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It’s Obvious: Erroneous Claim Construction Can Be Harmless

by Taylor MacDonald | Feb 13, 2025 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a Patent Trial & Appeal Board obviousness determination even though it found the Board had improperly construed a claim term, because the Court found the error harmless in the context of the prior art. HD Silicon Solutions LLC v. Microchip Technology Inc., Case No. 23-1397 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 6, 2025) (Lourie, Stoll, Cunningham, JJ.)

During a 2022 inter partes review (IPR), the Board determined that all but one of the 17 challenged patent claims were unpatentable as obvious in light of a prior patent (Trivedi) and other secondary prior art. The patent described methods of creating “a local interconnect layer in an integrated circuit” using two films. The independent claim recited a first film composed of titanium nitride and a second film as “comprising tungsten.” The Board construed “comprising tungsten” to include either elemental tungsten or tungsten-based compounds. The Board also found that the Trivedi patent disclosed films comprising either elemental tungsten or tungsten compounds. Thus, the Board held that all claims except one were obvious in light of Trivedi and that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Trivedi with other prior art. The patent owner appealed, arguing that the Board’s obviousness finding was dependent on the Board’s incorrect construction of the phrase “comprising tungsten.”

The Federal Circuit agreed that the Board’s claim construction was erroneous, because the term “comprising tungsten” required elemental tungsten. The Court explained that the claims explicitly used compound names when referring to compounds, such as “titanium nitride.” Thus, when the drafters wrote “comprising tungsten” without more, they clearly intended to exclude non-elemental tungsten options. The Court also noted that the patent specification used “tungsten” to reference only elemental tungsten and used the word “based” to encompass both elements and their compounds. For example, the patent discussed “chlorine-based” and “fluorine-based” components. Thus, the Court concluded that the claim drafters knew how to delineate when terms should include compounds, and that there was no such delineation in the term “comprising tungsten.”

The Board relied on a single sentence in the patent that stated: “the second film may comprise tungsten, for example,” to support its construction. The Federal Circuit rejected such a broad reading of this language, explaining that it only provided for impurities mixed among the elemental tungsten in the second film, rather than the film comprising a tungsten compound. The Board also cited a European Union (EU) patent in support of the construction that “comprising tungsten” explicitly included tungsten compounds. The Court stated that such extrinsic evidence was insufficient to overcome the asserted patent’s intrinsic teachings.

The Federal Circuit analyzed whether the Board’s obviousness holding could stand given its erroneous construction. The Court found that because the Board determined that Trivedi disclosed layers made of a tungsten compound and elemental tungsten, the patent claims were obvious when the disputed term was properly construed to be limited to elemental tungsten. Thus, the Board’s error was harmless.

Dog Toy Maker in the Doghouse (Again) for Tarnishing Jack Daniel’s Marks

by Eleanor B. Atkins | Feb 6, 2025 | Trademarks

Addressing this case for the third time, the US District Court for the District of Arizona found on remand that Jack Daniel’s was entitled to a permanent injunction after finding that VIP Products’ “Bad Spaniels” dog toy diluted Jack Daniel’s trademark and trade dress, despite VIP not having infringed those marks. VIP Products LLC v. Jack Daniel’s Properties Inc., Case No. CV-14-02057-PHX-SMM (D. Ariz. Jan. 21, 2025).

This case began more than 10 years ago when VIP filed a declaratory judgment action that its “Bad Spaniels” Silly Squeaker dog toy did not infringe or dilute Jack Daniel’s trademark rights. Jack Daniel’s counterclaimed, alleging trademark infringement and dilution. The district court initially entered a permanent injunction against VIP, finding that VIP’s “Bad Spaniels” toy violated and tarnished Jack Daniel’s trademarks and trade dress. VIP appealed, and the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that VIP’s use of “Bad Spaniels” was protected expressive speech under the First Amendment. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment to VIP on infringement and dilution. Jack Daniel’s appealed, but the Ninth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that the heightened protection afforded by the First Amendment does not apply where the contested mark is used as a trademark. The Supreme Court therefore vacated the Ninth Circuit’s decision and remanded for further consideration. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to determine whether VIP’s use of “Bad Spaniels” tarnished and/or infringed Jack Daniel’s trademarks and trade dress, consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision.

