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Exploring the Latest in Intellectual Property Law
IP UPDATE
Exploring the Latest in Intellectual Property Law
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Well Runs Dry: Summary Judgment Denial Supports Non-Exceptional Case Finding

by | Jun 1, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s denial of attorneys’ fees, explaining that when a district court denies summary judgment and allows a plaintiff’s case to proceed, the district court effectively determines that the position of the party opposing summary judgment is not objectively baseless. OneSubsea IP UK Limited v. FMC Techs, Inc., Case No. 22-1099 (Fed. Cir. May 23, 2023) (Moore, Clevenger, Dyk, JJ.)

OneSubsea and FMC compete in the subsea oil and gas exploration and extraction industry. In March 2015, OneSubsea filed a lawsuit against FMC alleging infringement of 95 claims across 10 OneSubsea patents. After the district court issued its claim construction ruling, FMC moved for summary judgment of noninfringement. OneSubsea opposed. While the summary judgment motion was pending, the Patent Trial & Appeal Board instituted inter partes review (IPR) proceedings on a subset of the asserted patents. FMC argued that while a stay of district court proceedings would be appropriate, it was unnecessary in light of its pending summary judgment motion. In August 2016, the district court denied summary judgment and stayed the case.

The case remained stayed for three years, during which time the Board invalidated 76 claims. In 2019, the district court lifted the stay. At a pre-trial hearing in 2020 discussing whether additional discovery was needed to address summary judgment, FMC doubted the need for more discovery and pointed to the 3,200 record pages illustrating differences between the designs of the accused device and the patented devices. In response, the district court stated, “And you really think I’m going to be able to grant summary judgment on that?” After the hearing, FMC renewed its summary judgment motion, which OneSubsea opposed. In reply, FMC moved to exclude the report of OneSubsea’s expert because he applied the wrong claim construction. Ultimately, the district court granted FMC’s motion to exclude and its motion for summary judgment.

In 2021, FMC moved for attorneys’ fees based on OneSubsea’s “substantively weak infringement claims” after the claim construction order was issued and “litigation misconduct.” After briefing was complete, the district court announced that the case had been reassigned to another judge following the retirement of the original assigned judge. The new judge rejected FMC’s view that OneSubsea’s case was objectively baseless and further rejected FMC’s claims of litigation misconduct. FMC appealed.

As a threshold matter, FMC argued that the Federal Circuit should apply de novo review instead of an abuse-of-discretion standard because the new judge only briefly “lived with the case” and should be disqualified from exercising discretion in deciding FMC’s attorneys’ fees motion. The Court rejected FMC’s invitation to change the standard of review, citing the substantial body of law in which appellate courts have consistently reviewed successor judges’ decisions on discretionary issues for abuse of discretion.

Turning to the merits, the Federal Circuit found that FMC’s exceptional case argument lacked merit. The Court explained that the argument disregarded the district court’s observation that FMC’s demand for a prompt favorable noninfringement judgment based [...]

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Heart-to-Heart on Reduction to Practice: When It Comes to Testing, How Much Is Enough?

by | Jun 1, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a Patent Trial & Appeal Board decision that the patent owner successfully demonstrated that the claimed heart catheter invention was conceived and reduced to practice prior to the effective date of the reference, by record evidence of adequate testing to demonstrate that the invention would work for its intended purpose. Medtronic, Inc. v. Teleflex Innovations S.Á.R.L., Case Nos. 21-2356; -2358; -2361; -2363; -2365 (Fed. Cir. May 24, 2023) (Moore, C.J.; Lourie, J.) (Dyk, J., dissenting).

Teleflex Innovations owns five patents directed to guide extension catheters that use a tapered inner catheter that runs over a standard coronary guidewire to reduce the likelihood that a guide catheter will dislodge from the coronary artery’s opening. All of the patents are related and share a common specification. Around the time of the challenged patents’ priority date, the applicant was working to develop two commercial variants of similar technology: the “rapid exchange” (or “RX”) version of the GuideLiner product, which Teleflex claims practices the challenged patents, and an “over-the-wire” (or “OTW”) variant, which does not practice the challenged patents.

