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Exploring the Latest in Intellectual Property Law
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Lanham Act Liability May Apply to Copyrighted Material

by | Jun 8, 2023 | ,

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that liability under the Copyright Act and liability under the Lanham Act are not mutually exclusive and that liability under the Copyright Act does not negate trade dress damages under the Lanham Act. Jason Scott Collection, Inc. v. Trendily Furniture, LLC, Case No. 21-16978 (9th Cir. May 30, 2023) (Wardlaw, Bumatay, Schreier (sitting by designation), JJ.)

Jason Scott Collection (JSC) and Trendily Furniture are high-end furniture manufacturers that sell their products in the Texas market. In 2016, Trendily intentionally copied three unique furniture designs by JSC and sold them to Texas retailers. Both collections featured heavy carved wood pieces with detailed embellishments and metal elements. The record showed that Trendily’s collection had been based on photographs of the preexisting JSC collection. The Trendily pieces were so similar that even JSC had initially mistaken the furniture as its own when confronted by a retailer. After JSC filed suit, the district court granted summary judgment to JSC on its copyright claim. Following a bench trial, the district court held Trendily liable on the trade dress claim. On that claim, the district court awarded almost $133,000 in prospective lost annual profits over a period of three years, which amounted to about six times the almost $20,000 in retrospective gross profits awarded on JSC’s copyright claim. Trendily appealed.

To obtain a judgment for trade dress infringement, a plaintiff must prove that the claimed trade dress is nonfunctional, the claimed trade dress serves a source-identifying role because it is either inherently distinctive or has acquired a secondary meaning and the defendant’s product creates a likelihood of confusion. Trendily argued that JSC had not adequately established a secondary meaning (for trade dress the parties stipulated was not inherently distinctive) or likelihood of confusion. The Ninth Circuit, however, found that the district court found adequate evidence of secondary meaning through copying and through confusion by retailers and consumers in the high-end furniture market. The Ninth Circuit also found that the district court had correctly found likelihood of confusion, putting special emphasis on Trendily’s intentional and precise copying of the JSC pieces leading to retailer confusion.

Turning to the damages award, Trendily argued that because copying is a commercially acceptable and necessary act in terms of competition, Trendily should only be held liable under the Copyright Act, rather than for trade dress infringement under the Lanham Act. However, the Ninth Circuit affirmed that liability under the Copyright Act and liability under the Lanham Act are not mutually exclusive and that liability under the Copyright Act did not negate the judgment against Trendily for trade dress damages under the Lanham Act. The Court then affirmed the trade dress damages award, finding that the prospective damages incurred when one of JSC’s business relationships fell apart because of Trendily’s copied furniture were reasonably foreseeable and had been “satisfactorily demonstrated.” The Court emphasized that the law only required “crude measures of damages in cases of intentional infringement.”

Finally, the Ninth Circuit affirmed [...]

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Out of Tune: Eleventh Circuit Permits Retrospective Relief for Timely Copyright Claims under Discovery Rule

by | Mar 9, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit furthered a circuit split in holding that, as a matter of first impression, a copyright plaintiff’s timely claim under the discovery rule is subject to retrospective relief for infringement occurring more than three years before the suit was filed. Nealy v. Warner Chappell Music, Inc., Case No. 21-13232 (11th Cir. Feb. 27, 2023) (Wilson, Jordan, Brasher, JJ.)

Section 507(b) of the Copyright Act includes a three-year statute of limitations that runs from the time the claim accrues, and a claim may only accrue one time under the discovery rule. In 2014, the US Supreme Court held in Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., that the equitable doctrine of laches does not bar copyright claims that are otherwise timely under the three-year limitations period set forth in § 507(b). The circuits are split on Petrella’s application—the Second Circuit strictly limits damages from copyright infringement to the three-year period before a complaint is filed, whereas the Ninth Circuit permits retrospective relief for infringement occurring more than three years before the lawsuit’s filing as long as the plaintiff’s claim is timely under the discovery rule.

