generally use data repetition so that the transmitted information may be decoded even when data loss occurs. The patented circuitry discloses a form of irregular data repetition in which portions of the information bits may be repeated a varying number of times.

Apple filed multiple IPR petitions challenging the validity of the claims at issue. The Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board) concluded in all cases that Apple failed to show that the challenged claims were unpatentable as obvious. At the district court, Apple and Broadcom raised new arguments of obviousness not asserted in the IPR proceedings. The district court granted Caltech’s motion for summary judgment of no invalidity, precluding Apple and Broadcom from raising arguments at trial that they reasonably could have raised in their IPR petitions.

At trial, the district court instructed the jury that “repeat” means “generation of additional bits, where generation can include, for example, duplication or reuse of bits.” Apple and Broadcom argued that the Broadcom chips (which were integrated into Apple devices) did not infringe the asserted claims because they did not repeat information at all. With respect to one of the asserted patents, the district court did not provide a jury instruction relating to its construction that the claim language “information bits appear in a variable number of subsets” requires irregular information bit repetition. The jury found infringement of all asserted claims. Apple and Broadcom filed post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) and a new trial, both of which the district court denied.

The district court adopted Caltech’s proposed two-tier damages theory, explaining that Broadcom and Apple’s products were different and therefore possessed different values simply because they were “different companies at different levels in the supply chain.” The district court ultimately entered judgment against Broadcom for $288 million and against Apple for $885 million. Broadcom and Apple appealed.

The Appeal

Broadcom and Apple argued that the district court’s construction of “repeat” was inconsistent with the claim language and specification. The Federal Circuit [...]

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This .SUCKS: Trademark Applications for Identical Characters Is a No-Go

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (Board) decision affirming the US Patent and Trademark Office’s (PTO) refusal to register two trademark applications for “.SUCKS.” In Re: Vox Populi Registry Ltd., Case No. 21-1496 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 2, 2022) (Lourie, Dyk, Stoll, JJ.)

Vox is a domain registry operator that maintains the master database of all domain names registered in each top-level domain. Vox filed two trademark applications for identical characters, one as a standard character and the other as a stylized form of .SUCKS, as shown below.

The PTO refused Vox’s applications on the grounds that, when used in connection with the domain services, each failed to function as a trademark. Vox appealed to the Board. The Board concluded that .SUCKS, whether as a standard mark or in the stylized form, would not be perceived as a source identifier. Vox appealed the Board’s decision only with respect to the stylized form of .SUCKS.

On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that although Vox did not appeal the rejection of the standard character application, it spent much of its opening brief arguing that the standard character functions as a mark. As such, the Court reviewed the Board’s decision with respect to the standard character mark .SUCKS under the substantial evidence standard. Substantial evidence “means only such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” The Court found that substantial evidence supported the Board’s finding that consumers will view .SUCKS as only a non-source identifying part of a domain name, rather than as a trademark. The Court cited evidence reviewed by the Board, including Vox’s website, online articles and advertisements showing that .SUCKS refers to a product rather than as an identifiable provider or service. Ultimately, the Court found that the Board reasonably weighed the evidence.

The Federal Circuit next addressed the question of whether the stylized design of .SUCKS is registerable. The Court found no error in the Board’s analysis of whether the stylized form creates a separate commercial impression, where “all of the characters in the mark are the same height and width and are merely displayed in a font style that was once mandated by the technological limitations of computer screens.” Because the stylized design was not inherently distinctive, the Court rejected Vox’s application, thus affirming the Board’s decision in full.




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IPR Petition Cannot Be Based on Applicant Admitted Prior Art

Addressing the type of prior art that may form the basis of an inter partes review (IPR) proceeding, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated an unpatentability finding based on “applicant admitted prior art” in the challenged patent. Qualcomm Inc. v. Apple Inc., Case Nos. 20-1558, -1559 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 1, 2022) (Taranto, Bryson, Chen, JJ.)

