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Exploring the Latest in Intellectual Property Law
claim construction
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Even a Non-Explicit Claim Construction Can Be Erroneous

by | Feb 15, 2024 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a Patent Trial & Appeal Board decision finding the challenged patent claims not obvious over the prior art. The Court found that the Board, after concluding that no claim construction was required, implicitly construed the claim limitation at issue and did so erroneously. Google LLC v. EcoFactor, Case Nos. 22-1750; -1767 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 7, 2024) (Reyna, Taranto, Stark, JJ.)

Google filed a petition for inter partes review (IPR) challenging claims of an EcoFactor patent related to dynamic climate control systems that factor outside weather conditions and thermal conditions inside the home to balance comfort and energy savings. The challenged claims define a method for reducing the cycling time of a climate control system involving “retrieving a target time at which [the] structure [(e.g., a house)] is desired to reach a target temperature.” The challenged method claims recite a step of “determining a first time prior to said target time at which [the] climate control system should turn on to reach the target temperature by the target time.” The relevant claim limitation reads:

[D]etermining a first time prior to said target time at which said climate control system should turn on to reach the target temperature by the target time based at least in part on [i] said one or more thermal performance values of said structure, [ii] said performance characteristic of said climate control system, [iii] said first internal temperature, [iv] said first external temperature, and [v] the forecasted temperature.

During the IPR proceedings, the parties disputed whether a prior art reference disclosed a method involving determining a first time prior to the target time based on a first internal temperature. Google argued that the prior art taught a calculation of a first time prior to the target time based on thermal performance values (input [i]) calculated from internal temperature values (input [iii]). EcoFactor argued that each of the inputs in the claim limitation was a distinct value not dependent on or calculated from any other input. Based on the claim language, the Board determined that claim construction was unnecessary and concluded that inputs [i] – [v] of the relevant claim limitation were separate inputs using different data. The Board concluded that Google had not shown that the challenged claims were unpatentable, reasoning that Google’s theory of obviousness relied on a single input as the basis for both input [i] and input [iii].

Google appealed. Google argued that although the Board stated that no construction was necessary, it incorrectly construed the claim limitation to require five discrete inputs.

The Federal Circuit agreed with Google, finding that the Board’s assessment of the claim limitation implicitly established the claim scope by requiring inputs [i] – [v] to be completely separate. The Court reasoned that the plain claim language did not provide any indication that none of the listed inputs could be based on any other input(s). Imputing this requirement into the limitation was therefore an act of claim construction.

The Federal [...]

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Ordinary Meaning: “Identifying” Doesn’t Mean Detecting; It Means Identifying

by | Jan 18, 2024 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Patent Trial & Appeal Board’s decisions finding one set of challenged claims patentable and another set of challenged claims in the same patent unpatentable. The Court determined that the Board properly construed a disputed claim term and made factual findings regarding prior art that were supported by substantial evidence. Pacific Biosciences of California, Inc. v. Personal Genomics Taiwan, Inc., Case Nos. 22-1410; -1554 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 9, 2024) (Prost, Taranto, Hughes, JJ.)

Pacific Biosciences of California (PacBio) filed two petitions seeking inter partes review (IPR) of different claim groups in a patent owned by Personal Genomics Taiwan (PGI). The challenged patent is directed to an apparatus for “identifying a single biomolecule” and methods of using or making that apparatus. The petitions overlapped in terms of the challenged claims but differed in terms of the invoked prior art. PacBio’s challenge (on both anticipation and obviousness) was based principally on the Hassibi reference in one IPR and on the Choumane reference in the other.

The Board rejected PacBio’s challenge to certain claims of the patent in its decision on the first IPR, but it agreed with PacBio’s challenge to certain claims of the patent in its decision in the other. In reaching its decisions, the Board construed the term “identifying a single biomolecule” as requiring an apparatus capable of ascertaining the identity of one single individual biomolecule by examining only that biomolecule. In the first decision, the Board found that this limitation was not taught by the Hassibi reference. In contrast, in the other IPR, the Board found that this limitation was taught by the Choumane reference. Both parties appealed.

The Federal Circuit affirmed both Board decisions. First, the Court agreed with the Board’s construction that the disputed claim term (“single biomolecule”) was the ordinary meaning of the phrase in context, namely that there was no apparent reason for the inclusion of the word “single” in the claim term unless to indicate that the capability required was identification of a molecule with just that one molecule in view. The Court explained that the specification supported this understanding by repeatedly stressing that this “single biomolecule” capability was critical to the invention and by differentiating the examination of individual biomolecules from examination of an ensemble of copied biomolecules. The Court also pointed to dependent claims of the patent to provide support for the Board’s construction (in terms of claim differentiation), noting that those claims recited using the claimed apparatus for expressly described multiple-molecule examinations.

