Eighth Circuit Archives

Eighth Circuit

What Do You Meme? TFW Commercial Use Outweighs Fair Use

by Anisa Noorassa | Jun 20, 2024 | Copyrights

The US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a district court’s copyright infringement decision, finding that a congressional reelection campaign’s use of a popular meme to solicit donations was commercial in nature and therefore not fair use. Laney Griner v. King for Congress, Case No. 22-3623 (8th Cir. June 7, 2024) (Benton, Erickson, Kobes JJ.)

Laney Griner owns the copyright for the popular meme “Success Kid,” which is a photograph of then 11-month-old Sam Griner with his hand in a fist clenching sand at the beach.

Griner took the photograph in 2007. The photograph went on to become one of the first viral memes, with billions of internet users spreading the image with a variety of captions. Griner registered the copyright of the Success Kid meme in 2012 and has since licensed that photograph to many companies, including Virgin Mobile, Vitamin Water, Microsoft and Coca-Cola, for commercial use.

Steven King served as a congressional representative from Iowa from 2003 to 2021. During his 2020 reelection campaign, the King for Congress Committee, which supported the congressional campaign, posted the meme on its website, Facebook and Twitter in an effort to seek donations:

After requesting the removal of the posts to no avail, Griner filed a lawsuit for copyright infringement and violation of Sam’s privacy. The jury found that neither the committee nor the congressman violated Sam’s privacy, but it did find that the committee (but not the congressman) had “innocently” infringed Griner’s copyright. The jury awarded $750 in damages, which is the statutory minimum. The committee appealed.

The committee argued that its use of the meme was fair use under Section 107 of the Copyright Act. Under the Copyright Act, four factors define fair use:

The purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes
The nature of the copyrighted work
The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole
The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work

The Eighth Circuit found that the first factor weighed against the committee since the post clearly used the meme to call for donations and was undoubtedly commercial in nature. The commercial nature of the use voided the committee’s argument that the meme had been used millions, if not billions, of times without permission by users across the internet. Likewise, the “transformative elements” that the committee added (original text) were not persuasive enough to overcome this commercial nature. The Court found that the third factor also weighed against the committee since the “most substantial part of the work,” the “Success Kid himself,” was used in the committee’s post. The Court found that the fourth factor weighed in neither party’s favor, despite the fact [...]

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Copyrightability? Think Outside the Checkbox

by Keval Amin | Feb 22, 2024 | Copyrights

The US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a district court’s judgment that a customer intake form was not copyrightable because it lacked requisite originality. Ronald Ragan, Jr. v. Berkshire Hathaway Automotive, Inc., Case No. 22-3355 (8th Cir. Feb. 2, 2024) (Grasz, Smith, Gruender, JJ.)

Ronald Ragan claimed that he owned the Guest Sheet, a form he designed to aid car dealerships in their sales processes. The form, registered with the US Copyright Office in 1999, included various questions, prompts, headings, fill-in-the-blank lines and checkboxes. Ragan initially accused an auto dealership of copying and using the Guest Sheet. However, subsequent legal action regarding the dealership’s alleged infringement was dismissed because of jurisdictional issues.

Five years later, Berkshire Hathaway Automotive acquired the dealership. Berkshire Hathaway continued to use the Guest Sheet post-acquisition despite Ragan’s objections. Allegedly, Berkshire Hathaway agreed to modify the form but continued to use it, prompting Ragan to initiate a copyright infringement lawsuit. Berkshire Hathaway moved for judgment on the pleadings, contending that the Guest Sheet was not copyrightable. After the district court granted the motion, Ragan appealed.

