IP UPDATE
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IP UPDATE
Exploring the Latest in Intellectual Property Law
Results for "Trademark appeal"
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Supreme Court: “Booking.com” Can Be Registered as Trademark

by | Jul 15, 2020 |

By an 8-1 vote, the Supreme Court rejected a per se rule by the US Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) that a generic word followed by “.com” is necessarily generic and therefore ineligible for trademark protection. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office et al. v. Booking.com BV, Case No. 19-46 (Supr. Ct. June 30, 2020) (Ginsberg, Justice) (Sotomayor, Justice, concurring) (Breyer, Justice, dissenting). In so doing, the Supreme Court found that the proper test for whether “booking.com” is eligible for trademark protection for travel booking services is whether the public perceives “booking.com” as identifying a single source.

Trademarks identify and distinguish the goods and services of a single party, and the Lanham Act establishes a system of trademark registration. Among other requirements for registration, a trademark must be distinctive, as judged along a spectrum of trademark distinctiveness. Distinctive trademarks, in order of most to least strength, include fanciful or made-up words (e.g., KODAK); arbitrary marks that are existing words that have no connection to the underlying goods or services (e.g., CAMEL cigarettes); and then suggestive marks, which require some mental thought to connect them to an attribute of the products or services (e.g., TIDE laundry detergent). Descriptive words are not inherently distinctive (e.g., BEST BUY), but can still be protectable and registerable upon proof of acquired distinctiveness (i.e., secondary meaning) arising from extensive use and advertising by the trademark owner. At the low end of the spectrum of distinctiveness are generic terms, which merely refer to a category or class of goods or services (e.g., wine or art) and are therefore never protectable or registerable as trademarks.

The PTO refused registration for “Booking.com,” citing policy developed from a 132-year-old Supreme Court case which held that the addition of “Company” to a generic word does not render the resulting name (i.e., Generic Company) distinctive.  See Goodyear’s India Rubber Glove Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 128 U. S. 598 (1888). After the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) affirmed the refusal of registration, Booking.com appealed to the US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, which reversed the refusal of registration, finding that “‘Booking.com’—unlike ‘booking’—is not generic. The district court found that the consuming public primarily understands that BOOKING.COM does not refer to a genus, rather it is descriptive of services involving ‘booking’ available at that domain name.”  The US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the Virginia federal court (IP Update, Vol. 22, No. 3), and the PTO sought certiorari from the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari (IP Update, Vol. 22, No. 11), and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg delivered the opinion of the Court, with which six other justices joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a short concurring opinion, and Justice Breyer dissented. The question under review by the Court was “whether the addition by an online business of a generic top-level domain (.com) to an otherwise generic term can create a protectable trademark.

Both parties in Booking.com agreed that “booking” is generic for the kind of travel [...]

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Trademark Claim for Profit Damages Means No Jury Trial

by | Jun 11, 2020 | ,

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a denial of a jury trial demand in a trademark infringement lawsuit where only a claim of disgorgement of profits was at issue. JL Beverage Company, LLC v. Jim Beam Brands Co., Beam Inc., Case No. 18-16597 (9th Cir. May 27, 2020) (Wallace, J.) (Friedland, J., concurring).

JL sued Jim Beam for trademark infringement. JL manufactured and sold vodka in bottles featuring stylized depictions of lips. Jim Beam also sells vodka in bottles featuring stylized depictions of lips. JL alleged that consumers would confuse its “Johnny Love Vodka” lip mark with Jim Beam’s Pucker line of flavored vodka products.

After JL failed to provide a computation of actual damages during discovery, Jim Beam sought to limit the damages JL could seek at trial. The district court found that JL’s failure prevented Jim Beam from preparing a responsive case and granted Jim Beam’s motion to exclude JL’s claims for actual damages. Jim Beam further argued that JL may not recover a royalty because 1) it is not appropriate in situations, like this one, where the parties did not have a previous royalty agreement and 2) as with actual damages, JL never identified a means of calculating a reasonable royalty or produced evidence upon which a fact finder could determine such a royalty. Again, the court agreed, and limited JL’s damage claims to equitable disgorgement of Jim Beam’s profits, as provided under the Lanham Act.

