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No curtain call yet: Mixed verdict in patent, trademark, standing case

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit addressed a wide array of issues in a long-running dispute over shower curtain technology. The Court provided important guidance on patent claim scope using intrinsic evidence, trademark standing and ownership of the mark in issue, trade dress functionality under TrafFix, and the need for district courts to provide a reviewable explanation when issuing patent infringement summary judgment based on the facts of this case. Focus Products Grp. Int’l, LLC v. Kartri Sales Co., Inc., Case No. 23-1446 (Fed Cir. Sept. 30, 2025) (Moore, Clevenger, Chen, JJ.)

The decade-long dispute started when Focus Products sent a cease-and-desist letter to Kartri Sales and its supplier, Marquis Mills International. The letter asserted patent infringement but was largely ignored. Focus Products then filed suit asserting three utility patents, two trademarks (HOOKLESS® and EZ ON), and unregistered trade dress rights in the appearance of its shower curtains.

Four months after the Supreme Court’s 2017 decision in TC Heartland v. Kraft Foods Group Brands, Kartri raised a venue objection and filed a motion to dismiss or transfer venue. The district court denied the motion, finding it to be unreasonably late, especially considering that Kartri actively conducted litigation after TC Heartland.

The district court construed several disputed claim terms. Based on its constructions, it found no triable issue of fact and granted summary judgment of patent infringement to Focus Products. However, the district court found genuine disputes of material fact regarding trademark and trade dress infringement and ordered a bench trial on those issues.

On the eve of trial, Kartri asserted unclean hands and equitable estoppel defenses. The district court denied these defenses because they were improperly raised for the first time immediately preceding trial.

After a bench trial, the district court held that:

  • Focus Products had standing to enforce the unregistered EZ ON mark.
  • Kartri infringed the mark and Focus Products’ trade dress, which was determined to be nonfunctional.
  • Kartri infringed Focus Products’ HOOKLESS® mark.

Accordingly, the district court awarded lost profits, reasonable royalties, attorneys’ fees, and enhanced damages for willful infringement. Kartri appealed.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Kartri’s motion to transfer venue under TC Heartland, finding Kartri’s objection untimely. Kartri waited four months after TC Heartland to raise the issue, during which time discovery had progressed significantly. The Court emphasized that venue objections must be raised seasonably and that continued litigation in the chosen forum may constitute forfeiture.

The Federal Circuit largely reversed the district court’s infringement findings, explaining that the district court erred in its claim construction because Focus Products had disclaimed shower rings with a flat upper edge during prosecution. While an affirmative disclaimer usually originates from the patent applicant, the Court found clear and unmistakable disavowal through the applicant’s acquiescence to the examiner’s species election, claim cancellation, and narrowed claim scope. This disclaimer was reinforced by the prosecution of a related asserted patent, which explicitly claimed the disclaimed feature. A patentee cannot try [...]

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Functional relationship recitation can’t overcome anticipating prior art

Underscoring functional relationships as limitations in patent claims and the importance of claim construction, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded a Patent Trial & Appeal Board decision that found claims of a patent unpatentable notwithstanding a functional relationship recitation. Bayer Pharma Aktiengesellschaft v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc., et al., Case No. 23-2434 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 23, 2025) (Moore, Cunningham, Scarsi, JJ.)

Bayer owns a patent that describes the results of a phase III clinical trial that evaluated the efficacy and safety of administering rivaroxaban with and without aspirin for the prevention of major adverse cardiac events. Certain claims require “administering to the human patient rivaroxaban and aspirin in amounts that are clinically proven effective in reducing the risk of myocardial infarction, stroke or cardiovascular death[,] wherein rivaroxaban is administered in an amount of 2.5 mg twice daily and aspirin is administered in an amount of 75 – 100 mg daily.” Other claims are directed to a once daily administration of “a first product comprising rivaroxaban and aspirin” and “a second product comprising rivaroxaban.”

Mylan challenged the patent in inter partes review (IPR), arguing that certain claims were anticipated by the Foley reference and others were obvious over Foley alone or in combination with Plosker. The Board agreed, finding all challenged claims unpatentable. Bayer appealed.

