Federal Circuit
Subscribe to Federal Circuit's Posts

Absent Expressed Rationale of Obviousness, Federal Circuit Calls for Do-Over

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a ruling by the Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board) where, on appeal, the US Patent & Trademark Office’s (PTO) rationale for sustaining the Board’s obviousness rejection did not reflect “the reasoning or findings the Board actually invoked.” In Re Google, LLC, Case No. 22-1012 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 9, 2023) (Moore, C.J., Lourie, Prost, JJ.)

Google’s patent application covers a method of filtering search results to display age-appropriate results using a “content rating score” in combination with a predetermined threshold value to determine which results will be presented. The application discloses several ways that the threshold value can be calculated, including using the length of the search query as a proxy for the age of the user, with longer queries being associated with older users and leading to a lower threshold score (allowing more mature content to be shown).

The application received a final rejection from the examiner, who asserted that the claims would have been obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103 based on two prior art references, Parthasarathy and Rose. Parthasarathy disclosed a method to determine a content score to use for ranking results, while Rose disclosed a method to assign result importance based on query length. The examiner argued that it would be obvious to combine Rose and Parthasarathy to achieve the claimed method that recited a “predetermined threshold value” based on the number of words in a query. The examiner acknowledged that Parthasarathy did not disclose a threshold based on a number of words but found that Rose did, citing Rose’s modified relevance-ranking algorithm. He reasoned that it would have been obvious to combine Rose and Parthasarathy to achieve the claimed threshold because “analyzing a query for determining the query length and using the query length as a threshold is very well known in the art and doing so would further provide for assigning weight to a long or a short query for retrieving documents.” Google appealed the examiner’s decision to the Board, which affirmed the examiner’s rejection and adopted the examiner’s findings. Google appealed to the Federal Circuit.

On appeal, the PTO argued that because there were only two ways a person of ordinary skill in the art could modify Parthasarathy’s threshold to incorporate Rose, either of the modifications would have been obvious. However, the Federal Circuit found that this argument was not supported by the Board’s decision. The Court explained that while the Board did conclude that modifying Parthasarathy’s threshold to take into account the length of the query would have been obvious, the Board did not provide any detail as to how that would be achieved. In the absence of specific fact-based findings by the Board, the Court explained that it could not adopt the PTO’s argument, which rested on facts not found in the Board’s decision. A ruling relying on these facts would have resulted in a violation of basic administrative law principles since a court may only uphold an agency action on [...]

Continue Reading




read more

Dictionaries Don’t Know Best: The Intrinsic Record Prevails (Again)

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit addressed the tension between the intrinsic and extrinsic record in claim construction, holding that the intrinsic record should be relied on first. The Court therefore reversed a district court finding of indefiniteness based on dictionary definitions and expert testimony. Grace Instrument Industries, LLC v. Chandler Instruments Company, LLC, Case Nos. 21-2370; -2370 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 12, 2023) (Chen, Cunningham, Stark, JJ.)

Grace owns a patent for a liquid pressurized viscometer used commonly to test the viscosity of drilling fluid that is used to drill oil wells. Grace’s viscometer uses an “enlarged chamber” between a lower chamber and a pressurization fluid inlet. According to the patent specification, this enlarged chamber was designed to reduce the measurement error in prior viscometer models that was caused by the mixing of sample fluid and pressurization fluid or by friction emanating from a seal in the viscometer. Within the lower chamber of the patented viscometer, there is a rotor having a “means for driving said rotor to rotate.”

Grace sued Chandler, claiming that Chandler infringed Grace’s viscometer patent. During claim construction, the district court found that the term “enlarged chamber” was indefinite, and that because it was a “term of degree,” it must be compared against something objective. The district court entered its final judgment in favor of Chandler. Grace appealed.

The Federal Circuit reversed, explaining that the “enlarged chamber[’s]” size did not need to be compared against any baseline object, but rather needed to be “large enough to accomplish a particular function.” The Court relied on the specification, which explained that the viscometer described in the patent reduced the mixing of sample fluid and pressurization fluid that was common in older viscometer models by using an “enlarged chamber.” The Court also cited the prosecution history, where the applicant explained that the invention solved a “long lasting problem” by reducing the measurement error caused by the friction of the seal or mixing of the fluids in older viscometer designs. Thus, the Court reasoned that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that the “enlarged chamber” must be large enough to prevent the mixing of the pressurization fluid and sample fluid to avoid the measurement errors associated with prior art viscometers.

