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No Due Process Violation When New Panel Hears Substantive Arguments

by McDermott Will & Emery | Oct 8, 2020 | America Invents Act, Patents

Affirming a Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board) non-obviousness determination, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that the Board did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning a patent owner who engaged in ex parte communications by having a new panel hear the merits of the petition. Apple Inc. v. Voip-Pal.com Inc., Case Nos. 18-1456, -1457 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 25, 2020) (Reyna, J.).

Voip-Pal sued Apple for allegedly infringing two of its patents directed to routing communications between two different types of networks: public and private. Apple then petitioned for inter partes review (IPR) of several claims from both patents, arguing they were invalid as obvious. The Board ultimately found the claims were not invalid because Apple did not provide evidentiary support as to the motivation to combine multiple references.

During the IPR proceedings, Voip-Pal’s former CEO sent six letters to various parties, copying members of Congress, the President, federal judges and administrative patent judges at the Board criticizing the IPR system, complaining about the cancellation rate and requesting judgment in favor of Voip-Pal. The letters did not discuss the underlying merits of Apple’s petitions. In view of Voip-Pal’s conduct, Apple requested that the Board sanction Voip-Pal by entering adverse judgment against Voip-Pal or by vacating the final written decisions and assigning a new panel to preside over “constitutionally correct” new proceedings going forward.

For the sanctions proceeding, a new panel replaced the initial panel and determined that Voip-Pal had engaged in sanctionable conduct, and further determined that it would preside over Apple’s petition for rehearing. The new panel found that Apple failed to show the initial panel had misapprehended or overlooked any matter, and even if the final panel were to accept Apple’s view of the prior art, it would not reach a different conclusion. Apple appealed.

On appeal, the Federal Circuit first addressed whether the appeal was moot. Before oral argument, the Court found in separate proceedings that some, but not all, of the claims at issue were invalid. Apple argued that this case mooted the entire appeal, even though the claims did not entirely overlap. Starting with the overlapping claims, the Court found that the appeal was moot in regards to these claims because Apple no longer had the potential for injury. However, the Court rejected Apple’s argument that the appeal was moot under a theory of claim preclusion in regards to the non-overlapping claims. The Court explained that any preclusive effect from the other appeal must be decided by a future court in any subsequent action brought by Voip-Pal. Thus, any discussion regarding claim preclusion would be advisory in nature and outside the scope of the Court’s Article III jurisdiction.

Turning to the merits, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board did not violate the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) or Apple’s due process rights. The Board’s rules provide that “[t]he Board may impose a sanction” and explains that “[s]anctions include entry of one or more” of eight defined actions. Although the Board’s sanctions imposed [...]

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One Claim Construction Error Is Enough to Trigger New Trial on Infringement

by McDermott Will & Emery | Oct 8, 2020 | Patents, Technology

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit re-affirmed that incorrect construction of even a single claim element can be grounds for a new trial on infringement. Network-1 Technologies, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Company, Case Nos. 18-2338, -2339, -2395, -2396 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 24, 2020) (Prost, C.J.).

Network-1 Technologies sued Hewlett-Packard (HP) for patent infringement. HP defended on the grounds that the patent was invalid and that it did not infringe. The jury found the patent not infringed and invalid as obvious. Following post-trial motions, the district court denied Network-1’s request for a new trial on infringement but granted its motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) on validity. The court found that HP should have been estopped from raising certain obviousness challenges as a consequence of certain obviousness challenges raised by a third party in a prior inter partes review (IPR) that were essentially the same as HP’s obviousness challenge here. Network-1 appealed the district court’s final judgment that HP did not infringe, arguing that the district court erred in its claim construction. HP cross-appealed on the issues of IPR estoppel under 35 USC § 315(e)(2) and invalidity because of a claim improperly broadened in re-examination.

On appeal, Network-1 contended that the district court erroneously construed the claim terms “main power source” and “low level current.” In order to prevail, Network-1 had to establish not only that at least one jury instruction on claim construction was legally erroneous, but that the error had prejudicial effect. Under Federal Circuit precedent, an incorrect claim construction that removes from the jury a basis on which it reasonably could have reached a different verdict can be an incorrect jury instruction. As the Court explained in Avid Tech. v. Harmonic (Fed. Cir. 2016), “[a]n erroneous claim construction on one element is harmless ‘only if a reasonable jury would have been required by the evidence to find non-infringement even without the error.’”

