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Results for "Trademark appeal"
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Waiver in PTO Trademark Appeals Applies “Per Decision, Not Per Case”

by | Mar 24, 2021 |

Addressing a “narrow question of statutory interpretation,” the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of a trademark case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that a party that appeals a Trademark Trial & Appeal Board (TTAB) decision to the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit may, after remand to and issuance of a new decision by the TTAB, seek review of the new decision in federal district court. Snyder’s-Lance, Inc. v. Frito-Lay N.A., Inc., Case No. 19-2316 (4th Cir. Mar. 17, 2021) (Wynn, J.)

Princeton Vanguard, a snack food producer, applied to register its mark “Pretzel Crisps” on the principal register. Frito-Lay opposed. The TTAB denied Princeton Vanguard’s application, concluding that the mark was generic.

Under the Lanham Act, Princeton Vanguard could appeal the TTAB’s original decision to either the Federal Circuit under 15 USC § 1071(a) or federal district court under § 1071(b). Princeton Vanguard elected a direct appeal to the Federal Circuit pursuant to § 1071(a), thus waiving its right to district court review. The Federal Circuit concluded that the TTAB applied the wrong legal standard in evaluating whether Princeton Vanguard’s mark was generic and remanded the case to the TTAB. The TTAB again concluded that Princeton Vanguard’s mark was generic. This time, Princeton Vanguard appealed to a federal district court pursuant to § 1071(b).

The district court sua sponte dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that Princeton Vanguard’s appeal of the original decision to the Federal Circuit pursuant to § 1071(a) precluded Princeton Vanguard from appealing the second decision to a district court pursuant to § 1071(b). Princeton Vanguard appealed.

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the statutory text of the Lanham Act supported Princeton Vanguard’s argument in favor of jurisdiction. The Court explained that Princeton Vanguard’s waiver of its right to district court review of the original TTAB decision pursuant to § 1071(a) did not apply to any subsequent decisions in the same case, and that the waiver applied “per decision, but not per case.”

The Court rejected Frito-Lay’s argument that Princeton Vanguard was taking a second bite at the apple by seeking re-review in federal district court of issues already decided by the Federal Circuit, reasoning that Princeton Vanguard was seeking district court review of the second, separate decision that had not been reviewed by the Federal Circuit. The Court stressed, however, that the Federal Circuit’s review of the TTAB’s original decision was binding as to issues it decided.

Practice Note: If the TTAB issues multiple decisions in the same proceeding, each decision is considered a separate decision for purposes of waiver under §§ 1071(a) (b), even if the decisions implicate similar issues.



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Trademark Trial & Appeal Board Gets a DuPont 101 Lesson

by | Feb 22, 2024 |

Addressing errors in the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board’s likelihood of confusion analysis in a cancellation action, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that the Board erred by failing to give sufficient weight to the first DuPont factor (similarity of the marks) and failing to consider the relevant evidence for the third (similarity of established trade channels). Naterra International, Inc. v. Samah Bensalem, Case No. 22-1872 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 15, 2024) (Moore, Stoll, Cunningham, JJ.)

In 2020, Naterra International filed a petition to cancel Samah Bensalem’s registration for BABIES’ MAGIC TEA for use in connection with “medicated tea for babies that treats colic and gas and helps babies sleep better” based on a likelihood of confusion with Naterra’s multiple registrations for BABY MAGIC for use in connection with infant toiletry products such as lotion and baby shampoo. The Board denied Naterra’s petition, finding that Naterra failed to prove a likelihood of confusion. The Board found that while the first DuPont likelihood of confusion factor (similarity of the marks) weighed in favor of a likelihood of confusion, factors two (similarity of the goods) and three (similarity of established trade channels) did not, and Naterra’s BABY MAGIC mark “fell somewhere in the middle” for factor five (fame of the prior mark). The Board found that factors four (conditions of purchasing), six (number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods), eight (length of time and conditions of concurrent use without evidence of actual confusion), 10 (market interface between applicant and owner of a prior mark) and 12 (extent of potential confusion) were neutral. Naterra appealed.

Naterra argued “that substantial evidence does not support the Board’s finding that the similarity and nature of the goods (DuPont factor two) and trade channels (DuPont factor three) disfavor a likelihood of confusion,” and that the Board did not properly weigh the first (similarity of the marks) and fifth (fame of the prior mark) DuPont factors.

