Federal Circuit Archives

Federal Circuit

Moving to Recuse? Too Little, Too Late

by Lois D. Mermelstein | Nov 14, 2024 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled that waiting until well after an adverse summary judgment motion to move for a district court judge’s recusal is untimely and moot, especially where an appeal from the adverse decision is already filed and where the recusal motion is based on public information. Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. Fitbit LLC, et al., Case No. 22-1526 (Fed Cir. Nov. 1, 2024) (Taranto, Prost, Reyna, JJ.) (nonprecedential).

Cellspin filed a complaint for patent infringement against Fitbit and others in October 2017. In February 2021, Fitbit amended its corporate disclosure statement to reflect the completion of its acquisition by Google (an indirect subsidiary of Alphabet). Almost a year later, in January 2022, Fitbit and the other defendants moved for summary judgment of noninfringement in their respective cases, and in June 2022, the district court granted summary judgment.

Months later, in January 2023, after the grant of summary judgment and the filing of notices of appeal from that grant, Cellspin filed a motion to recuse the district court judge based on the judge’s mutual fund investments that were likely to invest in Google. The consulting firm for which the judge’s husband worked also sold Google services, but the judge’s spouse did not do work for Google. The district court denied the motion on the merits as untimely and because the district court lacked authority to vacate the summary judgment that was already on appeal.

Applying Ninth Circuit law and reviewing for abuse of discretion, the Federal Circuit found that Cellspin’s behavior in waiting until well after it had lost on summary judgment, and almost two years after Google’s acquisition of Fitbit became final, “raises obvious concerns of lack of equity and strategic misuse of recusal.” The sources Fitbit cited for the judge’s spouse and the activities of the spouse’s employer were also public well before the summary judgment motion was granted, as were the judge’s financial disclosures.

While there is no specific time limit for seeking recusal, the Federal Circuit (citing its 1989 decision in Polaroid v. Eastman Kodak) noted that “timeliness is a well-established consideration in application of the [recusal] statute. In deciding motions to vacate orders issued by an allegedly disqualified judge, the courts have used ‘untimely’ as a synonym for ‘unfair’ when the circumstances, like those present here, are such that a grant of the motion would produce a result inequitable, unjust, and unfair.”

The Federal Circuit also noted that the risk of injustice to the parties from denying vacatur would also be essentially nonexistent here because the Federal Circuit’s concurrent holding on the summary judgment appeal against other defendants had preclusive effect, resolving Cellspin’s infringement assertions against Fitbit as well.

Practice Note: Any motion for recusal should be promptly filed when grounds for the motion become apparent.

Equivalence Requires Element-by-Element Proof With Linking Argument

by Tessa Kroll | Nov 7, 2024 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court determination that a patent owner had not provided the “particularized testimony and linking argument” required to demonstrate equivalence under the doctrine of equivalents. NexStep, Inc. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, Case No. 2022-1815 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 24, 2024) (Chen, Taranto, JJ.) (Reyna, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In his dissent, Judge Reyna criticized the majority for ignoring the totality of the evidence presented by the patent owner and imposing a new rule requiring patentees to always present expert testimony to prove infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.

NexStep owns a patent directed to a “concierge device” for assisting users with obtaining customer support for smart devices. The claims are directed to a concierge device that initiates a technical support session in response to “a single action” (i.e., a single button press) by a user. After the claimed “single action,” the concierge device conveys consumer device identification information for the product at issue, identifies an appropriate technical support team for the product, and causes the home gateway to initiate a support session for the device and forward the consumer device information during the session.

NexStep sued Comcast for patent infringement, asserting that three tools in Comcast’s mobile smartphone application infringed the concierge device patent: Xfinity Assistant, Troubleshooting Card, and Diagnostic Check. Each of these tools assists users with troubleshooting a given device in response to the user pressing a series of buttons on a smartphone’s display. At trial, NexStep argued that pressing a series of buttons literally met the single action limitation because a single action could comprise a series of steps. By way of illustration, NexStep’s expert explained that throwing a baseball – a single action – required multiple steps: “[W]hen you throw a baseball, you pick it up, you orient it, you get it in your palm, you throw it.”