The Federal Circuit concluded that the district court correctly construed the term “low level current” but erred in its construction of “main power source” to exclude AC power sources on the basis of expert testimony that receipt of AC power by a network device would render it inoperable. The Court deemed this error for two reasons:

- Even though the network device cannot receive AC power, the record established that “data nodes” or network switches were commonly used to convert AC power to DC power as needed to power the network device. Because nothing in the patent claims precluded the conversion of AC power to DC power, it was error for the district court to add such a limitation.
- The district court erred by adding a limitation to the claims to carve out certain inoperable embodiments, in this case embodiments that do not convert AC to DC. The Federal Circuit has previously explained that it is improper to add limitations to a claim to exclude only certain inoperable embodiments (Cordis v. Medtronic (Fed. Cir. 2008)). Here, [...]
  
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“Can’t Hold Us” Liable: Macklemore & Ryan Lewis Win Affirmance in Copyright Suit

by Paul Devinsky | Oct 8, 2020 | Copyrights

The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed a grant of summary judgment on the issue of copyright infringement and an award of attorneys’ fees against the plaintiff under the Copyright Act. Although the Court noted that it lacked jurisdiction to review sanctions against the plaintiff’s attorney, it observed that counsel went beyond “vigorous representation.” Batiste v. Lewis, Case Nos. 19-30400, -30889 (5th Cir. Sept. 22, 2020) (Clement, J.).

Batiste, a local musician, sued Macklemore & Ryan Lewis, an internationally famous hip-hop duo, for copyright infringement. Batiste alleged that the duo sampled his songs without authorization. As support, Batiste submitted the expert report of a musicologist, Milton, but Milton later admitted that Batiste had conducted the analysis and written the report, and that Milton did not even have access to the necessary software. The district court excluded the report, which Batiste then sought leave to resubmit in his own name. The district court denied leave because Batiste had not disclosed himself as an expert and because the new report was untimely. The district court subsequently granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, finding that Batiste had failed to submit sufficient evidence of Macklemore and Lewis’s alleged access to Batiste’s work or of probative similarity between Macklemore and Lewis’s works and Batiste’s. The district court then awarded fees to Macklemore and Lewis under the Copyright Act (17 USC § 505) and made Batiste’s attorney (Hayes) jointly and severally liable for the fees award as a sanction under 28 USC § 1987. Batiste appealed.

Addressing the district court’s summary judgment of no infringement, the Fifth Circuit considered Batiste’s proofs as to access and similarity.

Batiste tried to prove access through “widespread dissemination” and “chain of events” theories. The Court held that Batiste’s evidence of widespread dissemination was insufficient because it only established “quite limited” dissemination of Batiste’s music. Batiste’s chain of events theory—under which Macklemore and Lewis allegedly accessed Batiste’s work by playing a concert at a venue near a record store that sold Batiste’s music—raised only a “bare possibility” of access and was therefore also insufficient.

On the issue of similarity, the Court explained that because of Batiste’s failure to show access, he needed to show “striking similarity” to withstand summary judgment. The Court rejected Batiste’s argument that “overwhelming evidence of access” obviated any need for him to show similarity. The Court compared the allegedly infringing songs to Batiste’s and found them insufficiently similar for a jury to find striking similarity. The Court also rejected Batiste’s invitation to adopt the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit’s ruling in Bridgeport, which held a showing of similarity unnecessary in some circumstances. The Fifth Circuit noted that Bridgeport has been widely criticized, and pointed out that Bridgeport considered the issue of substantial similarity (which dictates whether factual copying, once established, is legally actionable), whereas the issue in this case was probative similarity (which raises an inference of factual copying).

Batiste challenged the award of attorneys’ fees as erroneous absent a [...]