Chandler argued that the term “enlarged chamber” was not a term of art. The Federal Circuit agreed but explained that “the intrinsic record sufficiently guides a skilled artisan as to the meaning of the term” as used in the patent. The Federal Circuit found that the district court erred in relying on a dictionary definition (extrinsic evidence) to contradict the meaning of the term found within the intrinsic record. The specification’s instructions for the meaning of a claim term should prevail over extrinsic evidence. Rebuffing Chandler’s argument, the Court explained that the specification does not need to explicitly define the claim term to govern the interpretation of that term.

The Federal Circuit remanded the case to the district court to reconsider indefiniteness in [...]

Continue Reading




read more

Swing and a Miss: Failed Interferences Don’t Affect Later Ones

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Patent Trial & Appeal Board’s (Board) interference decision finding that priority belonged to the junior party based on sufficiently corroborated reduction to practice. Dionex Softron GmbH v. Agilent Technologies Inc., Case No. 21-2372 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 6, 2023) (Reyna, Chen, Stark, JJ.)

Both parties attempted to instigate an interference by copying each other’s claims regarding a method of operating a liquid chromatography system. Agilent first substantially copied Dionex’s claims but failed to secure declaration of an interference and subsequently amended its claims. Dionex then copied verbatim Agilent’s amended claims, successfully provoking an interference. The Board identified Dionex as the senior party and Agilent as the junior, placing the burden for priority on Agilent.

At the interference, Dionex moved for judgment based on lack of written description for the relevant count language (emphasis added):

. . . determining a movement amount of the piston within the chamber from a first position to a second position to increase a pressure in the sample loop from an essentially atmospheric pressure to the pump pressure, based on the pump pressure […] wherein decreasing the volume includes forwarding the piston within the chamber by the determined movement amount from the first position to the second position.

Dionex contended that Agilent’s specification lacked written description for “determining a movement amount” and subsequently “forwarding the piston,” wherein the order of those two separate operations was important and lacking support. Dionex also contended that while the relevant specification was Dionex’s patent for a majority of count terms, some terms, such as “determining,” should be viewed in light of Agilent’s application. The Board disagreed and found that Agilent’s specification was controlling and contained adequate written description to support the count.

In finding Agilent’s written description adequate, the Board rejected Dionex’s contention that the claims required a determination of movement amount before forwarding the piston. Applying the broadest reasonable interpretation standard, the Board found that the count language permitted determination of movement amount while forwarding the piston and that consequently there was adequate support in the specification.

Both parties moved for judgment on priority. The Board granted Agilent’s motion, finding that even as the junior party, Agilent proved conception and reduction to practice before Dionex’s earliest conception date. Applying the rule of reason, the Board found that the testimony of one of Agilent’s co-inventors was sufficiently corroborated by two coworkers to show successful reduction to practice by the critical date. The Board also credited Agilent’s coworker testimony in denying Dionex’s contention that Agilent’s reduction to practice lacked a pressure senor and credited testimony stating that a high-pressure pump with a built-in pressure system was used. The Board also declined Dionex’s request to draw a negative inference from the lack of testimony of the other co-inventor, crediting Agilent’s explanation that the testimony would have been cumulative. Dionex appealed.

On appeal, the Federal Circuit found that the Board had correctly treated Agilent’s specification as the “originating specification” because it was Dionex’s [...]

Continue Reading




read more

More Delays: Appeal Dismissed under Collateral Order Doctrine

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit dismissed a patent holder’s interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine. Modern Font Applications LLC v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., Case No. 21-1838 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 29, 2022) (Reyna, Cunningham, JJ.) (Newman, J., dissenting).

Modern Font Applications (MFA) is a nonpracticing entity that holds the exclusive license to a patent disclosing a method for operating systems to read and display nonstandard fonts. In 2019, MFA sued Alaska Airlines in district court for patent infringement. During the proceeding, Alaska Airlines designated portions of its source code files as confidential information for attorneys’ eyes only under the district court’s standing protective order. MFA moved to allow its in-house counsel to access the source code, and Alaska Airlines moved to keep it protected. The district court denied MFA’s motion and granted Alaska Airlines’ motion, finding that the source code amounted to a trade secret and MFA’s in-house attorney was properly excluded as a “competitive decisionmaker.” MFA sought interlocutory appeal of the order.

