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Jersey Boys Don’t Cry: No Copyright Protection for Facts “Based on a True Story”

by Jodi Benassi | Sep 16, 2020 | Copyrights

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law finding that the musical Jersey Boys did not infringe a copyright held in an autobiography of band member Tommy DeVito. Donna Corbello v. Frankie Valli, et al., Case No. 17-16337 (9th Cir. Sept. 8, 2020) (Berzon, J.).

In the 1990s, Rex Woodard ghostwrote an autobiography of Tommy DeVito, one of the original members of the 1950s quartet the Four Seasons. Woodard and DeVito agreed to split the profits equally. However, shortly after finishing the book, and before finding a publisher, Woodard died. Donna Corbello, Woodard’s widow, became the successor-in-interest to the book, and she continued the search for a publisher. Almost 15 years later, Corbello still had not published the book.

DeVito’s autobiography reads as a straightforward historical account of the Four Seasons. At the beginning of the book, DeVito, as the narrator, describes his autobiography as a “complete and truthful chronicle of the Four Seasons,” and he promises not to let “bitterness taint the true story.” Corbello also sent letters to potential publishers emphasizing that the book provided a “behind-the-scenes” look at the Four Seasons. In all accounts, the book is a non-fiction, historical chronicle of events of the Four Seasons.

In 2005, the musical Jersey Boys debuted on Broadway. Jersey Boys also depicts the history of the Four Seasons from its origins in New Jersey to its induction into the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame in 1990. DeVito admitted to working with people involved in developing Jersey Boys and sharing the book with the individuals researching the history of the band.

In 2007, Corbello sued DeVito and 14 defendants, including the band members and the writers, directors and producers of Jersey Boys. The complaint included 20 causes of action, including various forms of copyright infringement. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on most of the claims. Corbello appealed. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants, vacated its assessment of costs against Corbello, and remanded for further proceedings.

On remand, the case proceeded to a jury trial where the jury found that the musical infringed the book and that use of the book was not fair use. After the verdict, the district court granted the defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, concluding that any infringement was fair use. Corbello appealed.

On appeal, the central disagreements were whether the musical was substantially similar to the book and whether the defendants copied any protectable portions of the book. The Ninth Circuit analyzed the similarities under the extrinsic test for substantial similarity. The appellate court found that each of the similarities failed because they involved only non-protectable elements of the book. Those non-protectable elements included DeVito depicting himself in the musical (a character based on a historical figure is not protected); Bob Gaudio arriving late to rehearsal, excited about a new song he just [...]

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Full of Hot Air? PTAB Joinder Decisions Under § 315(c) Are Appealable

by Paul Devinsky | Sep 16, 2020 | Patents

Addressing whether it has jurisdiction to review joinder decisions made by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reissued a prior decision explaining that a joinder decision is reviewable because the decision occurs after the inter partes review (IPR) proceeding institutes. Facebook, Inc. v. Windy City Innovations, LLC, Case Nos. 18-1400, -1401, -1402, -1403, -1537, -1540, -1541 (Fed. Cir. Opinion Issued: Mar. 18, 2020, Opinion Reissued: Sept. 4, 2020) (Prost, C.J.) (Prost, C.J., concurring with additional views).

Windy City Innovations filed a complaint accusing Facebook of infringing four patents that collectively have 830 claims. Facebook filed a motion requesting that Windy City be forced to limit the number of asserted claims to 40 by the time of Facebook’s one-year IPR filing deadline, but the district court denied the motion. One year after it was served with the complaint, Facebook filed petitions for IPR on a subset of the 830 claims.

Five months after Facebook filed its petitions, Windy City narrowed its case to a subset of claims, including claims that were not subject to Facebook’s IPR petitions. After the PTAB instituted review based on Facebook’s petitions, Facebook immediately filed two new IPR petitions. Because the one-year time bar had passed, Facebook also filed a motion under § 315(c) to join the new IPR petitions to its now-instituted proceedings. The PTAB granted Facebook’s motion for joinder and ultimately issued a final written decision with a mixed result, cancelling some claims and finding others not unpatentable. Both parties appealed