Ragan argued that the district court erroneously found the Guest Sheet uncopyrightable. The Eighth Circuit disagreed, stating that the Guest Sheet lacked the necessary originality to qualify for copyright protection. Despite Ragan’s contentions regarding the form’s sophistication distilled from years of experience, the Court found it to be a basic customer intake sheet with minimal creativity, consisting of simple questions, prompts and checkboxes and totaling fewer than 100 words. Citing and quoting from the 1991 Supreme Court decision in Feist Publ’ns. v. Rural Tel. Serv., the Eighth Circuit explained that to be copyrightable, a work must possess a minimal degree of originality: “To meet this [originality] requirement, a work must be ‘independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and . . . possess[] at least some minimal degree of creativity.’”

The Eighth Circuit rejected Ragan’s argument that the selection and arrangement of words on the Guest Sheet constituted sufficient originality, emphasizing the need for creativity beyond mere selection. The Court also noted that the Guest Sheet primarily served as a tool for collecting information rather than conveying substantial content, further diminishing its claim to copyright protection.

Ragan also argued that the Guest Sheet’s copyright registration certificate afforded it a presumption of validity. However, the Eighth Circuit rebuffed this argument noting that Berkshire’s challenge to Guest Sheet’s copyrightability could be based solely on examination of the form itself, notwithstanding the presumption of validity attendant to the registration certificate.

Practice Note: This decision highlights the importance of demonstrating substantial creativity in crafting documents for potential copyright protection and emphasizes that mere selection and arrangement of words may not suffice. Legal proceedings can hinge on the functionality and purpose of a document, as evidenced by the court’s distinction between information-conveying and information-capturing forms in determining copyrightability.

Uncompleted Building Sold in Bankruptcy Doesn’t Infringe Architect’s Copyright

by Jodi Benassi | Aug 24, 2023 | Copyrights

The US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a district court’s ruling that there was no actionable infringement where an uncompleted building sold under the authority of a bankruptcy court was later completed. Cornice & Rose International, LLC v. Four Keys, LLC et al., Case No. 22-1976 (8th Cir. Aug. 11, 2023) (Loken, Shepard, Kelly, JJ.) (per curiam). The Court explained that the architectural copyright claims were precluded by the bankruptcy court’s order approving the sale.

McQuillen Place Company retained Cornice & Rose, an architectural firm, to design a building. Cornice created technical drawings for the building and obtained copyrights for its drawings and for the building itself, the tangible embodiment of its design work. When the building was 90% complete, McQuillen halted construction and filed for bankruptcy. During liquidation proceedings, the trustee moved to sell the building to the lender, First Security Bank & Trust Company. Cornice objected to the sale on various grounds, including that its copyright protection in the building itself would be infringed by an order authorizing the sale. In response, First Security Bank suggested language to protect the parties, which the court incorporated into its order authorizing the sale of the uncompleted building, as follows:

Copyright: So long as the Purchaser, or its assignee, or its architect or agents do not use the Plans or Drawings or any work in which Cornice & Rose International, LLC (“C & R”) holds a valid copyright (the C & R Intellectual Property), the Purchaser, or its assignee, may use and occupy the Property, develop the Property, and complete the existing interior and exterior of the Property, free and clear of existing and future claims of C & R, whether for copyright infringement or otherwise. The Purchaser, or its assignee, or its architect or agents may not use the C &R Intellectual Property without first making arrangements satisfactory to C & R for the use of the C & R Intellectual Property. Nothing contained herein shall preclude future claims of copyright infringement resulting from the improper or unauthorized use of the C & R Intellectual Property by the Purchaser, or its assignee, or any third parties.

Cornice filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that under its contract with McQuillen, the license for the use of the building was conditioned on full, complete and timely payment. Because that had not occurred, there was no license for the construction of the building and, therefore, the building was an infringing copy of the architectural work. The following day the bankruptcy court denied the motion. Cornice filed an appeal, which the bankruptcy court dismissed under 1 U.S.C. §363(m) because the sale had been completed.

While the appeal was pending, the trustee sold the building, and First Security Bank assigned its interest to Four Keys, which hired various companies to finish the building. Cornice then sued First Security Bank, its president, Four Keys and others for copyright infringement by finishing the building as an infringing derivative work. Cornice sought a declaratory judgment [...]