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Overcoming Heavy Burden Required to Succeed on Venue-Related Writ of Mandamus

by Amol Parikh | Sep 29, 2020 | Patents, Technology

Addressing a venue challenge, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit denied a petition for a writ of mandamus because the challenger did not demonstrate it had no adequate alternative means to obtain desired relief since meaningful review could occur after final judgment was entered. In re. Google, Case No. 20-144 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 18, 2020) (Reyna, J.).

Personalized Media Communications (PMC) sued Google in the Eastern District of Texas for infringement of six patents related to adaptive video streaming. PMC initially asserted venue was proper based on the presence of several Google Global Cache (GGC) servers at facilities owned by internet service providers (ISPs) located within the district. Google moved to dismiss for improper venue. While Google’s motion was pending, the Federal Circuit issued its decision in In re. Google, rejecting a venue argument asserted by a different plaintiff against Google that was also premised on the presence of GGC servers, and finding that a regular and established place of business requires the regular physical presence of an employee or other agent of the defendant conducting the defendant’s business at the alleged place of business.

After the Federal Circuit’s decision, PMC asserted a different venue theory based on Google’s agreements with Communications Test Design (CTDI) to warehouse, refurbish, repair and ship hardware products, such as Google’s cellphones and speakers, from a CTDI facility located in the Eastern District of Texas. The district court agreed with PMC and denied Google’s motion, finding that CTDI was acting as Google’s agent and was conducting Google’s business from its facility. Google filed a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to vacate the district court’s order.

The Federal Circuit denied Google’s petition. The Court explained that a party seeking a writ bears the heavy burden of demonstrating that it has no adequate alternative means to obtain the desired relief and that the right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable. Without providing an explanation, the Court found that although Google raised viable arguments based on the law of agency and the Court’s precedent, it was not satisfied that Google’s right to a writ was clear and indisputable. The Court concluded that Google can obtain meaningful review of the district court’s venue ruling after final judgment in the case.

Practice Note: The Federal Circuit was also concerned that the district court did not move more quickly to resolve Google’s venue challenge. Significant work in the case had already been done, and the trial date is currently set for November 2020. If the venue is later found to be improper, the case will be transferred and a new trial will occur.

Jersey Boys Don’t Cry: No Copyright Protection for Facts “Based on a True Story”

by Jodi Benassi | Sep 16, 2020 | Copyrights

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law finding that the musical Jersey Boys did not infringe a copyright held in an autobiography of band member Tommy DeVito. Donna Corbello v. Frankie Valli, et al., Case No. 17-16337 (9th Cir. Sept. 8, 2020) (Berzon, J.).

In the 1990s, Rex Woodard ghostwrote an autobiography of Tommy DeVito, one of the original members of the 1950s quartet the Four Seasons. Woodard and DeVito agreed to split the profits equally. However, shortly after finishing the book, and before finding a publisher, Woodard died. Donna Corbello, Woodard’s widow, became the successor-in-interest to the book, and she continued the search for a publisher. Almost 15 years later, Corbello still had not published the book.

DeVito’s autobiography reads as a straightforward historical account of the Four Seasons. At the beginning of the book, DeVito, as the narrator, describes his autobiography as a “complete and truthful chronicle of the Four Seasons,” and he promises not to let “bitterness taint the true story.” Corbello also sent letters to potential publishers emphasizing that the book provided a “behind-the-scenes” look at the Four Seasons. In all accounts, the book is a non-fiction, historical chronicle of events of the Four Seasons.

In 2005, the musical Jersey Boys debuted on Broadway. Jersey Boys also depicts the history of the Four Seasons from its origins in New Jersey to its induction into the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame in 1990. DeVito admitted to working with people involved in developing Jersey Boys and sharing the book with the individuals researching the history of the band.

In 2007, Corbello sued DeVito and 14 defendants, including the band members and the writers, directors and producers of Jersey Boys. The complaint included 20 causes of action, including various forms of copyright infringement. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on most of the claims. Corbello appealed. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants, vacated its assessment of costs against Corbello, and remanded for further proceedings.

On remand, the case proceeded to a jury trial where the jury found that the musical infringed the book and that use of the book was not fair use. After the verdict, the district court granted the defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, concluding that any infringement was fair use. Corbello appealed.

