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Technical Issues Affirm Patent Validity but Preclude Pre-Suit Damages

by | Jul 22, 2020 |

In a split decision, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the subject matter eligibility of claims directed to collection, comparison and classification of information. The Court also unanimously found that the patent owner was not entitled to pre-suit or enhanced damages because it failed to prove pre-suit patent marking by its licensees. Packet Intelligence LLC v. Netscout Systems, Inc., Case No. 19-2041 (Fed. Cir. July 14, 2020) (Lourie, J.) (Reyna, J., dissenting in part).

This dispute began when Packet Intelligence sued Netscout for infringing three of its patents that were directed to a system and method for monitoring packets exchanged over a computer network. The case was tried before a jury, which found the patents-in-suit valid and infringed. The jury further determined that Packet Intelligence was entitled to pre-suit and post-suit damages, as well as enhanced damages. Netscout filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law that Packet Intelligence was not entitled to pre-suit damages, which the district court denied. Following a bench trial, the district court held that the claims of the patents-in-suit were not invalid under 35 USC § 101. Netscout appealed.

Netscout challenged the district court’s § 101 decision and the denial of Netscout’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on pre-suit damages. In a split panel decision, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination on subject matter eligibility under § 101. Netscape specifically argued that the claims were directed to an abstract idea because the claims were merely directed to the collection, comparison and classification of information.

The majority reiterated that the Federal Circuit has recognized that software-based innovations may be deemed patent-eligible subject matter at Alice step 1. For example, in Enfish, the Court held that software claims were valid at step 1 because the claims were directed to a technical improvement over conventional systems. Similarly, in SRI International, the Court held that software claims were valid because the claims at issue were “necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to solve a specific problem in the realm of computer networks.” Applying these principles, the majority found that the claims were patent eligible because they presented a technical solution to a technical problem. Notably, the majority relied on the patent specification’s disclosures regarding the invention’s improvements over conventional systems.

Judge Reyna dissented. In his view, the claims were directed to an abstract idea because they lacked specific technological means for the collection, analysis and display of data. Because a concrete technical solution was absent, Reyna argued that the claims were distinguishable from the SRI International case on which the majority relied. He would have found the claims invalid under step 1 and remanded the case to the district court to fully address Alice step 2.

Regarding pre-suit damages, the Federal Circuit unanimously held that Packet Intelligence was not entitled to such damages. The primary issue was whether a Packet Intelligence licensee had properly complied with the marking requirements in order to provide the required constructive notice to [...]

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Patent Owners Beware: Serial Filings, Rent-Seeking May Be Grounds for Adverse Fee Award

by | Jul 15, 2020 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded a district court’s denial of attorney’s fees to an accused infringer, finding the district court did not properly consider the Patent Owner’s manner of litigation, including the history of plaintiff’s actions in other jurisdictions and the broader context of its litigation practices. Elec. Commc’n Techs., LLC v. ShoppersChoice.com, LLC, Case No. 19-2087 (Fed. Cir. July 1, 2020) (Wallach, J.).

Following a finding by a Florida district court that a patent asserted by Electronic Communication Technologies (ECT) was ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101, ShoppersChoice filed a motion for attorney’s fees, citing ECT’s use of standardized demand letters and repeated infringement actions seeking nuisance-value settlements. ShoppersChoice also informed the district court of a recent award of attorney’s fees against ECT in the Central District of California (the True Grit decision) for conduct relating to the same asserted patent. The district court denied ShoppersChoice’s motion, finding that the case was not exceptional and that ECT’s litigation position was not so obviously weak. ShoppersChoice appealed.

The Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of attorney’s fees under the abuse of discretion standard, analyzing whether the district court made “a clear error of judgment in weighing relevant factors or in basing its decision on an error of law or on clearly erroneous factual findings” and whether it provided a “concise but clear explanation of its reason[ing].” The Court explained that “a pattern of litigation abuses characterized by the repeated filing of patent infringement actions for the sole purpose of forcing settlements, with no intention of testing the merits of one’s claims, is relevant to a district court’s exceptional case determination under § 285.” The Court found that the district court failed to conduct this analysis and erred by not considering ECT’s manner of litigation and the broader context of ECT’s litigation practices. Addressing the True Grit decision, the Federal Circuit noted that the California district court provided a detailed account of the nuisance value rent-seeking practices of ECT (and other affiliated shell companies), but ultimately found that the court failed to conduct an adequate inquiry into ECT’s litigation conduct.

The Federal Circuit thus vacated the attorney’s fee award and remanded the case, directing the district court to consider both ECT’s manner of litigation and the objective unreasonableness of its claims.

Practice note: While the California District Court’s decision is not binding in the Florida court, the Federal Circuit made clear that a court cannot ignore developments in other jurisdictions in connection with § 285 fee determinations.