Without claims for actual damages or royalties, Jim Beam moved to strike JL’s demand for a jury trial. Since the Lanham Act does not afford the right to a jury trial, the district court considered whether the Seventh Amendment affords such a right in a trademark dispute. The Seventh Amendment provides that “[i]n Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.” The district court found controlling law in Ninth Circuit precedent Fifty-Six Hope Road Music, which held that that the Seventh Amendment does not afford the right to a jury calculation of profits for two reasons: disgorgement is an equitable remedy, and the specific issue of profit determination cannot be said to be traditionally tried by a jury. The district court denied JL’s demand for a jury trial, held a two-day bench trial and ultimately determined that Jim Beam did not infringe JL’s marks. JL appealed the district court’s order granting Jim Beam’s motion to strike its jury trial demand and the district court’s judgment.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order and judgment, finding no error in the court’s likelihood of confusion analysis on any of the factors, nor in its denial of the jury trial.

In a concurring opinion, Judge Friedland wrote separately to address the tension between the Court’s holdings in Fifty-Six Hope Road Music (a trademark case) and Sid & Marty Krofft (a copyright case). In Krofft, the Ninth Circuit found a right to a jury trial in a copyright case where there was only a claim [...]

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Don’t SULKA: Trademark Plaintiff Must Demonstrate Intent, Ability to Use Mark

by | May 14, 2020 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a complaint seeking a declaration of trademark abandonment, finding that the plaintiff (the co-owner of an online business that sells to customers in India and Thailand) was unable to demonstrate a case or controversy absent evidence that he was prepared to immediately bring his goods to market in the United States. Abdul Rehman Karim Saleh v. Sulka Trading Ltd., et al., Case No. 19-2461 (2d Cir. Apr. 30, 2020) (per curiam).

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Supreme Court: Profit Disgorgement Available Remedy for Trademark Infringement, Willful or Not

by | Apr 30, 2020 |

Resolving a split among the circuits regarding whether proof of willfulness is necessary for an award of a trademark infringer’s profits, the Supreme Court of the United States issued a unanimous decision holding that the plain language of the Lanham Act has never required a showing of willful infringement in order to obtain a profits award in a suit for trademark infringement under §1125(a). Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., et al. Case No. 18-1233 (Supr. Ct. Apr. 23, 2020) (Gorsuch, Justice) (Alito, Justice, concurring) (Sotomayor, Justice, concurring).

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2019 IP Law Year in Review: Trademarks

by , , and | Feb 6, 2020 |

Executive Summary

Trademark jurisprudence in 2019 may be best summarized in two words: questions and answers. Decisions handed down at the district court level have teed up key questions that are poised to be answered by the United States Supreme Court in the 2020 term—such as the protectability of certain “.com” trademarks, as well as the standard for obtaining particular damages in trademark infringement disputes. For brand owners and trademark practitioners, 2019 will also go down as a year that provided answers to many important questions. For example, on numerous occasions in 2019, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board answered questions as to whether certain designs or designations have the capability to function as a source-identifying trademark. The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) answered questions relating to the cannabis industry and how the 2018 Farm Bill would be applied in the review of US trademark applications listing goods or services for CBD products. And, the Supreme Court answered an important question for trademark licensees regarding their rights when a trademark licensor goes bankrupt. This report provides a summary of 2019’s most important questions and answers when it comes to trademark law, and serves as a useful guide for navigating trademark prosecution and enforcement efforts into the year ahead.

