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Liability for Copyright Infringement Attaches if Conduct Exceeds Scope of License

by Jodi Benassi | Sep 2, 2020 | Copyrights

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit revived a software owner’s copyright infringement suit because the district court erred in granting summary judgment of no infringement by failing to analyze whether the accused infringer exceeded the scope of a copyright license. Oracle America, Inc., et al. v. Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company, Case No. 19-15506 (9th Cir. Aug. 20, 2020) (Smith, J.).

Oracle owns registered copyrights for Solaris software, including copyrighted software patches. Oracle requires its customers have a prepaid annual support contract, for each server they desire to be under support, to access the software patches. Customers under a support plan can access patches through an Oracle support website.

Hewlett Packard Enterprise (HPE) provides a “one-stop-shop” for support to its customers, including HPE servers running Solaris. HPE provides this support directly and through its partners. One of HPE’s partners is Terix Computer Company. Terix arranged for joint HPE-Terix customers to have Oracle support for all of their servers through a single server support plan. Terix accomplished this by downloading Solaris software patches, using the customer’s credentials (created using a Terix-supplied credit card), to make copies for servers that were not part of the support contract.

In 2013, Oracle sued Terix for copyright infringement. The court granted Oracle summary judgment, and Terix stipulated to a judgment on the claims without admitting liability. Oracle and HPE entered into an agreement, effective May 6, 2015, to toll the statute of limitations for any claims Oracle might assert against HPE.

In 2016, Oracle sued HPE for direct copyright infringement concerning HPE’s direct support customers, and for indirect infringement concerning joint HPE-Terix customers. Oracle also sued for claims of intentional interference and unfair competition under California state law. The parties did not dispute that the tolling agreement applied, so the court considered whether the copyright infringement claims were barred for conduct before May 6, 2012. The Copyright Act provides that a copyright infringement claim is subject to a three-year statute of limitations, which runs separately for each violation. Under Ninth Circuit law, a copyright infringement claim begins to accrue “when a when a party discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, the alleged infringement.” Importantly, actual or constructive knowledge triggers the statute of limitations. The Ninth Circuit has explained that suspicion of copyright infringement places a duty on the copyright holder to investigate further into possible infringement or lose the claim.

Oracle conceded that it had concerns about Terix and suspicions about HPE as early as 2010, but argued that HPE used fraudulent means to keep Oracle unaware of its actions, so it had no duty to inquire. The district court disagreed, finding that once Oracle had constructive knowledge, the doctrine of fraudulent concealment was no longer an option to toll the limitations. Because Oracle failed to investigate HPE, the court determined that HPE was entitled to summary judgment on the infringement claims for pre-May 6, 2012, conduct. Oracle appealed.

The Ninth Circuit explained that to prove indirect infringement, Oracle had to show that [...]

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Bugs in Space? Star Trek Plotline Does Not Infringe Tardigrade Video Game

by Paul Devinsky | Aug 27, 2020 | Copyrights

The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a district court’s pleadings-stage determination that certain Star Trek: Discovery characters and plotlines did not infringe copyrighted elements of a video game because there was not substantial similarity between protectible elements of the video game and the Discovery episodes. Abdin v. CBS Broad. Inc., Case No. 19-3160 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 17, 2020) (Chin, J.).

Between 2014 and 2017, Plaintiff Abdin posted videos and draft designs online for his sci-fi video game, Tardigrade, a puzzle-based game in which the human protagonist can travel through outer space in the warm embrace of a gigantic blue tardigrade. Tardigrades, also known as water bears, are microscopic animals capable of withstanding extreme climates—including the harsh vacuum and radiation of space. After a 2007 research study confirmed tardigrades’ spacefaring abilities, they became somewhat of a pop culture phenomenon, being featured in numerous literary works and television shows. In June 2018, Abdin registered a copyright for a distillation of his video game concept.