On remand, VIP attempted to challenge the constitutionality of the Lanham Act’s cause of action for dilution by tarnishment, arguing that “the statute amounts to unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination by enjoining the use of a mark that ‘harms the reputation’ of a famous mark.” Ultimately, the district court did not consider the merits of the constitutional challenge. The district court stated that although it was not precluded from considering VIP’s constitutional challenge, the issue was not properly before the court because VIP had not amended its pleadings to assert the challenge.

The district court assessed dilution by tarnishment using a three-factor analysis of fame, similarity, and reputational harm. With respect to fame, the parties did not dispute that the JACK DANIEL’S mark was famous. Nonetheless, VIP contended that Jack Daniel’s had not shown tarnishment of a famous mark by a “correlative junior mark.” Specifically, VIP argued that the famous JACK DANIEL’S mark correlated with VIP’s “Bad Spaniels,” and VIP’s use of “Old. No. 2” correlated with Jack Daniel’s mark “Old No. 7.” According to VIP, there could be no tarnishment because only the latter was offensive and Jack Daniel’s had not demonstrated that “Old. No. 7” was a famous mark. The district court disagreed with VIP’s correlative mark argument, stating, “it is VIP’s use of Jack Daniel’s marks – on a poop-themed dog chew toy – that Jack Daniel’s claims tarnish its trademarks, not ‘Bad Spaniels’ itself [...]

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Assessing Inputs: Determining AI’s Role in US Intellectual Property Protections

by Anisa Noorassa | Feb 6, 2025 | Copyrights

The US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) issued additional guidance on the contribution of artificial intelligence (AI) in its January 2025 AI Strategy. Similarly, the US Copyright Office issued part two of its “Copyright and Artificial Intelligence” report, addressing the copyrightability of AI- or partially AI-made works. Both agencies appear to be walking a fine line by accepting that AI has become increasingly pervasive while maintaining human contribution requirements for protected works and inventions.

In its published strategy, the PTO states that its vision is to unleash “America’s potential through the adoption of AI.” The strategy describes five focus areas:

Advancing the development of intellectual property policies that promote inclusive AI innovation and creativity.
Building best-in-class AI capabilities by investing in computational infrastructure, data resources, and business-driven product development.
Promoting the responsible use of AI within the PTO and across the broader innovation ecosystem.
Developing AI expertise within the PTO’s workforce.
Collaborating with other US government agencies, international partners, and the public on shared AI priorities.

The PTO stated that it is still evaluating the issue of AI-assisted inventions but reaffirmed its February 2024 guidance on inventorship for AI-assisted inventions. That guidance indicates that while AI-assisted inventions are not categorically unpatentable, the inventorship analysis should focus on human contributions.

Likewise, the Copyright Office discussed public comments regarding AI contributions to copyright, weighing the benefits of AI in assisting and empowering creators with disabilities against the harm to artists working to make a living. Ultimately the Copyright Office affirmed that AI, when used as a tool, can generate copyrightable works only where a human is able to determine the expressive elements contained in the work. The Copyright Office stated that creativity in the AI prompt alone is, at this state, insufficient to satisfy the human expressive input required to produce a copyrightable work.

Rules Are Rules, Especially in Trademark Proceedings

by Abigail A. Rubinstein | Feb 6, 2025 | Trademarks

The Commissioner for Trademarks recently issued a precedential decision terminating a reexamination proceeding for the registrant’s failure to respond within a statutory time period, where there was insufficient justification to waive the response requirement. In re Trigroup USA LLC, Reg. No. 7094794 (Jan. 24, 2025) (Gooder, Comm’r for Trademarks)

The Trademark Modernization Act of 2020 (TMA) created two new trademark proceedings: expungement and reexamination. The US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) began accepting petitions for these proceedings in 2021. The reexamination proceeding must be filed within the first five years after the registration of a trademark and can only be filed against applications filed on the basis of use (§ 1(a)) or intent to use (§ 1(b)). The proceeding questions whether the mark was in use by a certain date:

In the case of a use-based application, the mark must have been in use on all the goods or services identified in the application by the filing date of the application.
In the case of an intent-to-use application, the mark must have been in use on all the goods or services identified in the application by either the date the Allegation of Use was filed or the deadline for filing the Statement of Use.

A party filing for reexamination must submit evidence that the mark was not in use by those relevant dates.

When the PTO institutes a reexamination proceeding, it issues an Office Action providing the registrant with the opportunity to rebut the claims of non-use. The rules require a response within three months of the Office Action issue date, and failure to respond results in the cancellation of the registration.

