IP UPDATE
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PTAB Designates Three Opinions as Precedential

by | Dec 17, 2020 | ,

In RPX Corp. v. Applications in Internet Time, LLC, Case Nos. IPR2015-01750, -01751, -01752 (Oct. 2, 2020) (Boalick, CAPJ) (designated precedential on Dec. 4, 2020), the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board) terminated institution of RPX’s petitions for inter partes review (IPR) because Salesforce—served with a complaint more than one year before—should have been named as a real party-in-interest (RPI) to the proceedings. As a result, RPX’s petition was time-barred under § 315(b).

The Board’s determination came after remand from the Federal Circuit, which vacated the Board’s prior finding that Salesforce was not an RPI. (IP Update, Vol. 21, No. 8). The Federal Circuit instructed the Board to use the common law understanding of “real party-in-interest” and a “flexible approach that takes into account both equitable and practical considerations, with an eye toward determining whether the non-party is a clear beneficiary that has a pre-existing, established relationship with the petitioner.” On remand, the Board took additional discovery to examine the relationship between RPX and Salesforce, including RPX’s business model, Salesforce’s relationship with RPX, whether RPX represents Salesforce’s interests in invalidating the patents, and the significance of the fact that Salesforce and RPX had overlapping Board members. After considering the relationship, the Board found the evidence pointed clearly toward a common interest—between RPX and its members—in invalidating the patents in IPR proceedings. It found RPX could not avoid the time bar under § 315(b), or estoppel under § 315(e) for its members, by creating the appearance that RPX acts independently of its members’ interests when filing IPR petitions.

In SharkNinja Operating LLC v. iRobot Corp., Case No. IPR2020-00734 (Oct. 6, 2020) (Melvin, APJ) (designated precedential on Dec. 4, 2020), the Board declined to address—for purposes of institution—the patent owner’s claim that the IPR petition failed to name an alleged RPI under § 312(a)(2)’s requirement that a petition “identif[y] all real parties-in-interest.” iRobot alleged that JS Global was an unnamed RPI because it was intertwined with SharkNinja’s business and was in a position to fund and exercise control over the IPR petition. The Board declined to reach a determination on the issue because it would have no impact on the proceeding, absent evidence that (1) JS Global was a time-barred or an otherwise estopped entity whose addition to the petition would result in its dismissal under § 315 or (2) SharkNinja’s omission of JS Global was done in bad faith. Even if SharkNinja was mistaken in its decision not to name JS Global as an RPI, the Board’s precedent would allow SharkNinja to correct the mistake during the proceeding.

In Apple Inc. v. Uniloc 2017 LLC, Case No. IPR2020-00854 (Oct. 28, 2020) (Quinn, APJ) (designated precedential on Dec. 4, 2020), the Board exercised its discretion to deny Apple’s motion for joinder because it would have resulted in a “serial attack” on Uniloc’s patent. Apple had previously filed an IPR petition on the same patent, alleging various grounds of invalidity. The Board denied institution because it failed to show a reasonable likelihood [...]

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US Courts Can Compel Parties to Transfer Ownership of Foreign Patents

by | Dec 17, 2020 |

Addressing a district court decision agreeing to transfer ownership of certain US patents, but declining to do likewise for the related foreign patents, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit explained that US courts have authority to compel litigants before them to transfer ownership of their patents and held that ownership of the foreign patents should have been transferred as well. SiOnyx LLC v. Hamamatsu Photonics K.K., Case Nos. 19-2359, 20-1217 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 7, 2020) (Lourie, J.).

In 1998, a professor at Harvard discovered a process for creating black silicon with unique properties and launched a company, SiOnyx, to commercialize the invention. SiOnyx eventually met with Hamamatsu, a manufacturer of silicon-based photodetector devices, and entered into a nondisclosure agreement (NDA) to share confidential information to explore a potential joint venture. SiOnyx provided information to Hamamatsu under the NDA, but the joint venture plans never came to fruition, and Hamamatsu allowed the agreement to lapse. A short time later, Hamamatsu began marketing photodetector devices using black silicon and applied for foreign patents covering its products, along with related US patents. SiOnyx sued Hamamatsu for breach of contract, infringement of a SiOnyx patent and for ownership of Hamamatsu’s patents.