In the latest installment of the Star Trek series, the 2017 season of Discovery features a three-episode storyline involving a creature called Ripper that resembles a giant tardigrade. The crew of the USS Enterprise realizes that Ripper is able to act as a type of supercomputer to improve the performance of their space traveling equipment (the DASH Drive).

Abdin filed suit for copyright infringement against CBS in August 2018, alleging that the Discovery creators copied aspects of his video game, including space-traveling tardigrades. CBS filed a motion to dismiss, which was granted by the district court. The district court concluded that Abdin’s video game was not substantially similar to Discovery. Abdin appealed.

The Second Circuit reviewed the lower court’s dismissal de novo and affirmed the district court’s dismissal, finding that Abdin failed to plausibly allege substantial similarity between protectible elements of his video game and the Discovery episodes. The Court first looked to the two elements of a copyright infringement claim: (1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original. The Court explained that to satisfy the second element, Abdin must demonstrate that CBS actually copied Abdin’s work, and that a substantial similarity exists between CBS’s work and the “protectible” elements of Abdin’s work.

The Second Circuit identified three elements of Abdin’s video game that were not protectible under copyright law: facts and ideas, scènes à faire and generic character traits. First, the Court found that the scientific facts relating to tardigrades’ survivability are not copyrightable, and that Abdin’s idea of tardigrades moving through space was also unprotectible. While noting the distinction between an idea and its expression is elusive, the Court explained that Abdin’s space-traveling tardigrade was merely a generalized expression of a scientific fact. Second, the Court looked to whether any of Abdin’s otherwise protectible expressions were unprotected scènes à faire—indispensable “stock themes” in a given genre. The Court explained that space travel, supernatural forces and alien encounters are all generic themes that [...]

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Buzz-sawed: Give Copyright Credit or Face Statutory Damages, Fees, Costs

by Jodi Benassi | Aug 26, 2020 | Copyrights

The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a district court’s award of statutory damages where the defendant knowingly distributed a photograph without first getting permission to use the photograph. Gregory Mango v. BuzzFeed, Inc., Case No.19-446 (2nd Cir. Aug.13, 2020) (Park, J.).

Gregory Mango, a freelance photographer, sued BuzzFeed, an online media company, under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), for using one of his photographs in a news article without first obtaining his permission and crediting him. Mango asserted copyright infringement, alleging that BuzzFeed removed or altered the copyright management information (CMI), a violation under the DMCA. Mango sought statutory damages of $30,000 for his copyright infringement claim, $5,000 for his DMCA claim, and attorney’s fees. BuzzFeed argued that it could not be held liable under the DMCA because there was no evidence that it knew its conduct would lead to future, third-party infringement of Mango’s copyright.

The photo at issue was of Raymond Parker, who was the lead figure in a discrimination lawsuit filed by federal prosecutors in New York. The New York Post licensed the photo and published it, including Mango’s name in an attribution known as “gutter credit.” A few months later, BuzzFeed published an article about Parker and used Mango’s photo. The BuzzFeed journalist did not ask for permission to use the photo; instead, he listed the name of Parker’s attorneys’ law firm in the gutter credit. The journalist, a six-year veteran at BuzzFeed, had written more than 1,000 articles for the company, all of which included a photograph, and it was his custom to give credit to the photographers by “name or by photo outlet.” However, in this case, he asked the law firm for a photo of Parker but ultimately downloaded the photo from the New York Post website himself and attributed the photo to the law firm.

Prior to a bench trial, BuzzFeed stipulated to liability on the copyright infringement claim. The district court noted that under “Section 1202(b)(3) of the DMCA, plaintiffs must prove (1) actual knowledge … that CMI was removed and/or altered without permission and (2) constructive knowledge … that such distribution will induce, enable, facilitate or conceal an infringement.” The court found that Mango’s gutter credit constituted CMI and that BuzzFeed knew that the CMI had been removed and altered without permission, rejecting the journalist’s claims that he had believed he obtained permission and that BuzzFeed had reasonable grounds to know that such removal and distribution was infringement. The court found BuzzFeed liable on both claims and awarded Mango $8,750 in statutory damages and $65,132 in attorney’s fees. BuzzFeed appealed.

