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All the Benefits of a Reverse Triangular Merger, None of the IP Merger Mess

The US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a district court’s summary judgment dismissal of plaintiff’s claim that the defendant failed to provide a payment conditioned on the sale, merger or transfer of certain intellectual property since ownership was not transferred via the merger. GSE Consulting, Inc. v. L3Harris Techs., Inc., Case No. 22-10647 (11th Cir. Feb. 8, 2023) (Rosenbaum, Lagoa, Wetherell, JJ.)

L3Harris specializes in defense and information technology and until recently was known as Harris Corporation. The name change from Harris to L3Harris was the result of a reverse triangular merger it executed over 2018 and 2019 whereby its subsidiary, Leopard Merger Sub, merged with its target, L3 Technologies.

In 2008, Harris and GSE combined forces to develop an oil sands heavy oil recovery process. In addition to yielding intellectual property relating to the process’s corresponding radio frequency heating technology, the collaboration resulted in a consulting agreement that would have extended through December 31, 2022. Under the consulting agreement, GSE provided its specialized infrastructure and energy consulting services on call and assigned all its rights to intellectual property developed under the agreement to Harris. In return, GSE received base pay and the right of first refusal for 10% of the direct labor workshare of Harris’s radio frequency heating projects.

The consulting agreement also included several payment conditions to benefit GSE or mitigate its risk. GSE believed that the Harris-L3 merger triggered the following condition to the tune of $4 million:

6.b. Payments calculation for the following to be 3% of market capitalization, capped at $4M:

 

  1. in the event the IP is sold, merged or transferred and the primary basis of the sale is not the IP.

GSE argued that the intellectual property relevant to the consulting agreement had “merged” because the Harris-L3 plan of merger addressed that intellectual property and included it in the merger. GSE therefore issued a $4 million invoice to L3Harris.

L3Harris rejected the invoice, arguing that while the plan of merger addressed the relevant intellectual property, the relevant language declared that the merger would have no effect on Harris and L3’s respective ownership interests: “all such rights will survive unchanged after the consummation of the [merger].” According to L3Harris, ownership of the relevant intellectual property did not change through the merger. Not long after rejecting GSE’s invoice, L3Harris also shut down its radio frequency heating program.

GSE subsequently filed a lawsuit alleging breach of contract, and the parties filed competing summary judgment motions. GSE maintained its position that it was owed $4 million but also argued that if the district court found the payment provision ambiguous then it should consider testimony from those who brokered the agreement demonstrating that a corporate merger was sufficient to trigger payment. L3Harris argued that the provision was unambiguous and thus Florida law prohibited considering extrinsic evidence. L3Harris also argued that its merger didn’t involve anything that triggered payment (i.e., the relevant intellectual property was not sold, merged or transferred).

The district court granted [...]

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Agreement to One Is Not Consent to All

Addressing a myriad of issues involving unauthorized use of professional models’ photographs for gentlemen’s clubs’ promotional materials, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the district court erred in its interpretation of “consent,” and vacated and remanded to adjudicate the scope of the consent given. The Second Circuit simultaneously affirmed the district court’s dismissal of claims under the Lanham Act and New York corporate and libel law. Electra v. 59 Murray Enterprs., Case No. 19-235 (2d Cir. Feb. 9, 2021) (Pooler, J.)

Eleven famous female models, including celebrity Carmen Electra, brought claims against three gentlemen’s clubs for using photographs of the models without permission. Plaintiffs had posed for the photographs for modeling agencies and signed release agreements for those agencies to use the photos. The clubs were given these photographs through third-party contractors that used the images to promote social events, including advertisements on the clubs’ website and social media. Plaintiffs never provided the clubs with any authorization or written consent to use their photos, nor were they compensated. Plaintiffs maintained that they do not endorse the clubs and were harmed by the unauthorized use of their likeness in association with prurient activities that the clubs promote. The clubs argued that their contractors obtained the images from a catalogue source that they believed had all rights in the images.

The main issues on appeal were whether plaintiffs had provided their “written consent” to the clubs to use their photos when they signed releases with their own agencies (despite never authorizing the clubs to use the photos), and whether the releases barred their claims.

Of the 11 plaintiffs, only six were not time barred, and of those, only two had disputed terms of their agreements. The Court opined for those two plaintiffs.

Under New York Civil Rights Law §§ 50-51 (statutory right of privacy and publicity), it is a misdemeanor to “use for advertising purposes, or for the purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living person without having first obtained the written consent of such person.” This protects both private individuals and those in the public eye, such as the plaintiffs, if they did not give written permission for that particular use. In deciding whether plaintiffs gave their consent for lawful use, the Second Circuit explained that there is no consent if the use exceeds the terms of the agreement, a factual inquiry into the text and terms of the releases.

The district court granted the clubs summary judgment under § 51 claims, finding that each plaintiff with a timely claim had entered into a “comprehensive” release that “grant[ed] the releasee unlimited rights to the use of the images at issue.” The plaintiffs argued that the district court erred in so finding because the record did not contain releases for the images at issue. The district court did not address whether the releases constituted written consent, but mused that it would be “inconsistent” with the statute for plaintiffs to sign unlimited releases and [...]

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