The case ultimately went to trial and led to a jury verdict in SiOnyx’s favor on breach of contract and infringement. The jury also found that one of SiOnyx’s employees had contributed to the inventions claimed by Hamamatsu’s patents. Based on that inventorship finding, the district court transferred sole ownership of the US patents to SiOnyx pursuant to an NDA provision retaining intellectual property rights for confidential information shared under the agreement. The district court also treated the ownership transfer as an equitable remedy in view of Hamamatsu’s breach of the agreement. However, the district court declined to transfer ownership of the foreign patents because it questioned its authority to do so. Both parties appealed.

On appeal, the Federal Circuit first disposed of most of the appellate issues as being resolved by the jury verdict. Regarding ownership of the patents, Hamamatsu argued that the jury finding of co-inventorship by SiOnyx’s employee, rather than sole inventorship, implied that Hamamatsu employees also contributed to the invention and thus warranted partial ownership. The Court rejected this argument because it found that Hamamatsu had not shown that its contribution was derived from confidential information shared under the NDA and thus did not trigger any ownership rights under the agreement. The Federal Circuit also reasoned that Hamamatsu’s inventive contribution would not bar the equitable relief imposed by the district court. As for the foreign patents, the Court agreed with SiOnyx that the same grounds that led to transfer of the US patents also warranted transfer of the foreign patents, and reiterated that US courts have authority to compel the parties properly before them to transfer ownership of their patents.



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Fifth Circuit Says No Preliminary Injunction in Boozy Beverage Trademark Fight

by | Dec 17, 2020 |

The maker of BRIZZY-brand hard seltzer claimed that consumers would confuse a product branded VIZZY hard seltzer with its own. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit disagreed, however, and affirmed the district court’s denial of the preliminary injunction with an explanation as to how the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits with respect to its trademark infringement claim. Future Proof Brands, L.L.C., v. Molson Coors Beverage Company, et. al., Case No. 20-50323 (5th Cir. December 3, 2020) (Smith, J.).

With a booming market for hard seltzers and ready-to-drink cocktails, it is no surprise that disputes over brand names of the bubbly alcoholic beverages have followed. After the district court denied Proof Brands’ request for a preliminary injunction against Molson Coors’ entry into that market, Proof Brands appealed. The Fifth Circuit issued a reminder that a preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy which should not be granted unless the party seeking it has clearly carried [its] burden of persuasion,” and reviewed the district court’s denial of Future Proof’s request for an abuse of discretion. The Court further noted that under Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Hidalgo Cnty. v. Suehs, Future Proof must demonstrate four factors to obtain a preliminary injunction, namely: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted, (3) that the substantial injury outweighs the threatened harm to the party sought to be enjoined and (4) that granting the preliminary injunction would not disserve the public interest. Concluding that Future Proof was unable to demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of its trademark infringement claim, the court did not address the remaining three preliminary injunction factors.

Future Proof argued that in the course of determining whether there was a likelihood of confusion between the BRIZZY and VIZZY trademarks, the district court erred in analyzing the various factors, or “digits,” of consumer confusion used by the Fifth Circuit. The Court tackled each of the “digits” assessing the likelihood of consumer confusion, noting that even with “some errors,” the district court correctly concluded that Future Proof failed to show a substantial likelihood of success on its trademark infringement claim.

Starting with the type or strength of the trademark allegedly infringed factor, the Fifth Circuit disagreed somewhat with the district court and found the BRIZZY mark to be suggestive, rather than merely descriptive of “fizzy” beverages. Nevertheless, the Court noted that suggestive marks—like descriptive marks— are “comparatively weak” for purposes of a confusion analysis, and cited a number of third-party carbonated beverage brands sharing the common “-IZZY-” root to affirm its agreement with the district court that BRIZZY is a weak trademark. With a “weak” mark at issue, the Court found the similarity factor to weigh only marginally in favor of the injunction, especially given key differences between the product packaging and labels for the respective BRIZZY and VIZZY beverages.

Moving on to the defendant’s intent factor, [...]

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“You’ve Changed!”—New Trademark and TTAB Fees Incoming

by | Dec 10, 2020 |

Effective January 2, 2021, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) is increasing and adding certain trademark and Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”) fees. The changes come after a nearly three-year fee status quo.

The following TTAB fees will increase anywhere from $25 to $200:

  • Petition to cancel filed through the Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (“ESTTA”) (now $600 per class);
  • Notice of opposition filed through ESTTA (now $600 per class);
  • Initial 90-day extension request for filing a notice of opposition, filed through ESTTA (now $200 per application);
  • Second 60-day extension request for filing a notice of opposition, filed through ESTTA (now $200 per application);
  • Final 60-day extension request for filing a notice of opposition, filed through ESTTA (now $400 per application); and
  • Ex parte appeal filed through ESTTA (now $225 per class).

