IP UPDATE
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Results for "Trademark appeal"
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Muddy paws? Franchisor’s unclean hands precludes full equitable relief

by | Apr 2, 2026 | ,

The US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed a district court’s partial denial of a franchisor’s request for a preliminary injunction, finding that the franchisor’s inequitable conduct barred broader injunctive relief, even where the franchisor showed a likelihood of success on certain claims. Fetch! Pet Care, Inc. v. Atomic Pawz Inc., Case No. 25-1638 (6th Cir. Mar. 20, 2026) (Gibbons, Larsen, Murphy, JJ.)

Fetch! sued several former franchisee locations for breach of contract, trademark infringement, and trade secret misappropriation after the franchisees stopped paying royalties, downloaded client contact information, prepared transition plans, and continued operating competing businesses following termination of system access. Fetch! sought a temporary restraining order and then a preliminary injunction to bar operation of the competing businesses, use of alleged trade secrets, infringement of its registered trademarks, and interference with its business relationships.

The district court granted limited relief prohibiting use of Fetch!’s trademarks and restricting communications with existing Fetch! franchisees but declined to enjoin the defendants from continuing to operate competing businesses. The court concluded that although Fetch! was likely to succeed on certain claims, equitable relief was limited by Fetch!’s own conduct, including evidence that it aggressively marketed and sold its “2.0” franchise model while obscuring material differences from its legacy “1.0” model, and that it cut off certain franchisees’ system access under disputed circumstances. Fetch! appealed.

The Sixth Circuit emphasized that a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary equitable remedy and that equitable doctrines, including unclean hands, may independently bar relief. The Court agreed that the record supported a finding that Fetch!’s conduct in marketing and selling its 2.0 and managed-services franchises (particularly Fetch!’s removal of distinctions in disclosure materials and aggressive profitability representations) could constitute bad faith sufficient to deny broader injunctive relief.

The Sixth Circuit also addressed the three legacy 1.0 franchisees for which the district court had not applied unclean hands. Affirming on an alternative ground, the Court found that unclean hands likewise barred injunctive relief as to those defendants. The Court relied on evidence that Fetch! terminated or restricted their system access while they were current on payments and before they began operating competing businesses, and that Fetch! may have failed to comply with applicable state franchise law requirements governing notice and opportunity to cure.

Although it affirmed on unclean hands, the Sixth Circuit clarified aspects of its preliminary injunction jurisprudence:

  • It rejected the district court’s suggestion that a heightened showing of irreparable harm applies when claims are subject to arbitration, confirming that the traditional four-factor test governs.
  • It found that the district court erred in applying a clear-and-convincing standard for irreparable harm rather than the federal standard requiring a likelihood of irreparable injury.
  • It explained that competitive harms, such as loss of goodwill and customer relationships, can qualify as irreparable precisely because they are difficult to quantify.

Because Fetch!’s inequitable conduct supported denial of broader relief, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s refusal to enjoin the defendants’ competing operations while leaving in place the narrower [...]

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Too late to help: Inventorship fix fails to revive forfeited argument

by | Mar 19, 2026 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Patent Trial & Appeal Board, concluding that the retroactive effect of a correction of inventorship under 35 U.S.C. § 256 does not bar the application of forfeiture principles in inter partes review (IPR) proceedings, and that a patent owner that fails to timely raise an antedating theory during an IPR may forfeit reliance on a later corrected inventorship to resurrect that theory. Implicit, LLC v. Sonos, Inc., Case Nos. 20-1173; -1174 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 9, 2026) (Taranto, Stoll, Cunningham, JJ.)

Implicit owns patents directed to content rendering that originally named Edward Balassanian and Scott Bradley as co-inventors. Sonos filed IPR petitions against both patents, asserting unpatentability under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103, primarily based on Janevski, which had an effective prior art date of December 11, 2001.

To avoid Janevski as prior art, Implicit argued that the inventions were conceived and reduced to practice before December 11, 2001. It contended that Balassanian and Bradley conceived of the inventions and collaborated with another engineer, Guy Carpenter, to implement the invention prior to December 2001. Implicit argued that Carpenter’s work inured to the benefit of the named inventors, thereby antedating Janevski. The Board rejected Implicit’s argument and found the challenged claims unpatentable as anticipated or obvious over Janevski. The Board found Implicit’s evidence insufficient to establish conception and communication of the invention by Carpenter in a manner that would support an earlier reduction to practice.