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“All Substantial Rights” Test Informative in Obviousness-Type Double Patenting Context

by | Jul 15, 2020 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit endorsed for the first time the “all substantial rights” test to determine whether inventions are commonly owned for purposes of obviousness-type double patenting validity analysis of a later patent. Immunex Corp. v. Sandoz, Inc., Case No. 20-1037 (Fed. Cir. July 1, 2020) (O’Malley, J.) (Reyna, J., dissenting). The Court determined that patents were not commonly owned—and therefore a later patent was not invalid for obviousness-type double patenting—when the patentee retained a secondary right to sue for infringement and the right to “veto” further assignment of the patents by the grantee.

Roche licensed a family of patent applications to Immunex. Under the license agreement, Immunex agreed to pay a running royalty to Roche based on sales of products incorporating the patented technology. Non-party Amgen subsequently acquired Immunex. Amgen, Immunex and Roche entered into an agreement to eliminate the continuing royalties to Roche. The agreement granted to Immunex a paid-up, irrevocable, exclusive license to the US patent family for the patents-in-suit and gave Immunex the sole right to sublicense. It further granted Immunex the exclusive right to prosecute applications in the US patent family. Critically, Roche retained the secondary right to assert the patents if Immunex did not assert them in litigation after being informed of potential infringement, and the right to veto any downstream assignment by Immunex to a third party.

Immunex and Roche later sued Sandoz for infringing a patent included in the license agreement. At trial, Sandoz argued that the patents-in-suit were invalid for obviousness-type double patenting over several patents filed by Immunex.

The judicially created doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting prohibits claims in a second patent that, while not for the same invention, are so similar to the claims of a commonly owned earlier patent that granting both patents exclusive rights would “effectively extend the life of patent protection.” This doctrine rests primarily on two justifications: preventing unjustified extension of the time of the right to exclude, and preventing multiple infringement suits by different assignees. The doctrine applies to all commonly owned patents, including cases in which the obvious variant inventions have different inventors.

Urging a novel theory of common ownership, Sandoz argued that although the patents-in-suit were assigned to Roche, Immunex effectively owned both the Immunex patents and the patents-in-suit. Sandoz asserted that the agreement between Amgen, Immunex and Roche conveyed “all substantial rights” in the patents-in-suit, which was tantamount to an assignment of ownership. Thus, Sandoz argued that the “all substantial rights” test, which previously had only been used to determine who had standing to sue for infringement as a “patentee” under 35 USC § 281, should apply in the context of obviousness-type double patenting.

Immunex argued that the “common ownership” analysis should take into account ownership at the time of invention, such that common-ownership-based obviousness-type double patenting arises only where the relevant inventions were owned by the same entity.

The Federal Circuit agreed with Sandoz, endorsing for the first time the all substantial rights test to [...]

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Federal Circuit Extends Arthrex to Ex Parte Re-Examination Proceedings

by | Jul 15, 2020 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded a decision issued by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), holding that its decisions in Arthrex and VirnetX also apply to ex parte examinations at the PTAB. In re: Boloro Global Ltd., Case Nos. 19-2349, -2351, -2353 (Fed. Cir. July 7, 2020) (Dyk, J.).

The issue regarding ex parte appeals started to take shape in October 2019—in the context of an inter partes review (IPR) proceeding—when the Federal Circuit held that the appointment of administrative patent judges (APJs) at the PTAB is unconstitutional. Arthrex v. Smith & Nephew (IP Update, Vol. 22, No. 11). APJs are appointed by the secretary of commerce in consultation with the director of the US Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) pursuant to 35 USC § 6(a). In Arthrex, The Federal Circuit determined that APJs are principal officers and are not constitutionally appointed, because as principal officers they must be appointed by the president with the advice and consent of the Senate.

Having concluded that the appointment of APJs violated the Appointments Clause, the Federal Circuit held that “where the final decision was rendered by a panel of APJs who were not constitutionally appointed,” and “where the parties presented an Appointments Clause challenge on appeal,” the decision below “must be vacated and remanded.” The Court further instructed that, on remand, a new panel of APJs must be designated and a new hearing granted. The Court put a bookend on its holding, ruling that where an Appointment Clause challenge was not raised in an opening brief, the challenge was waived. So PTAB decisions that issued before Arthrex, if timely appealed and subject to an Appointment Clause challenge in the opening brief, could be vacated as unconstitutional and remanded for a new panel of APJs.

In May 2020, the Federal Circuit extended its decision in Arthrex to final decisions issued by APJs in inter partes re-examination proceedings (VirnetX v. Cisco Systems). In VirnetX, the Court discerned no differences between the duties of an APJ in an IPR proceeding as compared to an inter partes examination proceeding, because both proceedings involve third-party challenges to an issued patent and in both proceedings APJs exercise significant authority by issuing final decisions that decide the patentability of the challenged claims, and the PTO director does not have an independent way of reviewing those final determinations.