The jury returned a verdict of no literal infringement but found infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. Comcast moved for judgment as a matter of law, which the district court granted after finding that NexStep had failed to offer the “particularized testimony and linking argument” required to demonstrate equivalence. NexStep appealed.

The Federal Circuit emphasized that the doctrine of equivalents provides a “limited exception” to the principle that the claim defines the scope of the patentee’s exclusivity rights, and that a finding under the doctrine of equivalents is “exceptional.” To guard against overbroad applications of this exception, the Court’s precedent imposes specific evidentiary requirements necessary to prove infringement under the doctrine. The patent owner must provide proof on an element-by-element basis and from the perspective of someone skilled in the art, “for example through testimony of experts or others versed in the technology; by documents . . . and . . . by the disclosures of the prior art.” Finally, the patent owner must provide “particularized testimony and linking argument as to the insubstantiality of the differences between the claimed invention and the [...]

Continue Reading

Can’t Stop the FRAND: Navigating SEP Licensing Disputes

by Lois D. Mermelstein | Nov 7, 2024 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated a district court’s decision to deny an antisuit injunction prohibiting a patent owner from enforcing injunctions that it obtained in Columbia and Brazil on standard essential patents (SEPs). Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, et al. v. Lenovo (United States), Inc., Case No. 24-1515 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 24, 2024) (Prost, Lourie, Reyna, JJ.)

Lenovo and Ericsson entered into negotiations to cross-license their SEPs to each other. SEPs are patents declared essential to complying with a technical standard. Because SEPs by definition must be practiced to comply with a given standard, SEP holders wield significant power over standard implementers during licensing negotiations. Standard setting organizations therefore typically have an intellectual property policy under which SEP holders agree to license their SEPs on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) terms. Here, the parties agreed that the FRAND commitment was a contract, governed by French law, that each party could enforce against the other, and that the FRAND commitment included an obligation to negotiate in good faith over licenses to SEPs.

After the parties were unsuccessful in reaching agreement, Ericsson sued Lenovo in US district court alleging that Lenovo infringed four of Ericsson’s US SEPs related to the 5G wireless communication standard. Ericsson also alleged that Lenovo breached its FRAND commitment by failing to negotiate in good faith and asked the district court to determine a FRAND rate for a global cross-license between the parties. Lenovo counterclaimed, alleging that Ericsson infringed four of Lenovo’s 5G US SEPs and asking for a similar outcome. Lenovo also asked the district court to enter an antisuit injunction prohibiting Ericsson from enforcing the preliminary injunctions Ericsson obtained in Colombia and Brazil that prohibited Lenovo from infringing Ericsson’s Columbian and Brazilian 5G SEPs. The district court denied Lenovo’s motion, following the antisuit injunction framework in the Ninth Circuit’s 2012 decision in Microsoft v. Motorola. The district court concluded that the instant suit was not dispositive of the foreign action, which was a threshold requirement to enter such an injunction. Lenovo appealed.

The Federal Circuit disagreed with the district court’s determination, finding that a party with a FRAND commitment must negotiate in good faith over a license to its SEPs before it pursues injunctive relief based on those SEPs. Interpreting the “dispositive” requirement, the Court concluded that the “requirement can be met even though a foreign antisuit injunction would resolve only a foreign injunction (and not the entire foreign proceeding), and even though the relevant resolution depends on the potential that one party’s view of the facts or law prevails in the domestic suit.” Here, the Court found that the requirement was met because the “FRAND commitment precludes Ericsson from pursuing SEP-based injunctive relief unless it has first complied with the commitment’s obligation to negotiate in good faith over a license to those SEPs.” If the district court were to determine that Ericsson had not complied with that obligation, that determination would dictate the impropriety of Ericsson pursuing SEP-based injunctive relief. Accordingly, the [...]

Continue Reading

Pre-Markman Claim Construction Is OK, Within Limits

by Sydney E. McDermott | Oct 31, 2024 | Patents

In an appeal stemming from the denial of a preliminary injunction and dismissal of the complaint, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit clarified its precedent and explained that a district court may construe claims at the motion to dismiss Rule 12(b)(6) stage, but only to the extent necessary to decide the motion. UTTO Inc. v. Metrotech Corp., Case No. 23-1435 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 18, 2024) (Prost, Taranto, Hughes, JJ.)