DuPont Factor Two – Relatedness of the Goods

The Board rejected Naterra’s expert testimony that other so-called “umbrella” baby brands offered both infant skincare products and ingestible products, calling it “unsupported by underlying evidence.” The Federal Circuit disagreed, stating that “testimony that third-party companies sell both types of goods is pertinent to the relatedness of the goods.” Nonetheless, because the Court could not determine whether the Board rejected the expert testimony for other reasons, it remanded the case for further consideration and explanation of its analysis on this point.

DuPont Factor Three – Similarity of Trade Channels

The Board found that the third factor weighed against a likelihood of confusion, stating that it lacked the “persuasive evidence” necessary to “conclude that the trade channels are the same.” The Federal Circuit found that the Board erred by not addressing relevant evidence, namely Bensalem’s admission that the parties’ goods were sold in similar trade channels. The Court also noted that the Board “did not identify in its decision any evidence showing a lack of [...]

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A Primer on Practice at the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board

by | Jun 30, 2022 |

In a precedential decision rendered in an opposition proceeding, the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board (Board) took the lawyers for each side to task for ignoring Board rules in presentation of their case, but ultimately decided the case on a likelihood of confusion analysis. The Board found that the parties’ marks and goods were “highly similar” and sustained the opposition. Made in Nature, LLC v. Pharmavite LLC, Opposition Nos. 91223352; 91223683; 91227387 (June 15, 2022, TTAB) (Wellington, Heasley and Hudis, ALJs) (precedential).

Pharmavite sought registration of the standard character mark NATURE MADE for various foods and beverages based on allegations of bone fide intent to use in commerce. Made in Nature (MIN) opposed on the ground that Pharmavite’s mark so resembled MIN’s registered and common law “Made In Nature” marks as to cause a likelihood of confusion when used on the goods for which registration was sought.

In its brief to the Board, Pharmavite raised, for the first time, the Morehouse (or prior registration) defense. MIN objected to the Morehouse defense as untimely. The Board agreed, noting that defense is “an equitable defense, to the effect that if the opposer cannot be further injured because there already exists an injurious registration, the opposer cannot object to an additional registration that does not add to the injury.” The party asserting a Morehouse defense must show that it “has an existing registration [or registrations] of the same mark[s] for the same goods” (emphasis in original).

Here, the Board found that this defense was not tried by the parties’ express consent and that implied consent “can be found only where the non-offering party (1) raised no objection to the introduction of evidence on the issue, and (2) was fairly apprised that the evidence was being offered in support of the issue.” In this case, Pharmavite did introduce into the record its prior NATURE MADE registrations but only for the purpose of supporting Pharmavite’s “[r]ight to exclude; use and strength of Applicant’s mark.” The Board found that this inclusion did not provide notice of reliance on the Morehouse or prior registration defense at trial.

In sustaining the opposition, the Board commented extensively on the record and how it was used, “[s]o that the parties, their counsel and perhaps other parties in future proceedings can benefit and possibly reduce their litigation costs.”

Over-Designation of the Record as Confidential

The Board criticized the parties for over-designating as confidential large portions of the record, warning that only the specific “exhibits, declaration passages or deposition transcript pages that truly disclosed confidential information should have been filed under seal under a protective order.” If a party over-designates material as confidential, “the Board will not be bound by the party’s designation.”

Duplicative Evidence

The Board criticized the parties for filing “duplicative evidence by different methods of introduction; for example, once by Notice of Reliance and again by way of an exhibit to a testimony declaration or testimony deposition.” The Board noted that such practice is viewed “with disfavor.”

Overuse of [...]

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Alleged Trademark Infringer Remains Hog-Tied after Appeal

by | Feb 3, 2022 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit dismissed an appeal of a district court order denying a stay of a federal action for lack of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and reversed in part the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction. The Trial Lawyers College v. Gerry Spence Trial Lawyers College at Thunderhead Ranch, Case No. 20-8038 (10th Cir. Jan. 27, 2022) (Bacharach, Briscoe, Murphy, JJ.).

The dispute between the parties arose out of a program called The Trial Lawyers College at Thunderhead Ranch in Wyoming. The College’s board of directors split into two factions known as the “Spence Group” and the “Sloan Group.” After the split, the two groups sued each other. The Spence Group sued in state court for dissolution of the College and a declaratory judgment regarding control of the board of directors. The Sloan Group sued in federal court claiming trademark infringement under the Lanham Act.