The present case arose in the context of an appeal from an examiner in ex parte prosecution. Boloro argued that APJs in ex parte appeals also exercise significant authority by virtue of the matters on which they are asked to render judgment, and carry out similar functions when they carry out their function of deciding IPRs. Boloro asserted that although ex parte appeals were not specifically addressed in Arthrex, the PTAB also has the power in ex parte appeals to disqualify counsel, to admit people pro hac vice, and to order appellants to additionally brief any matter that the PTAB considers to [...]

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Supreme Court: “Booking.com” Can Be Registered as Trademark

by | Jul 15, 2020 |

By an 8-1 vote, the Supreme Court rejected a per se rule by the US Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) that a generic word followed by “.com” is necessarily generic and therefore ineligible for trademark protection. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office et al. v. Booking.com BV, Case No. 19-46 (Supr. Ct. June 30, 2020) (Ginsberg, Justice) (Sotomayor, Justice, concurring) (Breyer, Justice, dissenting). In so doing, the Supreme Court found that the proper test for whether “booking.com” is eligible for trademark protection for travel booking services is whether the public perceives “booking.com” as identifying a single source.

Trademarks identify and distinguish the goods and services of a single party, and the Lanham Act establishes a system of trademark registration. Among other requirements for registration, a trademark must be distinctive, as judged along a spectrum of trademark distinctiveness. Distinctive trademarks, in order of most to least strength, include fanciful or made-up words (e.g., KODAK); arbitrary marks that are existing words that have no connection to the underlying goods or services (e.g., CAMEL cigarettes); and then suggestive marks, which require some mental thought to connect them to an attribute of the products or services (e.g., TIDE laundry detergent). Descriptive words are not inherently distinctive (e.g., BEST BUY), but can still be protectable and registerable upon proof of acquired distinctiveness (i.e., secondary meaning) arising from extensive use and advertising by the trademark owner. At the low end of the spectrum of distinctiveness are generic terms, which merely refer to a category or class of goods or services (e.g., wine or art) and are therefore never protectable or registerable as trademarks.

The PTO refused registration for “Booking.com,” citing policy developed from a 132-year-old Supreme Court case which held that the addition of “Company” to a generic word does not render the resulting name (i.e., Generic Company) distinctive.  See Goodyear’s India Rubber Glove Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 128 U. S. 598 (1888). After the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) affirmed the refusal of registration, Booking.com appealed to the US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, which reversed the refusal of registration, finding that “‘Booking.com’—unlike ‘booking’—is not generic. The district court found that the consuming public primarily understands that BOOKING.COM does not refer to a genus, rather it is descriptive of services involving ‘booking’ available at that domain name.”  The US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the Virginia federal court (IP Update, Vol. 22, No. 3), and the PTO sought certiorari from the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari (IP Update, Vol. 22, No. 11), and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg delivered the opinion of the Court, with which six other justices joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a short concurring opinion, and Justice Breyer dissented. The question under review by the Court was “whether the addition by an online business of a generic top-level domain (.com) to an otherwise generic term can create a protectable trademark.

Both parties in Booking.com agreed that “booking” is generic for the kind of travel [...]

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Fifth Circuit Drills Down to Details in Drilling Database Disagreement

by | Jul 15, 2020 |

In a wide ranging opinion, the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that copying unimportant database schema from a proprietary database did not constitute infringement. The Court also held that where the technological measure that the defendant allegedly circumvented did not effectively control access to the work, there was no Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) violation. Moreover, the Court found error in not treating the defendant as the sole prevailing party on the copyright and DMCA claims for purposes of attorneys’ fees, notwithstanding plaintiff’s success on other claims. Digital Drilling Data Systems, LLC v. Petrolink Services, Inc., Case No. 19-20116 (5th Cir. July 2, 2020) (Duncan, J.).

Digital Drilling Data Systems (Digidrill) provides software used in oil drilling operations. Digidrill’s software collects data from underground sensors in order to help above-ground operators steer the drill. Digidrill’s systems compile the data into a database that is accessible through a variety of programs, including Digidrill’s DataLogger software. DataLogger includes a security feature that allows access only if a certain USB key is inserted in the computer running the software.

One of Digidrill’s competitors was Petrolink Services. Concerned about losing a large customer to Digidrill, Petrolink obtained a laptop running DataLogger along with the USB key. It soon realized that the database storing the data used by DataLogger was accessible without the USB key. Because Digidrill had not changed certain default settings, all that was required to gain access was a commonly known default administrator username and password. Petrolink then designed a program to copy data from the Digidrill database, including relevant portions of the database schema.