The Federal Circuit found that it lacked jurisdiction to review the discovery order. The Court explained that US Congress holds appellate courts to the final judgment rule, which states that decisions are only appealable if they end disputes on the merits, leaving nothing but execution of the judgment. A “practical construction” of this rule is the collateral order doctrine, which allows appellate review of a “small class” of attendant rulings. To qualify for review under this doctrine, a decision must be “conclusive”; address an important question, separate from the case’s merits; and be such that an appeal of the final judgment would not encompass a review of the decision at issue. The Federal Circuit stressed that the Supreme Court of the United States “has repeatedly emphasized the limited scope” of this doctrine.

The Federal Circuit found that MFA’s appeal failed the third prong of the collateral order doctrine. The Court noted that across appellate jurisdictions, pretrial discovery orders almost always fail this prong because review of final judgments can usually adequately address discovery issues. MFA argued that dismissing its appeal would prejudice MFA both financially and by eliminating its key litigation strategists and that the district court’s error would not be sufficient to overturn a final adverse judgment. The Court was not persuaded, noting that any financial harm was speculative, and that MFA could hire outside counsel or experts instead of relying on its in-house attorney. The Court also reiterated that to merit review under the collateral order doctrine, the issue must be “effectively unreviewable” on appeal, and the likelihood of an appellant’s success is irrelevant. The Court also found that MFA’s appeal failed the second prong because the exclusion of MFA’s attorney was too entangled with the ultimate outcome of the case to be considered an issue “separate” from the case. Because MFA failed two of three collateral order doctrine prongs, the Court did not address the first prong and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

In [...]

Continue Reading




read more

Challenging Inventorship on Summary Judgment? Put a Cap on It

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, citing a dispute as to material facts, held that a factfinder could reasonably conclude that an alleged joint inventor failed to sufficiently contribute to inventing the claimed technologies and thus reversed a district court order granting summary judgment of invalidity based on failure to join an inventor. Plastipak Packaging, Inc. v. Premium Waters, Inc., Case No. 21-2244 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 19, 2022) (Newman, Stoll, Stark, JJ.)

Plastipak sued Premium Waters, asserting 12 patents directed in part to the neck portions of lightweight plastic containers and preforms. These neck portions include a dispensing opening, a tamper-evident formation (TEF) that indicates if the container has been opened and a support flange/ring to facilitate manufacturing handling:

The patents list Richard Darr and Edward Morgan as inventors. Premium Waters countered that the patents should have included a third co-inventor, Alessandro Falzoni, an employee of another company with whom Darr and Morgan had collaborated on a project involving a design that included a neck portion, a specialty closure and a discontinuous TEF. Premium Waters moved for summary judgment of invalidity on the theory that the failure to include Falzoni as a joint inventor rendered the patent invalid, contending that Falzoni contributed the following to the invention:

  • A discontinuous (as opposed to continuous) TEF that is claimed by five of the asserted patents
  • A neck portion with only 0.580 inches or less separating its dispensing opening from its support flange/ring’s lower surface (the X dimension, as shown in the diagram above) that is claimed by the other asserted patents.

Plastipak contended that the asserted inventors were the sole inventors and that discontinuous TEFs (Falzoni’s alleged contribution) were merely state-of-the-art.

In granting the motion for summary judgment, the district court observed that Falzoni was “at least” a joint inventor because he had disclosed to one of the named inventors a neck finish measuring less than 0.580 inches with a discontinuous TEF in the form of an image of a 3D model that “constituted clear and convincing evidence of Falzoni’s disclosure, leaving ‘no doubt’ that the image ‘contributed significantly to the conception of a complete neck finish.’”

That model’s support ring lacked a lower surface, however, and Plastipak argued that without a lower surface the 3D model’s X dimension was undeterminable.

Plastipak also argued that Falzoni’s email circulating the 3D model stated that “[t]he area below the neck support ring has been left undefined” and seemingly invited the named inventor (Darr) to finalize it. Darr did so and, on the same day, emailed Falzoni a schematic depicting a support ring with a lower surface and a 0.591-inch X dimension.

Falzoni testified that while he calculated that the model had a ~0.563-inch X dimension, that calculation was based on “a reasonable indication” of where the support ring’s lower surface should be, and that the absence of an [...]

Continue Reading




read more

Litigation Funding Probe Continues to Make Waves

On remand from a decision allowing the US District Court for the District of Delaware to continue its probe into who was funding a patent owner’s infringement litigation, the district court denied the patent owner’s motion to withdraw the court’s memorandum explaining why records sought in its prior order were relevant to addressing several concerns. The district court also issued an order to show cause as to why the patent owner should not be sanctioned for failing to produce the records that the court sought. Nimitz Techs. LLC v. Bloomberg L.P., Case No. 22-413-CFC, ECF Nos. 27-28 (D. Del. Dec. 14, 2022) (Connolly, J.)