Bayer argued that the Board erred in:

  • Construing “clinically proven effective” as non-limiting and finding, in the alternative, that it was inherently anticipated
  • Construing “first product comprising rivaroxaban and aspirin” to encompass administration of rivaroxaban and aspirin as separate dosage forms
  • Failing to articulate why a skilled artisan would have combined Foley and Plosker with a reasonable expectation of success
  • Failing to analyze whether clinical proof of efficacy was an unexpected result

The Federal Circuit declined to resolve whether “clinically proven effective” is a limiting claim element, concluding that even if it were, it would not render the claims patentable. The Court explained that the phrase does not create a “new and unobvious functional relationship” with the known method of treatment. Analogizing to a hypothetical claim for a known drug method modified by a post-dated accolade (e.g., “Best Drug of 2026”), the Court emphasized that requiring clinical proof of efficacy does not transform the underlying treatment process.

Bayer relied on the Federal Circuit’s 2019 decision in Allergan Sales v. Sandoz, in which the Court found “wherein” clauses specifying safety and efficacy to be material to patentability. The Federal Circuit distinguished Allergan, noting that the claims there were written in open format and the “wherein” clauses modified the overall composition. In contrast, the claims of Bayer’s patent already specified exact dosages, and “clinically proven effective” did not modify any particular component. The Court therefore affirmed the Board’s finding of unpatentability for these claims.

However, the Federal Circuit agreed with Bayer on the construction of claims requiring a “first product comprising rivaroxaban and aspirin.” Bayer argued that this language required a single dosage [...]

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Identical or not? Jury can’t decide issues of claim construction

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a district court’s denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) of noninfringement, finding that the jury’s infringement findings were unsupported by sufficient evidence and that the district court had improperly delegated claim construction to the jury. Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Qiagen Sciences, LLC, Case No. 23-2350 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 13, 2025) (Lourie, Dyk, Cunningham, JJ.)

Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings (LabCorp) holds two patents with substantially overlapping specifications, both generally directed to methods for preparing DNA samples for sequencing and enrichment techniques aimed at enabling whole-genome sequencing. LabCorp initiated litigation alleging that various Qiagen Sciences kits containing materials used in DNA sample preparation for sequencing infringed its patents. During claim construction, the district court construed several patent terms as follows:

  • In the first patent, “second target-specific primer” means a single-stranded oligonucleotide with a 3’ portion that specifically anneals to a portion of the known target nucleotide sequence in the amplicon from step (b), and a 5’ portion identical to a second sequencing primer.
  • Also in the first patent, “second adaptor primer” refers to a nucleic acid molecule containing a sequence identical to part of the first sequencing primer and nested relative to the first adaptor primer.
  • In the second patent, “target-specific primer” is defined as a primer sufficiently complementary to the target to enable selective annealing and amplification, without amplifying non-target sequences in the sample.

The jury found that Qiagen infringed the first patent under the doctrine of equivalents and willfully and literally infringed the second patent. The jury awarded damages accordingly. The district court denied Qiagen’s renewed motion for JMOL to reverse the damages and the jury’s findings of infringement and validity, and its alternative request for a new trial. Qiagen appealed.

Qiagen raised two noninfringement arguments regarding the first patent, and the Federal Circuit agreed with both. First, the Court held that it was error to allow the jury to apply “plain meaning” and equate a sequence being “identical to another” with being “identical to a portion” of another. Specifically, Qiagen’s accused second target-specific primer (Sample Index Primer, or SIP) was 19 nucleotides long while the second sequencing primer (Read2 primer) was 34 nucleotides. The fact that they shared an overlapping sequence did not make them identical.

Although the district court had treated “identical” as a factual issue for the jury, the Federal Circuit, citing its 2008 decision in O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech., found that this was a claim construction matter that should not have been left to the jury. The term “identical” must be given its full meaning under claim construction and cannot be interpreted as “identical to a portion.” The Court emphasized that the specification and claims distinguished between full and partial identity: The second target-specific primer must be “identical to” the second sequencing primer while the adaptor primer need only be “identical to a portion” of the first sequencing primer. This difference [...]