New TTAB fees are also taking effect. A $100 fee per application will apply for a second request for an extension of time to file an appeal brief in an ex parte appeal filed through ESTTA (and for any subsequent extension requests). A $200 per class fee will apply for appeal briefs in an ex parte appeal filed through ESTTA. A $500 per proceeding fee will apply to requests for oral hearings.

As before, there will be no fee for a first 30-day extension request for filing a notice of opposition filed through ESTTA. The USPTO will also begin issuing partial refunds for petitions to cancel in default judgments. These refunds, however, will be available only if the cancellation involves solely an abandonment or nonuse claim, if the defendant did not appear, and if there were no filings in the proceeding other than the petition to cancel.

Additionally, USPTO trademark and TTAB filings which can be and are submitted on paper will cost more than filing their electronic counterparts.

Other key USPTO trademark fee changes include the following: TEAS standard application, now $350 per class; TEAS Plus application, now $250 per class; the processing fee for failing to meet TEAS Plus requirements, now $100 per class; Section 8 or 71 declaration filed through TEAS, now $225 per class; petition to the Director filed through TEAS, now $250; and a petition to revive an abandoned application filed through TEAS, now $150. No fee will apply for an electronically filed Section 7 request to amend a registration before submitting a Section 8 or 71 declaration, as long as the filing serves only to delete goods, services, and/or classes in the request. There will, however, now be a fee assessed for deleting goods, services, and/or classes from a registration after submitting a Section 71 or 8 declaration, but before that declaration is accepted ($250 per class if filed through TEAS). Lastly, a letter of protest will now cost $50 per application.

While the changes outlined above are key, practitioners should be mindful of potential changes to all fees applicable to their specific situation and consult the USPTO’s Final Rule, available here, to ensure [...]

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Amended Opinion Hedges Constitutionality of Punitive Damages Award

by | Dec 10, 2020 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit amended its August 2020 opinion in Epic Systems v. Tata Consultancy to clarify that its analysis of punitive damages applies only to this particular case. Epic Systems Corp. v. Tata Consultancy Services Ltd., Case Nos. 19-1528, -1613 (7th Cir. Nov. 19, 2020) (Kanne, J.)

In the district court action, the jury found that Tata Consultancy Services Ltd. (TCS) used fraudulent means to access and steal Epic System’s trade secrets and other confidential information, and awarded $240 million in compensatory damages and $700 million in punitive damages. The district court reduced the compensatory damage award to $140 million and reduced the punitive damages award to $280 million based on a Wisconsin statutory cap on punitive damages. Both sides appealed.

On appeal, TCS contested the award of $280 million in punitive damages for various reasons, including that the award was not in line with the due process clause of the 14th Amendment. In its amended opinion, the Seventh Circuit clarified that “the Constitution is not the most relevant limit to a federal court when assessing punitive damages, as it comes into play only after the assessment has been tested against statutory and common law principles. . . . Indeed, a federal court can and should reduce a punitive damages award sometime before it reaches the outermost limits of due process.”

The Seventh Circuit analyzed the three “guideposts” for determining whether there is a due process violation with respect to punitive damages awards:

  • The reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct
  • The disparity between the actual harm suffered and the punitive award
  • The difference between the award authorized by the jury and the penalties imposed in comparable cases.

The Court’s analysis of the first guidepost remained relatively unchanged from its original opinion, in which the Court found that a punitive damages award was justified.

The Seventh Circuit deviated from its original opinion in its analysis of the second and third guideposts. The Court found that determining the harm in the second guidepost was somewhat more difficult, because the $140 million compensatory award was based on benefit to TCS, not harm to Epic. However, the Court noted that in such instances, “few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive damages and compensatory damages will satisfy due process.” In its original opinion, the Court concluded that “a 2:1 ratio exceeds the outermost limit of the due process guarantee.” As amended, however, the Court softened this language and clarified that the 2:1 ratio exceeds only the outermost limit “in this case.” The Court explained that although TCS’s conduct was reprehensible, it was not egregious. The Court similarly concluded that the third guidepost warranted a 1:1 ratio of punitive to compensatory damages. Here again, while the Court’s original opinion applied to the “federal constitution,” the amended opinion reduced the scope of the holding to “this case” only.