Nimitz filed a mandamus petition seeking to reverse a district court order that sought litigation funding records from Nimitz. While the mandamus petition was pending, the district court issued a memorandum explaining the relevancy of the records it sought. On December 8, 2022, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued its decision denying Nimitz’s mandamus petition.

On the same day that the Federal Circuit’s decision issued, Nimitz filed a motion in the district court asking the court to withdraw its memorandum. Less than a week later, the court issued an order summarily denying the motion but addressing two matters raised in the motion because those matters had been raised in related actions.

In its motion, Nimitz argued that the court’s disclosure order did not cover limited liability companies because the order referred to “limited liability corporations.” The court rejected the argument, explaining that courts—including the Supreme Court of the United States, the Delaware Supreme Court, the Delaware Court of Chancery and the last four chief judges of the district court itself—routinely refer to limited liability companies as “limited liability corporations.”

Nimitz also sought the judge’s recusal, arguing that the district court had already publicly adjudged Nimitz and its counsel guilty of fraud and unethical conduct. The court rejected Nimitz’s argument, noting that the judge previously stated that the memorandum purposefully did not repeat his concerns “about counsel’s professionalism and potential role in the abuse of the Court because I have made no definitive conclusions about those issues, and I did not want to unnecessarily embarrass counsel.” The court, therefore, denied the motion.

The district court separately issued an order to show cause why Nimitz should not be sanctioned for failing to produce the litigation funding documents sought by the court. The court noted that the Federal Circuit denied the mandamus petition on December 8, and as of December 14, Nimitz had not produced any documents or asked for an extension of time to produce documents. Nimitz filed a response on December 21 arguing that the district court proceeding remained stayed until the Federal Circuit issued a mandate. Nimitz also argued that it is seeking further appellate review of the district court’s order and cannot produce the requested documents because it would moot the further appeal.




read more

Burdens Can’t Be Avoided No Matter How They’re Dressed Up

Addressing a multitude of issues, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling dismissing infringement of one patent and finding a trade dress invalid but reversed the invalidation of the other patent and vacated dismissal of an inequitable conduct defense. Mosaic Brands, Inc. v. Ridge Wallet LLC, Case Nos. 22-1001, -1002 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 20, 2022) (Newman, Prost, Stark, JJ.)

Mosaic Brands sued Ridge Wallet alleging infringement of a patent relating to a combination money clip and card holder adapted to retain paper currency and to removably store flexible cards such as credit cards, as well as Mosaic’s associated trade dress. Ridge denied the allegations and counterclaimed that Mosaic infringed a Ridge patent directed to a nearly identical wallet. In response to the counterclaim, Mosaic raised inequitable conduct as an affirmative defense.

During claim construction, the district court construed the terms “lip” and “varying thickness” in Mosaic’s patent. Following claim construction, the parties stipulated to noninfringement of Mosaic’s patent. The district court also found the trade dress of Mosaic’s wallet to be functional and thus invalid. As to Ridge’s patent, the district court granted summary judgment of invalidity based on a prior art product sold by Mosaic, and further denied summary judgment that Ridge had obtained its patent through inequitable conduct. Mosaic filed a motion for reconsideration regarding the inequitable conduct defense and to clarify remaining merits issues. The district court exercised its discretion to address the defense and identify deficiencies. The district court noted that Mosaic had only met a portion of its burden and later proceedings would present an opportunity to present more evidence of inequitable conduct. Both parties appealed.

The Federal Circuit first addressed a potential issue of appellate jurisdiction since the assertion of inequitable conduct was an affirmative defense and not a counterclaim yielding a final judgment to review. The Court found it had jurisdiction because the inequitable conduct defense merged and became final when the judgment denying summary judgment for inequitable conduct was entered.

Turning to the merits, the Federal Circuit addressed the two claim terms appealed by Mosaic. Mosaic argued that the district court’s interpretation of “lip” was too narrow because it required the lip to be made of “extruded plastic.” The Court quickly dispatched this argument by citing the specification of Mosaic’s patent, which described the lip as being made of extrudable plastic and extolled the benefits of such material. The Court focused on the context of how the patent used the phrase “the present invention” and found it to be limiting. As to the other claim term (“varying thickness”), Mosaic advocated for a plain and ordinary meaning of the term. The Court rejected Mosaic’s argument, finding that Mosaic failed to provide intrinsic evidence or meaningful explanation of how the district court’s construction differed from the plain and ordinary meaning. As such, the Court found that the district court made no error in either construction.