Both groups sought relief in the federal case. The Spence Group filed a motion to stay the federal court proceedings in light of the state court proceedings, and the Sloan Group requested a preliminary injunction. The district court denied the Spence Group’s stay and granted the Sloan Group’s request for a preliminary injunction. The Spence Group appealed both rulings.

The Tenth Circuit found that it lacked jurisdiction to review the district court’s stay denial. First, the state court resolved the dispute concerning board control, rendering part of the requested stay moot. Second, the Court determined that it lacked jurisdiction over the remaining motion for stay because it was not a final order. The Court explained that it needed to decide the appealability of the ruling based on the category of order rather than the particular facts of the case. The Court found that there was no unsettled issue of unique urgency or importance that warranted the Court exercising jurisdiction over the denial of the stay. Specifically, the Court explained that piecemeal litigation was unlikely because the state court already decided the issue of board control, and the Spence Group did not identify an unsettled issue of unique urgency.

The Tenth Circuit did exercise jurisdiction over the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction. The Spence Group challenged the district court’s finding of irreparable harm, the order to remove sculptures bearing the College’s name, restrictions on what the Spence Group could say and the consideration of evidence presented after the hearing ended. The Court reviewed the district court’s findings under an abuse-of-discretion standard. The Court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding irreparable harm, considering evidence after the hearing and enjoining the Spence Group from using words associated with the College. The Court explained that the district court reasonably found irreparable harm based on the College’s efforts to protect its name, logo and trademarks, as well as evidence of likely confusion among customers of the College based on the Spence Group’s use of those trademarks. As for the sculptures, the Court found [...]

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Texas Hammer Nails Trademark Infringement Appeal

by | Sep 2, 2021 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed a district court’s dismissal of an initial confusion trademark complaint, finding that the plaintiff alleged a plausible claim of trademark infringement under the Lanham Act. Adler v. McNeil Consultants, LLC, Case No. 20-10936 (6th Cir. Aug. 10, 2021) (Southwick, J.)

Jim Adler is a personal injury lawyer who trademarked and used several terms, including JIM ADLER, THE HAMMER and TEXAS HAMMER, to market his business, including via keyword advertisements. McNeil Consultants, a personal injury lawyer referral service, purchased keyword ads using Adler’s trademarked terms, which allowed McNeil’s advertisements to appear at the top of any Google search of Adler’s trademarked terms. McNeil’s advertisements used generic personal injury terms, did not identify any particular law firm and clicking on the ads placed a phone call to McNeil’s call center rather than directing the user to a website. The call center used a generic greeting so consumers did not realize with whom they were speaking.

Adler filed suit against McNeil, asserting Texas state law claims as well as trademark infringement under the Lanham Act. McNeil moved to dismiss, arguing that its keyword ads did not create a likelihood of confusion. The district court agreed and dismissed Adler’s complaint. Adler appealed.

To successfully plead a trademark infringement claim under Fifth Circuit law, the holder of a protectable trademark must establish that the alleged infringing use “creates a likelihood of confusion as to source, affiliation, or sponsorship.” To determine whether a likelihood of confusion exists, the Court weighs a non-exhaustive list of several confusion factors, including the similarity of the marks, the similarity of the products, the defendant’s intent and the care exercised by potential consumers.

The Fifth Circuit explained that Adler alleged initial interest confusion, which exists where the confusion creates consumer interest in the infringing party’s services even where no sale is completed because of the confusion. The Court noted that this case presented the first opportunity for the Fifth Circuit to consider initial interest confusion as it pertains to search engine keyword advertising. Relying on Ninth Circuit precedent and parallel reasoning to its own opinions on initial interest confusion in the context of metatag usage, the Court concluded that Adler’s complaint alleged a plausible claim of trademark infringement under the Lanham Act.

The Fifth Circuit noted that initial interest confusion alone is not enough to raise a Lanham Act claim. The Court explained that if a consumer searches TOYOTA and is directed to search results containing a purchased ad clearly labeled as selling VOLKSWAGEN products, a consumer who clicks on the VOLKSWAGEN ad has been distracted, not confused or misled into purchasing the wrong product. Distraction does not violate the Lanham Act. However, the Court explained that where the use of keyword ads creates confusion as to the source of the advertisement—not mere distraction—an infringement may have occurred. Because McNeil’s advertisements were admittedly generic and could have been associated with any personal injury law firm, the Court found that the keyword [...]