Medtronic petitioned for inter partes review (IPR), challenging all five patents on the basis that they were predated by a patent to Itou. During the IPR proceedings, Teleflex claimed that conception and reduction to practice occurred prior to Itou’s priority date and submitted several declarations and exhibits such as lab notebooks, internal company memoranda, presentations, invoices, sales orders, photographs, engineering drawings and documents from outside patent counsel in support of its contentions. Ultimately, the Board found that Itou did not constitute prior art and therefore Medtronic had failed to demonstrate that the challenged claims were unpatentable. Medtronic appealed.

On appeal, Medtronic did not challenge conception but argued that the Board’s findings on actual reduction to practice and reasonable diligence toward constructive reduction to practice should be reversed. To establish an actual reduction to practice, the patent owner must show that the inventors constructed an embodiment that met all the limitations of the claimed invention and determined that the invention would work for its intended purpose. Medtronic’s arguments were based on the grounds that the Board erred in three ways:

  1. Incorrectly identifying the intended purpose of the claimed invention
  2. Not requiring comparative testing to demonstrate that the invention worked for that purpose
  3. Relying solely on uncorroborated inventor testimony.

On the first issue, Medtronic argued that the Board incorrectly found an over-broad intended purpose of the claimed invention by relying too heavily on extrinsic evidence. The Federal Circuit acknowledged that while “the patents themselves are the most important” evidence, “it is appropriate to consider extrinsic evidence, particularly when it does not contradict the patents themselves.” The Court went on to conclude that the intended purpose here was broader than the narrow purpose argued by Medtronic (relating to difficult occlusions)—“[t]he very title of the patents themselves, ‘Coaxial Guide Catheter for Interventional Cardiology Procedures,’ describes the purpose of the claimed inventions, and it is undisputed that the [...]

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Analogous Art Must Be Compared to Challenged Patent

by | May 25, 2023 | ,

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a Patent Trial & Appeal Board obviousness decision, finding that a prior art reference relating to automotive engine parts was not analogous art to the challenged patent, which related to injection devices used for drug delivery. Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GMBH v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc., Case No. 21-1981 (Fed. Cir. May 9, 2023) (Reyna, Mayer, Cunningham, JJ.)

Sanofi-Aventis owns a patent directed to a drug delivery device that can be configured to allow for the setting of different dose sizes. The main independent claim of the patent recites a spring washer element with “at least two fixing elements configured to axially and rotationally fix the spring washer relative to the housing.”

Mylan initiated an inter partes review (IPR) proceeding against the patent, arguing that the challenged claims were obvious based on a combination of three prior art references: Burren, Venezia and de Gennes. Burren described a drug injection device that used a coiled spring, while Venezia described a hypodermic syringe with a spring washer having a tongue that fit into a collar to prevent the washer from rotating relative to the collar. The third prior art reference, de Gennes, disclosed a large spring-washer-like device used in automobile engines to maintain the alignment between the engine and the transmission. Sanofi argued that de Gennes was non-analogous art because it was not in the same field of endeavor as the injection devices described in the patent and was not reasonably pertinent to a problem faced by the inventor of the challenged patent.

The Board adopted Mylan’s definition of the problem to be solved, which was “axially fixing two components relative towards each other.” Under this broad definition, the Board found that de Gennes was reasonably pertinent to the challenged patent and that claims were obvious in view of Burren in combination with Venezia and de Gennes. Sanofi appealed.

Sanofi argued that the Board erred in determining that de Gennes was analogous art. The Federal Circuit explained that in evaluating whether a reference is analogous, a patent challenger must compare the reference to the challenged patent. Applying this test, the Court found that substantial evidence did not support the conclusion that de Gennes was analogous to the challenged patent. Although Mylan had mapped de Gennes to certain elements of the challenged claims, there was no evidence that de Gennes—an automobile-related patent—was analogous to the challenged patent—a drug delivery device. The Court also found that statements that de Gennes and the challenged patent were “both interested in solving the same issue . . . [of] accommodating various cartridge lengths” were insufficient to show that de Gennes was analogous to the challenged patent.



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No Extra Life: Harmless Claim Construction Error Does Not Restart Invalidity Challenge

by | May 18, 2023 | ,

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a Patent Trial & Appeal Board decision, finding that under the harmless error rule, the challenged claims were invalid as obvious even if the Board erred in claim construction. Bot M8 LLC v. Sony Interactive Entertainment LLC, Case Nos. 22-1291 (Fed. Cir. May 9, 2023) (Prost, Reyna, Cunningham, JJ.).