Turning to the appeal of Ridge’s patent, the Federal Circuit found that [...]

Continue Reading




read more

ANDA Filing Alone Insufficient for Induced Infringement of Method Patent

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld a district court’s findings of invalidity and noninfringement in a Hatch-Waxman case involving two sets of method patents directed to modulating dosages of pirfenidone, a drug used to treat idiopathic pulmonary fibrosis (IPF). The Court found that the first set of patents were obvious over the prior art and standard medical practice, while the second set were not directly infringed in light of actual physician prescription practice. Genentech, Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., Case No. 22-1595 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 22, 2022) (Newman, Lourie, Prost, JJ.) (Newman, J., dissenting).

Sandoz submitted two abbreviated new drug applications (ANDAs) for approval to market a generic version of pirfenidone, which Genentech sells under the brand name Esbriet®. Genentech sued Sandoz under the Hatch-Waxman Act, asserting that Sandoz’s generic version would induce infringement of two sets of patents: one directed to modifying dosages of pirfenidone in patients with abnormal liver biomarkers (LFT patents), and the other directed to avoiding adverse interactions in patients also taking fluvoxamine (DDI patents).

The LFT patents are directed to methods of administering pirfenidone to a patient who has exhibited Grade 2 abnormalities in liver function biomarkers alanine transaminase (ALT) and/or aspartate transaminase (AST) in response to pirfenidone. The LFT patents generally recite the following administration options:

  • Temporarily reducing the dose before returning to the full dose
  • Maintaining the full dose
  • Reducing the dose
  • Temporarily discontinuing pirfenidone before returning to the full dose
  • Temporarily discontinuing pirfenidone before returning to a reduced dose.

Sandoz’s proposed label included a “Dosage Modification due to Elevated Liver Enzymes” section, which stated that if a patient exhibits grade 2 elevations of ALT and/or AST, “[t]he full daily dosage may be maintained, if clinically appropriate, or reduced or interrupted (e.g., until liver chemistry tests are within normal limits) with subsequent re-titration to the full dosage as tolerated.” Genentech argued that these instructions constituted induced infringement of the LFT patents. The district court disagreed and held that the LFT patents were obvious over the prior art and standard medical practice and that the defendant would not induce infringement because the labels “merely described” the infringing uses but did not recommend them.

The DDI patents are directed to methods for avoiding adverse interactions between pirfenidone and fluvoxamine and generally involve the steps of discontinuing fluvoxamine or modifying the dose of pirfenidone and continuing fluvoxamine. Sandoz’s proposed label warned of the adverse interactions between pirfenidone and fluvoxamine and stated that fluvoxamine should be discontinued prior to administering pirfenidone or the dose of pirfenidone should be reduced. Genentech similarly argued that these instructions constituted induced infringement of its DDI patents, but the district court held that there was insufficient evidence for infringement because Genentech had not shown that a patient would actually be prescribed both pirfenidone and fluvoxamine in practice.

Genentech appealed the district court’s holdings with respect to both the LFT and DDI patents.

LFT Patents

The Federal Circuit first observed that “varying doses in response to the occurrence [...]

Continue Reading




read more

Tag, You’re It: Sanctions Award Must Reflect Violative Conduct

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit determined that an accused infringer was entitled to a new trial relating to validity issues but still faced sanctions for its continuous disregard of its discovery obligations. ADASA Inc. v. Avery Dennison Corp., Case No. 22-1092 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 16, 2022) (Moore, Hughes, Stark, JJ.)

ADASA owns a patent relating to methods and systems for commissioning radio-frequency identification (RFID) transponders. ADASA sued Avery Dennison for patent infringement, alleging that its manufacture and sale of certain RFID tags infringed ADASA’s patent. Both parties sought summary judgment following discovery. Avery Dennison asserted that the patent was ineligible for patent protection under 35 U.S.C. § 101, and ADASA argued that the asserted claims were not anticipated or obvious based on the book RFID for Dummies. The district court granted ADASA’s motion on validity and denied Avery Dennison’s motion for patent ineligibility. Prior to trial, ADASA moved in limine to exclude Avery Dennison’s damages expert’s testimony related to certain licenses, and the district court granted the motion.