Regarding the prior issues on appeal, the Federal Circuit concluded that the Board’s factual findings were supported by substantial evidence. Turning to the Hassibi reference, the Court stated that the Board reasonably credited the testimony of PGI’s expert and the Hassibi reference itself in finding that Hassibi only disclosed the capability to ascertain the identity of a single biomolecule using a BRC assay or different assay. With respect to the Choumane reference, the Court found that the Board reasonably [...]

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Espresso Yourself: When Prosecution History as a Whole Doesn’t Demonstrate Clear, Unmistakable Disclaimer

by | Jan 4, 2024 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded a district court’s claim construction and related summary judgment rulings after determining that the district court erred in construing a claim term by improperly limiting the plain and ordinary meaning of the term. K-fee System GmbH v. Nespresso USA, Inc., Case No. 22-2042 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 26, 2023) (Taranto, Clevenger, Stoll, JJ.)

K-fee filed a lawsuit against Nespresso alleging infringement of three K-fee patents directed toward coffee machine portion capsules that use a barcode. The district court issued a claim construction order construing the term “barcode,” which was present in every asserted claim. In the claim construction order, the district court characterized the dispute as “whether statements made by K-fee System GmbH . . . before the EPO [European Patent Office] concerning the meaning of ‘barcode’ should influence the plain and ordinary meaning of that limitation in these proceedings.”

In the EPO, Nespresso’s foreign affiliate had challenged the validity of K-fee’s related European patent, and K-fee had responded seeking to distinguish a particular piece of prior art (Jarisch/D1). Because the statements made to the EPO were submitted to the US Patent & Trademark Office during prosecution of the asserted patents, the district court analyzed the statements as part of the intrinsic record. The district court concluded that K-fee had “argued strenuously before the EPO for a particular ‘plain and ordinary meaning,’ which excluded ‘bit codes’—codes made up of two binary symbols.” Based on the EPO submissions, the district court construed the claim term “barcode” to:

its plain and ordinary meaning (i.e., a code having bars of variable width, which includes the lines and gaps), the scope of which is understood by the clear and unequivocal statements K-fee made to the EPO (i.e., the scope of barcode does not include the type of bit code disclosed in Jarisch/D1).

Based on that construction of “barcode,” Nespresso moved for summary judgment of noninfringement. It argued that its accused products operated identically to Jarisch capsules, which K-fee distinguished before the EPO, since both use a machine-readable code with only two binary symbols. The district court agreed. When applying its construction at summary judgment, the district court clarified that using “the type of bit code disclosed in Jarisch” … means “a binary code containing only ‘0s’ and ‘1s.’” Thus, the district court read K-fee’s EPO statements “to mean that a barcode must ‘contain more than only two binary symbols’ and, by extension, that any code that contains only two binary symbols could not be a barcode.” Because the court found that “there was no dispute that Nespresso’s accused products used a code having only two symbols,” it granted Nespresso’s motion for summary judgment of noninfringement. K-fee appealed.

Considering the issue de novo, the Federal Circuit reviewed K-fee’s statements to the EPO in context and disagreed “that the ordinary meaning of ‘barcode’ excludes ‘bit codes’ (in some sense, two-value codes) or even bit codes of ‘the type . . . disclosed in Jarisch’ to [...]

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Store This Element: Lexicography Controls Claim Term Definition Over Plain and Ordinary Meaning

by | Dec 21, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a Patent Trial & Appeal Board obviousness finding, determining that the Board properly applied the patentee’s lexicography in construing a disputed claim term and properly treated arguments raised by the parties in the reply and sur-reply briefings. ParkerVision, Inc. v. Vidal, Case No. 22-1548 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 15, 2023) (Prost, Wallach, Chen, JJ.)