UTTO sued Metrotech in the US District Court for the Northern District of California for patent infringement and tortious interference with prospective economic advantage under California law. UTTO also moved for a preliminary injunction. The asserted patent describes and claims methods for detecting and identifying “buried assets,” which refers to underground utility lines. The district court denied the preliminary injunction because of UTTO’s failure to show a likelihood of success on the merits for infringement based on the district court’s construction. The district court adopted a construction of the term “group” as requiring at least two data points per buried asset. The district court then dismissed the original complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted but allowed UTTO to amend, explaining that infringement of the claims as construed at the preliminary injunction stage was not pled.

UTTO then filed an amended complaint, which the district court also dismissed, noting that UTTO failed to plead facts supporting infringement of other limitations under the claim construction issued at the preliminary injunction stage. The district court again granted UTTO leave to amend, which UTTO did. But the district court dismissed that third complaint as well, this time with prejudice, citing the claim construction in its order at the preliminary injunction stage.

On appeal, UTTO (citing 2018 Federal Circuit precedent Nalco v. Chem-Mod) challenged the district court’s claim construction and its reliance on a claim construction in an order denying summary judgment to dismiss a complaint. The Federal Circuit explained that claim construction by a district court “to resolve . . . particular claim construction issues in [a] case” may be necessary and is not categorically barred at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage. The Court explained that there is a “logical relationship of claim construction” between “infringement and the normal function of courts deciding whether to grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” An infringement analysis first requires an analysis of the scope and meaning of the claims asserted and then the “properly construed claims” are compared to the accused device or method. Often, claims are construed based on intrinsic evidence alone, which the Federal Circuit concluded “is not different in kind from the interpretation of other legal standards, which is proper and routine in ruling on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6).” As an example, the Court cited its routine dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6) in connection with motions under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

The Federal Circuit cautioned that not all claim construction issues need to be construed at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, but only those issues necessary to decide a [...]

Continue Reading

What a Croc! False Claim That Product Feature Is Patented Can Give Rise to Lanham Act Violation

by Karen Gover | Oct 17, 2024 | Trademarks

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded a grant of summary judgment on a false advertising claim, concluding that a cause of action under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act can arise when a party falsely claims to hold a patent on a product feature and advertises that feature in a misleading way. Crocs, Inc. v. Effervescent, Inc., Case No. 2022-2160 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 3, 2024) (Reyna, Cunningham, JJ.; Albright, District J., sitting by designation).

Crocs, the well-known maker of molded foam footwear, sued several competitor shoe distributors for patent infringement in 2006. The case was stayed pending an action before the International Trade Commission but resumed in 2012 when Croc added competitor U.S.A. Dawgs as a defendant to the district court litigation. The case was stayed twice more, from 2012 to 2016 and 2018 to 2020. In between those stays, in May 2016, Dawgs filed a counterclaim against Crocs and 18 of its current and former officers and directors, alleging false advertising violations of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). The individual defendants were later dismissed from the action.

Dawgs claimed that Crocs deceived consumers and damaged its competitors by falsely describing its molded footwear material, which it calls “Croslite,” as “patented,” “proprietary,” and “exclusive.” Dawgs alleged that it was damaged by Crocs’ false advertisements and commercial misrepresentations because Crocs suggested that its competitors’ footwear material was inferior. Croslite is in fact not patented, as Crocs conceded.

Crocs argued in its motion for summary judgment that Dawgs failed as a matter of law to state a cause of action under Section 43(a) because the alleged advertising statements were directed to a false designation of authorship of the shoe products and not to their nature, characteristics, or qualities, as Section 43(a)(1)(B) requires. The district court agreed. Applying the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. and the Federal Circuit’s 2009 decision in Baden Sports, Inc. v. Molten USA, Inc., the district court granted summary judgment to Crocs. It reasoned that falsely claiming to have “patented” something is similar to a false claim of authorship or inventorship, not to the types of false advertising prohibited by the Lanham Act. Dawgs appealed.