Bot M8 owns a patent related to a gaming machine that authenticates certain data and includes both a board and a motherboard. The independent claims require that a “game program” is stored in memory on the board and written to the motherboard only after the game program has been authenticated by a central processing unit (CPU) on the motherboard (the Write Limitation). Sony Interactive Entertainment petitioned for inter partes review (IPR). Ultimately, the Board determined that the challenged claims were unpatentable as obvious. Bot M8 appealed.

The issue presented to the Federal Circuit was what data the Write Limitation precludes from being written to the motherboard prior to authentication: (1) the entire game program, (2) any portion of the game program and/or (3) any data (including data not related to the game program). It was undisputed that the claims at minimum preclude writing the entire game program to the motherboard before authentication (option 1). Both the Board and the Court rejected Bot M8’s argument that would preclude writing any data whatsoever before authentication (option 3). The question thus resolved into whether the Write Limitation also precluded writing any portion of the game program prior to authentication (option 2). Bot M8 argued that it did.

Bot M8 focused on a statement made by the Board as indicative that the Board applied an erroneous claim construction that would allow a portion of the game program to be written prior to authentication (rejecting option 2): “[Bot M8] seeks to read into claim 1 a requirement that nothing related to, or any portion of, the gaming information be read into [the motherboard’s] RAM … prior to authenticating the game program.”

The Federal Circuit rejected Bot M8’s argument, finding that even if the Board erred in construing the claim, Bot M8 failed to demonstrate that the alleged error was harmful. Specifically, the Court found that any such error was harmless because the Board never needed to apply an improper construction since it found the prior art disclosed writing only non­­-game program data prior to authentication, a protocol that both the Board and the Court found was not precluded by the Write Limitation. Deeming the Board’s potential claim construction error harmless, the Court affirmed the Board’s invalidity determination.

Practice Note: Parties seeking to appeal a Board decision based on an improper claim construction theory should demonstrate how the Board’s error resulted in harm.



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Blunt Rejection of Attorney Fees in Stipulated Dismissal

by | May 18, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the rejection of attorney fees, finding that neither inequitable conduct nor a conflict of interest rendered the case exceptional given the limited factual record following a stipulated dismissal in a patent case. United Cannabis Corp. v. Pure Hemp Collective Inc., Case No. 22-1363 (Fed. Cir. May 8, 2023) (Lourie, Cunningham, Stark, JJ.).

United Cannabis Corporation (UCANN) sued Pure Hemp for patent infringement. After the litigation was stayed pending bankruptcy proceedings, the parties stipulated to the dismissal. Pure Hemp then sought attorney fees based on alleged inequitable conduct by UCANN during prosecution of the asserted patent due to nondisclosure of a prior art reference used in the patent’s specification and based on a purported conflict of interest by UCANN’s litigation counsel. The district court denied Pure Hemp’s request, finding that the case was not exceptional. Pure Hemp appealed.

Pure Hemp argued that the district court erred by (1) failing to find Pure Hemp to be the prevailing party in the litigation, (2) not concluding that the undisputed facts established inequitable conduct and (3) not recognizing that UCANN’s attorneys had a conflict of interest.

The Federal Circuit found that although the district court erred in not finding Pure Hemp to be the prevailing party, this was a harmless error. The Court explained that by fending off UCANN’s lawsuit with a stipulation dismissing UCANN’s claims with prejudice, Pure Hemp is a prevailing party under § 285. However, the Court concluded that this error was harmless because the district court ultimately concluded that this case was unexceptional.

The Federal Circuit found Pure Hemp’s arguments on inequitable conduct without merit. The Court explained that it had no findings to review because Pure Hemp voluntarily dismissed its inequitable conduct counterclaim and did not seek any post-dismissal inequitable conduct proceedings. Although Pure Hemp argued that it could prevail based on the undisputed facts in the record, the Court disagreed. It explained that even the limited record demonstrated at least a genuine dispute as to both the materiality and intent prongs of inequitable conduct and, therefore, the district court properly determined that Pure Hemp did not demonstrate that this case was exceptional.

The Federal Circuit also rejected Pure Hemp’s argument that copying and pasting portions from the prior art in the patent’s specification (but not disclosing the same prior art references) was inequitable conduct. The Court explained that unlike the nonbinding cases Pure Hemp relied on, the district court here did not find that the copied prior art was material, and the record gave no reason to disbelieve the explanation provided by UCANN’s prosecution counsel. The Court was also unpersuaded by Pure Hemp’s arguments to support inequitable conduct, explaining that the Court was not free to make its own findings on intent to deceive and materiality and, further, the district court was not required to provide its reasoning for its decision in attorney fee cases.