Here, the registrant did not respond to the Office Action, and the PTO cancelled the registration. The registrant then filed a Petition to the Director requesting reinstatement of the registration. Such a petition is required to include a response to the original Office Action. However, in this case, the registrant did not provide such a response, and on that basis the Commissioner found that the Petition should not be granted.

The Commissioner further found that even if the petition had included a complete response, it did not set forth sufficient facts to justify a late response. Trademark Rule 2.146(a)(5) permits the Director to waive any requirement of the rules that is not mandated by statute only “in an extraordinary situation, when justice requires, and no other party is injured.” 37 C.F.R. § 2.146(a)(5).

The registrant explained that it had an ongoing matter in China and the failure to respond was due to inadvertent error because it was dealing with the Chinese matter. The Commissioner found that this was not an extraordinary circumstance. The registrant also explained that cancellation of the registration would hinder its ongoing efforts in China and prevent it from manufacturing its products there. The Commissioner found that justice did not require the waiver of the PTO rules just because there would be harm to the registrant: “a party cannot be excused from the [...]

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Eye-Catching: Biosimilars Injunction Prevails

by Courtney Seams | Feb 6, 2025 | Patents

Addressing a preliminary injunction in patent litigation related to the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA), the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction, finding that there was a proper exercise of personal jurisdiction and that no substantial question of invalidity had been raised for the patents at issue that would prevent the injunction from issuing. Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc., Case No. 24-1965 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 29, 2025) (Moore, C.J.; Reyna, Taranto, JJ.)

Regeneron holds a Biologics License Application for Eylea®, a therapeutic product containing aflibercept (a VEGF antagonist used in various treatments for eye diseases). Regeneron owns multiple patents related to its Eylea® product, including a patent directed to intravitreal injections using VEGF formulations. Mylan, Samsung Bioepis (SB), and other companies filed abbreviated Biologics License Applications (aBLAs) with the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) seeking approval to market Eylea® biosimilars. Regeneron brought suit against these parties asserting infringement of its patent and filed a motion for a preliminary injunction.

The district court granted the preliminary injunction against SB, enjoining it from offering for sale or selling the subject of its aBLA without a license from Regeneron. SB appealed, arguing that:

The exercise of personal jurisdiction over it was improper.
There was a substantial question of invalidity of the patent under either obviousness-type double patenting or lack of adequate written description.
There was no causal nexus established.

The Federal Circuit upheld the exercise of personal jurisdiction on SB, finding that SB had minimum contacts with the state of West Virginia. SB is headquartered in South Korea and entered into a development and commercialization agreement with Biogen for a biosimilar to Eylea®, SB15, that gives SB continuing rights and responsibilities as the agreement is implemented. The Court found that SB did not have to distribute the product itself under the agreement for it to be subject to personal jurisdiction. Further, the Court found that SB’s aBLA and internal documentation indicated an intent to distribute SB15 US-wide, which was sufficient to establish intent to distribute the product in West Virginia.

The Federal Circuit also upheld the district court’s grant of the preliminary injunction. SB invoked another patent in the same family as the asserted patent that was directed to an intravitreal injection containing a VEGF trap as the reference patent for an obviousness-type double patenting theory. The Federal Circuit upheld the district court’s findings that the stability requirement, the “glycosylated” requirement, and the “vial” limitations in the claims of the asserted patent were all patentably distinct from the reference patent. The Court found that the stability requirement recited in the asserted patent was more specific than, and not inherent within, the reference patent. The Court further agreed that the reference patent embraced both non-glycosylated and glycosylated aflibercept, not only the glycosylated aflibercept contained in the asserted patent claims.

The Federal Circuit then addressed SB’s arguments that the specification lacked sufficient written description for the claimed [...]

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Beach Buggy Battle: Stipulation Insufficient to Establish Trademark Distinctiveness

by Tim Dunker | Jan 30, 2025 | Trademarks

The US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that a district court does not need to accept both parties’ stipulation that a mark is distinctive but instead is permitted to make an evidentiary inquiry in determining whether the mark is distinctive or generic. Moke America LLC v. Moke Int’l Ltd., Case No. 23-1634 (4th Cir. Jan. 15, 2025) (King, Groh, JJ.) (Richardson, J., dissenting).

Starting in the 1960s, British Motor Corporation (BMC) sold vehicles colloquially referred to as “Mokes” in the United Kingdom, Australia, and Portugal. By the time BMC ceased production in 1993, Mokes had garnered a small but devoted following for use as beach buggies in the United States, the Caribbean, and Australia.