The Federal Circuit found that the PTAB erred in allowing Facebook to use § 315(c) to join itself to its earlier-filed petitions. The Court explained that the statutory language was unambiguous, finding that the ordinary usage of “joining a person as a party to a proceeding” means that the joined party must necessarily be someone who is not already a party. The Court further explained that allowing same-party joinder would impermissibly allow the Director to join new issues to an existing proceeding. The Court found that § 315(c) only authorizes the Director to join (1) a person (2) as a party (3) to an already instituted IPR. The language does not authorize the joined party to bring new issues into the already instituted IPR proceeding. The Court found this understanding consistent with other subsections of § 315, where there is a clear distinction between § 315(c), which refers to the joinder of a person as a party, and § 315(d), which refers to the consolidation of multiple proceedings and the issues in each. The Court was sympathetic to Facebook’s policy concerns regarding patents with a large number of claims that may not be narrowed to a manageable number of asserted claims before the one-year time-bar. Nevertheless, it found that policy considerations could not overcome the unambiguous language of the statute. The Court therefore vacated the PTAB’s final written decisions as to the later-filed petitions.

After the Court issued its original opinion, Facebook filed a petition for panel rehearing, [...]

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Logic to Modify: Even Deceptive Intent Does Not Bar Inventorship Correction

by Paul Devinsky | Sep 16, 2020 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated a district court invalidity determination finding that judicial estoppel prevented a patent owner from relisting an inventor previously removed for strategic litigation purposes. Egenera, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., Case Nos. 19-2015, -2387 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 28, 2020) (Prost, C.J.).

Egenera sued Cisco for infringement of a patent directed to a reconfigurable virtual network that included a “logic to modify” and transmit received messages. In response Cisco petitioned for inter partes review (IPR). During the IPR’s pendency, Egenera realized that all claim limitations were conceived of before inventor Schulter began working at the company, and petitioned the US Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) to remove Schulter as a listed inventor. The Patent and Trial Appeal Board (PTAB) declined to institute Cisco’s IPR, and the PTO granted Egenera’s petition to remove Schulter shortly thereafter.

During the litigation, the district court construed the patent claims’ “logic” terms as means-plus-function elements and concluded that the “logic to modify” limitation corresponded to a “tripartite structure” described in the specification. Cisco then asserted invalidity under pre-America Invents Act (AIA) § 102(f), contending that Schulter invented the tripartite structure, and that the patent therefore did not list all inventors. Egenera attempted to re-correct inventorship to include Schulter, but the court rejected the attempt. The district court found the patent invalid under § 102(f), reasoning that judicial estoppel precluded Egenera from “resurrecting” Schulter’s inventorship. Egenera appealed both the means-plus-function construction and the judicial estoppel finding.

The Federal Circuit first addressed whether Egenera could correct inventorship absent any judicial estoppel. The Court looked to the plain meaning of post-AIA § 256, which provides that “the error of omitting inventors . . . shall not invalidate the patent . . . if it can be corrected.” Notably, post-AIA § 256 removed the requirement that an inventorship error occur “without . . . deceptive intent.” The Federal Circuit stated it plainly: “‘Error’ is simply the incorrect listing of inventors” and does not exclude even deceptive intention. The Court explained that the inequitable conduct rules provide a safety valve for such actions, not § 256. The Court also noted that at the time Egenera removed Schulter as an inventor, no one had argued that “logic to modify” was means-plus-function language, which it presumptively was not. Egenera’s preferred construction of that term was consistent with its assertion that Schulter was not an inventor. The omission of Schulter as inventor was thus an “error” within the scope of § 256.

The Federal Circuit next turned to whether Egenera was judicially estopped from relisting Schulter as an inventor. Applying the First Circuit’s New Hampshire factors, the Federal Circuit looked to whether Egenera’s positions were inconsistent, whether its first position was successfully accepted by the court, and whether Egenera would derive an unfair advantage if not estopped. The Federal Circuit found that the district court erred in finding Egenera’s changing inventorship positions inconsistent. The Court explained that inventorship is complex and can depend on claim [...]

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No Remix: Copyright Act Preempts Right of Publicity Claim

by Eleanor B. Atkins | Sep 9, 2020 | Copyrights

The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that the federal Copyright Act preempts a state right of publicity claim when the latter is merely “a thinly disguised effort to exert control over an unauthorized [use of a copyrighted] work.” Jackson v. Roberts, Case No. 19-480 (2d Cir. Aug. 19, 2020) (Leval, J.).