As to Pure Hemp’s argument that the case was exceptional because UCANN’s attorneys [...]

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What’s Shakin’ Bacon? Not Inventorship—Contribution to Invention Can’t Be “Insignificant”

by | May 11, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a district court decision and found that an asserted inventor not named in the application was not a joint inventor because in the context of the entire invention his contribution was too insignificant to constitute joint inventorship. HIP, Inc. v. Hormel Foods Corp., Case No. 22-1696 (Fed. Cir. May 2, 2023) (Lourie, Clevenger, Taranto, JJ.)

Hormel owns a patent directed to precooking bacon and meat pieces. The patent claims a two-step method that involves a preheating step using a microwave oven, infrared oven or hot air, and then a higher-temperature cooking step. Prior to filing its patent application, Hormel and HIP entered into a joint agreement to develop an oven for the two-step cooking process. Hormel evaluated an HIP oven and learned, among other things, that preheating the bacon via a microwave oven prevented condensation from washing away the salt and flavor. HIP’s David Howard suggested an infrared oven (already known in the art) as a possibility for use in the preheating step. Hormel subsequently filed a patent application that did not name Howard as a joint inventor. HIP sued Hormel alleging that Howard was a joint inventor. The district court found that Howard was a joint inventor based solely on his alleged contribution of infrared preheating. Hormel appealed.

The inventors listed on an issued patent are presumed to be the only true inventors. Thus, a party must prove a claim to correct inventorship by clear and convincing evidence. A joint inventor must do the following:

  • Contribute in a significant manner to the conception or reduction to practice of the invention
  • Make a contribution to the claimed invention that is not insignificant in quality when that contribution is measured against the dimension of the full invention
  • Do more than explain well-known concepts or the current state of the art.

The Federal Circuit found that Howard’s alleged contribution of using an infrared oven for preheating the bacon was insignificant in quality when measured against the full invention, which it found to be clearly focused on preheating with a microwave oven. Preheating with an infrared oven was briefly mentioned in passing as an alternative to a microwave oven in the patent’s specification and in a single dependent claim. In contrast to using an infrared oven, the patent claims, specification and figures all prominently featured using a microwave oven for the preheating step. All the independent claims required or allowed using a microwave oven for the preheating step. The specification also repeatedly referred to preheating with a microwave oven, including in the background of the invention and the summary of the invention sections. Further, the examples and corresponding figures included procedures using a microwave oven to preheat, but no mention of using an infrared oven to preheat. Accordingly, the Court found that Howard’s infrared oven suggestion was insignificant in light of the full invention.

The Federal Circuit did not address the other requirements for joint inventorship, reasoning that since all three [...]

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Hanging Patentability on Written Description Cannot Be Truss-ted

by | May 4, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld a Patent Trial & Appeal Board finding that the claims of a patent for a truss hanger were invalid for lack of written description because they claimed an undisclosed range despite the predictable nature of the technology. Columbia Insurance Company v. Simpson Strong-Tie Company Inc., Case Nos. 21-2145; -2157 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 31, 2023) (Prost, Hughes, JJ.) (Moore, C.J., dissenting) (non-precedential).

Truss hangers secure support beams to wall frames in buildings. These hangers normally accommodate layers of fire-resistant sheathing by cutting out the sheathing that overlaps with the hanger, but this can reduce fire resistance. Columbia owns a patent claiming a truss hanger that extends through the sheathing and does not decrease fire resistance. The extension for the sheathing, illustrated below, must be “sized large enough to permit two layers of ⅝ inch thick sheathing to be received between the rear edge plane and the back flange plane, but too small to permit three layers of ⅝ inch thick sheathing to be received.”

Simpson petitioned for a post-grant review of the patent at the Board. That proceeding resulted in a mixed decision. The Board found in favor of Simpson that certain original claims and certain substitute claims of the patent were unpatentable for lack of written description and that certain claims were obvious over the prior art. However, it found in favor of Columbia with regard to one claim. Both parties appealed.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s findings regarding written description. The claimed extension portion covered a range of extension sizes between the upper limit (three layers of five-eighths-inch-thick sheathing) and lower limit (two layers of five-eighths-inch-thick sheathing). The Court affirmed the Board’s finding that nothing in the specification covered the claimed upper limit. Columbia argued that a skilled artisan would read the claims to cover exactly two layers of five-eighths-inch-thick sheathing, but the Court found that this claim construction argument was forfeited because it was raised for the first time on appeal and, even if it weren’t, it was incorrect because it was akin to rewriting the claims.

