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Government Contractors May Include Restrictive Markings on ‘Unlimited Rights’ Data

by and | Jan 7, 2021 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed an Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) denial of summary judgment and held that a federal contractor may include certain restrictive markings on “unlimited rights” data supplied to the US government. The Boeing Company v. Secretary of the Air Force, Case No. 19-2147 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 21, 2020) (Lourie, J.)

Boeing entered into two contracts with the US Air Force that required Boeing to deliver technical data to the Air Force with “unlimited rights” pursuant to Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 252.227-7013 (-7013 clause). Boeing marked each technical data deliverable submitted to the Air Force with a legend that described Boeing’s data rights pertaining to third parties. The government rejected Boeing’s technical data deliverables in view of the legend Boeing placed on the data, and Boeing requested a Contracting Officer Final Decision (COFD) regarding the propriety of its marking. The Air Force issued a COFD for each contract, confirming the rejection of technical data marked with Boeing’s legend as a nonconforming marking because it was not in the authorized format pursuant to paragraph (f) of the -7013 clause (Subsection 7013(f)).

Boeing appealed the COFDs to the ASBCA and moved for summary judgment, arguing that Subsection 7013(f) only applies to legends that restrict the government’s rights in technical data and is inapplicable to legends that only restrict third-party rights. The ASBCA denied Boeing’s summary judgment motion because Boeing’s legend was not one of the four specific legends authorized under Subsection 7013(f). The ASBCA entered final judgment, and Boeing appealed.

The Federal Circuit reversed. The Court found that the plain language of Subsection 7013(f) makes clear that the two sentences describe the way in which a contractor “may assert restrictions on the Government’s rights,” and agreed with Boeing that Subsection 7013(f) applies only in situations when a contractor seeks to assert restrictions on the government’s rights. The Federal Circuit explained that under the ASBCA’s reading, the first sentence would be “entirely unnecessary” to the regulation, and the Court “cannot disregard the first sentence.” The Court also explained that its interpretation of Subsection 7013(f) is faithful to the overall purpose of the -7013 clause because the US Department of Defense intended the technical rights regulations to govern allocation of data rights between contractors and the government.

The Federal Circuit remanded the case back to the ASBCA for further proceedings on whether Boeing’s legend did in fact restrict the government’s rights.

Practice Note: This decision strengthens contractors’ ability to ensure that data supplied in a federal procurement remain protected from non-governmental access, particularly in light of evolving standards for the protection of “confidential information” pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act from the Supreme Court holding in Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356 (2019).



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PTAB Designates Two Precedential Opinions for Evaluating Impact of District Court Litigations on Discretionary Denial under § 314(a)

by | Jan 7, 2021 |

In the wake of its May 13, 2020, precedential decision in Apple v. Fintiv, Inc., the Patent Trial and Appeal Board designated as precedential two additional decisions that weigh the Fintiv factors. In Fintiv, the Board articulated six factors for consideration when determining to exercise discretion to deny institution of an inter partes review (IPR) petition under § 314(a) in view of a parallel district court proceeding:

  • Existence of a stay pending IPR
  • Proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s deadline for issuing a final written decision
  • Expended investment in the parallel proceeding
  • Overlap between issues raised each proceeding
  • Whether the petitioner and the defendant are the same party
  • Other circumstances.

The two new precedential decisions provide further insight as to what circumstances may tip the balance for each factor. In each decision, the Board found that the circumstances of the parallel district court proceeding did not weigh in favor of a discretionary denial of institution.

In Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., Case No. IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 (USPTO Dec. 1, 2020 (Chagnon, APJ) (designated precedential as to § II.A on Dec. 17, 2020), the Board weighed the Fintiv factors and declined to deny institution based on the parallel district proceeding. In particular, the PTAB found that the already granted stay weighed strongly against exercising discretion to deny institution under the first factor. The Board rejected speculative arguments that if it declined review, the district court would lift the already granted stay and would set a trial date to pre-date the timeframe for issuing a final written decision in the IPR proceeding. The Board concluded that the second factor also weighed against denial because discovery was not complete and the district court had not issued a claim construction order or any other significant rulings. The Board also found that the fourth factor (issue overlap) weighed against denial because materially different invalidity grounds had been raised in the district court contentions as compared to the grounds at issue in the IPR petition.

In Snap, Inc. v. SRK Technology, LLC, Case No. IPR2020-00820, Paper 15 (USPTO Oct. 21, 2020 (Droesch, APJ) (designated precedential as to § II.A on Dec. 17, 2020), the Board again weighed the Fintiv factors and declined to deny institution based on the parallel district proceeding. Because the district court had not yet ruled on the motion to stay pending the outcome of the IPR, the Board found that the “stay factor” did not weigh for or against denying institution. As for the issue overlap factor, the Board found that a stipulation by the defendant to not pursue in district court any ground raised, or that could have reasonably been raised, in the IPR weighed strongly in favor of not exercising discretion to deny institution.