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Claim construction misstep undoes injunction

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded a preliminary injunction (PI), finding that the district court improperly construed a claim term based on references cited in a provisional application but omitted from the asserted patents. FMC Corp. v. Sharda USA, LLC, Case No. 224-2335 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 21, 2025) (Moore, Chen, Barnett, JJ.)

FMC owns two patents claiming priority to a provisional application concerning insecticides and miticides compositions. The patents specifically cover formulations comprising bifenthrin and a cyano-pyrethroid. Sharda currently markets an insecticide product known as Winner, which contains both bifenthrin and a cyano-pyrethroid.

FMC sued Sharda for patent infringement on its two patents and sought a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a PI. The district court denied both motions but issued a claim construction for the term “composition.” Instead of applying the term’s plain and ordinary meaning, the district court interpreted “composition” narrowly to mean “stable compositions, rather than the well-known unstable compositions that produce ineffective results as discussed throughout the prosecution history.” In reaching this construction, the district court relied on statements made in the provisional application and disclosures found in a separate, non-asserted FMC patent that claimed priority to the same provisional application. However, these disclosures were absent from the asserted patents themselves, appearing only in the provisional application and the non-asserted patent.

FMC renewed its motion for a TRO, which the district court granted and later converted into a PI. In issuing the PI, the district court again relied on its narrow construction of the term “composition” as a key point in rejecting Sharda’s invalidity defenses. Sharda appealed.

Sharda argued that the district court erred in both its construction of “composition” and its determination that Sharda failed to raise a substantial question regarding the patents’ validity. The Federal Circuit first addressed Sharda’s challenge to the district court’s construction of the term “composition,” which had been limited to stable compositions based on disclosures in the provisional application and a non-asserted patent. The Court acknowledged that while the provisional application contained multiple references to “stability,” all such references were deliberately removed from the common specification of the two asserted patents. As a result, the specifications of the asserted patents did not simply carry forward the language of the provisional application but instead reflected a substantive evolution.

Citing its 2024 decision in DDR Holdings, LLC v. Priceline.com LLC, the Federal Circuit emphasized that such omissions are legally significant. The Court concluded that a person of ordinary skill in the art, considering the deliberate removal of all references to stability, would not interpret the term “composition” as limited to stable formulations. Because FMC chose to revise the asserted patents’ written descriptions to exclude any mention of stability, the district court erred in importing a stability limitation from the provisional application and non-asserted patent into the claims. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that the district court improperly grafted a “stability” requirement onto the term “composition.”

The Federal Circuit also found fault with the district court’s [...]

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Appeal is too late to raise percolating claim construction dispute

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s finding of noninfringement, concluding that the patent owner had improperly raised a claim construction issue for the first time on appeal – an argument not preserved at the district court level. Egenera, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc., Case No. 23-1428 (Fed. Cir. July 7, 2025) (Prost, Taranto, Stark, JJ.)

Egenera owns a patent that enhances traditional server systems by enabling a one-time physical setup followed by flexible virtual reconfiguration. The company alleged that Cisco infringed specific claims of the patent.

During claim construction, the parties disputed the interpretation of two terms: “computer processor/processor” and “emulate Ethernet functionality over the internal communication network.” The district court adopted the ordinary meaning of “computer processor,” which excluded Cisco’s unified computing system from its scope. Regarding the term “emulate,” the district court considered whether it implied an absence from the internal communication network but made no further determinations as the parties did not explicitly raise a dispute regarding the remainder of the claim term. Based on its construction of “computer processor/processor,” the district court granted Cisco’s motion for summary judgment on certain claims. Later, at trial, a jury found no infringement of other asserted claims. Egenera moved for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) or alternatively for a new trial, both of which the district court denied. Egenera appealed the post-trial rulings and the earlier summary judgment ruling.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. It concluded that the record lacked sufficient evidence to show that Cisco’s system “emulated” Ethernet functionality as required by the asserted claims. The Court emphasized that Egenera’s argument focused narrowly on the construction of the term “emulate,” rather than on the evidentiary record. Moreover, neither party clearly indicated that the dispute centered on unresolved claim construction rather than factual issues. The Court noted that it will not address claim construction on appeal where the issue was not preserved in the district court and was inadequately presented on appeal. As a result, the Court confined its analysis to the sufficiency of the evidence and upheld the district court’s finding of noninfringement.