In August 2015, Moke International and Moke USA sold their first vehicle using the MOKE mark and subsequently sought trademark registration. One year later, Moke America began US sales of vehicles using the MOKE mark. Both parties described their vehicles as being reengineered and redesigned versions of the BMC Moke.

The present dispute began when Moke America opposed Moke International and Moke USA’s registration based on priority use of the MOKE mark. The Trademark Trial & Appeal Board dismissed the opposition. Moke America then filed a district court complaint seeking a declaration of trademark ownership and asserting trademark infringement. Moke International and Moke USA counterclaimed for a declaration of trademark ownership and trademark infringement, as well as affirmance of the Board’s dismissal.

A party claiming ownership of a mark bears the burden of proving distinctiveness. A generic term is not distinctive. Generic terms in trademark law are those that describe a genus or class of which a particular product is a member, such as “CONVENIENT STORE retail stores, DRY ICE solid carbon dioxide, and LIGHT BEER ale-type beverages.” Generic terms can never be protected. The purpose of denying protection for these terms is to safeguard the public from having commonly used words and phrases removed from the “linguistic commons.” Certain marks that are originally distinctive may become generic through the public’s pervasive use of the term through a process known as “genericide.” Genericide occurs when the trademark ceases to identify the particular source of a product or service to the public and instead identifies a class of product or service. Common examples include ASPIRIN and ESCALATOR.

Since both parties sought ownership of the MOKE mark, the parties stipulated that the mark was distinctive and not generic. The district court found that a stipulation was insufficient and noted that the parties must set forth evidence that the mark was distinctive and not generic. The district court concluded that MOKE was once inherently distinctive but had become generic before either party sold a vehicle bearing the MOKE mark. Both parties appealed.

Seeking to overturn the district court’s finding of genericness, the parties argued that the district court was required to accept their stipulation of the MOKE mark’s distinctiveness. The Fourth Circuit disagreed, finding that blindly accepting a stipulation was incompatible with the court’s role of [...]

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What’s Shaking? Not an Interlocutory Appellate Decision on Damages

by Tessa Kroll | Jan 30, 2025 | Trade Secrets

The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit dismissed and remanded a district court certified interlocutory appeal concerning the standard for calculating a reasonable royalty under the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA). The Court explained that the rate instruction issued by the district court was erroneous because the parties had not yet gone to trial and the plaintiff had not yet proven liability. Therefore, the issue of damages might never arise. Silverthorne Seismic, L.L.C. v. Sterling Seismic Servs., Ltd., Case No. 24-20006 (5th Cir. Jan. 3, 2025) (Smith, Clement, Higginson, JJ.) (Higginson, J., dissenting).

Silverthorne licensed seismic data to Casillas Petroleum Resource Partners II, LLC, an oil and gas exploration company. Under this arrangement, Silverthorne provided data to Sterling, a seismic data processer, which processed the data and sent it to Casillas. Because Sterling’s data processing required more data than what Casillas had paid for, Sterling was only permitted to forward the data that Casillas had licensed. However, Sterling sent Casillas unlicensed data, which Casillas allegedly showed to potential investors.

Silverthorne sued Sterling for trade secret misappropriation under the DTSA and sought reasonable royalties for Sterling’s improper disclosure. Shortly before trial, the district court issued an order adopting the Fifth Circuit’s definition of “reasonable royalty” in University Computing (1974), which, in this case, would have required Silverthorne to prove what the parties “would have agreed to for . . . use [of] the alleged trade secret.” University Computing predates the DTSA, which provides for reasonable royalties for “disclosure or use of a trade secret.” Silverthorne appealed the order, noting that it would not be able to prove what Sterling would have agreed to pay to use the data, since Sterling was a data processor and not an end user. The district court certified the following question for appeal:

[W]hether a plaintiff is entitled to prove reasonable royalty damages under the DTSA using willing buyer(s) detached from the parties to the litigation when willing buyers (here, oil and gas exploration companies) exist for plaintiff’s alleged trade secret (here, seismic data), but the defendant and comparable entities (here, seismic processors) do not buy or license that trade secret.

An administrative panel of the Fifth Circuit granted leave to appeal.