Music Specialist and Sherman Nealy (collectively, Music Specialist) filed a copyright infringement suit against Warner alleging that Warner was using Music Specialist’s musical works based on invalid third-party licenses and in violation of 17 U.S.C. § 501. The alleged copyright infringement occurred as early as 10 years before Music Specialist filed the present lawsuit. The district court denied Warner’s motion for summary judgment on statute of limitation grounds, finding that there was a genuine dispute of material fact regarding when Music Specialist’s claim accrual occurred. In a separate order, the district court certified for interlocutory appeal whether “damages in this copyright action are limited to the three-year lookback period as calculated from the date of the filing of the Complaint pursuant to the Copyright Act and Petrella.” Music Specialist appealed.

The Eleventh Circuit concluded that where a copyright plaintiff has a timely claim for infringement occurring more than three years before the filing of the lawsuit, the plaintiff may obtain retrospective relief for that infringement. The Court found that Petrella focused on the application of 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) to claim accrual under the injury rule, not the discovery rule, and was therefore inapplicable. The injury rule precludes recovery for harms occurring earlier than three years before the plaintiff files suit. On the other hand, the discovery rule permits damages recovery for infringing acts that copyright owners reasonably become aware of years later. Therefore, the discovery rule permits timely claims for infringement that occurred more than three years before the suit. The Eleventh Circuit found that the Supreme Court expressly reserved application of the discovery rule’s propriety for a future case and that, in the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion, the plain text of the Copyright Act does not place a time limit on remedies for an otherwise timely claim.

Practice Note: The Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the Second Circuit’s [...]

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Nothing Lasts for Everly, Not Even Copyright Co-Authorship Rights

by | Feb 23, 2023 |

Addressing a novel issue, the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled that a statute of limitations can time-bar a defense in narrow circumstances where a defendant uses it to seek affirmative relief. Garza v. Everly, Case No. 21-5530 (6th Cir. Feb. 10, 2023) (Bush, Guy, JJ.) (Murphy, J., concurring).

After successful careers writing and recording music as the Everly Brothers, Don and Phil Everly disputed copyright ownership of certain songs. Don sued Phil’s estate, seeking declaratory judgment that Don was the sole author of “Cathy’s Clown.” After a bench trial, the district court held that Don repudiated Phil’s co-authorship of “Cathy’s Clown” and Phil failed to reassert his co-authorship rights within the three-year timeframe provided by the Copyright Act. The trial court also ruled that Phil’s estate was “time-barred from asserting he was a co-author as a defense,” since the Copyright Act time-barred him from asserting the same as a claim. Don died in the interim, and Phil’s estate appealed.

There were three issues on appeal:

  • Whether the lower court improperly applied the Copyright Act’s scheme for authorship claims
  • Whether the finding of Don’s repudiation was erroneous
  • Whether the court erred in applying the statute of limitation to Phil’s defense.

Regarding the authorship issue, the Sixth Circuit explained that the Copyright Act allows authors to transfer ownership of works while retaining certain rights, including a termination right that lets authors later reclaim copyright ownership. Phil’s estate argued that because termination rights are inalienable, the trial court erred in finding that Phil was not a co-author since he should have had the opportunity to reclaim his rights. The estate also argued that any statute of limitations regarding Phil reclaiming co-authorship should not have started tolling until all of Phil’s descendants learned of these rights. The Sixth Circuit disagreed, explaining that the lower court properly applied the Copyright Act. Because Phil did not dispute repudiation within the statutory period, the trial court correctly denied his co-ownership. Furthermore, the statute of limitations does not “refresh itself” when an owner dies, because descendants cannot obtain rights a decedent had forfeit.

