The US Senate Judiciary Committee advanced to the full Senate six bills intended to reduce pharmaceutical prices and enhance market competitiveness. The package collectively targets several aspects of the pharmaceutical landscape, including pharmaceutical benefit manager (PBM) pricing practices, next-generation drug releases, patent portfolio assertions, and use of US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulatory mechanisms. Many of the bills’ proposals have been proposed before, but it is significant that the six bills were moved to the full Senate with bipartisan support.
The Affordable Prescriptions for Patients Act, if passed, would limit how many patents a reference product sponsor can assert in a Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA) litigation against a biosimilar applicant, although such limits could be surpassed with court approval. A biologics license holder could assert up to 20 patents in a BPCIA case. Certain patents, such as method of treatment patents, would fall outside the limitation.
Against the backdrop of the Supreme Court’s 2013 holding in FTC v. Watson that certain “pay for delay” agreements are prohibited as anticompetitive, the Preserve Access to Affordable Generics and Biosimilars Act would add precision to the boundaries of permissible settlements in the pharmaceutical industry. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) would have specific authority to institute a civil action to recover penalties, and certain presumptions would apply. For example, any agreement providing a generic or biosimilar applicant with “anything of value, including an exclusive license,” would be presumptively anticompetitive, with certain exceptions and exclusions. Terms that would remain permissible include a pre-expiration launch date, reasonable litigation expenses, and covenants not to sue for patent infringement.
Targeting the concern that branded small molecule and biologics drug manufacturers release new products with patent protection and withdraw or unfairly disincentivize older products to avoid generic competition, the Drug Competition Enhancement Act would deem the alleged practice of “product hopping” unfair competition subject to enforcement actions. The bill would define a hard switch as when a branded or biologics manufacturer discontinues or withdraws an application and introduces a follow-on product within a certain period relative to generic or biosimilar approval. It would define a soft switch as when the brand manufacturer took actions that “that unfairly disadvantage the listed drug or reference product relative to [a] follow-on product.” The bill would provide specific exclusions and justifications for branded manufacturer actions that would otherwise constitute a hard or soft switch.
Seeking to curb perceived abuses of the FDA citizen petition process, the Stop Significant and Time-Wasting Abuse Limiting Legitimate Innovation of New Generics (Stop STALLING) Act would grant the FTC the authority to bring a civil action against those filing “sham petitions” with the FDA, with penalties up to $50,000 per calendar day of review or the revenue earned by the seller of the branded product, whichever is greater. A petition could be classified as a sham based on its own objective unreasonableness, an intention to delay approval of a generic or biosimilar product, or as part of a series of covered petitions.
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