Both parties in this case are famous hip-hop artists more commonly known by their stage names: the plaintiff, Curtis James Jackson III, is known as 50 Cent, and the defendant, William Leonard Roberts II, is known as Rick Ross. In 2015, Roberts released a free mix tape that included samples from many famous songs, including Jackson’s hit “In Da Club.” The mix tape track at issue was titled “In Da Club (Ft. 50 Cent)” and included Rick Ross rapping over the “In Da Club” instrumentals, a 30-second sample of 50 Cent singing the “In Da Club” refrain, and multiple references to Rick Ross’s upcoming album.

Jackson sued Roberts, claiming that the unauthorized use of his name and voice violated his right of publicity under Connecticut common law. Pursuant to a recording agreement with his former record label, Shady Records/Aftermath Records, Jackson did not own a copyright interest in the “In Da Club” recording and therefore could not sue for copyright infringement. The district court granted Roberts’s motion for summary judgment, finding that Jackson had surrendered his publicity rights via the recording agreement and that the right of publicity claim was preempted. Jackson appealed.

The Second Circuit agreed that federal law preempted the right of publicity claim, but for different reasons than the district court: the Second Circuit found the state claim preempted under the doctrine of implied preemption or, alternatively, statutory preemption. The Court explained that “generally . . . implied preemption precludes the application of state laws to the extent that those laws interfere with or frustrate the functioning of the regime created by the Copyright Act. Statutory preemption preempts state law claims to the extent that they assert rights equivalent to those protected by the Copyright Act, in works of authorship within the subject matter of federal copyright.”

The Second Circuit used a two-part test to determine whether the state law claim was subject to implied preemption, asking (1) whether the state right of publicity claim asserted a sufficiently substantial state interest, distinct from those interests underlying federal copyright law, and (2) whether the state law claim would potentially conflict with rights established by the Copyright Act. Given that Roberts did not use Jackson’s name or persona to falsely imply Jackson’s endorsement of Roberts’ music, nor did Roberts invade Jackson’s privacy or use his persona in a derogatory nature, the Court reasoned that Jackson was not seeking to vindicate any distinct and substantial state interest. Likewise, the Court held that the second element was satisfied because Jackson’s right of publicity suit had the potential to interfere with the copyright holder’s exclusive control of its rights: “Jackson’s attempt to [control the use of the [...]

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Texas Appellate Court Clarifies Scope of Remand

by Paul Devinsky | Sep 9, 2020 | Trade Secrets

The Texas Fourth Court of Appeals found that a new trial on misappropriation and fraud claims must include a non-appealed breach of contract claim arising from the same set of facts. Title Source, Inc. v. HouseCanary, Inc., Case No. 04-19-00044-CV (Tex. App. – San Antonio Aug. 26, 2020) (Watkins, J.).

On June 3, 2020, the Texas Fourth Court of Appeals issued an opinion remanding HouseCanary’s Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act and common-law fraud claims for a new trial because the jury instructions permitted the jury to consider both permissible and impermissible theories of recovery. (IP Update, June 18, 2020). Acting on Title Source’s motion for rehearing, the Court issued a substitute opinion with additional language clarifying the scope of the remand and making clear that HouseCanary may elect to recover on its non-appealed breach of contract claim and forego recovery (along with the new trial) on its misappropriation and fraud claims. To the extent HouseCanary sought to recover on its misappropriation and fraud claims, however, the Court held that the breach of contract claim must also be within the scope of the new trial because it arises from the same facts, and failing to include it would therefore create a risk of inconsistent verdicts.

No Bite on Parties’ Unenforceable Agreement to Agree to Sell Apple Trees

by Paul Devinsky | Sep 9, 2020 | Food, Beverage & Agribusiness

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a grant of summary judgment, finding that the option provision in the parties’ contract was an unenforceable agreement to agree. Phytelligence, Inc. v. Wash. State Univ., Case No. 2019-2216 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 27, 2020) (Reyna, J.).

Phytelligence is an agricultural biotechnology company that used tissue culture to grow trees for sale to nurseries and growers. In 2012, Phytelligence and Washington State University (WSU) began discussing an arrangement to grow WA 38 apple trees, a new apple cultivar that WSU developed and patented. The parties executed a propagation agreement, which included a provision that granted Phytelligence an option to participate as a provider and/or seller. If WSU’s cultivar became available for licensing, Phytelligence would need to sign a separate contract with WSU or WSU’s agent to exercise the option to become a provider and/or seller.