On appeal, the central disagreements were whether the musical was substantially similar to the book and whether the defendants copied any protectable portions of the book. The Ninth Circuit analyzed the similarities under the extrinsic test for substantial similarity. The appellate court found that each of the similarities failed because they involved only non-protectable elements of the book. Those non-protectable elements included DeVito depicting himself in the musical (a character based on a historical figure is not protected); Bob Gaudio arriving late to rehearsal, excited about a new song he just [...]

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Full of Hot Air? PTAB Joinder Decisions Under § 315(c) Are Appealable

by Paul Devinsky | Sep 16, 2020 | Patents

Addressing whether it has jurisdiction to review joinder decisions made by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reissued a prior decision explaining that a joinder decision is reviewable because the decision occurs after the inter partes review (IPR) proceeding institutes. Facebook, Inc. v. Windy City Innovations, LLC, Case Nos. 18-1400, -1401, -1402, -1403, -1537, -1540, -1541 (Fed. Cir. Opinion Issued: Mar. 18, 2020, Opinion Reissued: Sept. 4, 2020) (Prost, C.J.) (Prost, C.J., concurring with additional views).

Windy City Innovations filed a complaint accusing Facebook of infringing four patents that collectively have 830 claims. Facebook filed a motion requesting that Windy City be forced to limit the number of asserted claims to 40 by the time of Facebook’s one-year IPR filing deadline, but the district court denied the motion. One year after it was served with the complaint, Facebook filed petitions for IPR on a subset of the 830 claims.

Five months after Facebook filed its petitions, Windy City narrowed its case to a subset of claims, including claims that were not subject to Facebook’s IPR petitions. After the PTAB instituted review based on Facebook’s petitions, Facebook immediately filed two new IPR petitions. Because the one-year time bar had passed, Facebook also filed a motion under § 315(c) to join the new IPR petitions to its now-instituted proceedings. The PTAB granted Facebook’s motion for joinder and ultimately issued a final written decision with a mixed result, cancelling some claims and finding others not unpatentable. Both parties appealed

The Federal Circuit found that the PTAB erred in allowing Facebook to use § 315(c) to join itself to its earlier-filed petitions. The Court explained that the statutory language was unambiguous, finding that the ordinary usage of “joining a person as a party to a proceeding” means that the joined party must necessarily be someone who is not already a party. The Court further explained that allowing same-party joinder would impermissibly allow the Director to join new issues to an existing proceeding. The Court found that § 315(c) only authorizes the Director to join (1) a person (2) as a party (3) to an already instituted IPR. The language does not authorize the joined party to bring new issues into the already instituted IPR proceeding. The Court found this understanding consistent with other subsections of § 315, where there is a clear distinction between § 315(c), which refers to the joinder of a person as a party, and § 315(d), which refers to the consolidation of multiple proceedings and the issues in each. The Court was sympathetic to Facebook’s policy concerns regarding patents with a large number of claims that may not be narrowed to a manageable number of asserted claims before the one-year time-bar. Nevertheless, it found that policy considerations could not overcome the unambiguous language of the statute. The Court therefore vacated the PTAB’s final written decisions as to the later-filed petitions.

After the Court issued its original opinion, Facebook filed a petition for panel rehearing, [...]

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Logic to Modify: Even Deceptive Intent Does Not Bar Inventorship Correction

by Paul Devinsky | Sep 16, 2020 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated a district court invalidity determination finding that judicial estoppel prevented a patent owner from relisting an inventor previously removed for strategic litigation purposes. Egenera, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., Case Nos. 19-2015, -2387 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 28, 2020) (Prost, C.J.).

Egenera sued Cisco for infringement of a patent directed to a reconfigurable virtual network that included a “logic to modify” and transmit received messages. In response Cisco petitioned for inter partes review (IPR). During the IPR’s pendency, Egenera realized that all claim limitations were conceived of before inventor Schulter began working at the company, and petitioned the US Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) to remove Schulter as a listed inventor. The Patent and Trial Appeal Board (PTAB) declined to institute Cisco’s IPR, and the PTO granted Egenera’s petition to remove Schulter shortly thereafter.