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Time’s Up: Fifth Circuit Reinstates Original Judgment in Trademark Dispute

by | Dec 5, 2024 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated a district court’s amended final judgment and reinstated its prior final judgment, finding that the district court overstepped its narrow mandate on remand, directly contradicting the Fifth Circuit’s earlier decision. In that earlier decision, the Fifth Circuit upheld the district court’s finding of trademark infringement but modified the scope of the injunction, approving it only in part. Rolex Watch USA, Incorporated v. BeckerTime, L.L.C., Case No. 24-10415 (5th Cir. Nov. 20, 2024) (Douglas, King, Willett, JJ.)

BeckerTime modified and sold Rolex-branded watches by adding diamonds, aftermarket bezels, and bands not authorized by Rolex. Rolex sued BeckerTime for trademark infringement, seeking an injunction and disgorgement of profits. While the district court found that BeckerTime infringed Rolex’s trademark, it declined to order disgorgement because of BeckerTime’s laches defense. In the first appeal, the Fifth Circuit upheld the infringement finding, noting that BeckerTime’s modifications of diamonds and aftermarket bezels went beyond mere repairs and restoration. However, the Fifth Circuit partially modified the district court’s injunction and issued a limited remand to clarify certain language in the injunction. On remand, Rolex and BeckerTime agreed on revised language for that portion of the injunction, which the district court approved. The district court, however, went further by amending other sections of the injunction. This appeal followed.

Both parties agreed that the district court had exceeded its mandate. The amendments permitted BeckerTime to advertise and sell Rolex watches with customized dials under certain conditions, requiring disclosures and inscriptions reading “CUSTOMIZED BY BECKERTIME.” Rolex contended – and the Fifth Circuit agreed – that this language conflicted with the prohibition (in the injunction) of all non-genuine dials, including those bearing original Rolex trademarks.

The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s amended judgment and reinstated its prior judgment with modifications, incorporating its earlier decision and the parties’ stipulation.



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Trademark Fee Increases: The TEAS Party Is Over

by | Dec 5, 2024 |

After a lengthy public comment and review process, the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) announced trademark fee increases effective January 18, 2025. The goal of PTO fee setting is to provide sufficient financial resources to facilitate the effective administration of the US intellectual property system. The PTO aspires to recover aggregate costs to:

  • Finance the PTO’s mission, strategic goals, and priorities.
  • Enable financial sustainability.
  • Promote efficient operations and filing behaviors.
  • Align fees with the costs of services provided.
  • Encourage access to the trademark system for all stakeholders.

The fees for filing a new trademark application via either the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) or TEAS Plus will remain unchanged: $350 per class for a TEAS standard application and $250 per class for a TEAS Plus application for as long as TEAS remains available (and then using the Beta site discussed below). However, the PTO will institute surcharges for applications that are incomplete or contain custom identifications of goods or services. These application surcharges are intended to encourage more complete applications, which will improve examination efficiency and help reduce pendency.

Description Surcharge Insufficient information (Sections 1 and 44), per class $100 Using the free-form text box instead of the Trademark ID Manual within the Trademark Center to identify goods and services (Sections 1 and 44), per class $200 Each additional group of 1,000 characters in the free-form text box beyond the first 1,000 (Sections 1 and 44), per affected class $200

Since the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) is currently unable to collect surcharges, the PTO will raise the fee for WIPO Madrid Trademark Applications to $600 per class.

The PTO will also raise the fees for post-registration filings to offset higher processing costs for these filings and continue balancing the cost of base applications.

Filing Current Fee Fee as of January 18, 2025 Section 9 registration renewal application, per class $300 $325 Section 8 declaration, per class $225 $325 Section 15 declaration, per class $200 $250 Section 71 declaration, per class $225 $325

The PTO has not increased the filing fees in connection with intent to use filings since 2002, although the time to examine such filings has increased exponentially because of the need to examine questionable specimens. Those fees are now set to increase as follows:

Description Current Fee Fee as of January 18, 2025 Amendment to allege use (AAU), per class $100 $150 Statement of use (SOU), per class $100 $150

The fees for requesting an extension of time are unchanged.