Addressing the repudiation issue, the Sixth Circuit found ample trial evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion. The evidence included 1980s vintage letters, phone calls, and a “Release and Assignment” Phil signed containing language relinquishing his co-authorship rights in “Cathy’s Clown.” There was also credible testimony that Don “plainly and expressly repudiated Phil’s authorship” decades prior.

Finally, addressing the statute of limitations defense, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the trial court. In doing so, it noted that Phil’s estate originally argued that Phil remained a co-author of “Cathy’s Clown” as a counterclaim to Don’s suit. It was only after Don successfully argued that the claim was time-barred that Phil’s estate “reframed the counterclaim into a defense.” The Court explained the general policies underpinning statutes of limitation and noted that they typically do not bear on defenses because plaintiffs could otherwise wait out the statutory periods for defenses before suing. However, this [...]

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After Supreme Court Remand, Copyright Infringement Claims Upheld in View of Registrant’s Unknown Inaccuracies

by | Nov 17, 2022 |

In February 2022, the Supreme Court of the United States held in Unicolors, Inc. v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz, L.P., that lack of either factual or legal knowledge on the part of a copyright holder can excuse an inaccuracy in the holder’s registration under the Copyright Act’s safe-harbor provision, 17 U.S.C. §411(b)(1), which governs the effect of inaccurate information in a copyright application. In light of this decision, the Supreme Court remanded the copyright dispute between textile design company Unicolors and global fast-fashion retail giant H&M Hennes & Mauritz to the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for further proceedings on the issue of whether Unicolors held a valid copyright in a 2011 textile design asserted in its copyright infringement claim against H&M. On remand, the Ninth Circuit concluded that under the correct standard confirmed by the Supreme Court, Unicolors held a valid copyright registration because the factual inaccuracies in its application were excused by the safe-harbor provision. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the prior jury verdict against H&M for copyright infringement and remanded with respect to the issue of damages only. Unicolors, Inc. v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz, L.P., Case Nos. 18-56253; -56548 (9th Cir. Nov. 10, 2022) (Bea, Bade, McCalla, JJ.)

The Copyright Act safe-harbor provision saves a copyright registration from invalidity when the application contains errors, except when the copyright registrant knowingly transmitted inaccurate material facts to the US Copyright Office. After the Supreme Court made it clear that “[l]ack of knowledge of either fact or law can excuse an inaccuracy in a copyright registration,” the Ninth Circuit was charged with determining whether Unicolors submitted its copyright application with knowledge that the information therein was factually inaccurate and with knowledge that the application failed to comply with the specific governing legal requirements. The Court first analyzed the validity of Unicolors’s asserted copyright registration, then addressed the remaining issues raised by H&M on appeal.

The Ninth Circuit’s first step in the validity assessment was to determine whether Unicolors’s application did, in fact, contain an inaccuracy. As in its prior decision, the Court concluded that the application was inaccurate because Unicolors registered a collection of 31 separate fabric designs as a single-unit publication when those 31 works were not initially published as a singular bundled collection, as required under the Copyright Act.

The second step of the Ninth Circuit’s inquiry looked at whether Unicolors submitted its copyright application knowing that it contained errors. This is where the Court departed from its prior decision and affirmed the district court’s decision regarding the validity of the registration. Specifically, the Court found that the single-unit registration issue was an unsettled question of law at the time of Unicolors’s application, such that Unicolors did not know that it submitted an application containing false information because it lacked the requisite knowledge of inaccuracy and lacked an intent to defraud the Copyright Office. Finding Unicolors’s copyright registration valid, the Court determined that Unicolors could maintain its copyright infringement claim against H&M.

[...]

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When Are Compulsory Copyright Licenses Compulsory?

by | Oct 20, 2022 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit partially affirmed a district court’s summary judgment order holding that audiovisual recordings of live concerts do not fall within the scope of the Copyright Act’s compulsory license provision while purchasers of audio-only recordings obtain a compulsory license in the copyright of the work fixed by their predecessors/sellers. ABKCO Music, Inc. et al. v. Sagan et al., Case No. 20-3816 (2d Cir. Oct. 6, 2022) (Jacobs, Wesley, Menashi, JJ.)