Following the Federal Circuit’s and Supreme Court’s decisions in Arthrex v. Smith & Nephew addressing the Appointments Clause as applied to IPR proceedings, the case was remanded to permit Director review. While proceedings were ongoing, Implicit sought correction of inventorship under 35 U.S.C. § 256 to add Carpenter as a co-inventor. The United States Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO) granted the request and issued certificates of correction in August 2022. The Federal Circuit remanded the case to the Board to determine what impact, if any, the corrections had on the prior final written decisions. The Board concluded that equitable doctrines, including forfeiture, precluded Implicit from relying on the corrected inventorship to advance a new antedating theory. Implicit appealed.

The appeal presented two principal questions:

  • Whether the retroactive effect of a correction of inventorship under § 256 forecloses application of forfeiture principles in an IPR proceeding.
  • Whether the Board abused its discretion in finding that Implicit forfeited its right to assert a new antedating theory based on corrected inventorship.

Implicit argued that § 256 contains no temporal limitation and that corrections operate retroactively, requiring the Board to revisit its unpatentability determinations once Carpenter was added as an inventor. Sonos and the USPTO countered that Implicit had litigated the IPRs on a single inventorship theory and waited until after adverse final written decisions to change course.

The Federal Circuit affirmed on both grounds.

First, the Federal Circuit found that forfeiture principles may apply notwithstanding the retroactive effect of § 256. Although [...]

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USPTO signals new emphasis on US manufacturing in IPR and PGR institution decisions

by | Mar 19, 2026 |

The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) issued a Memorandum on March 11, 2026, signaling that the Patent Trial & Appeal Board may place increased weight on domestic manufacturing activity and the interests of small businesses when deciding whether to institute inter partes review (IPR) or post grant review (PGR).

The America Invents Act (AIA) established IPR and PGR proceedings as mechanisms for challenging the validity of issued patents before the Board. In establishing the framework for institution decisions, the statute directs the USPTO Director to consider broader policy concerns, including the impact on the US economy, the integrity of the patent system, and the efficient administration of the USPTO.

The Memorandum highlights concerns regarding the decline of US manufacturing, particularly in the electronics and computer sectors. Citing government studies, the USPTO notes that the offshoring of key industries has contributed to economic and national security vulnerabilities. According to the USPTO, these developments bear directly on the Director’s statutory obligation to consider the economic effects of Board institution decisions.

While some stakeholders contend that IPR and PGR proceedings protect US manufacturers and small businesses from weak patents, the USPTO observed that many of the most frequent petitioners are large companies that report little domestic manufacturing activity and have not made meaningful investments in US production. According to the Memorandum, this data prompted the USPTO to question whether the current discretionary institution framework adequately accounts for the interests of companies that do invest in domestic manufacturing.

As a result, the USPTO announced that certain factors related to US manufacturing and small businesses may now inform discretionary institution determinations. The USPTO encourages parties to address these considerations explicitly in their discretionary briefing.

When evaluating whether to institute an IPR or PGR, the Director may consider:

  • Whether the products accused of infringement in parallel litigation are manufactured in the United States or tied to domestic manufacturing investments.
  • Whether the patent owner produces competing products in the US.
  • Whether the petitioner qualifies as a small business that has been sued for patent infringement.

The Memorandum clarifies that manufacturing considerations are not limited to final assembly but may also encompass the production of components and situations in which products manufactured domestically are later processed abroad. For method claims, the relevant product for this analysis will be the device used to perform the claimed method.

These considerations apply to all to all IPRs and PGRs in which the due date for a patent owner discretionary brief has not yet elapsed.



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Coiled in controversy: Summary judgment on Walker Process claim unwound

by | Mar 12, 2026 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated a district court’s grant of summary judgment on inequitable conduct and a Walker Process antitrust claim arising from allegations that a patent owner withheld material prior art during patent prosecution and sought to enforce the patents against a competitor in the coiled tubing market. Global Tubing v. Tenaris Coiled Tubes, Case Nos. 23-1882; -1883 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 26, 2026) (Taranto, Hughes, Stark, JJ.)