Qualcomm owns a patent directed to integrated circuit devices having power detection circuits for systems with multiple supply voltages. The patent seeks to solve problems associated with stray currents causing level shifters in integrated circuits to trigger input/output devices for transmission, which results in erroneous output signals from the circuit. The patent describes various prior art methods for solving the stray current problem.

Apple filed IPR petitions based on two grounds. The first was based on the combination of four prior art references. In its final written decision, the Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board) found that the combination of these four references did not render the challenged claims invalid. The second ground relied on the applicant admitted prior art disclosed in the specification of the challenged patent in combination with another prior art reference (Majcherczak). During the IPR proceedings, Qualcomm admitted that the combination of the applicant admitted prior art and Majcherczak taught every element of the challenged claims but argued that Apple’s use of the applicant admitted prior art as the basis for an invalidity ground is barred in an IPR proceeding. The Board disagreed with Qualcomm and found the challenged claims unpatentable based on Apple’s second ground. Qualcomm appealed.

Qualcomm argued on appeal that IPR proceedings may only be based on “prior art patents or prior art printed publications” and that 35 U.S.C. § 311(b), which governs IPR proceedings, does not allow for the use of “a patent owner’s admissions” that is contained in non-prior art documents. Apple countered, arguing that any prior art that is contained in “any patent or printed publication, regardless of whether the document itself is prior art, can be used as a basis for [an invalidity] challenge.”

The Federal Circuit agreed with Qualcomm, finding that applicant admitted prior art in a challenged patent may not form the “basis” for an invalidity claim in an IPR proceeding. The Court explained that invalidity grounds advanced in an IPR must be based on patents or printed publications that are themselves prior art to the challenged patent. In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on the 2019 Supreme Court opinion in Return Mail, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., which referred to “patents and printed publications” in the context of § 311(b) as “existing at the time of the patent application.” The Court also looked to its own interpretations of “prior art consisting of patents or printed publications” in the context of ex parte reexamination proceedings under 35 U.S.C. §§ 301 and 303, which “permits the Director to institute a reexamination after ‘consideration of other patents or printed publications.’” Accordingly, the Court vacated the unpatentability [...]

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Establishing Indefiniteness Requires More Than Identifying “Unanswered Questions”

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a district court finding of indefiniteness for focusing solely on the language of the claims and ignoring the specification and prosecution history. Nature Simulation Systems Inc. v. Autodesk, Inc., Case No. 20-2257 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 27, 2022) (Newman, Lourie JJ.) (Dyk, J., dissenting).

Nature Simulations Systems (NSS) asserted two patents against Autodesk that relate to packaging computer-aided data for three-dimensional objects. According to the patents, the claimed methods are improvements upon a “Watson” method known in the prior art. Following a Markman hearing that included technology tutorials from the named inventor and Autodesk’s expert, the district court considered whether two terms were indefinite: “searching neighboring triangles of the last triangle pair that holds the last intersection point” and “modified Watson method.”

The district court found both claim terms indefinite based on “unanswered questions” identified by Autodesk’s expert, who had raised three and four unanswered questions for the “searching” and “modified Watson” terms, respectively. NSS argued that all of the questions were answered in the specification, but the court held that “the claim language, standing alone” did not answer those questions. NSS appealed.

The Federal Circuit found flaws in the district court’s analysis because it adopted an incorrect “unanswered questions” analysis and analyzed the “claim language, standing alone.” The Court confirmed that the test for indefiniteness involves analyzing whether the claims provide reasonable certainty when viewed in light of the specification and prosecution history from the perspective of the person of ordinary skill in the art. Reviewing the specification, the Court observed that the text and figures of the specification of the asserted patents described the searching and intersection point process and the prior art Watson method and noted that the district court “declined to consider information in the specification that was not included in the claims.”

Reviewing the prosecution history, the Court further noted that both terms had been rejected during prosecution for indefiniteness, but that the examiner withdrew both rejections after amendments to the claims provided additional limitations. The Court faulted the district court for giving “no weight to the prosecution history showing the resolution of indefiniteness by adding the designated technologic limitations to the claims.” Instead, “PTO examiners are entitled to appropriate deference as official agency actions[.]” Ultimately, the Court observed that the claims were improvements to known methods, that it was undisputed the claims were described and enabled and that the examiner had held the claims to “define the scope of the patent subject matter.” For these reasons, indefiniteness was not established as a matter of law.