Intel filed a petition for inter partes review of a patent owned by ParkerVision. The challenged patent is directed to wireless local area networks (WLANs) that use frequency translation technology and incorporate another patent that describes down-conversion utilizing down-converter modules. The challenged claim is directed to apparatuses for down-converting electromagnetic (EM) signals. Among other things, the claim recites “wherein said first and said second frequency down-conversion modules each comprise a switch and a storage element.” The Board found the challenged claim unpatentable and in doing so, construed the term “storage element” to mean “an element of a system that stores non-negligible energy from an input signal.” The Board based its construction on the description of “storage modules” in a patent incorporated by reference into the challenged patent. ParkerVision appealed.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s construction, finding that ParkerVision had acted as its own lexicographer when it defined the term “storage element” in the incorporated-by-reference patent. The Court relied on a “critical” paragraph from the incorporated-by-reference patent that states: “[s]torage modules and storage capacitances, on the other hand, refer to systems that store a non-negligible amount of energy from an input EM signal.” The Court reasoned that the term “refer to,” together with the “as used herein” language from a preceding sentence, conveyed an intent for the sentence to be definitional and applicable to the whole patent rather than to a specific embodiment. To that end, the Court reiterated that a patentee may act as its own lexicographer by crafting a definition for a claim term rather than relying on the plain and ordinary meaning of that term, and that when a patentee does so, the definition may act as a disavowal of the full scope of the plain and ordinary meaning of the term.

ParkerVision also argued that the Board impermissibly relied on arguments allegedly raised for the first time in Intel’s reply brief, and that it erred in excluding certain arguments made by ParkerVision on sur-reply. The Federal Circuit rejected both arguments. The Court reasoned that because ParkerVision proposed a new claim construction in its patent owner response, Intel was permitted to argue and present evidence of obviousness under that new construction as long as such evidence relied on the same embodiments for each invalidity ground as were relied on in the petition.

The Federal Circuit also noted that ParkerVision’s arguments on sur-reply exceeded the scope of its patent owner response. While ParkerVision’s patent owner response proposed that the “storage element” be an element of the energy transfer system and store non-negligible amounts of energy from an input EM signal, ParkerVision only argued that the [...]

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Resorting to Extrinsic Evidence Is Necessary When Intrinsic Evidence Is Muddied

by | Nov 16, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit determined that the limitation “a pH of 13 or higher” could not be construed using the asserted patents’ intrinsic evidence and therefore remanded to the district court with instructions to consider the extrinsic evidence and its impact on claim construction. Actelion Pharms. Ltd v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., Case No. 22-1889 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 6, 2023) (Reyna, Stoll, Stark, JJ.)

Mylan Pharmaceuticals sought market entry for its generic epoprostenol—a small molecule hypertension drug—via an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA). Mylan certified under Paragraph IV with respect to two Orange Book-listed patents that Actelion Pharmaceuticals owned. Actelion timely asserted both patents and achieved a favorable claim construction for the term “a pH of 13 or higher.” This limitation is central to the pharmaceutical breakthrough that the asserted patents disclose, which is stably solubilizing the otherwise unstable epoprostenol. The asserted patents teach that epoprostenol bulk solutions’ pH should preferably be adjusted to about 12.5 to 13.5. Mylan contended that this language meant the claim should not encompass anything below pH 13 (i.e., leaving only a fraction of the disclosure’s preferred range within the scope of the issued claims). The district court disagreed, adopting Actelion’s position that the limitation encompassed values that “rounded” to pH 13 (i.e., pH 12.5 and above). This prompted a stipulated infringement judgment. Mylan appealed.

The Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s construction de novo, explaining that the district court’s construction was a ruling as a matter of law because no extrinsic evidence was considered. The Court then examined the claim language, specifications and prosecution histories in turn.

Regarding the claim language, the Federal Circuit rejected the parties’ invitations to acknowledge certain prior decisions as articulating bright-line rules. Instead, the Court appeared to endorse analyzing the intrinsic evidence on a case-by-case basis when construing similar range limitations. For example, the Court explained that “there is no blanket rule that ranges, or specifically open-ended ranges, must foreclose rounding.” The Court also rejected the following rules concerning range precision:

  • Avoiding rounding requires terms of precision, such as “precisely” or “exactly.”
  • The absence of approximation language dictates a precise value.

In contrast, the Federal Circuit signaled that district courts should properly account for a range’s technical implications (or at least ranges concerning the pH scale) even if that means looking to extrinsic evidence.

Regarding the specifications and prosecution histories, the Federal Circuit disagreed with the district court’s finding that both were inconsistent with Mylan’s position that the disputed limitation reflected a higher degree of precision. The Court concluded that there was little to glean from either, finding that the specifications were as clear as “muddied water” and the prosecution histories provided no insight into the relevant pH range—between pH 12 and pH 13.