Finally, the number of petitions and protests have increased. The PTO will attempt to recover more of the cost of processing petitions and protests as follows:

Description Current Fee Fee as of January 18, 2025 Petition to the Director $250 $400 Petition to revive an application $150 $250 Letter of protest $50 $150

For further details, including a complete list of the fee increases, click here.

The PTO also announced that as of January 18, 2025, filers [...]

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Clear Vision: Keyword Search Term Purchase Doesn’t Blur Trademark Lines

by | Oct 17, 2024 |

Addressing the issue of trademark infringement based on the purchase of search advertising keywords, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit joined the consensus view and upheld a district court decision finding that the mere purchase of a search advertising keyword containing another’s trademark does not by itself constitute trademark infringement. 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. JAND, Inc., Case No. 22-1634 (2d Cir. Oct. 8, 2024) (Chin, Carney, Lee, JJ.)

1-800 Contacts is an established online retailer for contact lenses. JAND (doing business as Warby Parker) was originally an online retailer for eyeglasses and began selling contact lenses online as well in 2019. As a newcomer to the market of online contact lenses, Warby Parker purchased search advertising keywords that included 1-800 Contacts’ trademarks. This practice is known as search keyword advertising, and it is a type of marketing that allows parties to purchase certain terms from search engines that, when used as a search query, result in the paying party’s advertisements appearing above the organic search results as part of the “paid results.”

1-800 Contacts sued Warby Parker for engaging in this practice, alleging that the purchase and use of 1-800 Contacts’ trademarks constituted trademark infringement and unfair competition under federal and New York state law. The district court disagreed, granting Warby Parker’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and finding that 1-800 Contacts’ trademarks and the “Warby Parker” trademark were entirely dissimilar. 1-800 Contacts appealed.

1-800 Contacts argued that Warby Parker purchased search engine keyworks consisting of 1-800 Contacts’ trademarks to use them in connection with an adverting campaign designed to mislead consumers. 1-800 Contacts alleged that the purchase of these keywords resulted in consumer confusion because users searching for “1-800 contacts” would receive Warby Parker’s “ambiguous ads that generate source, sponsorship or initial interest confusion.” 1-800 Contacts further alleged that the webpage that was linked to Warby Parker’s advertisements “magnified this confusion” because it mimicked the look and feel of 1-800 Contacts’ website.

The Second Circuit noted that two types of consumer confusion were at issue in the case: sponsorship confusion, which occurs when consumers believe “the mark’s owner sponsored or otherwise approved the use of the trademark,” and initial-interest confusion. To sufficiently plead internet-related initial-interest confusion, “a showing of intentional deception [is necessary] . . . because consumers diverted on the Internet can more readily get back on track that those in actual space.”

The Second Circuit reviewed the eight-factor Polaroid test to assess whether 1-800 Contacts sufficiently pled a likelihood of confusion. The Court agreed with the district court that certain factors, including the strength of the mark, the competitive proximity of the products, the relative quality of the products, and good faith, favored 1-800 Contacts. However, other factors, including, most importantly, the similarity of the marks, favored Warby Parker: “Here, the pleadings failed to plausibly allege that Warby Parker used 1-800’s Marks anywhere during the search advertising process outside of its purchase at the initial, permissible keyword auction. . . . Thus, the [...]

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Chickening Out: Reason for Trademark Abandonment Irrelevant Without Proof of Intent to Resume

by | Oct 3, 2024 |

The US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed a district court’s summary judgment decision finding that the prior owner of a trademark for fresh chicken had abandoned the mark by failing to use it for three years and failing to show an intent to resume use of the mark. To-Ricos, Ltd. v. Productos Avícolas Del Sur, Inc., Case No. 22-1853 (1st Cir. Sept. 19, 2024) (Montecalvo, Lipez, Thompson, JJ.)

PAS, a Puerto Rico corporation, sold Pollo Picú branded chicken from 2005 to 2011. The Picú trademark consists of a cartoon chicken with the phrase “Pollo Picú” underneath it:

While Pollo Picú was once a well-recognized brand in Puerto Rico, PAS encountered administrative and financial challenges. In 2006 and 2009, it failed to file declarations with the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) attesting to the use of the mark as required by Section 8 of the Lanham Act. The PTO therefore canceled the Picú trademark registration. PAS stopped selling chicken bearing the mark after its bank froze PAS’s financing in 2011. The bank filed suit in January 2012 under a preexisting loan agreement in which PAS had granted the bank a lien over PAS’s assets, including the Picú mark. PAS offered to sell the company to To-Ricos, PAS’s main competitor, but no sale occurred.