Trademarks

  1. Treatment of Generic & Descriptive Marks
  2. Potential Damages Available In Trademark Infringement Cases
  3. Cannabis, CBD, and Trademarks
  4. Trademark Licenses in Bankruptcy

2020 Outlook

As we await further answers to our most pressing trademark questions in 2020, we anticipate that this year will bring unique opportunities to apply traditional tenets of trademark law to modern-day disputes and business considerations. So long as marketing efforts continue to incorporate influencers, short-form and interactive content, artificial intelligence, blockchain technologies, and other initiatives to elevate brand profiles, trademark practitioners and the courts will need to be creative in applying traditional interpretations of relevant trademark laws and policies to trademark protection strategies and infringement disputes. In 2020, the USPTO also will be forced to continue to address the ever-crowded brand space by furthering its crack-down on fraudulent trademark applications, clearing dead weight from the USPTO register, and maintaining its strict registrability and failure-to-function assessments to make room for new and growing brands. Finally, in 2020 and beyond, we expect that trademark considerations will continue to color other legal matters and disputes, including corporate transactions, data ownership and privacy, and bankruptcy and restructuring, thus showing the immense commercial value and power of brands.

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When It’s All In the Family: Reverse Confusion Not a Basis for Broad Trademark Remedies

by | Jan 8, 2020 |

Addressing reverse confusion and scope of available remedies, the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld a district court’s refusal to award infringing profits and a broad permanent injunction after a jury found infringement. Fabick, Inc. v. JFTCO, Inc., Case Nos. 19-1760; -0072 (7th Cir. Dec. 9, 2019) (Flaum, J.)

This trademark dispute originates with a family feud. John Fabick, founder of the John Fabick Tractor Company, purchased two Caterpillar equipment dealerships intending for his son, Joe, to operate the dealerships. At the time, the John Fabick Tractor Company had used the mark FABICK in connection with its business. Joe later founded FABCO, which sold Caterpillar equipment and related goods. Eventually, one of Joe’s sons, Jeré, took over FABCO.

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Supreme Court: PTO Not Entitled to Attorney’s Fees in District Court Appeals

by | Jan 2, 2020 |

PATENTS / PTO ATTORNEY’S FEES

In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Sotomayor, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the US Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) is not entitled to recover its attorney’s fees in an appeal to a district court from an adverse decision of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) under 35 USC § 145. Peter v. NantKwest, Inc., Case No. 18-801 (Supr. Ct. Dec. 11, 2019) (Sotomayor, Justice).

The question posed in this case was:

[W]hether such “expenses” [in § 145 proceedings] include the salaries of attorney and paralegal employees of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).

The answer was a resounding “no.”

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Seventh Circuit Formally Adopts Octane Fitness Standard for Trademark Cases

by | Jan 2, 2020 |

TRADEMARKS / ATTORNEY’S FEE AWARD

The US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit officially joined its sister circuits in holding that the Supreme Court standard for awarding attorney’s fees in patent cases, set forth in Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., was equally applicable to attorney’s fees claims under the Lanham Act. In doing so, the Seventh Circuit overruled its prior holding that a plaintiff’s claims were only “exceptional” under the Lanham Act if they constituted an abuse of process. LHO Chicago River, LLC v. Perillo, Case. No. 19-1848 (7th Cir. Nov. 8, 2019) (Manion, J).

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Pink Is Not the New Black: See Functionality Doctrine

by | Jan 16, 2025 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a Trademark Trial & Appeal Board decision canceling trademarks for the color pink for ceramic hip components, stating that substantial evidence supported the Board’s findings that the color pink as used in the ceramic components was functional. CeramTec GmbH v. CoorsTek Bioceramics LLC, Case No. 23-1502 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 3, 2025) (Lourie, Taranto, Stark, JJ.)

Trademarks cannot be functional. The functionality doctrine prevents the registration of useful product features as trademarks. As explained by the Supreme Court (1995) in Qualitex v. Jacobson Prods.:

The functionality doctrine prevents trademark law, which seeks to promote competition by protecting a firm’s reputation, from instead inhibiting legitimate competition by allowing a producer to control a useful product feature. It is the province of patent law, not trademark law, to encourage invention by granting inventors a monopoly over new product designs or functions for a limited time, 35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 173, after which competitors are free to use the innovation. If a product’s functional features could be used as trademarks, however, a monopoly over such features could be obtained without regard to whether they qualify as patents and could be extended forever (because trademarks may be renewed in perpetuity).