In 2002, William Sagan purchased, through Norton, a collection of audio and audiovisual live concert recordings from Bill Graham Archives. All three parties are named defendants in this case. The agreement conveyed all intellectual property that the Archives held (from a transaction with Sagan) and included a disclaimer stating that record company and artist approval was required to exploit the recordings. The defendants’ subsequent purchases of other recordings contained similar limited assurance language regarding intellectual property rights. In 2006, the defendants made the entire collection publicly available online for a streaming and downloading fee. A year later, the defendants began using a third-party licensing agent to obtain compulsory licenses under 17 USC § 115 and negotiated licenses from plaintiff music publishers in the audio and audiovisual live concert recordings.

Section 115 of the Copyright Act requires persons seeking to make and distribute phonorecords of a previously published musical work to obtain a compulsory license by providing notice to the copyright owner before distribution and paying government-prescribed royalties. (§ 115(a)(1), (b), (c).) The Copyright Act defines phonorecords as “[m]aterial objects in which sounds, other than those accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed.” (§ 101.) Section 115’s substantive requirements for duplications of audio/sound recordings fixed by another include requirements that the sound be fixed lawfully, and that duplication be authorized by the copyright owner. (§ 115(a)(1).)

In 2015, the music publishers sued defendants for copyright infringement of 197 musical works posted online without valid compulsory licenses. The music publishers alleged that the defendants did not obtain compulsory licenses for audiovisual works as required by § 115 and that the defendants failed to comply with § 115 substantive compulsory licensing requirements for audio-only works. Defendants argued implied license and equitable estoppel as affirmative defenses. The publishers sought damages and a permanent injunction pursuant to the Copyright Act.

The district court, on summary judgment, ruled that the defendants had no valid license authorizing the reproduction and distribution of the musical works in either audio or audiovisual format, that the defendants had neither an implied license nor any basis for estoppel, and that Sagan (a principal in several of the defendant streaming services) was liable for direct infringement. The district court denied the publishers’ request for an injunction but granted the publishers an award of attorneys’ fees. The defendants appealed from the summary judgment order and the order granting fees and costs. The plaintiffs cross-appealed denial of an injunction.

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that the defendants infringed each musical work [...]

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Ninth Circuit Provides Clarity on the Scope of Receiverships

by | Sep 22, 2022 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed an order denying the defendants’ motion to discharge a receiver who had been appointed to aid in the execution of a judgment for violations of the Copyright Act. WB Music Corp et al. v. Royce International Broadcasting Corp., Case No. 21-55264 (9th Cir. Aug. 31, 2022) (Tashima, Watford, Friedland, JJ.)

The receivership in this appeal arises from litigation that commenced in 2016 in the US District Court for the Central District of California by a cohort of music publishers for broadcasting the plaintiffs’ music on radio networks in violation of the Copyright Act. In 2017, the district court found the defendants jointly and severally liable for copyright infringement.

A jury awarded the plaintiffs statutory damages totaling $330,000 and the district court entered a judgment in that amount. The defendants continuously refused to satisfy the judgment, and after much litigation, the court entered an amended judgment for an additional $1.25 million and attorneys’ fees of more than $900,000.

The defendants’ only assets were their Federal Communications Commission (FCC) licenses. The district court ultimately appointed a receiver who was entrusted with “the power and authority to take charge of and manage [the defendants’] [r]adio stations’ assets, businesses, and affairs,” as well as the ability to solicit offers for the sale of the stations. The court’s order also provided that the receiver would incur a monthly fee and a commission on the sale of any of the radio stations.