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Defend Trade Secrets Act Supports Sealing Information on Appeal

by | Jan 7, 2021 | ,

Addressing whether purported trade secret information ought to remain under seal on appeal, the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled in a one-judge order that the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) provided a statutory basis that overcame the presumption of public access. Magnesium Machine, LLC v. Terves, LLC, Case No. 20-3779 (6th Cir. Dec. 10, 2020) (McKeague, J.)

This case presented the issue of what part of a record may be sealed on appeal—normally a routine question—in litigation that was anything but routine. According to the verified complaint, Magnesium Machine discovered a particular salt-based treatment for use on oil and gas tools. According to Magnesium, in the course of litigating a patent infringement suit against one of Magnesium’s suppliers, Terves and its counsel, McDonald Hopkins, obtained information reflective of Magnesium’s alleged trade secret from a third party pursuant to subpoena. Specifically, Magnesium claimed that particular language in a settlement agreement disclosed Magnesium’s trade secrets. The settlement agreement had been produced by the third party without any confidentiality designation. The complaint alleged violations of the federal DTSA and Oklahoma and Ohio state trade secrets acts.

Invoking the seizure provisions of the DTSA, Magnesium sought and obtained an ex parte order directing the US Marshals to seize Terves’s electronic equipment, including devices at Terves’ president’s home. That order did not last long. Following an evidentiary hearing (in which Terves participated) the day after the order was issued, the district court vacated the seizure order because Magnesium had not demonstrated misappropriation of a trade secret.

To appeal, Magnesium requested express findings of fact and conclusions of law. The district court explained that Terves and its lawyers subpoenaed materials in good faith, that the settlement agreement was produced without restriction (such as a confidentiality marking), that Terves’s lawyers did not impermissibly share the settlement agreement with Terves employees and that upon objection by Magnesium, Terves deleted its copies of the settlement agreement. Thereafter, on motions to dismiss, the district court concluded that Magnesium failed to allege misappropriation and that the litigation privilege protected Terves’ counsel.

Terves sought and obtained attorneys’ fees against Magnesium and its counsel for proceeding in bad faith. The district court found that Magnesium had every reason to know that its claims were baseless, because it was “well aware at the time the suit was filed that Defendants had received the allegedly secret information through legitimate discovery means and that it was provided to them without description.” Moreover, claiming that a three-word phrase in the settlement agreement purportedly disclosed trade secret information was “an intentional exaggeration/misrepresentation.” Indeed, other public statements had provided far more detail than the purportedly secret phrase, according to the district court.

On appeal, although Terves contended that the purported trade secret did not qualify as a secret, in the exercise of caution and on Magnesium’s request, Terves nonetheless sought to file a brief under seal. Judge David McKeague, acting on behalf of the Sixth Circuit, agreed that it was appropriate to seal the information, [...]

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This Mashup Is Not a Place You’ll Go – Seuss Copyright Will ‘Live Long and Prosper’

by | Jan 7, 2021 | ,

Presented with a publishing company defendant’s mashup of Dr. Seuss’ copyrighted works with Star Trek in a work titled Oh, the Places You’ll Boldly Go!, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit tackled claims of both copyright and trademark infringement, including the defense of fair use and the use of trademarks in expressive works. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of defendants on the copyright infringement claim and affirmed the district court’s dismissal and grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants on the trademark claim. Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. ComicMix LLC, et al., Case No. 19-55348 (9th Cir. Dec. 18, 2020) (McKeown, J.)

Seuss Enterprises owns the intellectual property in the works of late author Theodor S. Geisel, better known as Dr. Seuss. Seuss Enterprises carefully yet prolifically licenses the Dr. Seuss works and brand across a variety of entertainment, media, art and consumer goods, including derivative works of Dr. Seuss’ final book, and graduation favorite, Oh, the Places You’ll Go! When Seuss Enterprises encountered a Kickstarter campaign to raise funds for the Oh, the Places You’ll Boldly Go! mashup work created by ComicMix (a company whose employees include an author of Star Trek episodes), it filed suit for copyright and trademark infringement. The district court granted ComicMix’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the Boldly work was a fair use of Dr. Seuss’s Oh, the Places You’ll Go! and that Seuss Enterprises did not have a cognizable trademark infringement claim under the Lanham Act. Seuss Enterprises appealed.