Global Tubing filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a ruling that its coiled tubing product did not infringe Tenaris’ patents. After uncovering a document in discovery that it characterized as evidence that Tenaris attempted to withhold material information during patent prosecution, Global Tubing amended its complaint to assert inequitable conduct and Walker Process fraud, alleging that Tenaris sought to use fraudulently obtained patents to monopolize the market. Following the completion of discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment of inequitable conduct to Global Tubing and summary judgment of no liability for Walker Process fraud to Tenaris. As to the Walker Process fraud claim, the court determined that because Tenaris was such a small market player, Global Tubing could not prove it had the market power sufficient to achieve a monopoly. Both parties appealed.

The Federal Circuit determined that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Global Tubing, finding that genuine disputes of material fact remained as to whether the single most reasonable inference was that the inventor acted with specific intent to deceive the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), making summary judgment on inequitable conduct inappropriate.

Addressing the Walker Process fraud claim, the Federal Circuit likewise vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Tenaris, finding that the record contained genuine disputes of material fact that precluded judgment as a matter of law. The Court explained that the evidence could support a finding that the inventor knowingly withheld a material prior art reference from the USPTO with intent to deceive, and that Global Tubing had raised a triable issue as to the first prong of its Walker Process claim: whether Tenaris obtained and enforced the patent through knowing and willful fraud on the USPTO.

Turning to the second prong of a Walker Process fraud claim (attempted monopolization), the Federal Circuit observed that the parties advanced competing definitions of the relevant market. The Court concluded that the district court erred by characterizing Tenaris as a small market participant with no dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power without first defining the relevant product and geographic markets or determining whether genuine disputes of material fact existed on those issues.

The Federal Circuit also concluded that genuine disputes of material fact remained as to whether Tenaris engaged in predatory or otherwise anticompetitive conduct. The Court noted that there may have been a triable issue regarding the appropriate date at which to measure Tenaris’ share of the relevant yet undefined market. Considering these unresolved factual questions, the Court [...]

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USPTO Director IPR institution discretion survives APA challenge

by | Feb 26, 2026 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concluded that the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s (USPTO) framework for discretionary denials of inter partes review (IPR) is a general statement of policy, not a substantive rule, and therefore is exempt from the Administrative Procedure Act’s notice‑and‑comment requirements.

The USPTO Director issued a trio of related instructions to the Patent Trial & Appeal Board for its exercise of delegated non-institution authority, addressing the common situation where the IPR petitioner and the patent owner are already involved in a district court litigation over the patent at issue. Two of the instructions were in the form of precedential Board decisions, which set forth six exclusive factors, weighing in favor or against institution, that the Board must assess. These instructions are generally referred to as the NHK-Fintiv instructions that, as Board precedent, bind only the Board and not the USPTO Director.

Several IPR petitioners argued that the Director’s instructions to the Board effectively bind the USPTO as an agency and thus should have been promulgated through formal rulemaking.

The Federal Circuit disagreed, emphasizing that institution decisions rest ultimately with the USPTO Director. The Court explained that while the NHK-Fintiv framework provides guidance on how that discretionary authority may be exercised, the Director retains the ability to depart from the framework in any given case. To that end, the guidance does not carry the force and effect of law and does not impose legally binding obligations on the agency or the public.

Practice note: The decision reinforces the Federal Circuit’s post‑Arthrex theme that the Director enjoys broad and largely unreviewable discretion at the IPR institution stage.



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Baseball was very good to Roberto: Lanham Act permits claims against government officials in personal capacity

by | Jan 29, 2026 |

In a decision addressing the intersection of trademark law, sovereign immunity, and constitutional takings, the US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit partially revived Lanham Act claims brought by the heirs of baseball legend Roberto Clemente against senior officials of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. While affirming dismissal of claims against the Commonwealth itself and related public entities, the Court concluded that certain Lanham Act claims against individual government officials in their personal capacities were plausibly alleged and not barred by qualified immunity at the pleading stage. Clemente Props., Inc. v. Pierluisi-Urrutia, Case No. 23-1922, 2026 WL 125574 (1st Cir. Jan. 16, 2026) (Barron, Lipez, Thompson, JJ.)