The Federal Circuit also affirmed the district court’s denial of JMOL. The Court emphasized that it needed to address only one of Cisco’s proposed noninfringement grounds to determine whether substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict. It concluded that the jury had a sufficient evidentiary basis to find that Egenera failed to prove infringement.

Finally, the Federal Circuit upheld the district court’s denial of Egenera’s motion for a new trial. It rejected all of Egenera’s arguments, which alleged errors related to jury selection, jury instructions, expert testimony, closing arguments, and a verdict contrary to the weight of the evidence.




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Prosecution history primacy: “Consisting essentially of” means what applicant said it meant

In a decision that underscores the primacy of prosecution history to determine claim scope, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the Patent Trial & Appeal Board’s interpretation of the transitional phrase “consisting essentially of,” holding that the patentee’s actions during prosecution narrowed the claims beyond the conventional construction. Eye Therapies, LLC v. Slayback Pharma, LLC, Case No. 23-2173 (Fed. Cir. June 30, 2025) (Scarsi, Dist. J., by designation; Taranto, Stoll, JJ.)

The case involved a method for reducing eye redness using low concentrations of brimonidine, a vasoconstrictive compound. Eye Therapies owns a patent that claims methods of administering brimonidine “consisting essentially of” the active ingredient. During inter partes review (IPR), the Board applied the typical construction of that transitional phrase, allowing for the presence of other active agents as long as they did not materially affect the invention’s basic and novel properties. Based on that reading, the Board found the claims obvious over prior art references that disclosed brimonidine in combination with other drugs. On appeal, Eye Therapies argued that the Board’s construction was too broad and inconsistent with the prosecution history.

The Federal Circuit agreed. Although “consisting essentially of” is generally understood to permit unlisted ingredients that don’t materially affect the invention, the Court emphasized that this meaning can be overridden by the intrinsic record. In this case, the applicant amended the claims to avoid prior art and repeatedly argued that the invention involved only brimonidine, with no other active agents. During the original prosecution, the examiner allowed the claims on that basis. The Court found these statements to be definitional, particularly in light of the applicant’s use of “i.e.” to equate the claim language with a brimonidine-only method. Given the clarity and consistency of the applicant’s position, the Court concluded that the prosecution history required a narrower reading than the one the Board used based on the phrase’s conventional meaning.

The Federal Circuit acknowledged that the patent specification disclosed embodiments containing additional active agents. That alone, however, did not justify a broader construction. The narrowing amendment came after the specification was drafted, and the Court reiterated that not every embodiment must fall within the scope of the claims, particularly when the claims have been narrowed during prosecution. The Court also noted that other embodiments in the specification were fully consistent with the narrower interpretation. Taken together, these factors reinforced the conclusion that the applicant’s prosecution statements – not the broader illustrative disclosures – defined the proper scope of the claims.

The Federal Circuit distinguished its 2009 decision in Ecolab v. FMC, where it declined to apply prosecution history disclaimer despite similar language. In Ecolab, the patentee initially stated that peracetic acid was the “sole antimicrobial agent,” but the examiner clarified that “consisting essentially of” did not mean “solely.” The applicant never repeated the statement and secured allowance on other grounds. The specification in Ecolab also described compositions that included other known antimicrobial agents, which supported the broader interpretation. In contrast, the applicant here amended the claims, consistently [...]

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Seeing double? Director instructs Board to resolve claim construction pre-institution

The acting director of the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) vacated and remanded a Patent Trial & Appeal Board decision to institute two inter partes review (IPR) petitions that challenged the same claims. The acting director determined that the two petitions primarily differed with respect to claim construction. In a decision designated as “informative,” he authorized the Board to resolve claim construction pre-institution in view of the Consolidated Trial Practice Guide’s (CTPG) direction that “one petition should be sufficient to challenge the claims of a patent in most situations.” CrowdStrike, Inc. v. GoSecure, Inc., IPR2025-00068; -00070 (PTAB June 25, 2025) (Stewart, Act. Dir.) The PTO designates a decision as informative when it provides “norms on recurring issues, guidance on issues of first impression to the Board, guidance on Board rules and practices, and guidance on issues that may develop through analysis of recurring issues in many cases.”