CeramTec manufactures ceramic hip components made from zirconia-toughened alumina (ZTA) ceramic containing chromium oxide (chromia). The addition of chromia gives the ceramic a characteristic pink color. CeramTec obtained trademarks for the pink color as used in these components. CoorsTek Bioceramics, a competitor, challenged the trademarks, arguing that the pink color of the ceramic was functional. The Board agreed, finding that the pink color was functional because it resulted from the addition of chromia, which provided material benefits to the ceramic, such as increased hardness. CeramTec appealed.

The Federal Circuit applied the four-factor Morton-Norwich (CCPA 1982) test to determine functionality:

  • Existence of a utility patent
  • Advertising materials
  • Availability of functionally equivalent designs
  • Comparatively simple or cheap manufacture.

The Federal Circuit found the first and second Morton-Norwich prongs were strongly in CoorsTek’s favor, as CeramTec held multiple patents that disclosed the functional benefits of chromia, such as toughness, hardness, and stability of the ZTA ceramic. Similarly, the Court found that CeramTec had multiple advertising materials that promoted its product’s functional advantages.

The Federal Circuit found that there was no evidence of alternative designs that were functionally equivalent to the pink ZTA ceramic, rendering the third factor neutral. The Court also found the fourth factor neutral because there was conflicting evidence regarding whether chromia reduced manufacturing costs.

Finally, CeramTec argued that CoorsTek should be precluded from challenging the trademarks based on the doctrine of unclean hands. The Federal Circuit acknowledged that the Board spoke too strongly in suggesting that the unclean hands defense is categorically unavailable in functionality proceedings but found any error to be harmless. The Court confirmed that the Board had adequately considered the defense and found it inapplicable in this case.



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Equity Is Neither a “Good” Nor a “Service” Under Lanham Act

by | Jan 16, 2025 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court’s decision that, in terms of trademark use in commerce, corporate equity is not a “good” or “service” under the Lanham Act. LegalForce RAPC Worldwide, PC v. LegalForce, Inc., Case No. 23-2855 (9th Cir. Dec. 27, 2024) (Thomas, Wardlaw, Collins, JJ.) (Collins, J., concurring).

LegalForce RAPC Worldwide is a California corporation that operates legal services websites and owns the US mark LEGALFORCE. LegalForce, Inc., is a Japanese corporation that provides legal software services and owns the Japanese mark LEGALFORCE.

Both parties had discussions with the same group of investors. After those meetings, LegalForce Japan secured $130 million in funding, while LegalForce USA received nothing. Thereafter, LegalForce USA brought several claims against LegalForce Japan, including a trademark infringement claim. To support its case, LegalForce USA cited LegalForce Japan’s expansion plan, a trademark application for the mark LF, website ownership, and the use of LEGALFORCE to sell and advertise equity shares to investors in California.

The district court dismissed claims related to the website for lack of personal jurisdiction and dismissed claims related to the US expansion plan, trademark application, and alleged software sales in the United States as unripe. The district court dismissed the trademark infringement claims related to the efforts to sell equity shares for failure to state a claim. The court found that advertising and selling equity cannot constitute trademark infringement because it is not connected to the sale of goods or services, and the case did not present justification for extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act. LegalForce USA appealed.

To state a claim for trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, plaintiffs must show that:

  • They have a protectible ownership interest in the mark, or for some claims, a registered mark
  • The defendant used the mark “in connection with” goods or services
  • That use is likely to cause confusion. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a), § 1125(a).

The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that LegalForce Japan had not used LegalForce USA’s mark “in connection with” goods or services, and thus LegalForce USA failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted.

The Ninth Circuit concluded that using LEGALFORCE to advertise and sell equity failed to satisfy the requirement that a defendant used the mark in connection with goods or services. Referring to the U.C.C., the Court explained that corporate equity is “not a good for purposes of the Lanham Act, because it is not a movable or tangible thing.” Equity is also not a service because it is not a performance of labor for the benefit of another. There is no “another” involved because those who buy LegalForce Japan equity are owners and so they are not legally separate “others.”

The Ninth Circuit also agreed with the district court that LegalForce Japan’s services in Japan did not satisfy the “in connection with” goods or services requirement under the Lanham Act. To determine when a statute applies extraterritorially, courts invoke the 2023 Supreme Court
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