Digidrill sued Petrolink for copyright infringement, DMCA violation and unjust enrichment. The district court entered summary judgment against Digidrill on its copyright infringement and DMCA claims. The district court allowed the unjust enrichment claim to go to trial, where the jury awarded damages to Digidrill. Petrolink then sought fees and costs as a prevailing party under the Copyright Act and DMCA, which the district court denied because both parties had prevailed on some claims. Both parties appealed.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment against Digidrill on its copyright and DMCA claims. As for the copyright claim, the Court cited its own precedent and noted that “[T]o prove copyright infringement, a plaintiff must establish (1) ownership of a valid copyright; (2) factual copying; and (3) substantial similarity.” The only element at issue here was the third prong, substantial similarity.

Digidrill contended that even though Petrolink copied only 5% of DataLogger’s copyrighted schema, a reasonable trier of fact might nevertheless have found substantial similarity due to the “qualitative importance” of that small copied portion. The Fifth Circuit rejected Digidrill’s qualitative importance argument, concluding that there was no record evidence establishing the importance of the copied schema to the DataLogger program as a whole. Thus, “[W]hile the question of substantial similarity typically should be left to the factfinder, summary judgment may be appropriate if the court can conclude . . . that no reasonable juror [...]

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Stick to Your Guns: PTAB Should Rarely Issue New Grounds of Unpatentability

by | Jul 15, 2020 |

The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) Precedential Opinion Panel (POP) issued a precedential opinion in an inter partes review (IPR) to resolve two questions:

  • May the PTAB raise a ground of unpatentability not developed by the petitioner?
  • If it does so, must the PTAB provide the parties notice and an opportunity to respond to the new ground of unpatentability?

Hunting Titan, Inc. v. DynaEnergetics Europe GmbH, Case No. IPR2018-00600 (USPTO July 6, 2020) (Boalick, CAPJ) (granting request for POP rehearing). The POP held that while the PTAB may raise new grounds of unpatentability, it should refrain from doing so except in rare instances. If it does raise new grounds of unpatentability, the PTAB must provide the parties notice and an opportunity to respond to the new grounds.

Titan filed a petition requesting IPR of a patent owned by DynaEnergetics directed to a perforating gun assembly for wellbore tools. One of the grounds alleged anticipation by a prior art reference (Schacherer). The PTAB instituted review, and DynaEnergetics timely moved to amend the claims. Opposing the motion to amend, Titan argued that the substitute claims were obvious over various prior art references, including the Schacherer reference. Titan did not argue anticipation as to the substitute claims. In its final written decision, the PTAB held that the amended claims were unpatentable because they were anticipated by Schacherer. DynaEnergetics moved for reconsideration and POP review.

The POP granted review to provide precedential guidance on new grounds of unpatentability. Citing to the recent US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decision in Nike, Inc. v. Adidas AG, the POP determined that the PTAB may raise new grounds of unpatentability in certain cases, but those cases should be exceedingly rare. The POP reasoned that the adversarial nature of an IPR proceeding puts the competing parties in a better position to identify and argue the strongest grounds. The POP rejected the notion that the PTAB should independently examine the patentability of every proposed substitute claim, as if it were a reexamination proceeding, by culling through the prior art to determine if better unpatentability arguments could have been presented. Only in rare cases that are no longer adversarial, such as when a petitioner does not oppose a motion to amend or when a petitioner ceases to participate in an instituted IPR that proceeds to a final judgment, would it be reasonable for the PTAB to consider new grounds of unpatentability. Although the POP did not articulate every exceptional scenario, it suggested that when the record “readily and persuasively” establishes that substitute claims are unpatentable, it would be reasonable for the PTAB to rely on a new ground of unpatentability. Titan’s IPR was not an exceptional case, so the POP reversed the panel’s decision as to the substitute claims.

The POP also explained that the parties must be given notice and an opportunity to respond to any new grounds the PTAB may raise. With respect to substitute claims, notice cannot come from the grounds [...]

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Reliance on Common Sense Permitted in Obviousness Analysis

by | Jul 9, 2020 | ,

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a final written decision from the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) finding patent claims directed to aircraft lavatories obvious based on prior art because a skilled artisan would have used common sense to incorporate a missing limitation into the prior art. B/E Aerospace, Inc. v. C&D Zodiac, Inc., Case Nos. 19-1935, -1936 (Fed. Cir. June 26, 2020) (Reyna, J.).

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Lights Out for Light-Up Shoe Patent, Thanks to Non-Limiting Preamble

by | Jul 9, 2020 |

Finding that a patent’s preamble was not limiting and the patent owner’s secondary considerations of non-obviousness were weak, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld a finding of obviousness by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB). Shoes By Firebug LLC v. Stride Rite Children’s Grp., LLC, Case Nos. 19-1622, -1623 (Fed. Cir. June 25, 2020) (Lourie, J.).

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