authorship Archives

Tragic Ending: Award-Winning AI Artwork Refused Copyright Registration

by Amol Parikh | Sep 21, 2023 | Copyrights

The US Copyright Office (CO) Review Board rejected a request to register artwork partially generated by artificial intelligence (AI) because the work contains more than a de minimis amount of content generated by AI and the applicant was unwilling to disclaim the AI-generated material. Second Request for Reconsideration for Refusal to Register Théâtre D’opéra Spatial (Copyright Review Board Sept. 5, 2023) (S. Wilson., Gen. Counsel; M. Strong, Associate Reg. of Copyrights; J. Rubel Asst. Gen. Counsel).

In 2022, Jason Allen filed an application to register a copyright for a work named “Théâtre D’opéra Spatial,” reproduced below.

The artwork garnered national attention in 2022 for being the first AI-generated image to win the Colorado State Fair’s annual fine art competition. The examiner assigned to the application requested information about Allen’s use of Midjourney, a text-to-picture AI service, in the creation of the work. Allen explained that he “input numerous revisions and text prompts at least 624 times to arrive at the initial version of the image.” He went on to state that after Midjourney created the initial version of the work, he used Adobe Photoshop to remove flaws and create new visual content and used Gigapixel AI to “upscale” the image, increasing its resolution and size. As a result of these disclosures, the examiner requested that the features of the work generated by Midjourney be excluded from the copyright claim. Allen declined to exclude the AI-generated portions. As a result, the CO refused to register the claim because the deposit for the work did not “fix only [Mr. Allen’s] alleged authorship” but instead included “inextricably merged, inseparable contributions” from both Allen and Midjourney. Allen asked the CO to reconsider the denial.

The CO upheld the denial of registration, finding that the work contained more than a de minimis amount of AI-generated content, which must be disclaimed in a registration application. The CO explained that when analyzing AI-generated material, it must determine when a human user can be considered the “creator” of AI-generated output. If all of a work’s “traditional elements of authorship” were produced by a machine, the work lacks human authorship and the CO will not register it. If, however, a work containing AI-generated material also contains sufficient human authorship to support a claim to copyright, then the CO will register the human’s contributions.

Applying these principles to the work, the CO analyzed the circumstances of its creation, including Allen’s use of an AI tool. Allen argued that his use of Midjourney allowed him to claim authorship of the image generated by the service because he provided “creative input” when he “entered a series of prompts, adjusted the scene, selected portions to focus on, and dictated the tone of the image.” The CO disagreed, finding that these actions do not make Allen the author of the Midjourney-created image because his sole contribution was inputting the text prompt that produced it.

The [...]

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Almost Paradise? No Authorship for AI “Creativity Machine”

by Kavya Rallabhandi | Aug 31, 2023 | Copyrights

The US District Court for the District of Columbia agreed with the US Copyright Office’s denial of a copyright application that sought to register visual art generated by artificial intelligence (AI) because US copyright law only protects works of human creation. Thaler v. Perlmutter, Case No. CV 22-1564 (D.D.C. Aug. 18, 2023) (Howell, J.)

The Copyright Act of 1976 provides immediate copyright protection to any work of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression. Applicants may submit their works to the Copyright Office for registration, during which works are reviewed for eligibility for copyright protection. the Copyright Office then registers eligible works, affording the registration owner certain legal benefits and presumptions.

Stephen Thaler, the owner of an AI computer system called the “Creativity Machine,” claimed that his AI independently generated the below visual art entitled “A Recent Entrance to Paradise.”

Thaler sought to register the work with the Copyright Office. The copyright application described the art as “autonomously created by a computer algorithm running on a machine,” identified the Creativity Machine as the author and listed Thaler as the copyright claimant under the work-for-hire doctrine. The Copyright Office denied Thaler’s application because the work lacked human authorship, which is an essential element of a valid US copyright. Thaler twice requested reconsideration of the copyright application, and the Copyright Office twice refused to register the work because of the human authorship requirement. Thaler timely appealed the Copyright Office’s denial to the District Court for the District of Columbia, and both parties moved for summary judgment.