Judge Timothy B. Dyk dissented, stating that “[t]he fact that a patent examiner introduced the indefinite language does not absolve the claims from the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112.” Far from adopting a flawed “unanswered questions” analysis, Judge Dyk instead believed the court’s analysis was detailed and thorough, and that it was performed in view of the specification. Judge Dyk found the majority’s definition of the disputed terms inconsistent [...]

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Nailed It: Expert Must at Least Meet Ordinary Skill Level to Testify from POSITA Perspective

Addressing a US International Trade Commission (ITC) decision finding a § 337 violation as to one patent but no violation as to four other patents, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reiterated that a technical expert must at least meet the level of ordinary skill in the art of the asserted patents to testify from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA), whether for claim construction, validity or infringement. Kyocera Senco Indus. Tools Inc. v. ITC, Case Nos. 20-1046, -2050 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 21, 2022) (Moore, C.J.; Dyk, Cunningham, JJ.)

In 2017, Kyocera filed a complaint at the ITC seeking a § 337 investigation based on infringement allegations for six patents directed to battery-powered gas spring nail guns. The investigation was assigned to the Chief Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who, in the context of a Markman order, adopted Koki Holdings America Ltd.’s uncontested level of skill in the art as including “experience in powered nailer design.” After claim construction, Kyocera dropped one patent from the investigation and went forward with infringement under the doctrine of equivalents as the sole basis for violation for four other patents.

Prior to the evidentiary hearing, Koki moved to exclude Kyocera’s expert’s testimony due to their admission during deposition that they did not have the experience in powered nailer design required by the adopted level of ordinary skill in the art. The Chief ALJ held that the Federal Circuit’s decision in AquaTex Indus. v. Techniche Sols. expressly required that Kyocera’s expert’s testimony be excluded as to infringement under the doctrine of equivalents but permitted the expert to testify as to literal infringement on one patent and on claim construction. After the evidentiary hearing, the Chief ALJ issued an initial determination that relied, in part, on Kyocera’s expert to find a particular element satisfied on the one remaining patent where literal infringement was asserted, but ultimately found no infringement due to other claim limitations. The Chief ALJ’s noninfringement decision as to the one remaining patent was then overturned on review by the full ITC, which found a § 337 violation and issued a limited exclusion order.

Kyocera appealed the Chief ALJ’s exclusion of its expert’s testimony on doctrine of equivalents, and Koki cross-appealed on the Chief ALJ’s decision to allow Kyocera’s expert to testify as to literal infringement and claim construction. The Federal Circuit reversed the ITC’s decision, holding that it was error to permit any infringement testimony from Kyocera’s expert and explaining that a witness must at least have ordinary skill in the art to offer testimony from the perspective of a skilled artisan for claim construction, validity or infringement, whether literal or under the doctrine of equivalents.

Alexander Ott was a member of Koki’s ITC trial team and the Federal Circuit appeal team in this case.




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Power Play: District Court Properly Transferred Bad Faith Anticipatory Suit

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit denied a petition for mandamus relief from an order transferring a first-filed declaratory judgment action from the District of New Jersey to the Western District of Texas, finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in departing from the first-to-file rule. In re Amperex Tech. Ltd., Case No. 22-105 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 14, 2022) (Lourie, Prost, Taranto, JJ.) (per curiam).

Maxell, Ltd. owns patents related to lithium-ion battery technology. To facilitate licensing discussions regarding Maxell’s patents, Maxell and Amperex entered into a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) stipulating that neither party would sue the other for one year. At the end of the one-year period, Amperex proposed extending the NDA because the parties had not reached an agreement. Maxell replied that Amperex’s products infringed Maxell’s patents and cautioned that if “Maxell and Amperex are not able to enter into a licensing agreement by Friday, April 9, 2020, Maxell will be left with no choice but to pursue litigation.”