WSU eventually began requesting proposals from companies interested in commercializing WA 38. Phytelligence did not submit a proposal. In 2014, WSU accepted a proposal from Proprietary Variety Management (PVM) and entered into a management contract granting PVM an exclusive license to propagate and sell WA 38. Three years after WSU entered into this management contract, Phytelligence notified WSU that it wanted to exercise its option to participate as a provider and/or seller under the propagation agreement. WSU responded that under the propagation agreement, Phytelligence had to sign a separate contract with WSU to exercise the option and directed Phytelligence to PVM. Phytelligence rejected all of PVM and WSU’s options for selling WA 38, and the agreement between the parties was terminated.

Phytelligence sued WSU, alleging breach of the propagation agreement and seeking damages and specific performance. WSU moved for summary judgment, arguing that the option provision of the propagation agreement was an unenforceable “agreement to agree.” The district court agreed and granted WSU’s motion. Phytelligence appealed.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The Court stated that an agreement to agree was an agreement to do something that requires a further meeting of the minds, and without such a meeting, the agreement would not be complete. The Court found that an agreement to agree is unenforceable because courts are unable to fix the liability of parties based on agreements that are too indefinite and uncertain. Turning to the agreement between Phytelligence and WSU, the Court explained that the plain language of the propagation agreement required the parties to sign a separate contract to exercise the option, thus rendering the provision an unenforceable agreement to agree. The Court also rejected Phytelligence’s argument that the extrinsic evidence supported its theory that the option was an enforceable contract with open terms. The Court instead found that the communications between the parties revealed that WSU did not commit to any definite terms for a future license with Phytelligence.

Structural Limitations Are Not Met by Imaginary Demarcation Lines

by Amol Parikh | Sep 9, 2020 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s claim construction of the term “end plate” that required a flat external surface, and its construction of the term “protrusion extending outwardly from the end plate” that required a demarcation between the protrusion and end plate. The Federal Circuit therefore prohibited an infringement theory premised on an end plate being inside the accused product and a protrusion that was not demarcated from the end plate. Neville v. Foundation Constructors, Inc., Case No. 20-1132 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 27, 2020) (Chen, J.).

Neville owns patents directed to foundation piles, which are tubular structures placed into the ground to provide stability for the foundations built over them. One set of claims requires an “end plate having a substantially flat surface disposed perpendicular to the centerline of the tubular pile.” Another set of claims requires “at least one protrusion extending outwardly from the end plate.”

Neville filed a lawsuit alleging that Foundation Constructors’ pile tips infringed the patents. The district court granted summary judgment of non-infringement, reasoning that the plain meaning of “end plate having a substantially flat surface” did not encompass “an interior surface facing into the rest of the pile tip.” Examining the intrinsic record, the district court concluded that “the patent applicant intended the ‘substantially flat surface’ of the end plate to refer to the side of the end plate facing outward.” The court found that the accused products did not have such an “end plate.” As to claims requiring a protrusion extending outwardly from the end plate, the court reasoned that “[b]ecause the end piece of the accused pile tip is a single, conically-shaped piece, there is not a demarcation of where an ‘end plate’ should end and the ‘protrusion’ should begin,” and non-infringement was therefore appropriate. Neville appealed.

Neville argued that the district court’s ruling of non-infringement was based on an incorrect claim construction and should therefore be overturned. The Federal Circuit rejected Neville’s arguments and affirmed summary judgment.

The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that the phrase “substantially flat surface disposed perpendicular to the centerline of the tubular pile” did not refer to any interior-facing surface. Starting with the language of the claim, the Court found that the word “end” suggested that the relevant surface of the end plate is the external one at the second end of the pile tip. The Court found that the specification reinforced the view that the invention was directed to the exterior surface of the end plate as being “substantially flat,” and through this end plate the pile tip applies force to the underlying soil. Neville argued that the specification implicitly taught that an end plate having a substantially flat surface perpendicular to the tubular pile could be fully interior to another portion of the pile tip because the specification disclosed that the pile tip, including the end plate, “could be cast as a single unit.” The Court rejected Neville’s argument, finding that under Neville’s logic, the [...]