The Second Circuit determined that the district court correctly applied the DMCA in the case, finding that the journalist had distributed Mango’s photo knowing that his gutter credit had been removed or altered without Mango’s permission and distributed it with a gutter credit of the law firm, knowing that doing so would conceal that he did not have permission to use the photo.

BuzzFeed argued [...]

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Standard Essential Patent Licensing Practices Do Not Violate Antitrust Laws

by Anthony S. Ferrara and Lisa P. Rumin | Aug 26, 2020 | Antitrust

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated a district court decision that found Qualcomm’s patent licensing practices violate antitrust laws and reversed a permanent, worldwide injunction against several of Qualcomm’s business practices. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Qualcomm Inc., Case No. 19-16122 (9th Cir. Aug. 11, 2020) (C.J. Callahan).

Qualcomm sells modem chips that are incorporated into cellular handsets (i.e., smartphones) made by companies such as Samsung, Huawai, Apple and others. Qualcomm also holds a number of standard essential patents (SEPs) implemented by modem chips that are essential to cellular communication standards. A core part of Qualcomm’s business model is that it only licenses its SEPs to smartphone makers, i.e., its original equipment manufacturer (OEM) customers, not to rival modem chip suppliers—even though its rivals’ chips practice Qualcomm’s SEPs. Doing this allows Qualcomm to maximize its profits by charging royalty rates based on the value of the end-product smartphones rather than just the modem chip. In addition, Qualcomm will not supply modem chips to OEM customers unless they first pay to license Qualcomm’s SEPs (“no license, no chips”). OEMs must pay this licensing fee to Qualcomm even if they source chips from another supplier.

In January 2017, the FTC filed suit against Qualcomm in the Northern District of California, alleging that Qualcomm’s licensing practices violate the antitrust laws and unfairly protect its monopoly power as a modem chip supplier. Following a two-week bench trial, the district court issued a lengthy opinion ruling in favor of the FTC and ordering extensive injunctive relief requiring Qualcomm to change its business practices. The court made a number of findings, including: (1) Qualcomm’s refusal to license its SEPs to rival chipmakers violates both its FRAND commitments to standard-setting organizations (SSOs) and an antitrust duty to deal; (2) Qualcomm’s royalty rates for its SEPs are unreasonably high because they are based on the value of end products and (3) Qualcomm’s royalties, in conjunction with its “no license, no chips” policy, imposes an anticompetitive “surcharge” on the price of its rivals’ chips. Qualcomm appealed.

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision in its entirety and vacated the injunctive relief which had been ordered, finding that Qualcomm’s licensing practices amount to “hypercompetitive,” not anticompetitive, behavior. The Court recognized that Qualcomm’s licensing practices are designed to maximize its profits, but concluded that they do not unfairly distort competition within the modem chip markets. According to the Court, the district court improperly extended the reach of the antitrust laws in issuing its injunction.

The Ninth Circuit addressed and rejected each of the district court’s findings. First, the Court concluded that Qualcomm does not have an antitrust “duty to deal” with its rival chipmakers. The Court emphasized that the Supreme Court has recognized only a narrow exception to the general rule that a business need not deal with its competitors, and concluded that the exception was not met here. The Court also concluded that whether Qualcomm breached a FRAND commitment to license its SEPs to rivals was [...]

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Attorney’s Fees Properly Awarded in Unsuccessful Trade Secret Misappropriation and Civil Theft Suit

by Paul Devinsky | Aug 26, 2020 | Trade Secrets

The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed a take-nothing judgment and an attorney’s fees award against plaintiffs in a trade secret misappropriation and civil theft suit under Texas law, finding that the fee award did not need to be segregated to various claims. ATOM Instrument Corp. v. Petroleum Analyzer Co., L.P., Case Nos. 19-29151, -20371 (5th Cir. Aug. 7, 2020) (Southwick, J.). The Court also remanded for an additional award of appellate attorney’s fees.