The defendants moved ex parte for an order to compel the plaintiffs to accept payment of the amended judgment—asserting that they were prepared to wire funds in the amount sufficient to cover the amended judgment and post-judgment interest—but refused to agree to pay costs incurred by the plaintiffs’ post-judgment proceedings. Per the district court’s order, the defendants were to deposit with the court funds sufficient to satisfy the amended judgment. The order further provided that the receivership would not terminate unless the defendants paid all costs incurred post-judgment. The court entered a second amended judgment approximately four months later, which included additional unpaid sanctions and fees.

The defendants ultimately deposited the required funds with the district court; however, the funds were never released to the plaintiffs. The defendants then filed a motion to terminate the receivership and enjoin the sale of their radio stations on three grounds: (1) the receiver did not take an oath as required under California law; (2) the court lacked the discretion to refuse to terminate the receivership and (3) the court abused its discretion in denying the motion. The motion was opposed by the plaintiffs, who argued that the receivership should not be terminated without ensuring that the receiver was compensated for his services. The receiver opposed the motion, arguing that terminating the position would enable the defendants to “evade a range of liabilities” as there were still large creditors with outstanding judgment liens. The district court denied the defendants’ motion and the defendants appealed.

Agreeing with First Circuit [...]

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Publisher’s Fair Use Defense Dries Up

by | Aug 18, 2022 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned a district court’s summary judgment, rejecting an accused publisher’s argument that their use of copyrighted photos embedded in articles was fair use under the Copyright Act. McGucken v. Pub Ocean Ltd., Case No. 21-55854 (9th Cir. Aug. 3, 2022) (Ikuta, Nguyen, Owens, JJ.)

Elliot McGucken captured and edited photographs of an ephemeral lake that formed on the desert floor in Death Valley. He posted his photos to Instagram and licensed them to several websites that ran articles about the lake. Pub Ocean posted an article about the lake with some digression on loosely related topics. It used 12 of McGucken’s photos, among others, without seeking or receiving a license. McGucken filed suit for copyright infringement. The district court sua sponte granted summary judgment for Pub Ocean, concluding that it was entitled to a fair use defense. McGucken appealed.

The Ninth Circuit reversed after applying the four-factor test in determining whether fair use applies:

  1. The purpose and character of the use
  2. The nature of the copyrighted work
  3. The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole
  4. The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.

Factor 1: The Purpose and Character of the Use

The Ninth Circuit explained that the question under the first factor is whether the infringing work is transformative and whether it is commercial. Higher transformation in new works means the other factors, including commercialism, are less significant. For-profit news articles are generally considered commercial uses. The Court explained that a work conveying factual information does not transform a copyrighted work when it uses a “clear, visual recording” of the infringing work’s subject.

The Ninth Circuit found that Pub Ocean’s article used the photos for the exact purpose for which they were taken—to depict the lake. The Court disagreed that the article was transformative when Pub Ocean merely “recontextualiz[ed] or repackage[ed] [ ] one work into another.” The Court also disagreed with Pub Ocean’s argument that the fair use defense was strengthened by its purpose of news reporting (one example of fair use listed in 17 U.S.C. § 107). The Court explained that the category of news reporting alone is not sufficient to sustain a per se finding of fair use. The Court also noted that Pub Ocean’s minor cropping and arrangement of photos in the article’s text, even if considered marginal transformation, was too weak to favor fair use.

Factor 2: The Nature of the Copyrighted Work

Under the second factor, the question is the extent to which the copyrighted work is creative and whether it is unpublished. The Ninth Circuit found that McGucken’s photos were creative because they were the product of many technical and artistic decisions. The Court also explained that the publication of the photos on Instagram and in articles failed to weigh in favor of fair use. Citing Dr. Seuss, the Court explained that “while [...]

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Seeing Starz: No Damages Bar in Copyright Discovery Rule Case

by | Aug 4, 2022 |

The US Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss copyright infringement claims as barred by the statute of limitations, affirming the copyright owner’s right to sue even though more than three years had passed since the alleged infringement occurred. Starz Entertainment, LLC v. MGM Domestic Television Distribution, LLC, Case No. 21-55379 (9th Cir. July 14, 2022) (Wardlaw, Ikuta, Bade, JJ.)