Practice Note: While the Seventh Circuit originally seemed to indicate that any punitive damages award that exceeds a compensatory award [...]

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Two Turntables, No Microphone: Using Technical Diagram Is Not Copyright Infringement

by | Dec 10, 2020 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed a district court’s summary judgment grant with respect to a copyright infringement claim related to technical drawings, and reversed the court’s summary judgment grant related to software source code. RJ Control Consultants, Inc. et al. v. Multiject, LLC, et al., Case No. 20-1009 (6th Cir. Nov. 23, 2020) (Donald, J.)

In 2008, Paul Rogers, through his company RJ Control Consultants (RJC), entered into an oral agreement with his friend Jack Elder, through Elder’s company Multiject. Rogers agreed to develop a rotary turntable control system (not for music, but to control a molding system) for Elder, calling the product “Design 3.”

In 2014, Elder asked Rogers for copies of Design 3’s technical diagrams as well as the software source code “in case something happened” to Rogers. Rogers provided the information to Elder, believing that Elder would not improperly use or disclose the information to others. Three days later, Elder informed Roger that he no longer needed Roger’s services and would instead use RSW Technologies for the assembly and wiring of the system. Elder claimed that he was increasingly concerned with Roger’s pricing and decided to switch out Rogers and RJC for RSW. Multiject and RSW used Design 3, both the technical drawings and the source code, in the assembly and wiring of identical new systems.

In 2016, Rogers obtained two copyright registrations, one for the technical diagrams and one for the source code. RJC filed a complaint for several federal and state law claims, including copyright infringement. Multiject and RSW filed motions for summary judgment on all claims, including dismissal of the copyright claims, which the district court granted. RJC appealed.

Multiject and RSW argued that copyright protection did not extend to the software at issue because the software embodied a procedure, a system and a method of operating an injection molding machine, and that is not eligible for copyright protection. They also argued that the use of copyrighted technical drawings to produce a control system did not constitute copyright infringement of the technical drawings for the same reasons that making a recipe out of a copyrighted cookbook does not constitute copyright infringement of the cookbook. Multiject and RSW asserted that to the extent Rogers sought to protect the “use” of his technical drawings to create something else, he should have sought protection under patent law—not copyright law.

The Sixth Circuit agreed. Because the source code and technical diagrams were registered, the validity of the copyrights was not contested. The Court first considered whether physical copying to reproduce the system contained in the drawings was copyright infringement. The Court noted that whether the drawings were themselves reproduced was a separate question from whether the drawings were used to create the system portrayed in that drawing. The Court found that the “manufacture of the control system from the copyrighted technical drawing was not copyright infringement because the recreation of a control system by using a copyrighted technical drawing is not ‘copying’ for [...]

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Reprints Do Not Change Earlier Publication Date

by | Dec 10, 2020 |

Addressing the entirety of the evidence standard, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a Patent Trial and Appeal Board finding that responsive evidence can be properly considered to demonstrate the public availability of a reference relied upon in an inter partes review (IPR) petition. VidStream LLC v. Twitter, Inc., Case Nos. 19-1734, -1735 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 25, 2020) (Newman, J.)

Youtoo Technologies sued Twitter for infringement of a patent directed to recording and publishing content on social media websites. In response, Twitter filed two IPR petitions challenging the asserted patent claims as obvious. The IPR petitions relied on a textbook (Bradford) as a primary reference in both petitions. Bradford was first published in 2011, but the copy provided with the petitions indicated a reprint date of 2015. The Board granted the IPR petitions and ultimately found all claims unpatentable over combinations of art including Bradford. VidStream, which emerged as the patent owner after Youtoo went through bankruptcy proceedings, appealed.

VidStream argued that the Board erred in accepting and considering evidence that Twitter provided for the first time with its replies, instead of considering only the documents that Twitter filed with its original petitions. Specifically, Twitter filed with its replies a copy of the US Copyright Office Certificate of Registration stating that Bradford’s date of first publication was November 8, 2011; a Library of Congress copy of Bradford; and a declaration by Twitter counsel that he had compared the excerpts of Bradford that were submitted with the petition with the same pages in the 2011 Library of Congress copy of Bradford and found them “identical.” VidStream stated that the Bradford pages filed with Twitter’s petitions were published December 13, 2015, and thus argued that Twitter did not show that these pages were available before the patent’s 2012 priority date. VidStream maintained that the Board erred in considering Bradford in the obviousness combinations.