The Federal Circuit ultimately concluded that this was an instance in which properly construing a claim limitation required the aid of extrinsic evidence, invoking the Supreme Court of the United States’ guidance from Teva v. Sandoz that extrinsic evidence [...]

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Statements in Unrelated Application Don’t Narrow Claim Term

by | Nov 9, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated a stipulated judgment of noninfringement in a patent infringement dispute after construing a disputed claim term, taking a more literal approach than the district court based on the meanings of the individual words of the claim language. Malvern Panalytical Inc. v. TA Instruments-Waters LLC, Case No. 22-1439 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 1, 2023) (Prost, Hughes, Cunningham, JJ.)

The dispute involved a suit brought by Malvern against TA Instruments-Waters and Waters Technologies Corporation (collectively, Waters) alleging infringement of two patents. Both asserted patents disclose microcalorimeters for measuring the amount of energy absorbed or released during a chemical reaction between two compounds and include independent claims directed to “a micro titration calorimetry system” having several elements, including an automatic pipette assembly that is guided into at least two positions via another component—namely, the disputed “pipette guiding mechanism.”

The pre-grant publication of a commonly assigned but unrelated patent was cited during the prosecution of an unrelated Malvern patent because the examiner understood the disclosure of that patent to recite an automated pipette guiding mechanism. The applicant initially tried to rebut the rejections by arguing that the disclosure of that patent recited a “purely passive [pipette] guiding mechanism.” However, after the examiner found the arguments unpersuasive, the applicant simply changed course and argued that the cited reference was not prior art because the publication and unrelated patent had a common assignee.

Malvern then requested supplemental examination of the now asserted patent under 35 U.S.C. § 257. In connection with the supplemental examination, Malvern filed an information disclosure statement (IDS) that included 154 documents, seven of which were office actions from the prosecution of the unrelated patent. Malvern did not describe or characterize the office actions in any way.

Turning back to the litigation, during claim construction proceedings, Malvern argued that “pipette guiding mechanism” should mean a “mechanism that guides the pipette assembly” while Waters argued that it should mean a “mechanism that manually guides the pipette assembly.” The district court concluded that the term “pipette guiding mechanism” was a coined term because Malvern presented no evidence that a “pipette guiding mechanism” was known or readily understandable to a person of ordinary skill in the art. Based on that determination, the district court relied on intrinsic evidence to determine the objective boundaries of the term.

The district court found that the statement made during the prosecution of the unrelated patent was relevant to the claim construction because the asserted and unrelated patents were assigned to Malvern. The district court also considered these statements as having been incorporated into the intrinsic record of the asserted patent because it concluded that Malvern agreed to incorporate the statements when it cited the office actions filed during supplemental examination of the asserted patent. Malvern appealed.

The Federal Circuit explained that it was appropriate to construe the term “pipette guiding mechanism” by looking into the individual meanings of the words “pipette,” “guiding” and “mechanism.” The Court indicated that when the patentee [...]

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No Money, Mo’ Problems: Speculative Damages Award Cannot Stand

by | Oct 26, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld a district court’s claim construction and jury instructions but reversed a premature judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) on obviousness and an imprecise damages award. Cyntec Company, Ltd. v. Chilisin Electronics. Corp., Case No. 22-1873 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 16, 2023) (Moore, Stoll, Cunningham, JJ)

Cyntec sued Chilisin for willful infringement of two patents related to molded chokes, which are component parts in batteries and power supplies. Four events at trial led to this appeal. First, the district court construed the disputed “by means of” term by its plain meaning but also instructed the jury that when a result occurs “by means of” a factor, that factor “has an impact on”—but may not be the “only potential cause” of—the result. Second, Chilisin presented invalidity evidence, arguing that the asserted claims were obvious by one prior art reference in light of another.

Before Chilisin could cross-examine Cyntec’s rebuttal expert, the district court granted Cyntec’s JMOL, finding the patents not obvious. In the third event that led to the appeal, Cyntec presented a market-share lost profits theory of damages based on expert testimony. Chilisin unsuccessfully moved to exclude the testimony as being speculative and unreliable. The jury awarded more than $1.8 million in damages and the district court subsequently granted enhanced damages totaling more than $5.5 million. As for the fourth event, Chilisin unsuccessfully moved for JMOL and a new trial on multiple issues. Chilisin then appealed.