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A Textbook Example: Single Online Sale Does Not a Minimum Contact Make

by Mike Baldwin | Aug 10, 2023 | Copyrights

The US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding that a single online sale did not establish minimum contacts to support personal jurisdiction. Kendall Hunt Publishing Company v. The Learning Tree Publishing Corporation, Case No. 22-1885 (8th Cir. July 24, 2023) (Smith, Wollman, Loken, JJ.)

Kendall Hunt Publishing filed a copyright infringement lawsuit against The Learning Tree Publishing in the District of Iowa. Before founding Learning Tree, Frank Forcier and John Coniglio worked remotely for Kendall Hunt from their homes in California. Both individuals traveled to Iowa for work, had regular contact with Iowa co-workers during their tenures and accessed files on an Iowa-based server. Nicholas Baiamonte teaches in California, where he wrote an online ethics textbook. Forcier negotiated with Baiamonte on behalf of Kendall Hunt from 2014 to 2016, and as a result, Baiamonte entered into contracts with Kendall Hunt to publish his textbook as Course Pack 4: Ethics. Baiamonte assigned publication rights to Kendall Hunt.

In 2019, Forcier and Coniglio incorporated Learning Tree in California to sell online textbooks to post-secondary students. Learning Tree targeted its advertising to California professors and educational institutions, as well as some limited sales to Colorado and Oklahoma. One of these textbooks was an ethics textbook that included some copyrighted portions of Baiamonte’s ethics textbook.

Kendall Hunt’s lawsuit alleged that a single purchase of the ethics textbook by an Iowa-based Kendall Hunt employee established the requisite minimum contacts with Iowa to support personal jurisdiction. Kendall Hunt also alleged that the prior contacts Forcier and Coniglio established with Iowa through their employment with Kendall Hunt should be attributed to Learning Tree. These contacts included Coniglio regularly traveling to Iowa from 1995 to 2006 and Forcier traveling to Iowa in 2005 and 2006. The district court rejected Kendall Hunt’s jurisdictional arguments and dismissed the complaint. Kendall Hunt appealed.

Reviewing de novo, the Eighth Circuit set out the factors to analyze Iowa’s long-arm statute, which is permissive up to the extent of due process. These factors include the nature and quality of Learning Tree’s contracts with Iowa, the quantity of the contacts, the relation of the cause of action to the contacts, the interest of the forum state and the convenience of the parties. They also include the additional factors for intentional torts: the intentionality of the acts; whether the contacts were uniquely or expressly aimed at the forum; and whether the contacts caused harm, or the defendant knew they were likely to cause harm, of which the majority occurred in the forum state.

The Eighth Circuit concluded that Learning Tree did not expressly aim at or target Iowa because it did not advertise in Iowa. The Court found that Kendall Hunt’s litigation-based purchase was the only sale, and the infringing conduct occurred in California. Based on this fact and the Court’s 2022 decision in Brothers & Sisters in Christ v. Zazzle, which was decided under similar facts, the Court [...]

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Actual Confusion Is the Best Evidence of Confusion

by Ashley T. Brzezinski | Feb 9, 2023 | Trademarks

The US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and vacated a district court’s preliminary injunction grant in a trademark dispute, concluding that potential confusion is insufficient to satisfy the burden of showing a substantial likelihood of confusion. H&R Block, Inc.; HRB Innovations, Inc. v. Block, Inc., Case Nos. 22-2075; -2023 (8th Cir. Jan. 24, 2023) (Gruender, Erickson, JJ.) (Melloy, J., dissenting).

H&R Block was founded in 1955 and specializes in income tax preparation and other tax and financial services. Over the years, H&R Block has invested billions of dollars in advertising campaigns and has developed significant market presence both in person and online. The company has also obtained several federal registrations directed to the use of a green square logo with its products and asserts that in addition to “H&R Block” it is known as just “Block.”