After some discussion, Maxell’s counsel expressed interest in having another meeting and requested Amperex’s presentation materials in advance. Amperex’s counsel replied, “I will be in touch as soon as I can get the materials,” just two hours before filing a 90-page complaint seeking a declaratory judgment of noninfringement in the US District Court for the District of New Jersey. Two days later, Maxell filed an infringement action in the US District Court for the Western District of Texas. Maxell moved the New Jersey court to decline jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment action or transfer the action to the Western District of Texas. Amperex subsequently moved to enjoin Maxell’s action, and Maxell filed a motion to dismiss or transfer Amperex’s complaint, arguing that the action was brought in bad faith and in anticipation of Maxell’s actions.

Departing from the first-to-file rule, the district court granted Maxell’s transfer request. The district court acknowledged that a “first-filed action is preferred . . . unless considerations of judicial and litigant economy, and the just and effective disposition of disputes, require otherwise.” The district court then addressed several factors, including whether Amperex’s suit was anticipatory and the relative convenience of the forums. The district court concluded that Amperex’s suit was anticipatory because “when one party gives a deadline by which a dispute must be resolved non-judicially and the other party quickly files a declaratory action, the declaratory action is anticipatory.” Moreover, while neither bad faith nor ongoing negotiations are required for a suit to be anticipatory, bad faith actions that “disrupt the non-judicial settlement of disputes or . . . string the defendant along so that the plaintiff can win the race to the courthouse . . . weigh strongly in favor of transfer or dismissal.” Thus, the district court found that Maxell’s clear ultimatum coupled with Amperex’s “feigned cooperation” weighed heavily in Maxell’s favor.

The district court next noted that neither district was more convenient for the parties or witnesses, whereas Amperex’s failure to properly serve Maxell [...]

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Magazine Reload: Claim Construction Error Requires Reversal and Remand

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a district court’s summary judgment ruling based on a claim construction error because nothing in the claims or specification of the asserted patent supported the district court’s overly narrow interpretation of the disputed claim term. Evolusion Concepts, Inc. v. HOC Events, Inc. d/b/a Supertool USA, Case No. 21-1963 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 14, 2021) (Prost, Taranto, Chen, JJ.); Evolusion Concepts, Inc. v. Juggernaut Tactical, Inc., Case No. 21-1987 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 14, 2021) (Fed. Cir. Jan. 14, 2021) (Prost, Taranto, Chen, JJ.).

Evolusion owns a patent directed to a device and method for converting a semi-automatic rifle with a detachable magazine to one with a fixed magazine. A detachable magazine allows a user to fire the weapon until the magazine is depleted, then release the magazine, insert a new magazine and resume firing. In contrast, a fixed magazine can be removed and replaced only by disassembling certain nonmagazine parts of the firearm, which slows the rate of fire. The specification states that firearms with detachable magazines are likely to face increased legal restrictions, noting that bills recently introduced in US Congress would have banned semi-automatic weapons with detachable magazines. The claims of the patents recite, among other limitations, a “magazine catch bar.”

Evolusion sued Juggernaut for infringement. Juggernaut asserted invalidity and noninfringement. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment relating to infringement of the device claims, agreeing that the question of infringement depended entirely on whether the claimed “magazine catch bar” included a factory-installed (OEM) magazine catch bar. The district court concluded that the term “magazine catch bar,” as used in the claims and specification, excluded an OEM magazine catch bar. The court’s conclusion was based primarily on the sentence in the specification that states: “The invention is a permanent fixture added to a semi-automatic firearm by removing the standard OEM magazine catch assembly and installing the invention.” The court reasoned that the “magazine catch bar” of the invention could not be an OEM magazine catch bar since the OEM magazine was one of the components removed to install the invention. Based on the construction, the court concluded that Juggernaut did not literally infringe the patent. The court also found that Juggernaut could not infringe under the doctrine of equivalence because Evolusion had dedicated a factory-installed magazine catch bar to the public by disclosing, but not claiming, this embodiment.