CrowdStrike submitted two IPR petitions that challenged the same claims of GoSecure’s patent. The Board instituted both IPRs. GoSecure requested director review, asserting that instituting both petitions was an abuse of the Board’s discretion. On review, the acting director determined that the Board abused its discretion in view of the CTPG’s direction.

The acting director concluded that the two petitions did not reflect an exception to the CTPG’s direction. He determined that CrowdStrike’s petitions were primarily distinguished by the constructions applied to a claim term. The acting director explained that the Board should have construed the term at issue prior to granting institution, concluding that the Board’s institution decision amounted to improper expansion of CrowdStrike’s permitted word count and placed a substantial and unnecessary burden on the Board and GoSecure that could raise fairness, timing, and efficiency concerns. The acting director vacated and remanded the Board’s institution decision.

The acting director also instructed the Board that the patent owner should be allowed to “submit whatever arguments are necessary for the panel to make a claim construction determination” even if the patent owner has not addressed the issue.




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X-Ray Vision: Court Sees Through Implicit Claim Construction

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the Patent Trial & Appeal Board’s final determination that challenged patent claims were not unpatentable, finding that the Board’s decision relied on an erroneous implicit claim construction. Sigray, Inc. v. Carl Zeiss X-Ray Microscopy, Inc., Case No. 23-2211 (Fed. Cir. May 23, 2025) (Dyk, Prost, JJ.; Goldberg, Chief Distr. J., sitting by designation).

Zeiss owns a patent related to X-ray imaging systems that incorporate projection magnification. Sigray filed a petition requesting inter partes review (IPR) of all claims in the patent. After institution, the Board issued its final written decision, which declined to hold any of the challenged claims unpatentable. Sigray appealed.

On appeal, Sigray argued that the claims were unpatentable based on a single prior art reference, Jorgensen. The Jorgensen reference “describes a system that uses an X-ray source to generate an X-ray beam, which then passes through a sample before being received by a detector.” Sigray argued that Jorgensen anticipated or rendered the challenged claims obvious. The parties agreed that Jorgensen explicitly disclosed all the limitations of the independent claim except for one reading “a magnification of the projection X ray stage . . . between 1 and 10 times.”

The parties’ arguments centered on whether the magnification limitation was inherently disclosed in Jorgensen. The Board concluded that “viewing the record as a whole, . . . [Sigray] has not shown persuasively that Jorgensen inherently discloses projection magnification within the claimed range. Sigray argued, and the Federal Circuit agreed, that the Board’s findings incorrectly relied on a flawed understanding of the claimed range. In Sigray’s view, “the Board implicitly and incorrectly construed the limitation ‘between 1 and 10’ to exclude unspecified, small divergence resulting in projection magnifications only slightly greater than 1.” This was illustrated by the Board’s determination that Sigray “failed to show that the . . . X-ray beam in Jorgensen diverges enough to result in projection magnification between 1 and 10 times.”

The Federal Circuit found that the Board’s use of the term “enough” indicated that the evidence it relied on supported a finding of some divergence in the X-ray beams. Because the beams were not completely parallel, the Court reasoned that some magnification necessarily resulted, and that even a miniscule amount (as disclosed in the prior art) fell within the claimed magnification range of 1 to 10. Since the Board made only one evidence-supported finding relevant to anticipation, the Court reversed on the independent claim and two dependent claims without remand. However, the Court remanded the case to the Board to determine whether the three remaining challenged claims, which recited further material limitations, would have been obvious.




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“Payment Handler”: A Nonce Term Without Instructions

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s ruling that a software term was a “nonce” term that invoked 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph (i.e., a means-plus-function claim element). The Court further found that the patent specification did not recite sufficient corresponding structure, rendering the claim element indefinite. Fintiv, Inc. v. PayPal Holdings, Inc., Case No. 23-2312 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 30, 2025) (Prost, Taranto, Stark JJ.)