During the litigation, the district court construed the patent claims’ “logic” terms as means-plus-function elements and concluded that the “logic to modify” limitation corresponded to a “tripartite structure” described in the specification. Cisco then asserted invalidity under pre-America Invents Act (AIA) § 102(f), contending that Schulter invented the tripartite structure, and that the patent therefore did not list all inventors. Egenera attempted to re-correct inventorship to include Schulter, but the court rejected the attempt. The district court found the patent invalid under § 102(f), reasoning that judicial estoppel precluded Egenera from “resurrecting” Schulter’s inventorship. Egenera appealed both the means-plus-function construction and the judicial estoppel finding.

The Federal Circuit first addressed whether Egenera could correct inventorship absent any judicial estoppel. The Court looked to the plain meaning of post-AIA § 256, which provides that “the error of omitting inventors . . . shall not invalidate the patent . . . if it can be corrected.” Notably, post-AIA § 256 removed the requirement that an inventorship error occur “without . . . deceptive intent.” The Federal Circuit stated it plainly: “‘Error’ is simply the incorrect listing of inventors” and does not exclude even deceptive intention. The Court explained that the inequitable conduct rules provide a safety valve for such actions, not § 256. The Court also noted that at the time Egenera removed Schulter as an inventor, no one had argued that “logic to modify” was means-plus-function language, which it presumptively was not. Egenera’s preferred construction of that term was consistent with its assertion that Schulter was not an inventor. The omission of Schulter as inventor was thus an “error” within the scope of § 256.

The Federal Circuit next turned to whether Egenera was judicially estopped from relisting Schulter as an inventor. Applying the First Circuit’s New Hampshire factors, the Federal Circuit looked to whether Egenera’s positions were inconsistent, whether its first position was successfully accepted by the court, and whether Egenera would derive an unfair advantage if not estopped. The Federal Circuit found that the district court erred in finding Egenera’s changing inventorship positions inconsistent. The Court explained that inventorship is complex and can depend on claim [...]

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No Remix: Copyright Act Preempts Right of Publicity Claim

by Eleanor B. Atkins | Sep 9, 2020 | Copyrights

The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that the federal Copyright Act preempts a state right of publicity claim when the latter is merely “a thinly disguised effort to exert control over an unauthorized [use of a copyrighted] work.” Jackson v. Roberts, Case No. 19-480 (2d Cir. Aug. 19, 2020) (Leval, J.).

Both parties in this case are famous hip-hop artists more commonly known by their stage names: the plaintiff, Curtis James Jackson III, is known as 50 Cent, and the defendant, William Leonard Roberts II, is known as Rick Ross. In 2015, Roberts released a free mix tape that included samples from many famous songs, including Jackson’s hit “In Da Club.” The mix tape track at issue was titled “In Da Club (Ft. 50 Cent)” and included Rick Ross rapping over the “In Da Club” instrumentals, a 30-second sample of 50 Cent singing the “In Da Club” refrain, and multiple references to Rick Ross’s upcoming album.

Jackson sued Roberts, claiming that the unauthorized use of his name and voice violated his right of publicity under Connecticut common law. Pursuant to a recording agreement with his former record label, Shady Records/Aftermath Records, Jackson did not own a copyright interest in the “In Da Club” recording and therefore could not sue for copyright infringement. The district court granted Roberts’s motion for summary judgment, finding that Jackson had surrendered his publicity rights via the recording agreement and that the right of publicity claim was preempted. Jackson appealed.

The Second Circuit agreed that federal law preempted the right of publicity claim, but for different reasons than the district court: the Second Circuit found the state claim preempted under the doctrine of implied preemption or, alternatively, statutory preemption. The Court explained that “generally . . . implied preemption precludes the application of state laws to the extent that those laws interfere with or frustrate the functioning of the regime created by the Copyright Act. Statutory preemption preempts state law claims to the extent that they assert rights equivalent to those protected by the Copyright Act, in works of authorship within the subject matter of federal copyright.”