Square, Inc., is the company behind the Square payment card reader and point-of-sale software that allows individual sellers to accept credit card payments. Square was founded in 2009 and grew over time by acquiring or developing other businesses. Cash App is one of Square’s businesses. Cash App started in 2013 as Square Cash and is a purely digital platform that allows users to deposit and store money on the app. In November 2020, Square acquired free tax credit service Credit Karma Tax, which was rebranded as Cash App Taxes and integrated into the Cash App platform for the 2022 tax season. In December 2021, Square was renamed Block, Inc., and the name change was publicized via Twitter.

Fifteen days after the name change was announced, H&R Block filed suit alleging trademark infringement. Shortly thereafter, H&R Block moved for a preliminary injunction. The district court analyzed the marks at issue for likelihood of confusion and granted, in part, H&R Block’s request for a preliminary injunction. Block appealed.

The Eighth Circuit analyzed a list of six non-exclusive and non-exhaustive factors in assessing likelihood of confusion:

The strength of the owner’s mark
The similarity of the owner’s and the alleged infringer’s marks
The degree to which the products compete with each other
The alleged infringer’s intent to pass off its goods as those of the trademark owner
Incidents of actual confusion
The type of product, its cost and its conditions of purchase.

The Eighth Circuit agreed with the district court that H&R Block had demonstrated that its registered and common law marks were commercially strong but found that the record as a whole did not weigh in favor of H&R Block on the similarity factor because there were observable differences between the two logos and the competing products.

The Eighth Circuit indicated that ultimately the best evidence of likelihood of confusion is actual consumer confusion. While the record supported possible confusion by some consumers, the Court found that the district court had erred in finding actual consumer confusion and that H&R Block had not presented sufficient evidence to rise to the level of substantial confusion by an appreciable number of ordinary consumers. [...]

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Functionality Dooms Alleged Trade Dress Protection

by Kathleen Lynch | Nov 29, 2022 | Trademarks

The US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment of noninfringement in a trade dress suit, finding that the trade dress was functional and the attorneys’ fee award—as diminished by the district court—was appropriate. Pocket Plus, LLC v. Pike Brands, LLC, Case No. 21-3414 (8th Cir. Nov. 15, 2022) (Gruender, Melloy, Erickson, JJ.)

Since 2009, Pocket Plus has sold vertically oriented pouches that attach to waistbands or belts to carry water bottles, cell phones and other small objects. Pike Brands, d/b/a Running Buddy, began selling similar pouches in 2012 and introduced a vertical version in 2015. In 2021, Pocket Plus sent cease and desist letters to Running Buddy, then sued for trade dress infringement under Iowa common law and the Lanham Act. Running Buddy moved for summary judgment, arguing that Pocket Plus’s trade dress was unprotectable. Running Buddy also threatened Rule 11 sanctions because of the weakness of the case. After winning summary judgment, Running Buddy moved to recover attorneys’ fees, which the district court partially granted. Both parties appealed, with Pocket Plus challenging the summary judgment grant and both parties challenging the amount of the attorneys’ fee award.

The Eighth Circuit began by noting that the issue of validity was complicated by Pocket Plus’s shifting explanation of what its trade dress was, explaining that its “definition evolved throughout the litigation,” becoming increasingly detailed. Eventually, the Court reasoned that regardless of which definition prevailed, the result was the same.

Addressing the noninfringement finding, the Eighth Circuit recited the relevant legal principles, explaining that to prove infringement, a plaintiff must show that its trade dress is nonfunctional and distinctive and that a lack of protection may confuse customers. The Court explained that it must consider trade dress in its entirety—not as individual elements—and determine whether features are protectable “arbitrary embellishment” or simply essential to product use. In this case, Pocket Plus never registered its trade dress so it did not benefit from a presumption of nonfunctionality. Pocket Plus argued that its vertical orientation and over-the-hip design were nonfunctional elements since competitors made pouches differently and that packaging illustrations likewise made the trade dress nonfunctional. The Court was not persuaded, finding that each feature the plaintiff pointed to was designed to “affect [the pouch’s] suitability for carrying objects,” making each feature essential to purpose and therefore functional. Because the Court found functionality, it affirmed noninfringement without addressing the other requirements.