Majority Opinion

The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal as not involving a controlling question of law. The Court explained that interlocutory appeals are only permitted where an order involves a controlling question of law, the resolution of which would materially and immediately affect the outcome of litigation in the district court. The Fifth Circuit emphasized that a question is not controlling just because the answer would complicate a litigant’s ability to make its case or because the answer could save the parties from a post-judgment appeal. Applying these principles, the Court reasoned that damages issues generally do not control a case until the plaintiff establishes liability, unless the damages issue would be dispositive. Because Silverthorne had not yet established liability and was not barred from proving damages under the district court’s definition [...]

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Bottling the Truth: Equivalence and Reverse Equivalence

by Keval Amin | Jan 30, 2025 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled that the “substantially the same way” comparison in connection with a doctrine of equivalents (DOE) analysis involving a means-plus-function claim limitation should focus on the overall structure corresponding to the claimed function, not on unclaimed structure. Steuben Foods, Inc. v. Shibuya Hoppmann Corp., Case No. 23-1790 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 24, 2025) (Moore, Hughes, Cunningham, JJ.)

Steuben Foods holds patents for an aseptic bottling system designed to sterilize and fill bottles with foodstuffs at speeds exceeding 100 bottles per minute, making the technology suitable for high-volume food production. Steuben sued Shibuya for infringing its patents. At trial, Steuben successfully demonstrated that Shibuya’s aseptic bottling system infringed a patent claim related to a “second sterile region,” a feature designed to pre-sterilize a valve mechanism and prevent contamination. The jury awarded Steuben more than $38 million in damages and, in doing so, rejected Shibuya’s defense under the reverse doctrine of equivalents (RDOE). The RDOE is a rarely invoked defense that is asserted when an accused product, although meeting the literal terms of a claim, operates on fundamentally different principles and thus does not infringe. Despite the jury’s verdict, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) of noninfringement, holding that Shibuya’s RDOE defense precluded infringement. Steuben appealed.

The Federal Circuit reversed the JMOL based on the RDOE, finding that the district court improperly weighed evidence that should have been left to the jury. The Court emphasized that Steuben’s expert testimony constituted substantial evidence supporting the jury’s findings and warranted deference. The Court also rejected Shibuya’s narrow construction of the claimed “second sterile region,” which would have excluded food flow, and affirmed the broader interpretation adopted by the district court (an interpretation the Court noted better aligned with the claim language).

The Federal Circuit noted that it had “previously described RDOE as an ‘anachronistic exception, long mentioned but rarely applied.’” While the Court declined to definitively rule on the RDOE’s continued viability under the Patent Act of 1952, it favorably noted Steuben’s argument that “if a device literally falls within the scope of a claim, but the accused infringer believes the claim is too broad and its device should not infringe, the appropriate recourse is a § 112 challenge, not a claim of noninfringement under RDOE.” In this case, the Federal Circuit concluded that even if Shibuya had made a prima facie case under RDOE that the principle of operation of the accused product was so far removed from the asserted claim, “the jury’s verdict should not have been overturned under RDOE because [Steuben’s expert] provided rebuttal testimony that the jury was entitled to credit. JMOL of noninfringement was therefore improper.”

The district court had also analyzed whether, under the DOE, claimed structures, such as conveyor plates and systems, were equivalent to Shibuya’s rotary wheels and neck grippers. The district court concluded they were not. The district court had construed the term “means for filling the aseptically disinfected plurality of bottles [...]

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Vimeo’s Fleeting Interaction With Videos Doesn’t Negate Safe Harbor Protections

by Taylor MacDonald | Jan 23, 2025 | Copyrights

The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a district court’s decision, granting Vimeo qualified protection under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) safe harbor provision. Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, Inc., Case Nos. 21-2949(L); -2974(Con) (2d Cir. Jan. 13, 2025) (Leval, Parker, Merriam, JJ.) This case addresses, for the second time, whether Vimeo had “red flag knowledge” of the defendant’s copyrighted works under the DMCA.

DMCA Section 512(c) provides a safe harbor that shelters online service providers from liability for indirect copyright infringement on their platforms under certain conditions. Congress provided two exceptions that would remove the safe harbor protection:

Actual or red flag knowledge of infringing content
The ability to control content while receiving a financial benefit directly attributable to the accused infringement activity.

EMI, an affiliate of Capitol Records, vehemently opposed Vimeo’s inclusion of videos containing EMI’s music on its site and initiated the present suit in 2009. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Vimeo, dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims on the ground that Vimeo was entitled to the safe harbor protection provided by Section 512(c). EMI appealed.