Starz entered into licensing agreements for movies and television series episodes with MGM in 2013 and 2015. Under the agreements, MGM granted Starz the exclusive right to exhibit the movies and television series episodes for specified time periods. MGM agreed that it would not exhibit or license the content to any third parties during such specified time periods. From 2019 to 2020, Starz discovered that certain content it licensed from MGM was available on other streaming platforms.

Starz sued MGM in May 2020, asserting 340 claims of direct, contributory and vicarious copyright infringement, among other claims. MGM moved to dismiss, arguing that Starz’s copyright infringement claims were barred by the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Petrella v. MGM. MGM asserted that Petrella imposes a strict bar to collecting any damages for copyright infringement that occurs more than three years prior to the filing of the complaint. The district court determined that Petrella did not affect the discovery rule (i.e., that under the Copyright Act there exists a three-year damages bar) except when the plaintiff reasonably was not aware of the infringements at the time they occurred. MGM filed an interlocutory appeal.

The Copyright Act states: “No civil action shall be maintained under the provisions of this title unless it is commenced within three years after the claim accrued.” The issue on appeal here was when a copyright infringement claim accrues. The Ninth Circuit noted that it, and every other circuit, has an exception to the infringement rule, known as the “discovery rule,” which starts the clock when a copyright holder knows or reasonably should know that an infringement occurred. The Court disagreed with MGM that Petrella did away with the discovery rule. Instead, the discovery rule of accrual copyright claims is alive and well, and thus the Court affirmed the district court’s finding that Starz was not barred by Petrella from bringing a lawsuit.

The Ninth Circuit next addressed the issue of whether Petrella imposed a damages bar separate from the statute of limitations. MGM argued that Petrella created a separate damages bar that limits damages to damages arising from acts of infringement within the three-year window. The Court found that a three-year lookback period would eviscerate the discovery rule and explained that MGM’s approach is a textbook example of the absurdity of such a rule. The agreements between Starz and MGM covered hundreds of titles under separate time periods, and under MGM’s approach, damages could only be recovered for a 2013 infringement if the complaint was filed by 2016. In this case, Starz did not discover [...]

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A Work of Art? Ninth Circuit Analyzes Foreign Judgments and Fair Use

by | Jul 21, 2022 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit analyzed the fair use doctrine of US copyright law in a dispute for recognition of a 2001 French judgment relating to a finding of copyright infringement of certain photographic works featuring the art of Pablo Picasso. The Court’s analysis ultimately resulted in a reversal of the district court’s ruling for the defendants against whom the French judgment was sought. Vincent Sicre de Fontbrune et al; v. Alan Wofsy et al, Case Nos. 19-16913; -17024 (9th Cir. July 13, 2022) (Hurwitz, VanDyke, JJ.; Ericksen, Distr. J.) The Court remanded for further proceedings for an examination of the enforceability of the judgment under California’s Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgment Recognition Act (California Recognition Act).

In 1979, Yves Sicre de Fontbrune acquired the business capital and intellectual property rights to Cashiers d’Art, a complete published catalog of the works of Pablo Picasso. The catalog was created in 1932 by photographer Christian Zervos and featured almost 16,000 photographs of Picasso’s works. In 1991, Alan Wofsy Fine Arts obtained permission from the estate of Pablo Picasso to publish The Picasso Project, a work illustrating and describing Picasso’s works. The Picasso Project contained reproductions of certain photos from Cashiers d’Art.

Sicre de Fontbrune sued Wofsy in France for copyright infringement after The Picasso Project was offered for sale at a book fair in Paris and French police seized two volumes of the work. A trial court in France first found the photographs to be documentary in nature and ineligible for copyright protection. In 2001, however, the French Court of Appeal determined that the photographs at issue were not mere copies of Picasso’s works but added creative elements through deliberate choices of lighting, lens filters and framing. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court, found Wofsy “guilty of infringement of copyright” and entered judgment in favor of Sicre de Fontbrune.