The plaintiffs, Clemente’s sons and affiliated entities, alleged that Commonwealth officials improperly used Clemente’s name and likeness on commemorative license plates and registration tags without authorization. Proceeds from the program were directed toward a public initiative intended to replace an earlier Clemente-founded project. Plaintiffs claimed trademark infringement, false endorsement, false advertising, and dilution under the Lanham Act, as well as a taking in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Defendants moved to dismiss on immunity grounds and for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motions in full. Plaintiffs appealed.

The First Circuit reversed in part. The Court rejected the district court’s conclusion that the use of Clemente’s name and image was not “in connection with” goods or services under the Lanham Act. The Court explained that commemorative license plates and tags qualify as goods, and the fact that they were issued by a government entity did not remove them from the statute’s commercial scope. The Court also pointed to the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s Trademark ID Manual, which expressly recognizes license plates as registrable goods, and found no persuasive basis for excluding fundraising activities supporting the Roberto Clemente Sports District Fund from trademark scrutiny.

The First Circuit further concluded that plaintiffs adequately alleged commercial injury within the Lanham Act’s zone of interests and plausibly pleaded likelihood of confusion, including the mistaken impression that the Clemente family endorsed or financially benefited from the initiative. Accordingly, dismissal of Lanham Act claims under Section 32 (trademark infringement), Section 43(a) (false endorsement), and Section 43(c) (dilution) was improper with regard to officials sued in their personal capacities.

Sovereign immunity remained a shield for the Commonwealth, the Convention Center District Authority, and officials sued in their official capacities. However, the First Circuit concluded that qualified immunity did not bar the personal-capacity Lanham Act claims at the pleading stage and thus vacated dismissal and remanded for further proceedings.

The First Circuit affirmed dismissal of the false advertising claim, determining that plaintiffs failed to allege that defendants’ statements constituted commercial advertising or promotion as required under Section 43(a)(1)(B). The Court also affirmed dismissal of the Takings Clause claim, concluding that alleged infringements of intangible intellectual property do not support a categorical physical-taking theory and cannot be analyzed using frameworks applicable to physical occupation or appropriation.

Finally, the First Circuit deemed waived any [...]

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All rise: Here comes the real judge

by | Jan 22, 2026 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit sustained the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board’s refusal to register trademark applications (over oppositions) for two character marks and a design mark based on the Board’s finding of likelihood of confusion with the common law rights of a world-famous baseball player and major league baseball’s players association  as supported by substantial evidence and consistent with trademark law. Chisena v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, Case No. 23-2073 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 8, 2026) (Hughes, Freeman, Lourie, JJ.) (nonprecedential).

Michael Chisena, acting pro se, sought trademark registration for two word marks, ALL RISE and HERE COMES THE JUDGE, and a design mark featuring a baseball field with a superimposed scale of justice and judge’s gavel (pictured below) (Chisena marks) for use in connection with “clothing, namely t-shirts, shirts, shorts, pants, sweatshirts, sweatpants, jackets, jerseys, athletic uniforms, and caps.”

Source: Chisena v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, Case No. 23-2073 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 8, 2026), Slip Op at 2.

Chisena filed intent to use applications and alleged that the constructive use priority date for the word marks was July 14, 2017, and for the design mark it was October 12, 2017. The Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA) and Aaron Judge, a superstar Yankees outfielder and team captain (collectively, appellees), filed Notices of Opposition against registration of the marks, which the Board consolidated into a single proceeding.

Judge is a well-known baseball player whose rise to fame prompted the commercialization of judicial slogans and insignia in connection with his baseball career. The appellees alleged that the Chisena marks would likely cause confusion with their marks, which include ALL RISE and certain judicial symbols. They argued that they had common law trademark rights that predated Chisena’s alleged priority dates. The Board found that the appellees established priority against the Chisena marks and that there was a likelihood of confusion between the marks and therefore refused to register the Chisena marks. Chisena appealed.