The Federal Circuit reviewed three issues on appeal:

  1. The nonobviousness JMOL
  2. The infringement findings
  3. The damages award.

Starting with nonobviousness, the Federal Circuit reversed the JMOL and remanded. While obviousness is ultimately a legal question, it relies on “numerous underlying factual findings,” including the scope/content/differences of prior art, the skill level of a person of ordinary skill in the art and objective indicia of nonobviousness such as commercial success. The Court found Chilisin had presented enough evidence to allow a jury to find the asserted claims obvious in light of the two prior art references presented. The Federal Circuit also analyzed the district court’s reasoning regarding the prior art and found that its “conclusions are either insufficient to support JMOL or unsupported by the evidence.” Thus, it was improper to withhold a partial fact issue from the jury.

Next, the Federal Circuit analyzed the infringement issue, dividing the analysis into the district court’s claim construction and jury instructions, and the jury’s infringement finding. Chilisin argued that the disputed term “by means of” should signal but-for causation, meaning the factor must cause the result. The Court agreed that this was one possible reading, but because the claim language did not read “by exclusive/primary means” or something similar, the disputed term could also encompass “mere contribution.” The Federal Circuit cited to the specification in support of its claim interpretation and ultimately upheld the district court’s claim construction and the consistent jury instructions. The Court rejected Chilisin’s argument that there was insufficient evidence of infringement, concluding [...]

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Go With the Flow: “A” Still Means “One or More”

by | Oct 26, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a claim construction that was adopted during an inter partes review (IPR) because the Patent Trial & Appeal Board erred in construing the contested limitation as limited to a single sample rather than including the possibility of plural samples. ABS Global, Inc. v. Cytonome/ST, LLC, Case No. 22-1761 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 19, 2023) (Reyna, Taranto, Stark, JJ.)

ABS and Genus plc (collectively, ABS) filed a petition to institute an IPR on a patent owned by Cytonome. The patent claims microfluidic devices for particle (e.g., cells, molecules and other particles of interest) processing. The claimed devices exploit the principles of laminar flow to hydrodynamically focus particles at a certain point along the flow path for inspection or other purposes. The claimed devices are capable of hydrodynamically focusing the flow of a particle-containing fluid (the sample fluid) by abutting the sample fluid on more than one side with a fluid that does not contain particles (the sheath fluid). Generally, the faster the sheath fluid flows relative to the sample fluid the more the sample fluid’s corresponding cross-section is compressed. Figure 3A of the patent is an example of how the claimed devices use sheath fluid (SF) to focus a sample fluid (S) along a channel (CL):

ABS’s petition argued that the challenged claims were anticipated or obvious at least in view of a prior publication that taught devices with a split sample stream. The Board disagreed, construing the challenged patent claims as directed to a single sample stream and concluding that ABS failed to demonstrate why those of ordinary skill—in view of the art cited in ABS’s petition—would have modified the prior art split sample stream into the claimed single sample stream. ABS appealed.

The Federal Circuit found that the Board erred in construing the challenged claims. In construing the independent claim as being limited to a single sample stream, the Board focused on two limitations: “an inlet configured to receive a sample stream” and “a fluid focusing region configured to focus the sample stream….” In limiting the claim to a single sample stream, the Board relied on the definite article preceding the second recitation of “sample stream” and noted that a plural-allowing interpretation would be inconsistent with a dependent claim that further requires the focusing fluid to be “introduced into the flow channel symmetrically with respect to a centerline of the sample stream.”

The Federal Circuit reversed the Board’s claim construction, concluding that the dependent claim was not inconsistent with a plural-streams interpretation for the independent claim and that the Board committed two errors in construing both claims. First, the Board did not properly apply what the Court refers to as the “general rule,” which is applicable to open-ended “comprising” claims that recite “a” or “an” before a noun. The Court explained that such a limitation should be construed to mean one or more unless context sufficiently indicates otherwise. Second, [...]

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Chilly Adventures: Design Patent Prior Art Comparison Applies to Article of Manufacture

by | Sep 28, 2023 |

Addressing a matter of first impression concerning the scope of prior art relevant to a design patent infringement analysis, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concluded that “to qualify as comparison prior art, the prior-art design must be applied to the article of manufacture identified in the claim.” Columbia Sportswear North America, Inc. v. Seirus Innovative Accessories, Inc., Case Nos. 21-2299; -2338 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 15, 2023) (Prost, Reyna, Hughes, JJ.)