Under the authority of the Administrative Procedure Act, the district court reviewed the Copyright Office’s final agency action through the arbitrary and capricious standard of review (5 U.S.C. § 704). The district court first analyzed whether the AI computer system could own the copyright, then determined whether Thaler was a proper claimant under the work-for-hire doctrine. The district court held that the Copyright Office did not err in denying Thaler’s copyright registration application because US copyright law only protects works of human—not machine—creation. Although copyright law was designed to adapt with the times, the district court stated that there is an underlying and consistent understanding that human creativity is the driving force of copyrightability. While the tools humans use to create copyrightable works (fixed in tangible mediums) are ever evolving and range from pencils to computers, human authorship is a bedrock requirement to copyrightability such that the tools themselves cannot be listed as copyright authors. The district court further held that the plain text of the 1976 Copyright Act requires human authorship since it states that the originator of the copyrightable work must have the capacity for intellectual, creative or artistic labor—a standard that AI has yet to meet. Because AI computers cannot be copyright authors, the district court did not address the work-for-hire analysis.

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Publisher’s Co-Authorship Claim Arises Under Copyright Act, Invoking Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction

by Paul Devinsky | Aug 19, 2021 | Copyrights

The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed a district court’s dismissal of a copyright authorship dispute, finding that the district court had exclusive jurisdiction over the case because a book publisher’s claim of co-authorship arose under the federal Copyright Act, not state contract law. Di Angelo Publ’ns, Inc. v. Kelley, Case No. 20-20523 (5th Cir. Aug. 12, 2021) (Higginbotham, J.)

Makeup artist Jentry Kelley and Di Angelo Publications entered into a publishing contract for Kelley’s cosmetics book. Kelley provided Di Angelo with an initial three-page manuscript, which Di Angelo claimed it then transformed into a book while communicating and collaborating with Kelley. The book listed Kelley only as the holder of the book’s copyright. After an initial 1,000-copy print run, Kelley asked Di Angelo to prepare an updated or revised version of the book for sale. Di Angelo claimed it had prepared the updated work when it discovered that Kelley was attempting to work directly with Di Angelo’s printer to reduce the costs she would incur selling the revised edition, which violated the parties’ contract.

After unsuccessful overtures to the printer, Kelley filed a complaint in Harris County, Texas, asking for rescission of the parties’ contract because Di Angelo intentionally misled her regarding publishing costs and overcharged her for publishing services. Kelley alleged that she was the sole copyright owner and that Di Angelo did not develop or have any intellectual property rights in connection with the book. Di Angelo counterclaimed for breach of contract, among other claims, and sought a declaratory judgment that Kelley failed to substantially perform under the contract. Di Angelo alleged that Kelley had prevented it from selling the updated edition of the book.

Following partial summary judgment in favor of Kelley, including on the declaratory judgment claim, Di Angelo filed suit in the Southern District of Texas. Di Angelo disputed Kelley’s claim to exclusive copyright ownership and asserted a single claim for relief: A declaration that Di Angelo owned the copyright in the two editions of the book, as well as any derivative works, and had rights in their printing and distribution. Additionally,Di Angelo alleged that it acquired copyrights in the books by “writing, editing, planning and taking all photographs and making all illustrations, and planning, designing, and arranging the layout” of the book. Kelley moved to dismiss Di Angelo’s declaratory relief claim, characterizing the suit as an end-run around the Harris County rulings against Di Angelo and arguing that there was no federal jurisdiction because Di Angelo’s claim was premised solely on Kelley’s alleged breach of the contract, which was governed by Texas law. Di Angelo responded that resolution of the authorship dispute required the district court to interpret federal copyright law, including definitional and ownership provisions, which the state court lacked jurisdiction to address. The district court agreed with Kelley on the jurisdictional question and granted the motion to dismiss. Noting that the parties’ contract referred to Kelley as the “author,” the district court found that that Di Angelo’s claim [...]

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