The Federal Circuit found that the Board’s priority decisions were supported by substantial evidence that appellees’ marks were used in commerce prior to the Chisena marks’ priority date. The Court concluded that the priority dates for the Chisena marks were the constructive use filing dates since Chisena did not use the marks in commerce until after he filed the applications. The Court further relied on licensed products bearing judicial slogans, phrases, symbols, and personal indicia related to Judge used as early as June 2017 in holding that appellees’ common law trademark rights predated the Chisena marks’ priority dates.

Chisena argued that appellees did not adequately identify the specific marks at issue in their Notices of Opposition. The Federal Circuit agreed with the Board that the notices provided fair notice because they adequately claimed ownership of the marks that served as the basis for the opposition and the basis for appellees’ priority claims.

Chisena argued that the appellees’ [...]

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Coffee, tea, or doctrine of foreign equivalents?

by | Dec 18, 2025 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a Trademark Trial & Appeal Board decision upholding refusal of the KAHWA mark for cafés and coffee shops, holding that the doctrine of foreign equivalents was inapplicable since KAHWA has a well-established alternative English meaning. In re Bayou Grande Coffee Roasting Co., Case No. 2024-1118 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 9, 2025) (Moore, Hughes, Stoll, JJ.)

In February 2021, Bayou applied to trademark KAHWA for cafés and coffee shops, claiming use since 2008. The examiner refused, deeming the mark generic or descriptive under the doctrine of foreign equivalents, asserting that KAHWA means “coffee” in Arabic. Bayou argued that it instead refers to a specific type of Kashmiri green tea not sold in US cafés or coffee shops. The examiner upheld refusals on both grounds and denied reconsideration.

On appeal, the Board affirmed the examiner’s refusals based on the Kashmiri green tea meaning but did not address the Arabic meaning. The Board found KAHWA generic and descriptive for cafés and coffee shops due to record evidence showing relevant customers regarded KAHWA as the generic description for a type of green tea beverage, and cafés and coffee shops serve a variety of tea beverages. Bayou appealed.

The Federal Circuit first determined that the Board’s generic and merely descriptive findings based on the Kashmiri green tea meaning did not constitute new grounds of rejection. The Court also reversed the Board’s generic and merely descriptive findings based on the Kashmiri green tea meaning.

The Federal Circuit concluded that the Board’s generic finding was not supported by substantial evidence because of undisputed evidence that no café or coffee shop in the United States sells kahwa. Therefore, whether relevant customers understood KAHWA to refer to a specific type of Kashmiri green tea was insufficient to establish genericness. The Court also held that the Board’s merely descriptive finding was not supported by substantial evidence because kahwa is neither a product/feature of café and coffee shop services nor a tea variety typically offered there. Moreover, registering KAHWA would not grant Bayou rights against cafés or coffee shops merely selling kahwa, and potential future sales were irrelevant to the descriptiveness analysis.

Finally, the Federal Circuit held that because KAHWA’s undisputed English meaning is Kashmiri green tea, translation was unnecessary, and the doctrine of foreign equivalents did not apply. Under the doctrine of foreign equivalents, a foreign mark may be translated into English to evaluate it for genericness or descriptiveness. However, translation is not required when consumers would not translate, or when the mark has a well‑established alternative meaning that makes the literal translation irrelevant.



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Game plan backfires: Mark cancelled

by | Dec 18, 2025 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board’s cancellation of a registration and dismissal of registrant’s opposition, finding that the cancellation petitioner had priority through a valid assignment of common law rights. Game Plan, Inc. v. Uninterrupted IP, LLC, Case No. 24-1407 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 10, 2025) (Reyna, Prost, Cunningham, JJ.)

Game Plan obtained a federal registration in 2018 for the stylized mark I AM MORE THAN AN ATHLETE. GP GAME PLAN covering charitable fundraising via t-shirt sales. Uninterrupted IP (UNIP) subsequently filed six intent-to-use (ITU) applications for marks incorporating I AM MORE THAN AN ATHLETE and MORE THAN AN ATHLETE for clothing and entertainment services. Game Plan opposed the ITU applications, asserting likelihood of confusion and priority under § 2(d) of the Lanham Act, and claimed common law rights in support of its opposition. UNIP denied any likelihood of confusion and counterclaimed to cancel Game Plan’s registration, asserting priority based on common law rights in MORE THAN AN ATHLETE that UNIP acquired through a 2019 asset purchase agreement (executed after Game Plan filed its Notice of Opposition) from More Than an Athlete (MTAA), which had used the mark since at least 2012, and MTAA’s founder.