A long and complex procedural process followed the Court of Appeal’s ruling, during which appeals and new lawsuits were filed. Wofsy failed to appear on several occasions while also filing a review proceeding in the French courts. Before Wofsy filed the French review proceeding, however, Sicre de Fontbrune brought an action in the Superior Court of California in Alameda County, seeking recognition of the original French judgment. Wofsy removed that action to district court, which dismissed the case with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding the French judgment to be not a penalty but a sum of money cognizable under the California Recognition Act.

On remand, the parties submitted cross motions for summary judgment on eight defenses under the California Recognition Act. The district court granted summary judgment for Wofsy on only one of the defenses, finding that the French judgment was “repugnant to public policy.”

On appeal of the international diversity case, the Ninth Circuit explained that the enforceability of foreign judgments is governed by the law of the state in which enforcement is sought, making the California Recognition [...]

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Tableware Designer Gets Heavenly Results on Its Pearly Plates

by | Jul 21, 2022 | ,

The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed a district court decision, reversing the dismissal of a copyright claim based on lack of standing and finding ownership of the copyright in the claimant based on an assignment of that claim. The Fifth Circuit also found that the plaintiff had a protectible trade dress under the Lanham Act based on secondary meaning. Beatriz Ball, LLC v. Barbagallo Co., LLC, Case No. 21-30029 (5th Cir. July 12, 2022) (Jones, Haynes, Costa, JJ.) (per curiam).

Beatriz Ball, the founder of Beatriz Ball, LLC, alleged that Pampa Bay was marketing and distributing products that infringed on Ms. Ball’s registered copyrights and unregistered trade dress for its “Organic Pearl” line of tableware. Ms. Ball brought suit against Pampa Bay in Louisiana federal court, asserting claims for copyright infringement under the Copyright Act and unfair competition under § 43 of the Lanham Act.

Pampa Bay has marketed and distributed products similar to the Organic Pearl collection but made with cheaper materials since 2016. Ms. Ball alleged that Pampa Bay infringed upon her copyright and its unregistered trade dress because the products are confusingly similar and look and feel like the Organic Pearl trade dress in every way. The district court ruled against Ms. Ball, finding that it had not established that its unregistered trade dress acquired “secondary meaning” as is required for protection of an unregistered trade dress under the Lanham Act. The district court further held that Ms. Ball lacked standing to bring the copyright claims as a result of a lack of legal interest because when “Beatriz Ball Collection” transferred ownership in the copyrights to “Beatriz Ball, LLC,” the language of the assignment did not specifically transfer the right to a cause of action for prior infringements predating the assignment. The assignment clause in issue read:

Assignment. Assignor [Beatriz Ball and Beatriz Ball Collection] hereby irrevocably conveys, transfers, and assigns to Assignee [Beatriz Ball, LLC], and Assignee hereby accepts, all of Assignor’s right, title and interest in and to any and all copyrights, whether registered or not and whether or not applications have been filed with the United States Copyright Office or any other governmental body. This assignment expressly includes any and all rights associated with those copyrights.

The district court found that because the assignment did not specifically transfer the assignor’s right to causes of action for prior infringements, the LLC lacked standing to challenge infringements pre-dating the assignment. The district court therefore never reached the merits of the copyright claim.

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit first reviewed the standing issue to determine if the LLC owned the copyrights at the time of the alleged infringement or if the right to vindicate prior infringements had been effectively assigned to Ms. Ball. Reversing the district court’s ruling, the Court concluded that the LLC had standing to bring the suit as the actual copyright holder. The Court reasoned that § 411(b)(1), which provides that a registration with “inaccurate information” can support an infringement action [...]

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