Fintiv sued PayPal for infringing four patents related to cloud-based transaction systems, also known as “mobile wallet platforms,” “mobile financial services platforms,” or “electronic payment systems.” During claim construction, the district court ruled that the terms “payment handler” and “payment handler service” were indefinite. The court concluded that both terms were means-plus-function limitations governed by § 112, sixth paragraph. Although the claims did not use the word “means,” the district court found that PayPal had demonstrated that the terms were drafted in a format consistent with traditional means-plus-function language, effectively substituting “payment handler” for the word “means.” The court also found that the patent specifications failed to disclose corresponding structure capable of performing the claimed functions. As a result, the court held the claims invalid for indefiniteness and entered final judgment. Fintiv appealed.

Fintiv argued that the district court erred in concluding that the payment handler terms invoked § 112(f) and that the specifications failed to disclose the structure for the claimed functions. The Federal Circuit disagreed.

The Federal Circuit analyzed the “payment-handler” terms, which did not explicitly use the word “means.” Under § 112(f), there is a rebuttable presumption that a claim term does not invoke means-plus-function treatment unless the challenger can show that the term is a nonce term that lacks “sufficiently definite structure” or only recites a function without providing enough structure to perform that function. Fintiv contended that the payment handler terms, both individually and collectively, identified the required structure. However, the Court found that PayPal had successfully rebutted the presumption since the payment handler terms recited functions without reciting sufficient structure to perform those functions. The Court agreed with the district court that the term “handler” did not convey sufficient structure to a person of ordinary skill in the art.

Having determined that the payment handler terms invoked § 112(f), the Federal Circuit sought to identify the corresponding structure described in the specifications for performing the payment handler function but found none. The Court concluded that “without an algorithm to achieve these functionalities – and, more generally, given the specifications’ failure to disclose adequate corresponding structure – we hold the payment-handler terms indefinite.”




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Prosecution Disclaimer Alive and Well, Especially in Closed Claim

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s noninfringement determination, finding that the presence of a disclaimed compound in the accused product precluded infringement. Azurity Pharm., Inc. v. Alkem Lab’ys Ltd., Case No. 23-1977 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 8, 2025) (Moore, Chen, Murphy, JJ.)

Azurity owns a patent directed to a nonsterile, stable liquid formulation of vancomycin hydrochloride, specifically designed for oral administration to treat Clostridium difficile infections. Following Alkem’s submission of an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA), Azurity brought a Hatch-Waxman Act claim against Alkem for infringement of certain claims of the patent. The district court found that Azurity had disclaimed the presence of propylene glycol in the claimed formulation during the prosecution. Since Alkem’s ANDA product contained propylene glycol, the district court held that it did not infringe. Azurity appealed.

The Federal Circuit affirmed, focusing on the patent’s prosecution history and noting that Azurity used the lack of propylene glycol to distinguish its claimed invention from the prior art. The Court noted that this distinction was made during prosecution multiple times in response to the examiner’s rejections, and that Azurity had added negative claim limitations that specifically omitted propylene glycol from the scope of the claims.

The Federal Circuit also noted that Azurity used a “consisting of” transitional phrase to narrow the claims and relied on the closed transition to overcome the prior art. The Court explained that “consisting of” is a closed transition that limits the claim scope to only the recited components. By using this transition and not including propylene glycol as one of the claim components, Azurity effectively disclaimed propylene glycol from the invention. Therefore, the Court found that omission of propylene glycol during patent prosecution was “clean, unambiguous, and complete.”

Azurity argued that a pretrial stipulation between the parties, which stated that “[s]uitable flavoring agents for use in the asserted claims include flavoring agents with or without propylene glycol,” should preclude the application of the disclaimer. The Federal Circuit did not find this argument persuasive, concluding that the stipulation did not alter the clear and unambiguous disclaimer made during prosecution, nor did it affect the noninfringement finding. Since Alkem’s ANDA product contained propylene glycol and Azurity disclaimed inclusion of propylene glycol, there was no infringement.




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