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Not Your Grandfather’s Internet Royalties? DMCA Favorable Rates Might Apply to Internet Offerings

by Christopher M. Bruno | Sep 3, 2020 | Copyrights

Reversing the Copyright Royalty Board’s determination that a favorable grandfathered royalty rate did not apply to internet streaming audio transmissions, the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit concluded that internet transmissions are not categorically excluded from the definition of “service” in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA). Music Choice v. Copyright Royalty Bd., Case No. 19-1011 (DC Cir. Aug. 18, 2020) (Rao, J.).

In the late 1990s, Music Choice, a company best known for its cable television genre-specific music channels, also offered some digital audio transmissions over the internet. These audio transmissions—and their alleged continuation through today—are the subject of this case.

Seeking to establish a new regime governing royalties for digital music services, Congress required in the DMCA that service providers pay copyright holders a market-based rate for playing digital music, but set a generally lower “reasonable rate” for certain preexisting subscription services. A preexisting subscription service—i.e., a service offering digital audio subscriptions for a fee before July 31, 1998—was entitled to the lower rate for its subscription transmissions “made in the same transmission medium used by such service on July 31, 1998.” The question here was whether those transmissions could be made over the internet.

In 2016, the Royalty Board held proceedings to set the preexisting royalty rates for 2018 to 2022, during which it referred the legal question of whether Music Choice’s internet transmissions qualified for the grandfathered rates to the Copyright Register. The Register concluded that, based on the DMCA’s legislative history, the grandfathered rates were intended to apply only to cable and satellite offerings. Accordingly, when the Royalty Board set rates for Music Choice’s offerings, it excluded its internet transmissions from the more favorable grandfathered rate.

Music Choice appealed, and the DC Circuit reversed the Royalty Board. The Court found nothing in the DMCA that required that the definition of “service” categorically exclude internet transmissions. As long as the entity existed as of July 31, 1998 (as Music Choice undisputedly did), internet transmissions could be eligible for the grandfathered rate so long as such transmissions were in the medium in existence on that date. The Court found that nothing in the clear and broad statutory definition of “transmission medium” excluded internet transmissions. The Court also concluded that the structure of the DMCA supported such a conclusion, because in other places it distinguished between particular types of transmissions, whereas in the grandfathered copyright rate at issue, the statute used language capturing all types of transmissions available before the key date.

Having concluded that the Royalty Board wrongly excluded internet transmissions per se, the DC Circuit remanded to the Board to consider “the extent to which Music Choice’s current internet offerings can be fairly characterized as included in the service offering Music Choice provided on July 31, 1998.”

Practice Note: It remains to be seen how narrowly the Royalty Board will define the service offered by Music Choice as of July 31, 1998. Regardless of what the Board finds, this case [...]

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Use of Infringing Product, Misappropriated Trade Secrets May Continue—for a Licensing Fee

by Paul Devinsky | Sep 3, 2020 | Copyrights

The US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed a district court’s stay of a permanent injunction against copyright infringement and trade secret misappropriation, permitting the infringer to continue use of an infringing product and misappropriated trade secrets but requiring the infringer to pay a licensing fee. ECIMOS, LLC v. Carrier Corp., Case Nos. 19-5436, -5519 (6th Cir. Aug. 21, 2020) (Boggs, J.).

Carrier sold HVAC systems. ECIMOS designed and sold a quality-control-testing system that assessed each HVAC unit at the end of Carrier’s assembly line. ECIMOS’s system consisted of a software program, associated hardware and a database that stored results of runtests performed by the system. Carrier paid ECIMOS to maintain and periodically upgrade its software system. ECIMOS licensed Carrier to use the system but prohibited unauthorized copying, distributing or creating derivative works based in whole or in part on the software.

Years into the relationship, ECIMOS upgraded its software to run on a new operating system. ECIMOS expected Carrier to agree to the proposed upgrade just as it had done previously. Unbeknownst to ECIMOS and without its consent, Carrier had already installed ECIMOS’s software directly onto the new operating system. Carrier started a venture with a third party, Amtec, to develop a new quality-control software and storage database to replace the ECIMOS system.