Dawgs argued that the district court’s application of Dastar and Baden to the circumstances of its case was inapposite, and the Federal Circuit agreed. In Dastar, the petitioner copied a television series in the public domain, made minor changes, and sold it as a video set, passing it off as its own. The Supreme Court held that a false claim of authorship does not give rise to a cause of action under the Lanham Act. Similarly, in Baden, the Federal Circuit found that a basketball manufacturer’s false suggestion that it was the author of the “innovative” “dual-cushion technology” in its basketballs did not give rise to a false advertising claim under the Lanham Act.

In this case, however, the Federal Circuit reasoned that Croc’s false [...]

Continue Reading

Don’t Tread on Illinois’ Absolute Litigation Privilege

by Connor M. Larson | Oct 17, 2024 | Trademarks

Addressing when Illinois law’s “absolute litigation privilege” bars certain counterclaims, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s summary judgment finding that the plaintiff lacked a valid trade dress and reversed the district court’s decision that declined to apply the absolute litigation privilege as a complete defense to all of the alleged infringer’s counterclaims. Toyo Tire Corp v. Atturo Tire Corp., Case No. 22-1817 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 4, 2024) (Moore, Clevenger, Chen, JJ.) (nonprecedential).

Toyo and Atturo are competitors in the tire design business. After perceiving widespread copying of its tire designs, Toyo filed a district court action asserting design patent infringement and trade dress infringement against Atturo. Atturo asserted counterclaims, including false designation of origin under the Lanham Act and several state law counterclaims. The district court eventually dismissed with prejudice Toyo’s design patent infringement claims and proceeded with just the trade dress infringement claim.

A primary issue in the case was the description of the asserted trade dress. In its complaint, Toyo identified its trade dress merely as “the overall appearance” of its line of tires. Over the course of discovery, disputes arose concerning Toyo’s failure to distinctly describe its asserted trade dress. Toyo answered an interrogatory that requested this information with a non-limiting definition. The district court compelled Toyo to provide a more specific answer, which Toyo did by providing highlighted images.

Toyo’s fact witness was subsequently deposed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) and gave answers that were inconsistent with Toyo’s interrogatory response. This led the district court to compel more testimony on what exactly the asserted trade dress contained, and which tire features met the definition of the trade dress, and which did not. On the advice of counsel, the corporate witness declined to answer more than 100 different questions. Toyo’s inability to describe its trade dress continued into expert discovery. When it served its expert reports, Toyo introduced yet another aspect of its trade dress – that the trade dress only included two-dimensional aspects. Toyo introduced this new argument to support the requirement that to qualify as trade dress the designated feature must be nonfunctional.

Atturo moved for sanctions. In granting the sanctions, the district court barred Toyo from asserting only the two-dimensional aspects of the trade dress, precluding Toyo from continually shifting its position because doing so “would effectively lead to trial by ambush.” Having struck the only argument that could save the trade dress from invalidity, the district court granted summary judgment of invalidity on both functionality and lack of secondary meaning.

Trial then proceeded only on Atturo’s counterclaims. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Atturo on six of the counterclaims, awarding $10 million in compensatory damages and $100 million in punitive damages. The district court set aside the jury verdict as it related to counterclaims of defamation and liability under the Illinois Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Both parties appealed.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s issuance of discovery sanctions, and the grant of [...]

Continue Reading

No Matter How You Slice and Dice It, Conclusory Evidence Can’t Support Entire Market Value Damages

by Sydney E. McDermott | Oct 10, 2024 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concluded that the entire market value rule was not applicable where conclusory expert testimony was the only evidence that a product’s infringing features drove consumer demand, and therefore reversed. Provisur Techs., Inc. v. Weber, Inc., Case No. 23-1438 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 2, 2024) (Moore, C.J.; Taranto, Cecchi, JJ.)

Provisur sued Weber in the Western District of Missouri over three patents related to slicing and packaging meats and cheeses. The jury determined that Weber willfully infringed several claims of the three asserted patents and awarded damages. Following the trial, Weber moved for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) on the issues of infringement and willfulness, and a new trial on infringement, willfulness, and damages. The district court denied Weber’s motion in its entirety. Weber appealed.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment with respect to two of the asserted patents but reversed the infringement finding on the sole asserted claim of the third patent. Provisur’s infringement theory was that the consumer could program the device to infringe the limitations of the claim. However, at trial, Provisur provided no evidence that it was actually possible for the consumer to configure the device to practice the claim or that any consumer had ever done so. Some of the software necessary to be configured in an infringing manner was not accessible to the consumer. Instead, only Weber service technicians could access it. Provisur also proffered no evidence that the devices had ever actually been configured to infringe the claims, instead only offering evidence that the claims could have been infringed.