Evolusion also sued Supertool for infringement. When Supertool failed to respond to the complaint, the district court clerk entered a default under Rule 55(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. With the requests for relief not yet adjudicated, Evolusion moved for a “default judgment” under Rule 55(b), but the court denied the motion. In its denial, the court, citing its ruling in the Juggernaut case, stated that Evolusion failed to state a viable claim for infringement against Supertool because its products also required reusing the factory-installed magazine catch bar. Evolusion appealed the Juggernaut and Supertool rulings.

The Federal Circuit reversed the noninfringement [...]

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Silence May Be Sufficient Written Description Disclosure for Negative Limitation

Addressing the issue of written description in a Hatch-Waxman litigation, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that the patent adequately described the claimed daily dose and no-loading dose negative limitation. Novartis Pharms. v. Accord Healthcare Inc., Case No. 21-1070 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 3, 2022) (Linn, O’Malley, JJ.) (Moore, CJ, dissenting).

Novartis’s Gilenya is a 0.5 mg daily dose of fingolimod hydrochloride medication used to treat relapsing remitting multiple sclerosis (RRMS). HEC filed an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) seeking approval to market a generic version of Gilenya. Novartis sued, alleging that HEC’s ANDA infringed a patent directed to methods of treating RRMS with fingolimod or a fingolimod salt at a daily dosage of 0.5 mg without an immediately preceding loading dose.

The specification described the results of an Experimental Autoimmune Encephalomyelitis (EAE) experiment induced in Lewis rats showing that fingolimod hydrochloride inhibited disease relapse when administered daily at a dose of 0.3 mg/kg or administered orally at 0.3 mg/kg every second or third day or once a week, and a prophetic human clinical trial in which RRMS patients would receive 0.5, 1.25 or 2.5 mg of fingolimod hydrochloride per day for two to six months. The specification did not mention a loading dose associated with either the EAE experiment or the prophetic trial. It was undisputed that loading doses were well known in the prior art and used in some medications for the treatment of multiple sclerosis.

The district court found that HEC had not shown that the patent was invalid for insufficient written description for the claimed 0.5 mg daily dose or the no-loading dose negative limitation. The district court also found sufficient written description in the EAE experiment and/or prophetic trial and credited the testimony of two of Novartis’s expert witnesses. HEC appealed.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. Turning first to the daily dose limitation, the majority held that the prophetic trial described daily dosages of 0.5, 1.25 or 2.5 mg and found no clear error by the district court in crediting expert testimony converting the lowest daily rat dose described in the EAE experiment to arrive at the claimed 0.5 mg daily human dose. Reciting Ariad, the Court explained that a “disclosure need not recite the claimed invention in haec verba” and further, that “[b]laze marks” are not necessary where the claimed species is expressly described in the specification, as the 0.5 mg daily dose was here.

Turning to the no-loading dose negative limitation, the majority disagreed with HEC’s arguments that there was no written description because the specification contained zero recitation of a loading dose or its potential benefits or disadvantages, and because the district court inconsistently found that a prior art abstract (Kappos 2006) did not anticipate the claims because it was silent as to loading doses. The Court explained that there is no “new and heightened standard for negative claim limitations.” The majority acknowledged that silence alone is insufficient disclosure but emphasized that [...]

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Improper Claim Construction Requires Partial Remand of Obviousness Determination

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued decisions in two separate inter partes reviews (IPRs), one involving a patent related to radio frequency communication systems and the other involving a patent related to multi-processor systems. Intel Corporation v. Qualcomm Incorporated, Case No. 20-1664 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 28, 2021) (Prost, Taranto, Hughes, JJ.); Intel Corporation v. Qualcomm Incorporated, Case Nos. 20-1828, -1867 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 28, 2021) (Prost, Taranto, Hughes, JJ). Based on issues of claim construction and obviousness, the Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s (Board) decision in the radio frequency communication systems patent IPR and vacated the Board’s decision in the multi-processor systems patent IPR.