The Eighth Circuit next considered the attorneys’ fees. Under the Lanham Act, a court may, in its discretion, grant attorneys’ fees to the winning party but only in “exceptional cases” after “considering the totality of the circumstances.” Pocket Plus argued that this case was not “exceptional” while Running Buddy argued that the district court abused its discretion in awarding only a portion of the attorneys’ fees.

The Eighth Circuit addressed both exceptionality and the amount awarded, in turn. To be “exceptional,” a case must be objectively unreasonable, motivated by ill will or frivolous. The Court noted Pocket Plus’s weak [...]

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Implied Copyright License to Photographs of Artist Formerly Known as Prince

by Paul Devinsky | Sep 15, 2022 | Copyrights

The US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld a ruling that a marketer had an implied copyright license to distribute marketing materials containing digital copies of photographs of the late musical artist Prince. Beaulieu v. Stockwell, Case No. 21-3833 (8th Cir. Aug. 30, 2022) (Gruender, Benton, Grasz, JJ.)

Allen Beaulieu was Prince’s personal photographer for five years, taking thousands of photos during multiple world tours. Beaulieu registered a copyright for these photos in 1984. In 2014, Beaulieu decided to publish a book of his photos. He hired (and entered into contracts with) Thomas Crouse to write and publish the book and Clint Stockwell to assist in scanning and storing digital copies of the photos. There was significant interest in the book after Prince’s death in 2016. In May 2016, Beaulieu gave Stockwell an unknown number of uncatalogued photos to be digitized. At about the same time, Stockwell sent a press packet containing a digital photo slideshow and press release to potential investors, including Charles Sanvik.

The collaboration with Stockwell and the others eventually fell apart, and Beaulieu demanded his photos back. Beaulieu’s lawyer retrieved some of the photos from Stockwell’s home, but Beaulieu did not make an inventory of the photos that were returned. Beaulieu sued Stockwell, Crouse and Sanvik for copyright infringement (among various other property torts). The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims and found that Stockwell had an implied license to create and distribute the press release containing Beaulieu’s photos. Beaulieu appealed.

Addressing Beaulieu’s copyright claim, the Eighth Circuit focused on the district court’s finding of an implied license. An implied license is an affirmative defense to a copyright infringement claim. The Court explained that a nonexclusive implied license may be found where a person requests the creation of a work, the creator makes the particular work and delivers it to the person who requested it, and the licensor intends that the licensee-requestor copy and distribute the work. The Court also explained that such an implied license could be implied from conduct. The Court recounted the details of the contract between Beaulieu and Stockwell, which included provisions permitting the use of the digital photos for “promotional and marketing” purposes. The Court also noted that Beaulieu was informed of the marketing plans and was sent drafts of the marketing emails, including the digital photo slideshow, to which Beaulieu did not object. The Court found that Beaulieu’s receipt of these materials, along with his continuing interactions with the collaborators thereafter, implied his approval of the marketing plan and demonstrated an implied license to the photographs.

Single T-Shirt Sale Can’t Clothe Bare-Bones Personal Jurisdiction Claim

by Nitya Anand | Aug 18, 2022 | Trademarks

The US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a district court’s dismissal of a trademark infringement suit for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding that the trademark owner failed to allege that the alleged infringer could reasonably anticipate being hauled into court in Missouri. Brothers and Sisters in Christ, LLC v. Zazzle, Inc., Case No. 21-1917 (8th Cir. Aug. 2, 2022) (Smith, Benton, Kelly, JJ.)