The Federal Circuit noted that VidStream had challenged the proper priority date of Bradford before the Board and had also filed a motion to exclude Bradford as improper evidence. The Board denied VidStream’s motion to exclude, finding that it was appropriate to permit Twitter to respond to VidStream’s challenge by providing additional evidence to establish the Bradford publication date. In line with its 2018 Nobel Biocare Servs. AG v. Instraden USA Inc. and Anacor Pharm. decisions, the Court found that the responsive evidence supported the Board’s finding that Bradford was published and publicly accessible before the patent’s priority date. Like the Board, the Court considered the entirety of the evidence relevant to a determination of printed publication. For example, the ISBNs of the 2011 and the 2015 printings of Bradford were the same, and a Machine-Readable Cataloging record had been created for Bradford in August 2011. Bradford was also printed by an established publisher, and the internet archive included an Amazon webpage for Bradford, further confirming that Bradford was publicly accessible in 2011 and that interested persons could access and order the book in [...]

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Apportionment Unnecessary When Royalty Is Based on Comparable License

by | Dec 3, 2020 |

Rejecting a defendant’s request for a new trial on a variety of grounds, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a damages award and explained that apportionment was unnecessary because a sufficiently comparable license was used to determine the appropriate royalty. Vectura Ltd. v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC et al., Case No. 20-1054 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 19, 2020) (Prost, C.J.)

Vectura owns a patent directed to the production of composite active particles for use in pulmonary administration, such as in dry-powder inhalers. Vectura filed a lawsuit against GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) alleging infringement of the patent by GSK’s Ellipta-brand inhalers. At trial, a jury found the patent valid and infringed, and awarded $90 million in damages. After GSK’s motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) on infringement was denied, GSK appealed.

The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting all of GSK’s arguments. The Court rejected GSK’s argument that, based on a claim construction issue, it was entitled to JMOL of non-infringement. The asserted claims of the patent related to “composite active particles” made up of particulate additive material (magnesium stearate) on the surface of a particle of active material, used to promote the dispersion of these particles (in, e.g., inhalers). GSK argued that there was no substantial evidence of improved dispersion because Vectura’s scientific test was technically defective. The Court concluded that this test “generally supported” Vectura’s view and that, in any event, Vectura had provided other evidence—including GSK’s own documents—that the accused inhalers demonstrated improved dispersion.

The Federal Circuit also rejected GSK’s argument that the district court had erroneously construed the claim term “composite active particles” to mean “[a] single particulate entit[y/ies] made up of a particle of active material to which one or more particles of additive material are fixed such that the active and additive particles do not separate in the airstream.” GSK argued that this term required use of the “high energy milling” process referred to in the specification of the patent, but the Federal Circuit disagreed, stating that “[a]lthough the [asserted] patent contains a few statements suggesting that its high-energy milling is required . . . those statements are outweighed by the numerous statements indicating that high-energy milling is merely a preferred process.”

The Federal Circuit further rejected GSK’s argument that Vectura’s damages theory was deficient. Vectura’s damages theory was based on a 2010 license between the parties relating to highly comparable technology. GSK argued that Vectura’s damages theory simply adopted the royalty rate from this prior license wholesale and failed to “show that the patented . . . mixtures drove consumer demand for the accused inhalers before presenting a damages theory based on the entire market value of the accused inhalers.” The Court noted that the case presented a “rather unusual circumstance” in that, while apportionment is ordinarily required where an entire-market-value royalty base is inappropriate, “when a sufficiently comparable license is used as the basis for determining the appropriate royalty, further apportionment may not necessarily be required.” The Court concluded that this was “one [...]

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Making Waves: Post-Employment Contract Assignment Provision Invalid Under California Law

by | Dec 3, 2020 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit invoked “precedents that are relevant but not directly on point” to examine when employment contract provisions may require assignment of inventions conceived post-employment and without use of the former employer’s confidential information, finding that an intellectual property assignment provision in the employer’s predecessor’s employment agreement was void under California law. Whitewater West Industries, Ltd. v. Richard Alleshouse, et al., Case No. 19-1852 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 19, 2020) (Taranto, J.)