In a 2016 appeal (Vimeo I ), the Second Circuit considered Vimeo’s activities under the DMCA. In Vimeo I, the Court (in the context of an interlocutory appeal) ruled that the copyright holder must establish that the service provider (e.g., Vimeo) had “knowledge or awareness of infringing content,” and that the service provider bore the initial burden to prove it qualified for the DMCA safe harbor, whereupon the burden shifted to the copyright holder to prove a disqualifying exception.

Knowledge of Infringement

In Vimeo I, the Second Circuit cited its 2012 decision in Viacom Int’l v. You Tube and explained that red flag knowledge incorporates an objective standard. The facts actually known to the service provider must be sufficient such that a reasonable person would have understood there to be infringement that was not offset by fair use or a license. Vimeo I clarified that service provider employees who are not experts in copyright law cannot be expected to know more than any reasonable person without specialized understanding.

The Second Circuit explained that this knowledge analysis is a fact-intensive one, and that copyright owners cannot rely on service provider employees’ generalized understanding to prove red flag knowledge for any video (or other work). The Vimeo I court also noted that the DMCA did not place a burden on service providers to investigate whether users had acquired licenses. In Vimeo I, the Second Circuit further instructed that because the legal community cannot agree on a universal understanding of fair use, it would be unfair to expect “untutored” service provider employees to determine whether a given video is not fair use on its face.

Right and Ability to Control

In analyzing what constitutes the right and ability to control, the Second Circuit emphasized that Congress’ purpose behind the DMCA was to effect a compromise between rightsholders and safe harbor claimants: “Congress recognized that the [...]

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Untwisting the Fixation Requirement: Flexible Rules on Moveable Sculptures

by Hannah Hurley | Jan 23, 2025 | Copyrights

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded a district court’s dismissal of a claim of copyright infringement for kinetic and manipulable sculptures, finding that movable structures were sufficiently “fixed” in a tangible medium for copyright purposes. Tangle, Inc. v. Aritzia, Inc., et al., Case No. 23-3707 (9th Cir. Jan. 14, 2024) (Koh, Johnstone, Simon, JJ.)

Tangle, a toy company, holds copyright registrations for seven kinetic and manipulable sculptures, each made from 17 or 18 identical, connected 90-degree curved tubular segments. These sculptures can be twisted or turned 360 degrees at the joints, allowing for various poses. Aritzia, a lifestyle apparel brand, used similar sculptures in its retail store displays, leading Tangle to file a lawsuit alleging copyright and trade dress infringement. Aritzia’s sculptures were larger, were a different color, and had a chrome finish.

The Copyright Act requires that a work of authorship be “fixed in any tangible medium of expression.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). At the pleading stage, the district court concluded that the sculptures were not fixed and thus dismissed Tangle’s copyright claim. The district court also dismissed the trade dress claim for failure to provide adequate notice of the asserted trade dress. Tangle appealed.

While the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court’s dismissal of the trade dress claim, it disagreed with the district court’s ruling on the copyright claim. Comparing the kinetic, movable sculptures to music, movies, and dance, the Court found that Tangle’s dynamic sculptures were entitled to copyright protection and that Tangle adequately alleged valid copyrights in its sculptures. The Court held that the works’ ability to move into various poses did not, by itself, support the conclusion that they were not “fixed” in a tangible medium for copyright purposes.

The Ninth Circuit held that under the “extrinsic test” test, which looks at “the objective similarities of the two works, focusing only on the protectable elements of the plaintiff’s expression,” as set forth in the Court’s 2018 decision in Rentmeester v. Nike, Tangle plausibly alleged copying of its protected works by alleging that the creative choices it made in selecting and arranging elements of its copyrighted works were substantially similar to the choices Aritzia made in creating its sculptures.

Since Aritzia failed to dispute that Tangle had properly alleged copying, the Ninth Circuit stated that Tangle only needed to show that the sculptures were substantially similar to prove infringement. Applying its 2004 decision in Swirsky v. Carey, the Ninth Circuit explained that “substantial similarity can be found in a combination of elements, even if those elements are individually unprotected.”

The Ninth Circuit found that the copyrighted and accused sculptures were similar enough to the ordinary observer to constitute infringement because both were comprised of identical, connected 90-degree curved tubular segments that could be twisted and manipulated to create many different poses. The Court further explained that the vast range of possible expressions could afford the sculptures broad copyright protection.

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