Radio Frequency Communication System Patent IPR (1664)

In the IPR related to the radio frequency communication systems patent, Intel proposed that the claim term “radio frequency input signal” should take its ordinary meaning of an input signal having a radio frequency. Qualcomm argued that a person of skill in the art reading the patent would understand the phrase to reference the radio frequency signal that is received before down-conversion, and thus proposed that the term should mean “a signal centered at a carrier frequency at which the signal was transmitted/received.” The Board agreed with Qualcomm based on the intrinsic evidence.

Intel argued before the Board that certain claims of the radio frequency communication systems patent would have been obvious in light of the Der reference and the Valla reference. Qualcomm argued that a skilled artisan would not have been motivated to combine Der and Valla, because Der’s transistor would defeat the intended purpose of Valla’s amplifier. The Board agreed with Qualcomm. Qualcomm also submitted substitute claims. The Board accepted the substitute claims after finding that a skilled artisan would have lacked reason to combine Der and the Burgener reference to achieve the substitute claims. Intel appealed.

The Federal Circuit first addressed the threshold question of whether it had jurisdiction since no lawsuit had been filed against Intel. Despite the absence of any lawsuit against Intel itself, the Court found that Intel had standing because it had engaged in acts that previously resulted in assertion of the patent against one of Intel’s customers. Because Intel continues to sell the relevant products to that customer and others, it must address the risk of an infringement suit by Qualcomm. Qualcomm also refused to offer a covenant not to sue or stipulate that it would not reassert its prior infringement allegations involving the Intel products. The Court found that this refusal made Intel’s risk more than “mere conjecture or hypothesis.” Therefore, the Court found that Intel had standing to pursue the appeal.

Turning to the merits, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s construction of “radio frequency input signal.” The Court explained that while both parties’ proposed constructions had appeal when considered in a vacuum, the proper inquiry required analysis of the surrounding claim language and specification. The Court found that linguistic clues in the claims suggested that [...]

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Change the Look of the Room: Appeal Transferred to Federal Circuit

The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit transferred an appeal of a preliminary injunction enjoining alleged copyright and trademark infringement to the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit because the operative complaint included six counts of patent infringement and thus arose under patent law. Hudson Furniture, Inc. et al. v. Lighting Design Wholesalers Inc., Case No. 20-3299 (2d Cir. Dec. 21, 2021) (Livingston, CJ; Kearse, Lee, JJ.) (per curiam).

Hudson filed a complaint against Lighting Design alleging patent, trademark and copyright infringement. The district court granted Hudson’s preliminary injunction and enjoined Lighting Design from alleged infringement of Hudson’s copyrights and trademarks. The district court also denied Lighting Design’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and its motion for reconsideration permitting alternative service of process. Lighting Design appealed the rulings to the Second Circuit.

Hudson asked the Second Circuit to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the appeal arose from a complaint involving patent law claims and thus fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit. Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1292 and 1295, the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals involving any action that arises under any act of US Congress relating to patents. An action arises under patent law when a well-pleaded complaint establishes that (1) federal law creates the cause of action or (2) the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law.

The Second Circuit agreed that exclusive jurisdiction rested with the Federal Circuit, explaining that the operative complaint included six counts of patent infringement, and the appeal concerned the district court’s ruling on a motion for injunctive relief involving patent law and non-patent law claims. The Court rejected Lighting Design’s argument that patent law did not constitute a substantial part of the overall success of the case since Hudson failed to secure preliminary injunctive related to the patent law claims. The Court explained that Lighting Design’s argument focused on only the second basis for Federal Circuit jurisdiction (whether the right to relief depends on a “substantial question” related to patent law). The Court found that even if it accepted Lighting Design’s argument, the fact that federal patent law created the cause of action was sufficient to establish Federal Circuit jurisdiction under the first basis of jurisdiction. While the Second Circuit agreed with Hudson, it declined to dismiss the appeal and instead opted to transfer the appeal to the Federal Circuit because the original appeal was timely filed in good faith and transferring the appeal was in the interest of justice.




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