The Board dismissed Game Plan’s opposition because it submitted no evidence during its trial period, explaining that Game Plan could not sustain its § 2(d) claims based on common law rights alone. The Board also found that UNIP had acquired valid and enforceable common law rights in the mark from MTAA and its founder and therefore held that UNIP had priority based on the 2019 assignment. Game Plan appealed.

Game Plan argued that the assignment was an invalid “assignment in gross” and violated 15 U.S.C. § 1060(a)(1) and 37 C.F.R. § 2.133(a). The Federal Circuit concluded that the assignment was not in gross because:

  • It expressly transferred “all of the goodwill of this business related to” the mark.
  • UNIP’s subsequent use was substantially similar to the assignor’s use.
  • The assignor remained engaged as a consultant, supporting continuity of goodwill.

The Federal Circuit further held that § 1060(a)(1) did not apply because UNIP did not assign its pending ITU applications. Rather, it received an assignment of existing common law rights to a mark in use. Likewise, the Court found that § 2.133(a) did not bar the Board’s priority determination because the Board relied on UNIP’s independent common law rights, which independently predated Game Plan’s filing date, rather than any amendment to UNIP’s application.

The Federal Circuit also affirmed the Board’s refusal to consider Game Plan’s evidence, noting that Game Plan was advised of the proper procedures for submitting evidence at trial but failed to follow those procedures. Game Plan attempted to rely on materials attached to its motion for summary judgment that were not reintroduced into evidence during the testimony period as required by Board rules. The Court concluded that the Board acted within its discretion to exclude the evidence not submitted during the designated [...]

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Institution decisions off limits: Federal Circuit rejects mandamus petitions based on due process, “settled expectations”

by | Dec 18, 2025 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit denied mandamus relief to three petitioners after the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) denied inter partes review (IPR) institution. The Court explained that Congress insulated the Director’s discretion from judicial review by making IPR institution determinations final and nonappealable, and that 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) bars virtually all judicial oversight. In re Cambridge Industries USA Inc., Case No. 2026-101; In re Sandisk Technologies, Inc., Case No. 2025-152; In re HighLevel, Inc., Case No. 2025-148 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 9, 2025) (nonprecedential) (Prost, Chen Hughes, JJ.)

The Federal Circuit acknowledged that while “colorable constitutional claims” may present an exception to the no judicial review clause, no such claims were raised in these cases. The petitioners failed to identify the kind of property interests or retroactivity concerns that could support either a colorable due process claim or an alternative avenue for relief.

Settled expectations

The lead case, In re Cambridge Industries USA, addressed the USPTO’s use of the “settled expectations” factor as a basis for discretionary denial. The agency denied institution on two patents that had been in force for seven and nine years, respectively, concluding that the patent owner had developed “settled expectations” in those long-standing rights. The companion petition, In re Sandisk Tech., involved patents that had been in force for nine and 12 years, and the USPTO reached the same conclusion.

The Federal Circuit declined to disturb either decision. The Court held that the petitioners had not shown that the settled expectations factor exceeded the USPTO’s statutory authority or that the agency’s application of the factor was unreasonable. It also rejected the argument that the USPTO had effectively created a “maximum-patent-age cap” on institution. Emphasizing the narrow scope of mandamus review, the Court reiterated that it was not deciding whether the USPTO’s actions were correct or statutorily permissible, but only that the petitioners failed to establish a “clear and indisputable right” to relief in light of Congress’s limits on judicial review of institution decisions.

Efficiency

In HighLevel, a district court had already found the challenged patents ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Patent Trial & Appeal Board nonetheless denied IPR institution, determining that instituting review would not be an efficient use of agency or party resources and that the “efficiency and integrity of the patent system” were best served by declining review. The USPTO denied Director review.

The Federal Circuit rejected HighLevel’s contention that this decision violated due process, holding that HighLevel’s “mere reliance on the PTO evaluating its petition without regard to efficiency concerns arising from parallel litigation” was insufficient to establish a colorable constitutional claim.



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