ECIMOS sued Carrier for violating the copyright on the ECIMOS system’s database, breaching the parties’ software-licensing agreement and misappropriating ECIMOS’s trade secrets. At trial, ECIMOS alleged that Carrier improperly shared ECIMOS’s copyrights and trade secrets with Amtec, allowing Amtec to develop a competing system. The jury agreed, finding that the competing system incorporated ECIMOS’s trade secrets. The jury determined that Carrier infringed the copyright on ECIMOS’s runtest database script source code, that ECIMOS held a trade secret in its software source code and its assembled hardware drawings and wiring diagrams, and that Carrier misappropriated those trade secrets by sharing them with Amtec. The jury awarded ECIMOS copyright and contract damages.

The district court also imposed a permanent injunction against Carrier’s use of the infringing Amtec database, but stayed the injunction until Carrier developed a noninfringing database. The court also enjoined Carrier from further disclosure of ECIMOS’s trade secrets, but did not enjoin Carrier from using those trade secrets. To the contrary, the district court appointed a special master to supervise the redesign and permitted Carrier to continue using the infringing database that incorporated ECIMOS’s trade secrets until the redesigned system was complete. The district court further required Carrier to pay ECIMOS the licensing fees that ECIMOS would have charged in the course of an ongoing, mutually agreeable licensing relationship. ECIMOS objected to the stay and appealed.

ECIMOS argued that the stay was an abuse of discretion, that the injunction should have prohibited Carrier from using (not just disclosing) ECIMOS’s trade secrets, and that the injunction should have prohibited Carrier’s disclosure and use of ECIMOS’s assembled hardware, not just the hardware drawings and wiring diagrams. The Sixth Circuit disagreed, affirming in full the district court’s [...]

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Epic Punitive Damages Award Violates Due Process

by Thomas DaMario | Sep 3, 2020 | Trade Secrets

Addressing the appropriateness of three separate damages awards totaling $520 million, the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s award of $140 million in compensatory damages, but found that $280 million in punitive damages does not meet the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Epic Systems Corp. v. Tata Consultancy Services Ltd., Case Nos. 19-1528, 19-1613 (Aug. 20, 2020) (Kanne, J.).

Epic Systems is a leading developer of electronic health record software, which it licenses to top hospitals in the United States. Each customer-licensed module is specific to the customer’s needs and can be customized to ensure proper integration with the customer’s systems. In order to facilitate customization and updates to the software, Epic provides a web portal called “UserWeb,” which provides access to various resources including administrative guides, training materials, software updates and forums. UserWeb also contains confidential information about the health-record software itself, and as such, Epic restricts access to the UserWeb portal via credentialed logins. Those with access are also required to keep all UserWeb information confidential.

In 2003, Kaiser Permanente—the largest managed healthcare organization in the United States—obtained a license to use Epic’s software. Due to the size and complexity of integrating and maintaining the software, Kaiser hired Tata Consultancy Services (TCS) to help with updates and integration. TCS has its own electronic health record software, Med Mantra, which was known to Epic. Accordingly, Kaiser imposed numerous rules for TCS to follow in order to maintain the confidentiality of Epic’s software. TCS employees claimed that they could perform their required tasks faster if they had full access to UserWeb, which Kaiser repeatedly asked Epic to grant to TCS. Epic repeatedly declined this request.

Undeterred, TCS was able to find another way into Epic’s UserWeb. TCS hired an employee who had full access to UserWeb, which he gained from working for a different organization that also helped manage Kaiser’s integration of Epic’s software. While in his previous position, the employee had falsely claimed to be a Kaiser employee, thus allowing him full access to UserWeb. The employee shared these credentials with numerous TCS employees, who then had unfettered access to UserWeb, which contained confidential information relating to Epic’s healthcare software.

TCS used this information to generate a “comparative analysis” document, an 11-page spreadsheet that compares TCS’s software, Med Mantra, to Epic’s software. TCS wanted to sell Med Mantra directly to Kaiser, and the first step was to be sure that “key gaps” in the Med Mantra software were addressed before the attempted sale. After viewing a presentation that included the comparative analysis document, one TCS employee alerted Kaiser and Epic to the existence of the document and the fact that TCS had gained access to UserWeb.

A few months later, Epic filed suit against TCS, alleging that TCS used fraudulent means to access and steal Epic’s trade secrets and other confidential information. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Epic on all claims. During the damages trial, [...]

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