Next, the Federal Circuit assessed willfulness. Weber’s primary argument was that the district court improperly allowed expert testimony in violation of 35 U.S.C. § 298, which states that a party’s failure “to obtain the advice of counsel with respect to any allegedly infringed patent . . . may not be used to prove that the accused infringer willfully infringed the patent.” Provisur’s expert, who testified about industry standards for intellectual property management, “did not distinguish between legal and non-legal services when testifying about consulting a third party.” The Court concluded that that portion of the testimony was inadmissible and the remaining evidence could not support a finding of willfulness.

Finally, the Federal Circuit addressed the damages issue, specifically focusing on the reasonable royalty award. The infringing features were subparts of a larger accused product – which had many non-infringing features. The accused product contained multiple separate machines unrelated to the alleged invention.

Provisur’s royalty award was predicated on its use of the entire market value rule, where the base to which the royalty rate is applied is the cost of the entire accused product as opposed the cost of just the infringing part. The Federal Circuit noted that the entire market value rule is an acceptable theory, but it requires a showing that the infringing part “is the basis for customer demand.”

Provisur’s damages expert used the entire market value rule in calculating the [...]

Continue Reading

Got Pillaged? Not If You Didn’t Follow the APA and FTCA

by Christian Tatum | Oct 10, 2024 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court decision dismissing claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) against the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) relating to “pillaged patents.” The Federal Circuit found that dismissal was appropriate because the plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies and the claims were barred under collateral estoppel. Winfrey v. Dep’t of Com., Case No. 24-1260 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 25, 2024) (Prost, Hughes, Cunningham, JJ.) (per curiam).

Eula Winfrey filed a pro se complaint in district court seeking “relief for the issue of two pillaged patents,” one of which was directed to a “step-up diaper” and the other to a “stroller buddy.” Winfrey claimed that the PTO “improperly denied her two patent applications and wrongfully deemed the applications to be abandoned,” and that she was the true inventor of Huggies Pull-Ups diapers. Interpreting Winfrey’s requests for relief as claims under the FTCA and the APA, the district court dismissed the claims related to the step-up diaper patent application for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The district court found that Winfrey never presented an administrative claim to the PTO as required by the FTCA and that she did not file a petition to revive the application after the PTO deemed it abandoned. The district court also dismissed Winfrey’s APA claim related to the stroller buddy patent application based on collateral estoppel because Winfrey had previously litigated that claim. Winfrey appealed.

Applying Eleventh Circuit law, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of all of Winfrey’s claims. Addressing the FTCA claim first, the Court noted that “nowhere in any of her extensive filings before this court do we find evidence that Ms. Winfrey filed the requisite administrative claim to bring a claim for money damages against the USPTO.” The Federal Circuit also affirmed the district court’s dismissal of claims related to the stroller buddy application based on collateral estoppel, finding that Winfrey had brought the claim unsuccessfully three times. Finally, with respect to the APA claim for the step-up diaper patent application, the Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies after finding that Winfrey failed to “present any evidence that she filed a petition with the USPTO to revive her application or challenge its abandonment determination.”

Rewind: Federal Circuit Grants En Banc Rehearing Over Royalty Damages

by Keval Amin | Oct 3, 2024 | Patents

The en banc US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued a per curiam order vacating its previous panel decision upholding a district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion for a new trial on damages. In that decision, the Federal Circuit found that the plaintiff’s damages expert adequately demonstrated the economic comparability of prior license agreements to a hypothetical negotiation between the parties. Now, the Court has granted the defendant’s petition for rehearing en banc. EcoFactor, Inc. v. Google LLC, Case No. 23-1101 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 25, 2024) (per curiam) (Moore, C.J.; Lourie, Dyk, Prost, Reyna, Taranto, Chen, Hughes, Stoll, Stark, JJ.) Judge Prost dissented in part in the original panel decision.