Columbia owns a design patent that covers an ornamental design of a heat reflective material. Seirus markets and sells products (e.g., gloves) made with material that it calls HeatWave. An image of Columbia’s patented design and Seirus’s HeatWave material appear below:

Columbia Patented Design

Seirus HeatWave

Columbia sued Seirus for infringement. After the district court granted summary judgment of infringement, Seirus appealed to the Federal Circuit. The Court issued its decision in Columbia I, concluding that the district court improperly declined to consider the effect of Seirus’s logo in its infringement analysis and resolved certain issues that should have been left to the jury. The Court therefore vacated summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

On remand, the district court held a trial. Before trial, the district court limited admissible comparison prior art to “wave patterns of fabric,” declined to instruct the jury that “prior art” referred to prior designs of the claimed article of manufacture, and declined to instruct the jury that it did not need to find that any purchasers were deceived or that there was any actual or likelihood of confusion among consumers in the marketplace. Seirus was permitted to admit three prior art references that disclosed fabric, and Columbia was precluded from distinguishing the references by arguing that they did not disclose heat reflective material. The jury returned a verdict of noninfringement. Columbia appealed.

Among other things, Columbia challenged the exclusion of evidence and jury instructions concerning comparison prior art, and the jury instructions implicating Seirus’s logo.

The Federal Circuit began by discussing the appropriate prior art comparison in the context of design patent infringement. Citing its 2008 en banc decision in Egyptian Goddess v. Swisa, the Court explained that under the ordinary-observer test governing design patent infringement, prior art can help highlight distinctions and similarities between the claims and the accused design. For instance, when a claimed design is close to a prior art design, small differences between the accused design and the claim design are likely to be important. Conversely, if an accused design copied a particular feature of the claimed design that departs from the prior art, the accused design is likely to be regarded as deceptively similar to the claimed design, and thus infringing.

The question of first impression before the Federal Circuit was the proper scope of comparison prior art that [...]

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Less Is More: IPR Claim Amendments May Not Enlarge Claim Scope

by | Sep 14, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a decision from the Patent Trial & Appeal Board denying a motion to amend claims during an inter partes review (IPR) proceeding, explaining that a claim amendment is improper if a proposed claim is broader in any respect relative to the original claims, even if it is overall narrower. Sisvel International S.A. v. Sierra Wireless, Inc., et al., Case Nos. 22-1387; -1492 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 1, 2023) (Prost, Reyna, Stark, JJ.)

Sisvel owns two patents directed to methods and apparatuses that rely on the exchange of frequency information in connection with cell reselection between a mobile station (or user cell phone) and a central mobile switching center. Sierra Wireless filed petitions for IPR alleging that claims of Sisvel’s patents were unpatentable as anticipated and/or obvious in view of certain prior art. During the IPR proceeding, the Board determined that the claim term “connection rejection message” should be given its plain and ordinary meaning of “a message that rejects a connection.”

The Board also denied Sisvel’s motion to amend the claims of one of the patents, finding that the amendments would have impermissibly enlarged the claim scope. the Board focused on a limitation relating to “setting a value,” comparing the original claims’ requirement with that of the proposed substitute claims. The original claims required that the value be set “based at least in part on information in at least one frequency parameter” of the connection rejection message while the substitute claims recited that the value may be set merely by “using the frequency parameter” contained within the connection rejection message. The Boeasoneasoned that in the proposed substitute claim, the value that is set need not be based on information in the connection rejection message, and thus the claim was broader in this respect than the original claims. After denying the motion to amend, the Board concluded that the original claims were unpatentable. Sisvel appealed.

Sisvel challenged the Board’s construction of “connection rejection message,” arguing that the term should be limited to a message from the specific cellular networks disclosed in the specification. The Federal Circuit rejected Sisvel’s argument, finding that the intrinsic evidence provided no persuasive basis to limit the claims to any particular cellular network disclosure. Having agreed with the Board’s construction, the Court affirmed the unpatentability determination.

Sisvel also challenged the Board’s refusal to permit Sisvel to amend the claims. Sisvel argued that the Board had incorrectly found that the proposed substitute claims were broader than the original claims because when all the limitations were considered as a whole, the scope of the substitute claims was narrower than the original claims.

Citing 35 U.S.C. § 316(d)(3), the Federal Circuit noted that when a patent owner seeks to amend its claims during an IPR, the amended claims “may not enlarge the scope of the claims of the patent.” The Court explained that removal of a claim requirement can broaden the resulting amended claim and concluded that such was the case [...]

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