Richard Alleshouse began working for Wave Loch in 2007 as an engineer in the field of large-scale sheet-wave water attractions, which are surf and wave simulators sometimes seen on cruise ships and in water parks. Alleshouse’s many duties for the company included the inspection, assessment and improvement of the company’s wave rides; the development of new rides; and product management of the company’s branded FlowRider sheet wave attraction.

After almost five years with the company, Alleshouse consulted with a lawyer, Yong Yeh, regarding the scope of his employment agreement with Wave Loch, which included intellectual property assignment terms that survived termination of the employment agreement. Following that consultation, Alleshouse and Yeh discussed the idea of starting their own company to design sheet-wave attractions. In August 2012, Alleshouse resigned from Wave Loch, and in October 2012, Alleshouse and Yeh filed provisional patent applications that resulted in three different US patents describing and claiming certain “water attractions involving a flowing body of water on a surface” and “nozzle shapes and configurations which create a flowing body of water over a surface.”

In 2017, Whitewater West Industries, the successor to Wave Loch, sued Alleshouse, Yeh and their new company, Pacific Surf Design, in federal district court in California, asserting claims for breach of contract and correction of inventorship. In particular, Whitewater sought an assignment of the three patents under the terms of Alleshouse’s employment contract with Wave Loch, and claimed that Yeh was improperly listed as an inventor on each of the three patents. The district court ruled for Whitewater and found that the intellectual property assignment provision in Alleshouse’s employment agreement was valid and thus breached due to the failure to assign the patent rights at issue. Alleshouse appealed.

Alleshouse challenged the employment agreement’s intellectual property assignment provision as invalid under California Labor Code § 16600, which prohibits any contract provision that restrains a person from a lawful profession, trade or business, and under § 2870(a), which prohibits requiring an employee to assign over any invention that an employee developed entirely on her own time without using the employer’s equipment, supplies, facilities or trade secret information (with certain enumerated exceptions for employee inventions related to the employer’s business or the employee’s work for the business). The parties agreed on two factual points that were important to the Federal Circuit’s analysis on appeal: that the inventions at issue were not conceived until after Alleshouse left his job at Wave Loch, and that Alleshouse did not use any trade secret or confidential information belonging to Wave [...]

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“Icy” Guidance on Polaroid Factors

by | Dec 3, 2020 |

In a “somewhat unusual” trademark case involving directly competing products and marks using the same words, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part the grant of summary judgment for the accused infringer on trademark infringement and dilution claims. The Court found that the similarity of the marks and bad faith on part of the accused infringer weighed in favor of finding infringement. Car Freshner Corp. v. American Covers, LLC, Case No. 19-2750 (2d Cir. Nov. 19, 2020) (Newman, J.)

Car Freshner and American Covers both sell car air freshener products. Car Freshner filed a lawsuit against American Covers alleging that Car Freshner’s trademark “Black Ice” was infringed and diluted by American Covers’ sale of air freshener products using the words “Midnight Black Ice Storm.” The district court rejected Car Freshner’s trademark infringement claim, concluding that “Midnight Black Ice Storm” was not similar enough to “Black Ice” to create a likelihood of confusion about the source of the products. The district court also rejected Car Freshner’s trademark dilution claim, concluding that the marks in question were not sufficiently famous. Car Freshner appealed.

On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s entry of judgment for American Covers on the trademark infringement claim. Reviewing the trademark infringement claim using the eight Polaroid factors, the Court noted the lack of guidance regarding how much weight to accord each of the factors. Despite this lack of guidance, the Court was particularly persuaded by two of the Polaroid factors: the similarity of the marks, and bad faith on the part of the accused infringer. As to the similarity of the marks factor, the Court noted that “[i]t is extremely unusual for the mark of a junior user to include two identical words of a senior user’s mark in sequence[,]” particularly when both users are competitors in the same market. Despite the differences in packaging between the two products, the Court found that the similarity of the marks weighed heavily in favor of a finding of trademark infringement. As to the bad faith factor, the Court found that emails produced by American Covers, which revealed that its employees specifically chose product names meant to encourage customers to form a connection between American Covers’ products and Car Freshner’s products, were “explicit evidence of bad faith” on the part of American Covers.

As to the dilution claim, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment finding, concluding that there was no evidence that either of the marks in question was famous.

Practice Note: Although courts have not provided guidance on how to weigh the Polaroid factors in trademark cases, this case demonstrates that two of the factors (similarity of the marks and bad faith on the part of the accused infringer) can be especially persuasive, particularly when the evidence for these factors is strong.



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