On appeal, ComicMix asserted its defense of fair use by arguing that its copying of the Dr. Seuss works (described at one point in the record as painstaking attempts to create “identical” illustrations) resulted in a parody of the works. The Ninth Circuit examined the facts under the four non-exclusive factors of fair use reflected in § 107 of the Copyright Act:

  • The purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes
  • The nature of the copyrighted work
  • The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole
  • The effect of the use upon the potential market for, or value of, the copyrighted work.

Remarking that the outcome of the purpose and character of the use factor influences the assessment of the third and fourth factors, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Boldly work was not transformative as a parody or otherwise, and that the “indisputably commercial” nature of the work weighed against fair use. The Court explained that a parody exists only if the resulting work critiques or comments on the underlying copyrighted work. The Ninth Circuit cited its decision in another Seuss case (Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books), which involved the retelling of the O.J. Simpson murder trial through the lens of The Cat in the Hat. Here, the Court similarly found that Boldly only “evokes” Oh, the Places [...]

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An Early Holiday Present for Generics? Legislation Requiring Greater Disclosure by Brands Passes the Senate

by | Dec 21, 2020 |

Earlier this month, two bills intended to promote generic competitiveness by presenting a clearer idea of the patent landscape covering reference products passed the full Senate, albeit with amendments. These laws, if enacted, will require brand pharmaceutical companies to submit more information about their innovator products.

Potential Changes to Orange Book Listing Requirements for Non-Biologics Drugs

As part of its current obligations, an innovator product manufacturer must submit to the FDA the patent number and expiration date of any patents that claim the drug or a method of using the drug. The FDA then performs the ministerial function of listing the information in the Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, known as the Orange Book. The Hatch-Waxman Act permits generic manufacturers to file a counterclaim to delist a patent that they believe is improperly listed. Over the years, FDA has issued technical regulations expanding on the requirements, which under statute, are relatively sparse. However, there has been some uncertainty regarding what patents must be listed—especially in the case of drug products with innovative delivery systems.

The Orange Book Transparency Act of 2020, H.R. 1503, seeks to codify certain existing regulations and bring some certainty to the process. First, the Orange Book Act provides greater clarity on the types of patents a brand company must list. Currently, the relevant statutes require submission of patent information for “any patent which claims the drug for which the applicant submitted the application or which claims a method of using such drug” that could be asserted based on the manufacture, use, or sale of the drug. The Orange Book Act would alter that language to require submission of patent information for patents that claim the drug substance (active ingredient), the drug product (formulation or composition), or a method of use that is included in the application (i.e., a method of use that corresponds with an approved indication/use code). All other patents—e.g., patents that cover off-label use—must not be listed.

Second, the FDA would be responsible for “specify[ing] any exclusivity period that is applicable,” including the 180-day exclusivity period for first-to-file applicants.

Finally, the Orange Book Act codifies certain existing agency requirements. Under current FDA regulations, brand manufacturers are required to promptly request delisting if they determine that a patent no longer qualifies or its relevant claims are invalidated, and within 14 days if court-ordered. The Orange Book Act would codify the duty on brand manufacturers to remove listed patents within 14 days—rather than “promptly”—when any claim of a listed patent “has been cancelled or invalidated pursuant to a final decision” by the Patent Trial & Appeal Board or a court once it is unappealable. This quick turnaround time of communicating to the public which patents have been found invalid will be key to giving generics an advantage in developing generic products and patents covering branded drug products invalid. The Orange Book Act includes a 30-day period for a brand manufacturer to list a patent after issuance; this requirement mirrors already existing FDA regulations.

While [...]

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BREXIT: How Will It Impact Your European Trademark Rights?

by and | Dec 17, 2020 | ,

The United Kingdom (UK) has officially withdrawn from the European Union (EU) on February 1, 2020, but will only become a third party after a transition period ending on December 31, 2020. With that date fast approaching, you are probably wondering what will change for your trademark rights on January 1, 2021?

EU TRADEMARKS REGISTERED BEFORE JANUARY 1, 2021

  • Owners of EU trademarks (and EU parts of International Registrations) registered on or before December 31, 2020 will automatically receive a registered and enforceable UK trademark on January 1, 2021, without any re-examination or additional costs. The UK trademark will be for the same sign, the same goods, and the same filing, priority or seniority date as its corresponding EU trademark.
  • Trademark owners will have the right to opt-out from this automatic cloning as of January 1, 2021 if they have no interest in the UK territory.
  • As of January 1, 2021, EU registered trademarks and corresponding UK clones must be renewed separately.
  • Renewals made before January 1, 2021 for EU trademark registrations expiring after this date will not apply to UK clones. Also, UK clones expiring within the six (6) months following January 1, 2021 will benefit from an additional six (6)-month renewal period, with no late renewal fee to be paid.
  • If a EU trademark is declared invalid or cancelled in the EU as result of a procedure that was ongoing on December 31, 2020, its UK clone will also be deemed invalid or cancelled on the same date if the grounds are applicable in the UK.