The Second Circuit used a two-part test to determine whether the state law claim was subject to implied preemption, asking (1) whether the state right of publicity claim asserted a sufficiently substantial state interest, distinct from those interests underlying federal copyright law, and (2) whether the state law claim would potentially conflict with rights established by the Copyright Act. Given that Roberts did not use Jackson’s name or persona to falsely imply Jackson’s endorsement of Roberts’ music, nor did Roberts invade Jackson’s privacy or use his persona in a derogatory nature, the Court reasoned that Jackson was not seeking to vindicate any distinct and substantial state interest. Likewise, the Court held that the second element was satisfied because Jackson’s right of publicity suit had the potential to interfere with the copyright holder’s exclusive control of its rights: “Jackson’s attempt to [control the use of the [...]

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Texas Appellate Court Clarifies Scope of Remand

by Paul Devinsky | Sep 9, 2020 | Trade Secrets

The Texas Fourth Court of Appeals found that a new trial on misappropriation and fraud claims must include a non-appealed breach of contract claim arising from the same set of facts. Title Source, Inc. v. HouseCanary, Inc., Case No. 04-19-00044-CV (Tex. App. – San Antonio Aug. 26, 2020) (Watkins, J.).

On June 3, 2020, the Texas Fourth Court of Appeals issued an opinion remanding HouseCanary’s Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act and common-law fraud claims for a new trial because the jury instructions permitted the jury to consider both permissible and impermissible theories of recovery. (IP Update, June 18, 2020). Acting on Title Source’s motion for rehearing, the Court issued a substitute opinion with additional language clarifying the scope of the remand and making clear that HouseCanary may elect to recover on its non-appealed breach of contract claim and forego recovery (along with the new trial) on its misappropriation and fraud claims. To the extent HouseCanary sought to recover on its misappropriation and fraud claims, however, the Court held that the breach of contract claim must also be within the scope of the new trial because it arises from the same facts, and failing to include it would therefore create a risk of inconsistent verdicts.

No Bite on Parties’ Unenforceable Agreement to Agree to Sell Apple Trees

by Paul Devinsky | Sep 9, 2020 | Food, Beverage & Agribusiness

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a grant of summary judgment, finding that the option provision in the parties’ contract was an unenforceable agreement to agree. Phytelligence, Inc. v. Wash. State Univ., Case No. 2019-2216 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 27, 2020) (Reyna, J.).

Phytelligence is an agricultural biotechnology company that used tissue culture to grow trees for sale to nurseries and growers. In 2012, Phytelligence and Washington State University (WSU) began discussing an arrangement to grow WA 38 apple trees, a new apple cultivar that WSU developed and patented. The parties executed a propagation agreement, which included a provision that granted Phytelligence an option to participate as a provider and/or seller. If WSU’s cultivar became available for licensing, Phytelligence would need to sign a separate contract with WSU or WSU’s agent to exercise the option to become a provider and/or seller.

WSU eventually began requesting proposals from companies interested in commercializing WA 38. Phytelligence did not submit a proposal. In 2014, WSU accepted a proposal from Proprietary Variety Management (PVM) and entered into a management contract granting PVM an exclusive license to propagate and sell WA 38. Three years after WSU entered into this management contract, Phytelligence notified WSU that it wanted to exercise its option to participate as a provider and/or seller under the propagation agreement. WSU responded that under the propagation agreement, Phytelligence had to sign a separate contract with WSU to exercise the option and directed Phytelligence to PVM. Phytelligence rejected all of PVM and WSU’s options for selling WA 38, and the agreement between the parties was terminated.

Phytelligence sued WSU, alleging breach of the propagation agreement and seeking damages and specific performance. WSU moved for summary judgment, arguing that the option provision of the propagation agreement was an unenforceable “agreement to agree.” The district court agreed and granted WSU’s motion. Phytelligence appealed.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The Court stated that an agreement to agree was an agreement to do something that requires a further meeting of the minds, and without such a meeting, the agreement would not be complete. The Court found that an agreement to agree is unenforceable because courts are unable to fix the liability of parties based on agreements that are too indefinite and uncertain. Turning to the agreement between Phytelligence and WSU, the Court explained that the plain language of the propagation agreement required the parties to sign a separate contract to exercise the option, thus rendering the provision an unenforceable agreement to agree. The Court also rejected Phytelligence’s argument that the extrinsic evidence supported its theory that the option was an enforceable contract with open terms. The Court instead found that the communications between the parties revealed that WSU did not commit to any definite terms for a future license with Phytelligence.

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