Olstowski was a consultant for Petroleum Analyzer Co., L.P. (PAC), during which time he developed a krypton-chloride-based excimer lamp to detect sulfur with ultraviolet fluorescence. Although he developed the lamp independently, he used PAC resources to test the technology. Olstowski and PAC negotiated but failed to agree on licensing. Olstowski founded ATOM Instrument to assist him in the licensing discussions. Subsequently, PAC filed a declaratory judgment action in Texas court alleging that it owned the lamp technology. The state court ordered the claim to arbitration. The arbitration panel declared Olstowski the owner of the technology and enjoined PAC from using it. The state court confirmed the arbitral award, and a Texas appellate court upheld the confirmation order.

PAC thereafter developed a new sulfur-detecting excimer lamp called MultiTek that also used krypton-chloride with UV fluorescence. Olstowski and ATOM filed in state court for contempt of the injunction, but the state court denied the contempt motion as moot because PAC had ceased selling MultiTek.

ATOM filed for bankruptcy the following year. Olstowski and ATOM initiated a district court proceeding against PAC alleging misappropriation of trade secrets, unfair competition and civil theft. After holding a bench trial, the court found that MultiTek did not practice Olstowski’s technology and therefore entered a take-nothing judgment in favor of PAC. The district court also awarded attorney’s fees to PAC under a provision of the Texas Theft Liability Act (TTLA) that awards fees to prevailing parties. Olstowski and ATOM appealed both issues, and PAC sought an award of its appellate attorney’s fees.

As to liability, ATOM argued that the district court erred in finding that the MultiTek lamp did not practice Olstowski’s technology. ATOM characterized the error as a legal one regarding interpretation of the arbitral award, but the Fifth Circuit held that “whether one company used another’s protected technology” is a factual question for which Olstowski and ATOM had failed to carry the burden of proof at trial. ATOM further argued that the district court had ignored the alleged law of the case in deviating from the scope of technology defined in the arbitral award, but the Court again rejected ATOM’s argument because the district court had explicitly stated that the description of Olstowski’s technology in the arbitral award remained in effect.

As to the award of attorney’s fees, ATOM argued that the district court had not appropriately segregated fees related to the TTLA claim from those related to other claims. Applying Texas law, the Fifth Circuit affirmed that the TTLA claim was sufficiently related to the other claims [...]

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Copyright Board Ordered to Take a New Look at Streaming Services Rate Structure

by Christopher M. Bruno | Aug 26, 2020 | Copyrights

Reversing the Copyright Royalty Board’s (Board) determination of a revised rate structure governing musical works, the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit concluded that the Board reached a final structure without providing adequate notice. George Johnson v. Copyright Royalty Bd., Case No. 2019-1028 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 7, 2020) (Millett, J.).

Every five years, the Board holds a proceeding to determine the royalty rate and terms for reproducing and distributing musical works, where interested stakeholders are permitted to present evidence and argument. At issue in Johnson is the Board’s decision, made after a five-week evidentiary hearing, setting the compulsory rate for the right to reproduce and distribute recordings of copyrighted musical works, known as a mechanical license, through streaming services for the period of January 1, 2018, to December 31, 2022.

Before the Board’s determination, depending on the type of service provided, the service provider owed a royalty based on a formula that considered two factors: (1) the service provider’s revenue associated with the particular offering, known as the “revenue prong,” and (2) the royalties paid by the service provider to sound recording copyright holders, known as the “total content cost prong.” For some streaming service offerings, the royalty was subject to a mechanical floor, and for some, the total content cost prong was subject to a cap. The Board’s final determination uncapped the total content cost prong and decided to phase in, for all categories over five years, a 15.1% revenue rate and a 26.2% total content cost rate, both higher than prior rates. Streaming services Amazon, Google, Pandora and Spotify, along with copyright owners and pro se songwriter George Johnson, appealed various aspects of the ruling.