Brothers and Sisters in Christ (BASIC) is a Missouri-based clothing company that owns the trademark “love happens.” Zazzle is a California-based online retailer. BASIC sued Zazzle in a Missouri district court for trademark infringement, alleging that Zazzle used its nationally available website to advertise and sell goods in Missouri. BASIC further alleged that in 2019, Zazzle sold and shipped a t-shirt bearing a purportedly infringing “love happens” logo to at least one Missouri resident. The district court granted Zazzle’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). BASIC appealed.

Reviewing the issue de novo, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The Court explained that because the Lanham Act does not authorize nationwide personal jurisdiction, the Court was required to apply Missouri’s long-arm statute and the federal due process clause. Given that Missouri’s long-arm statute authorizes personal jurisdiction over defendants who engage in, among other things, the transaction of any business or the commission of a tortious act within the state, the Court’s inquiry focused on whether exercising personal jurisdiction over Zazzle comported with the due process clause. Because BASIC did not allege that Zazzle was subject to general personal jurisdiction in Missouri (i.e., BASIC did not allege that Zazzle was “essentially at home” in the forum state), the question instead turned on whether BASIC had sufficiently pled facts to support a claim of specific personal jurisdiction.

The Eighth Circuit explained that specific personal jurisdiction existed over Zazzle for the purposes of BASIC’s trademark infringement claims if Zazzle had certain minimum contacts with the forum state and BASIC’s claims arose out of or related to those contacts. For specific jurisdiction to apply, the underlying controversy must be connected to the defendant’s activities in the forum state; unconnected activities directed to the forum state, no matter how numerous or systematic, cannot convey specific personal jurisdiction. The Court used a five-factor test previously set forth in Whaley v. Esebag to conduct its analysis: “(1) the nature and quality of [defendant’s] contacts with the forum state; (2) the quantity of such contacts; (3) the relation of the cause of action to the contacts; (4) the interest of the forum state in providing a forum for its residents; and (5) convenience of the parties.”

The Eighth Circuit found that the behavior alleged by BASIC (Zazzle’s operation of a national website that sells and ships goods to Missouri combined with a single specific instance of an allegedly infringing t-shirt being sold and shipped to a Missouri consumer) was insufficient to support a specific jurisdiction claim. Zazzle’s website availability and sales unrelated to the use [...]

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Delay in Enforcing Trademark Measured from When Infringement Became Actionable

by Eleanor B. Atkins | May 26, 2022 | Trademarks

Addressing laches and progressive encroachment, the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded a district court’s grant of summary judgment based on laches because the district court failed to “conduct a meaningful analysis” as to when the trademark infringement first became actionable. A.I.G. Agency, Inc. v American International Group, Inc., Case No. 21-1948 (8th Cir. May 13, 2022) (Loken, Gruender, Grasz, JJ.)

A.I.G. Agency (Agency) is a family-owned insurance broker in Missouri and American International Group, Inc. (International) is a large insurance company. Each company has used its version of an AIG trademark for decades. Agency first adopted the mark in 1958 while International began using AIG sometime between 1968 and 1970. In 1995, International sent a demand letter to Agency notifying it of International’s trademark registration and requesting that Agency cease use of the AIG mark. Agency responded that it had the right to use AIG in Missouri and Illinois because it had been using the trademark in those states long before International obtained its registration. In 2008, International again reached out to Agency demanding that it stop using AIG as a mark. Agency again asserted that it had the right to use the mark in Missouri and Illinois. International responded that it did not object to Agency’s use of AIG in St. Charles and St. Louis Counties in Missouri, but it would contest Agency’s use beyond that limited geographic scope.

Nearly a decade later, in 2017, Agency sued International for common law trademark infringement and unfair competition. International asserted that Agency’s claims were barred by laches and counterclaimed for trademark infringement, trademark dilution and unfair competition. Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted summary judgment for International, finding that Agency’s claims were barred by the doctrine of laches. Agency appealed.