In October 2014, PAS and the bank signed a settlement agreement requiring PAS to pay a stipulated sum by December 2014 or the bank would foreclose on most of PAS’s assets, but not the Picú mark. The agreement provided that the bank would retain its lien over the mark until the foreclosure proceedings concluded. PAS failed to make the payment, but the bank did not exercise its foreclosure rights. In June 2017, PAS moved for the Commonwealth Court to order the bank to foreclose on PAS’s assets or declare PAS free of its obligations to the bank. The Commonwealth Court granted the motion in November 2019.

In April 2016, To-Ricos applied to register the Picú mark with the PTO. Three months later, PAS applied to re-register the same mark and filed an opposition to To-Ricos’s application. A year later, PAS licensed the right to use the Picú mark in the United States to IMEX. IMEX sold chicken under the mark for a few months but stopped after To-Ricos sent cease and desist letters.

In June 2019, To-Ricos began selling Picú branded chicken. It also filed a lawsuit against PAS, seeking a declaratory judgment establishing To-Ricos as the legal owner of the Picú mark. To-Ricos moved for summary judgment, arguing that PAS had abandoned its mark. PAS opposed. The district court agreed with To-Ricos, noting that PAS admitted to not having used the mark in commerce for at least three consecutive years prior to To-Ricos’s application, and that PAS had not demonstrated its intent to resume use of the mark within that period. PAS appealed.

PAS [...]

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Blurred Vision: Appeal Dismissed for Lack of Standing

by | Aug 29, 2024 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit dismissed a patent challenger’s appeal in an inter partes review (IPR) because the challenger could not meet the injury-in-fact requirement for Article III standing. Platinum Optics Tech. Inc. v. Viavi Solutions Inc., Case No. 23-1227 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 16, 2024) (Moore, Taranto, JJ.; Checchi, Dist. J, sitting by designation).

Viavi Solutions owns a patent directed to optical filters that include layers of hydrogenated silicon and to sensor systems comprising such optical filters. Platinum Optics Technology (PTOT) petitioned for IPR. The Patent Trial & Appeal Board found that PTOT had failed to establish that the challenged claims were unpatentable. PTOT appealed.

The Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal, finding that PTOT did not have Article III standing. The Court explained that while Article III standing is not required to appear before an administrative agency (such as the US Patent & Trademark Office), such standing is required once a party seeks judicial review in an Article III federal court. PTOT argued it had standing because of potential infringement liability due to its continued distribution of a product previously accused of infringing the patent and its development of new models of the previously accused product. The Court rejected both arguments.

First, PTOT asserted that it suffered an injury in fact because there was a likelihood that Viavi would sue again. PTOT relied on a letter from Viavi stating that it did not believe PTOT could fulfill its supply agreements with noninfringing products. The Federal Circuit disagreed with PTOT’s assertion, concluding that mere speculation about the possibility of suit, without more, is insufficient to confer Article III standing. Moreover, the Court noted that Viavi’s letter was sent prior to the patent infringement suits, which were dismissed with prejudice. Thus, the Court found that PTOT had not established an injury in fact based on potential infringement liability due to its continued distribution of a previously accused product.

Second, PTOT asserted that it suffered an injury in fact based on its development of new models of the previously accused product. PTOT’s argument was supported by a declaration from a Deputy Director of Operation Management at PTOT and the same letter from Viavi threatening future suit. The Federal Circuit did not find the declaration testimony compelling. It explained that the declaration, which generally alleged that PTOT continued to develop new models of the previously accused product, did not identify any specific concrete plans for PTOT to develop a product that might implicate the patent. The declaration did not explain the particulars of these new models or how the models might relate to the patent. The Court found that the declaration was insufficient to establish that PTOT’s development activities created a substantial risk of infringement or were likely to cause Viavi to assert infringement. The Court noted that the letter from Viavi did not specifically address models in development or foreclose PTOT’s ability to develop a noninfringing product.

Thus, the Federal Circuit concluded that PTOT failed to establish an injury [...]

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