The Federal Circuit also affirmed the Board’s finding that certain claims were obvious, concluding that the Board’s determination was supported by substantial evidence. The Court rejected Columbia’s argument that the Board’s claim construction violated the Administrative Procedure Act because the construction adopted by the Board was similar enough to Simpson’s proposed construction and not raised sua sponte.

Finally, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s finding that the claim on which Simpson appealed was not indefinite because the term “large enough to permit the drywall to be received” informs a skilled artisan with reasonable certainty that the scope of this claim includes any extension portion sized larger than the smallest commonly known sheathing size. The Court also found that the claim was not obvious because the Board correctly interpreted the claim language [...]

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Breaking Up Is Hard to Do: Validity Upheld Based on Expert Separation Testimony

by | Apr 27, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court decision finding that two patents covering enantiomerically pure compositions of the psoriasis drug Otezla® (apremilast) were valid and one patent covering a dosage titration schedule was invalid as obvious. Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc. Case No. 22-1147 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 19, 2023) (Lourie, Cunningham, Stark, JJ.)

Amgen markets apremilast, a phosphodiesterase-4 inhibitor that is used for treating psoriasis and related conditions, under the brand name Otezla®. Amgen has three patents covering Otezla®. Two of the patents are directed to orally administered pharmaceutical compositions of enantiomerically pure apremilast (composition patents), and one of the patents covers a dosage titration schedule for enantiomerically pure apremilast that ranges from a starting dose of 10 mg to a dose of 60 mg by the sixth day (dosage patent). Sandoz submitted an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) seeking approval from the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to market a generic version of apremilast. Amgen filed suit against Sandoz for infringement of its three patents covering Otezla®.

Sandoz asserted that the composition patents were invalid based on prior art that had an example (Example 12) that described a 50%:50% racemic mixture of apremilast but did not disclose the purified apremilast (+) enantiomer recited in the claims. The prior art did state that apremilast could be isolated from this racemic mixture using chiral chromatography, a well-known technique. The district court rejected Sandoz’s argument, finding that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that a skilled artisan would have had reason to believe that the desirable properties of Example 12 derived in whole or in part from the apremilast enantiomer (i.e., the (+) enantiomer). The district court also concluded that Sandoz had not demonstrated that a skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success in resolving Example 12 into its individual enantiomeric components. Furthermore, the district court looked to objective indicia of non-obviousness, finding that apremilast unexpectedly provided substantial improvement over previously known phosphodiesterase inhibitors in terms of both efficacy and tolerability, and a nexus existed between the unexpected potency and the asserted claims.

Sandoz also argued that the dosage patent was invalid based on prior art that taught various dosage schedules and amounts for apremilast. The district court found that it would have been within the ability of a skilled artisan to titrate apremilast for a patient presenting with psoriasis and that doing so would have been a routine aspect of treating psoriasis with a drug (such as apremilast) that was known in the art to require dose titration to ameliorate side effects. The district court therefore found that the dosage patent was invalid. Sandoz appealed with respect to the composition patents, and Amgen appealed with respect to the dosage patent.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision with respect to the composition patents, finding that Sandoz had not proven that a skilled artisan would have had sufficient motivation to purify apremilast’s (+) enantiomer from the racemic mixture disclosed in Example [...]

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Reaching New Lights: Inherent Upper Limit Enables Open-Ended Range

by | Apr 27, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed an International Trade Commission decision finding a § 337 violation. The Court concluded that the Commission correctly found that an open-ended claim was enabled since there was an inherent upper limit and correctly construed the term “a” to mean “one or more” in finding infringement. FS.com Inc. v. International Trade Commission, Case No. 22-1228 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 20, 2023) (Moore, Prost, Hughes, JJ.)