On appeal, the challenges ran the gamut of administrative arguments: among others, that the Board’s decision was improperly retroactive, that the Board failed to give proper notice before settling on the rate structure in its final determination and fixed rates arbitrarily and capriciously, that it rejected certain evidence without an adequate explanation, and that it made certain changes to its decision without statutory authority to do so.

Although the D.C. Circuit found most of these arguments unavailing, it was convinced of a few, warranting remand to the Board for further proceedings. Primarily, the Court concluded that the Board failed to provide proper notice that it would uncap the total content cost prong combined with a significant increase in the mechanical royalty license rate. Specifically, the Court held that the Board’s ultimate rate structure, while adopting pieces from various proposals (some of which were never even offered at or before the hearing), was not within the zone of reasonably contemplated outcomes. By eliminating the cap on total content cost for all categories and increasing the royalty rates, the mechanical royalty licenses would be subject to the copyright owners’ unchecked market power.

The D.C. Circuit found two other errors. First, the relevant stakeholders had a settlement history from which the Board could draw conclusions regarding an appropriate rate structure. Nonetheless, the [...]

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Diamonds to Dust? Too Many Factual Disputes Precludes Summary Judgment

by Sarah Bro | Aug 26, 2020 | Trademarks

The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated a district court’s summary judgment grant in favor of a fine jewelry producer for trademark infringement, counterfeiting and unfair competition because factual disputes exist around whether the accused infringer’s use of the word “Tiffany” was merely descriptive of a particular ring setting, thereby supporting a fair use defense to infringement. Tiffany and Company v. Costco Wholesale Corporation, Case Nos. 17-2798-cv, -19-338, -19-404 (2nd Cir. Aug. 17, 2020) (Livingston, J.).

In 2012, a Costco customer alerted Tiffany that she believed Costco was selling diamond engagement rings advertised as Tiffany rings. When Tiffany approached Costco about the issue in December 2012, Costco asserted that its point-of-sale displays bearing the Tiffany name referred to the diamond setting styles of its rings, and that other similar point-of-sale displays also identified common ring settings such as “bezel” or “cathedral” settings. Costco also claims that within one week after Tiffany’s December 2012 outreach, it voluntarily removed all uses of “Tiffany” from its jewelry displays and has not since used the word “Tiffany” to identify any rings or setting styles.

Nevertheless, in 2013, Tiffany filed suit against Costco for trademark infringement and counterfeiting under the Lanham Act, and unfair competition in violation of New York state law, based on Costco’s sales of otherwise unbranded diamond engagement rings identified by point-of-sale signs containing the word “Tiffany.” In response, Costco raised the affirmative defense of fair use, arguing that its use of “Tiffany” on certain signage for rings was not as a source-identifying trademark, but merely to describe a particular six-prong diamond setting style. Costco also filed a counterclaim seeking to cancel certain federal trademark registrations for the TIFFANY mark as “generic” for a specific jewelry setting, and not entitled to registered trademark protection.

The district court granted Tiffany’s motion for summary judgment finding Costco liable for trademark infringement and counterfeiting as a matter of law. The district court then revised a jury’s damages award finding that Costco was liable for willful or intentional infringement to the tune of more than $21 million. Costco appealed.

On appeal, Costco argued it had successfully raised a question of material fact as to its liability for trademark infringement and counterfeiting and was entitled to present its fair use defense to a jury. The Second Circuit addressed the lower court’s trademark “likelihood of confusion” assessment under its own Polaroid factors and explained that if a factual inference must be drawn to arrive at a particular finding on a Polaroid factor, and if a reasonable trier of fact could reach a different conclusion, the district court may not properly resolve that issue on summary judgment. Here, the Court determined that Costco raised a triable question of fact as to at least three of the Polaroid factors, namely, (1) whether Costco’s customers were actually confused as to the source or affiliation of its diamond engagement rings, (2) whether Costco adopted Tiffany’s trademark in bad faith and (3) whether the relevant population of consumers was sufficiently [...]