EcoFactor sued Google over Nest thermostats allegedly infringing EcoFactor’s HVAC patent. The initial appeal revolved around the validity of the patent, the infringement verdict, and the damages awarded. Google argued that the patent was directed to an abstract idea and therefore was patent ineligible under 35 U.S.C. §101. Google also argued that the district court erred in its rulings on noninfringement and damages. The Federal Circuit majority upheld the district court’s decisions, finding genuine issues of material fact on patent validity, substantial evidence of infringement, and admissible expert testimony supporting the damages award. The Court dismissed Google’s challenge to the expert’s use of license agreements for calculating royalties, as the Court found the methodology reasonable. However, Judge Prost’s dissent in the original panel decision criticized the damages calculation, arguing that the expert’s methodology lacked rigor, particularly for failing to apportion the patented technology’s value from other licensed patents.

The en banc Federal Circuit will now reconsider the practice of using a patent owner’s prior license agreements to determine royalty rates, a method that can become complicated when the scope of licenses varies or when lump sums and royalties are not clearly apportioned.

The en banc order directed the parties to file new briefs limited to the issue of whether “the district court[] adhere[d] to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), in its allowance of testimony from EcoFactor’s damages expert assigning a per-unit royalty rate to the three licenses in evidence in this case.”

When Can Same Claim Limitation Have Different Meanings? When It’s Functional, Of Course

by Sydney E. McDermott | Sep 26, 2024 | Patents

Addressing for the first time whether a functional limitation must carry the same meaning in all claims, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit determined that it need not, vacating a district court decision to the contrary. Vascular Sol. LLC v. Medtronic, Inc., Case No. 2024-1398 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2024) (Moore, Prost, JJ.; Mazzant, Dist. J., by designation).

The seven patents asserted by Teleflex syin this case all come from a common application and are directed to a “coaxial guide catheter that is deliverable through standard guide catheters by utilizing a guidewire rail segment to permit delivery without blocking use of the guide catheter.” The asserted patents all share a common specification. However, the asserted claims differ in how they refer to the “side opening.” Some claims include the side opening as part of the “substantially rigid portion/segment” while other claims recite that the side opening is separate and distal to the “substantially rigid portion/segment.”

This case has a long procedural history involving an initial preliminary injunction motion and multiple inter partes reviews (IPRs). At the second preliminary injunction stage, Medtronic and the district court grouped the asserted limitations into two mutually exclusive groups:

Group One, which included the “substantially rigid portion/segment” claim limitation.
Group Two, which “required that the side opening not be in the substantially rigid portion” (emphasis supplied).

In denying Medtronic’s preliminary injunction motion, the district court questioned “how a skilled artisan could possibly be expected to understand the scope of a patent when the same device could simultaneously infringe two mutually exclusive claims within that patent.”

The district court then proceeded to claim construction. It rejected both parties’ initial constructions and appointed an independent expert – former US Patent & Trademark Office Director Andrei Iancu – to propose a construction. Teleflex argued that Iancu should adopt a split construction (i.e., one construction for the Group One limitations and another construction for the Group Two limitations). Medtronic argued that the claims were indefinite. Iancu rejected both proposed constructions but agreed with the district court on the mutual exclusivity of the two groups. The district court determined that all claims that included the “substantially rigid portion/segment” were indefinite, and since all the asserted claims included that term, the parties stipulated to final judgment. Teleflex appealed.

Teleflex argued that the district court erred in determining that the boundary of the substantially rigid portion must be the same for all claims. Medtronic argued that the claims were indefinite.

The Federal Circuit concluded that the district court erred when it determined that the Group One and Group Two limitations were mutually exclusive and indefinite. The Federal Circuit cautioned that affirming the district court’s conclusion would mean that claims in a patent cannot vary in how they claim the disclosed subject matter and that independent claims must be entirely consistent with other independent claims, neither of which is a restriction in how patentees may claim subject matter. The Federal Circuit explained that at the claim construction stage [...]

Continue Reading

Older Posts »

BLOG EDITORS

Paul Devinsky

Amol Parikh

BLOG EDITORS

STAY CONNECTED

TOPICS

ARCHIVES

RECENT POSTS