Corning Optical Communications owns several patents directed to fiber optic technology. Corning alleged that FS violated § 337 by importing high-density fiber optic equipment that infringed the patents. In assessing infringement, the Commission construed the claim term “a front opening” to mean “an opening located in the front side of a fiber optic module (e.g., the opening depicted in Figure 13 of the [asserted] patent as having dimensions H1 and W1”) and further concluded that the term encompassed one or more openings. The Commission found that FS’s products met this requirement and therefore infringed. FS argued that certain claims were invalid because they were not enabled. The claims at issue recited “a fiber optic connection density of at least ninety-eight (98) fiber optic connections per U space” or “a fiber optic connection of at least one hundred forty-four (144) fiber optic connections per U space.” FS argued that these open-ended density ranges were not enabled because the specification only enabled up to 144 fiber optic connections per U space. The Commission rejected FS’s invalidity argument. FS appealed.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the Commission’s enablement determination. The Court explained that open-ended claims are not inherently improper and may be enabled “if there is an inherent, albeit not precisely known, upper limit and the specification enables one of skill in the art to approach that limit.” The Court found that there was an inherent upper limit of about 144 connections per U space since skilled artisans would have understood that densities substantially above 144 connections per U space were technologically infeasible. The Court further found that the specification disclosed that the maximum density achievable was 144 connections per U space and expert testimony confirmed that, despite market pressure, no commercial product has achieved a density greater than 144 connections. Considering this evidence, the Court concluded that the Commission properly found that the open-ended claims had an inherent upper limit of about 144 connections per U space and the claimed open-ended range was therefore enabled.

The Federal Circuit also affirmed the Commission’s infringement determination. The Court explained that the terms “a” or “an” in a patent claim generally mean “one or more,” unless the patentee evinces a clear intent to limit “a” or “an” to “one.” FS argued that the recitation of “front openings” in an unasserted claim showed a clear intent to limit “a front opening” in the asserted claim to a single opening. The Court rejected that argument, finding that limiting an unasserted claim to multiple openings did not show an intent to limit the asserted claim to [...]

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No Spark Here: TTAB Refuses to Register Similar Mark for Real Estate Services

by | Apr 27, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board’s refusal to register a mark due to the “close similarity” between the applied-for mark and a previously registered mark. In Re: Charger Ventures LLC, Case No. 22-1094 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 13, 2023) (Prost, Reyna, Stark, JJ.)

Charger Ventures applied to register SPARK LIVING, identifying its services as rental property management and real estate leasing and listing. Based on an existing mark, SPARK, which identified other real estate services such as rental brokerage, commercial property leasing and management, the Examining Attorney ultimately refused to register Charger’s mark, despite Charger twice amending its application and disclaiming the word LIVING. Charger appealed to the Board, which used the 13 DuPont factors to analyze likelihood of confusion. The Board focused on five of the DuPont factors:

  1. Similarity of the marks: SPARK LIVING fully incorporates SPARK, and LIVING is both descriptive and disclaimed, making it “subordinate to SPARK.”
  2. Similarity of the nature of goods/services: While not identical, commercial and residential real estate services may “emanate from a single source under a single mark.”
  3. Similarity of trade channels: There exists “some overlap” between commercial and residential real estate trade channels.
  4. Class of purchasers: Although real estate purchasers exercise a high level of care, “even . . . sophisticated purchasers are not immune from source confusion.”
  5. Strength of the mark: Although SPARK is somewhat commercially weak, “even weak marks are entitled to protection.”

The Board did not announce the weight it afforded to each factor but found that Charger failed to overcome the high similarity between its mark and SPARK. The Board therefore affirmed the Examining Attorney and refused to register SPARK LIVING. Charger appealed to the Federal Circuit.

As to factor 1, Charger argued that the Board erred in finding similarity of the marks. The Federal Circuit disagreed, noting that Charger disclaimed LIVING from its mark. The Court explained that disclaimer has no legal effect on likelihood of confusion because consumers do not know which words have been disclaimed. The Court found that the Board properly considered the full mark and that the marks were clearly similar.

As to factors 2 and 3, Charger argued that the previous SPARK registration could not be newly extended to include residential real estate services. The Federal Circuit rejected Charger’s argument, finding that many marks bridge the commercial and residential gap and that a registration’s listed services do not limit the trade channels in which the mark actually operates.

Regarding factor 4, Charger argued that SPARK and SPARK LIVING appealed to different classes of purchasers. The Federal Circuit disagreed, finding that Charger had failed to show that residential property owners were distinct from commercial owners.

Charger asserted that the Board improperly analyzed factor 5, since a mark’s weakness is “paramount” to likelihood of confusion. However, the Federal Circuit agreed with the Board that Charger failed to overcome the registered mark’s presumption of validity, despite other “spark” marks in the field. The Court [...]

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