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Standard Essentiality Is a Question for the Fact Finder

by Amol Parikh | Aug 20, 2020 | Patents

Affirming a jury verdict of infringement, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concluded that the question of whether patent claims are essential to all implementations of an industry standard should be resolved by the trier of fact. Godo Kaisha IP Bridge 1 v. TCL Comm. Tech. Holdings Ltd., Case No. 19-2215 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 4, 2020) (O’Malley, J.).

IP Bridge owns patents that it contends are essential to the Long-Term Evolution (LTE) standard, and accused TCL of infringing the patents based on the sale of LTE-compliant mobile phones and tablets. Relying on the Federal Circuit’s 2010 decision in Fujitsu Ltd. v. Netgear Inc., IP Bridge presented evidence at trial that (1) the asserted claims are essential to mandatory sections of the LTE standard and (2) the accused products comply with the LTE standard. TCL did not present any evidence to counter that showing. The jury found that TCL was liable for infringement of the asserted claims and awarded damages. Following the verdict, TCL filed a motion for judgment as matter of law, contending that IP Bridge could not rely on the methodology approved in Fujitsu because Fujitsu only approved that methodology in circumstances where the patent owner asks the district court to assess essentiality in the context of construing the claims of the asserted patents. The district court rejected TCL’s argument and concluded that substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict. TCL appealed.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings but explained that it was writing to refute TCL’s contention that whether a patent is essential to a standard is a question of law to be resolved in the context of claim construction. TCL argued that while standard compliance may be used to prove infringement, a district court must make a threshold determination as part of claim construction that all implementations of a standard infringe the claims. TCL argued that since IP Bridge never asked the district court to conduct such an analysis, the question should not have gone to the jury. IP Bridge responded by arguing that whether a patent is essential to a standard is a classic fact issue and is in the province of the factfinder.

The Federal Circuit agreed with IP Bridge and found that TCL’s appeal rested on a misreading of Fujitsu. In Fujitsu, the Court noted that if a district court finds that the claims cover any device that practices a standard, then comparing the claims to that standard is the same as the traditional infringement analysis of comparing the claims to the accused product. The Court explained that the passing reference to claim construction is a recognition that the first step in any infringement analysis is claim construction; it is not a statement that the district court must determine whether the claim covers every implementation of the standard. The Court also explained that determining standard essentiality of patent claims during claim construction does not make sense from a practical perspective because essentiality is a question about whether the claim elements [...]

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Senator Tillis Urges USPTO to Adopt Patent Reform Proposals

by Amol Parikh | Aug 18, 2020 | Patents

On August 10, 2020, Senator Thom Tillis of North Carolina urged the Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), Andrei Iancu, to adopt two patent reform proposals suggested by Lisa Larrimore Ouellete and Heidi Williams. Senator Tillis is the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Intellectual Property. Stanford University professors Lisa Larrimore Ouellete and Heidi Williams proposed the reforms in a paper, Reforming the Patent System, The Hamilton Project, Policy Proposal 2020-12 (June 2020).

The first proposed reform would require patent applicants to more clearly distinguish between hypothetical experimental results and actual experimental results. The USPTO allows applicants to include so-called “prophetic examples” in a patent application. The patent applicant is supposed to distinguish between prophetic examples and actual working examples by the verb tense used to describe the example. Prophetic examples should be described in the present or future tense, while working examples should be described in the past tense. However, the verb tense is not always clear. Moreover, the verb tense distinction may not be appreciated by foreign language translators, scientists and engineers, especially in countries where prophetic examples are not allowed. Ouellette and Williams proposed that prophetic examples in patent applications be clearly labeled. This would reduce confusion by the public. Senator Tillis noted that confusing data in patent applications could be used to mislead the public and pump up profits for a company that has little to offer the economy or the public.