At trial, ADASA entered licenses into evidence as part of its damages case and alleged that they reflected lump-sum agreements to practice the asserted patent. The district court declined to include a jury instruction on lump-sum damages and a lump-sum option on the verdict form, observing that Avery Dennison’s expert had not offered a lump-sum damages opinion and concluding that the licenses alone were insufficient for the jury to award lump-sum damages. The jury returned an infringement verdict and awarded ADASA a running royalty of $0.0045 per infringing RFID tag, which resulted in an award of $26.6 million.

In its post-trial motions, Avery Dennison moved for a new trial, arguing it was reversible error for the district court to exclude its damages expert’s testimony and to decline to provide a jury instruction for a lump-sum damages award. Before the district court ruled on its motion, Avery Dennison revealed to ADASA that it had discovered additional previously undisclosed RFID tags in its databases. A subsequent investigation determined that the number of undisclosed tags was more than two billion. Avery Dennison agreed to pay an additional $9.5 million in damages, which corresponded to the royalty rate determined by the jury. ADASA subsequently moved for sanctions. The district court award $20 million in sanctions after finding that Avery Dennison had engaged in protracted discovery failures and a continuous disregard for the seriousness of the litigation and its expected obligations. The sanctions award corresponded to a $0.0025 per-tag rate applied to both the adjudicated and late-disclosed tags. Avery Dennison appealed.

Avery Dennison challenged the district court’s summary judgment rulings, its denial of a new trial and its imposition of sanctions. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s patent eligibility determination, finding that the patent “is directed to a specific, hardware-based RFID serial number data structure designed to enable technological improvements to the commissioning process,” which “is not a mere mental process,” and concluded that the claim was directed to patent-eligible subject matter.

[...]

Continue Reading



read more

Bad Connection: Claim Construction Argument without Explanation Given No Weight

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board) obviousness decision after finding that the patent owner failed to explain how its cited extrinsic evidence supported its proposed claim construction. Uniloc 2017 LLC v. Netflix, Inc., Case No. 21-2085 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 15, 2022) (Dyk, Taranto, Hughes, JJ.) (nonprecedential).

Uniloc owns a patent directed to a “more efficient” method for encoding videos by only coding at the pixel level when necessary and, where possible, reusing code for macroblocks in the background area. Netflix petitioned for inter partes review of several claims in Uniloc’s patent. The Board ultimately found the claims unpatentable as obvious. Uniloc appealed.

Uniloc argued that the Board erred in its claim construction of a limitation that required “dividing the stationary background region and the object region from an inputted video in a macroblock-by-macroblock basis by using a difference between the previous frame and the current frame.” The dispute before the Federal Circuit was whether the “macroblock-by-macroblock basis” required that the act of dividing be done macroblock-by-macroblock, as urged by Uniloc, or whether the dividing resulted in separate macroblock-based regions, as urged by Netflix and found by the Board. The Court concluded that Netflix and the Board were correct.

The Federal Circuit first addressed the intrinsic record, finding that it was ambiguous as to the meaning of “macroblock-by-macroblock basis.” Although the claim language supported either interpretation, Uniloc’s argument would require the Court to read language into the claim that was “simply not there.” The specification did not clarify the claim construction issue either. Although Uniloc pointed to one example where the dividing step occurred one macroblock at a time, the Court stated that it did not limit claim language to examples used in the specification. Lastly, the Court explained that the portions of the specification describing the purpose of the invention and avoiding problems in the prior art also failed to clarify the meaning of the macroblock-by-macroblock basis. Because the purpose was merely to make coding more efficient and avoid dividing at the pixel level, either interpretation could apply.

Relatedly, the Federal Circuit rejected Netflix’s argument that Uniloc forfeited the arguments on appeal related to the portions of the specification explaining the purpose of the claimed invention and how it purportedly solved problems in the prior art. The Court explained that the forfeiture doctrine does not “preclude a party from proffering additional or new supporting arguments, based on evidence record, for its claim construction.” Here, Uniloc “merely cited additional support in the specification to support the same argument it had always made” related to the macroblock-by-macroblock basis.

The Federal Circuit next addressed the extrinsic evidence and agreed with the Board’s decision that a “macroblock-by-macroblock basis” required dividing results in separate macroblock-based regions. Uniloc’s only extrinsic evidence was a dictionary definition of “basis,” and Uniloc offered no additional expert evidence to explain technological facts or usage in the field that would support its interpretation. In contrast, Netflix provided expert testimony and [...]

Continue Reading




read more

BLOG EDITORS

STAY CONNECTED

TOPICS

ARCHIVES