The Eighth Circuit explained the difference between the equitable affirmative defense of laches (which is meant to bar claimants from bringing unreasonably delayed claims) and the doctrine of progressive encroachment (under which the period of delay in a trademark infringement case is measured not from when a claimant first learned of the allegedly infringing mark, but from when that infringement first became actionable). The Court explained that “[t]he doctrine [of progressive encroachment] saves trademark holders from being hoisted upon the horns of an inequitable dilemma—sue immediately and lose because the alleged infringer is insufficiently competitive to create a likelihood of confusion, or wait and be dismissed for unreasonable delay.” Here, Agency argued that it did not have an actionable and provable claim for infringement until 2012 when International changed its marketing strategy.

The Eighth Circuit found that the district court failed to “conduct a meaningful analysis” to determine when the infringement became actionable, noting that the district court found that laches barred the claims because “both parties have been using ‘AIG’ in the same markets for decades, each with full knowledge of the other’s activities.” The Court further criticized the district court for not employing a specific test to determine [...]

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No Breach of Contract Where Company Disclosed Its Own Non-Public Information

by Paul Devinsky | Apr 14, 2022 | Trade Secrets

The US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a district court’s dismissal of a trade secret lawsuit against a consultant that allegedly failed to prevent its client from disclosing its own proprietary information during a call with a potential buyer. Protégé Biomedical, LLC v. Duff & Phelps Securities, LLC, and Philip I. Smith, Case No. 21-1368 (8th Cir. Apr. 4, 2022) (per curiam) (Erickson, J., dissenting).

Protégé entered into an agreement with Duff & Phelps to help Protégé find a buyer for its business. Under the agreement, Duff & Phelps received immunity from certain types of claims, its employees were shielded from individual liability and it owed no fiduciary duties to Protégé.

One of Protégé’s competitors, Z-Medica, was identified as a potential buyer. One of Duff & Phelps’s employees, Philip Smith, facilitated execution of the non-disclosure agreement (NDA) by a member of Z-Medica’s board of directors. Protégé assumed that the NDA would also bind Z-Medica and thus participated in conference calls with Z-Medica in which Protégé revealed non-public information. In Z-Medica’s view, however, the board member signed the NDA in his personal capacity and not as Z-Medica’s representative. As a result, Z-Medica used the information it received from Protégé to create its own competing product.

Protégé sued Z-Medica. After settling with Z-Medica, Protégé sued Duff & Phelps and Smith in state court for breach of contract, unlawful practice of law, negligence, breach of professional services and breach of fiduciary and principal-agent duties. Duff & Phelps removed the case to federal court on the ground that Smith, the only non-diverse defendant, had been fraudulently joined. The district court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. Protégé appealed.

The Eighth Circuit first analyzed whether the case belonged in federal court. The Court upheld the district court’s determination that Smith was fraudulently joined. The Court stated that fraudulent joinder occurs when there is no reasonable basis in fact and law for the claims brought against the non-diverse defendant. Here, the Court found that there was no reasonable basis for Protégé to allege breach of contract against Smith since he was never a party to the contract between Protégé and Duff & Phelps. The Court found that Protégé’s unlawful practice of law claim against Smith also constituted fraudulent joinder because Smith never gave legal advice to Protégé. The Court noted that the contract immunized Smith from Protégé’s other claims and thus, without any viable claims against Smith, the case was properly in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

Turning to the merits of the claims against Duff & Phelps, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal for failure to state a claim. The Court reasoned that Protégé’s breach of contract claim was predicated on an alleged failure by Duff & Phelps to prevent Protégé from disclosing its proprietary information. However, the agreement only made Duff & Phelps responsible for its own conduct, not for Protégé’s conduct. The Court explained that Protégé’s other claims failed for the same reason.

Judge Erickson [...]

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