The second proposed reform would require patent owners to disclose ownership of patents in a more transparent and standardized manner. The lack of a transparent and standardized recording of patent assignments increases the costs and uncertainties of freedom-to-operate searches, licensing, negotiations and patent litigation. There is currently no requirement by the USPTO that the assignment records be updated when there is an ownership change of a patent. There is no requirement that hidden owners of patents be listed in an assignment record. Moreover, a single patent owner can be referred to by different names in different patents. Ouellette and Williams proposed: 1) Congress or the USPTO should require standardization of entity and inventor names across patent records, 2) Congress or the USPTO should increase incentives to record changes in patent assignments, and 3) at least for patents involved in litigation, parties having ownership interests in the patents should be identified.

Ouellette and Williams also proposed adjusting patent terms for pharmaceuticals so that pharmaceuticals that have to undergo a lengthy clinical trial would still have a sufficient patent term once they are approved by the Food and Drug Administration. However, patent term changes require a change to the patent statute, and therefore this proposal needs to be approved by Congress.

Senator Tillis explained that the two proposed reforms would enhance “the patent system so that it provides optimal incentives for innovators and inventors while also minimizing transactional costs that may discourage the development of new products.” Senator Tillis noted the two proposed reforms could be implemented by the USPTO [...]

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Challenge to PTAB’s Finding of Non-Obviousness Fails to Pay Out

by Thomas DaMario | Aug 13, 2020 | America Invents Act, Patents

Addressing whether the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) ran afoul of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in finding that a dependent claim was valid despite the patent owner’s lack of validity arguments beyond those advanced for the corresponding and invalid independent claim, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the PTAB’s ruling and found no APA violation. FanDuel, Inc. v. Interactive Games LLC, Case No. 19-1393 (Fed. Cir. July 29, 2020) (Hughes, J.) (Dyk, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Interactive Games owns a patent directed to a method for allowing users to gamble remotely via a mobile device, according to certain game configurations. Specifically, the independent claim is directed to altering a user’s game outcome based on the gaming configuration associated with the location of a user’s mobile gaming device. A dependent claim adds the additional limitation of “accessing a lookup table which contains an ordered list of locations and associated game configurations.”

FanDuel petitioned for inter partes review (IPR) of the patent as obvious based on three references. The first reference (Carter) disclosed a mobile wagering system capable of determining a gambler’s location and restricting access based on the location. Carter’s system used a database that correlated various locations with applicable access levels. Importantly, the reference generally indicated that the system may employ various components such as “memory elements, processing elements, logic elements, look-up tables, and the like.” The second reference (Walker) disclosed enabling or disabling certain features on a mobile gaming device based on a user’s location. And the third reference (the webpage) included a list of slot payouts by casino, city and state, alphabetically organized by state. FanDuel also submitted an expert declaration that the use of look-up tables was well known in the art and that it would have been an obvious design choice to store Carter’s jurisdictional information in an “ordered list” similar to the webpage.

In its Preliminary Patent Owner Response, Interactive incorporated its validity arguments for the independent claim into its arguments for the dependent claim, but did not otherwise advance any substantive arguments specific to the dependent claim. The PTAB instituted IPR for all challenged claims. Following institution, Interactive submitted a patent owner response, which again did not advance any substantive arguments specific to the dependent claim. While Interactive did submit an expert declaration, the statements made by FanDuel’s expert specific to the dependent claim were uncontested. Ultimately, the PTAB found the independent claim invalid, but found the dependent claim valid. FanDuel appealed.

FanDuel argued that the PTAB’s decision with respect to the dependent claim violated the APA because the PTAB changed its obviousness theory midstream. FanDuel alleged that no further record development was presented regarding the dependent claim after institution, and therefore a finding of validity in light of the PTAB’s decision to institute amounted to a changed position by the PTAB, to which FanDuel was entitled notice and an opportunity to respond.

The Federal Circuit disagreed and affirmed the PTAB’s decision. In finding [...]

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