EU TRADEMARK APPLICATIONS FILED BEFORE JANUARY 1, 2021

  • EU trademark applications (and EU parts of International Registrations) filed, but not yet registered, before January 1, 2021 will not be automatically cloned into UK trademark applications.
  • The holders of such applications have until September 30, 2021 to reapply for an identical trademark in the UK that will benefit from the earlier filing date of its corresponding EU trademark. These new UK filings will be subject to an examination process as well as UK national filing fees.

EU TRADEMARK APPLICATIONS FILED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2021

  • As of January 1, 2021, new EU trademark applications will cover the 27 remaining EU Member States, but will not be protected in the UK.
  • To acquire trademark protection in the UK, one will have to apply for a separate UK trademark which may still claim priority of an earlier national or EU trademark filed within the preceding six (6) months.

ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

  • As of January 1, 2021, pending or new oppositions or invalidity actions based solely on UK rights will be dismissed.
  • Licenses recorded for EU trademarks will not automatically be recorded for UK clones or new UK filings.
  • Existing EU Customs applications for action will not continue to have effect in the UK unless granted by UK customs authorities.
  • Agreements will have to be checked to amend provisions if appropriate.

If you are conducting or planning to conduct business [...]

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To Die For – New York Recognizes Publicity Rights of Deceased Performers.

by | Dec 17, 2020 |

On November 20, 2020, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo signed into law Senate Bill S5959D, a law that is highly important for New York based recording artists, actors, and other celebrities. The new law recognizes post-mortem rights of publicity to protect deceased performers from exploitation of their likeness for 40 years after death.

Specifically, the new law establishes the right of privacy and the right of publicity for both living and deceased individuals. It provides that an individual’s persona is the personal property of the individual and is freely transferable and descendible, meaning the rights can be exercised by the artist’s descendants. The new law provides for the registration with the department of state of such rights of a deceased individual, and that the use of a digital replica for purposes of trade within an expressive work is a violation of law. The legislation also creates a private right of action and new penalties for the publishing of sexually explicit images of individuals and “deep fakes” that are used to falsely depict individuals as engaging in sexual activity, protecting people from revenge porn.

The new law goes into effect on May 31, 2021 and will align New York with 23 other states that have statutory post-mortem rights of publicity.



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PTAB Designates Three Opinions as Precedential

by | Dec 17, 2020 | ,

In RPX Corp. v. Applications in Internet Time, LLC, Case Nos. IPR2015-01750, -01751, -01752 (Oct. 2, 2020) (Boalick, CAPJ) (designated precedential on Dec. 4, 2020), the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board) terminated institution of RPX’s petitions for inter partes review (IPR) because Salesforce—served with a complaint more than one year before—should have been named as a real party-in-interest (RPI) to the proceedings. As a result, RPX’s petition was time-barred under § 315(b).

The Board’s determination came after remand from the Federal Circuit, which vacated the Board’s prior finding that Salesforce was not an RPI. (IP Update, Vol. 21, No. 8). The Federal Circuit instructed the Board to use the common law understanding of “real party-in-interest” and a “flexible approach that takes into account both equitable and practical considerations, with an eye toward determining whether the non-party is a clear beneficiary that has a pre-existing, established relationship with the petitioner.” On remand, the Board took additional discovery to examine the relationship between RPX and Salesforce, including RPX’s business model, Salesforce’s relationship with RPX, whether RPX represents Salesforce’s interests in invalidating the patents, and the significance of the fact that Salesforce and RPX had overlapping Board members. After considering the relationship, the Board found the evidence pointed clearly toward a common interest—between RPX and its members—in invalidating the patents in IPR proceedings. It found RPX could not avoid the time bar under § 315(b), or estoppel under § 315(e) for its members, by creating the appearance that RPX acts independently of its members’ interests when filing IPR petitions.

In SharkNinja Operating LLC v. iRobot Corp., Case No. IPR2020-00734 (Oct. 6, 2020) (Melvin, APJ) (designated precedential on Dec. 4, 2020), the Board declined to address—for purposes of institution—the patent owner’s claim that the IPR petition failed to name an alleged RPI under § 312(a)(2)’s requirement that a petition “identif[y] all real parties-in-interest.” iRobot alleged that JS Global was an unnamed RPI because it was intertwined with SharkNinja’s business and was in a position to fund and exercise control over the IPR petition. The Board declined to reach a determination on the issue because it would have no impact on the proceeding, absent evidence that (1) JS Global was a time-barred or an otherwise estopped entity whose addition to the petition would result in its dismissal under § 315 or (2) SharkNinja’s omission of JS Global was done in bad faith. Even if SharkNinja was mistaken in its decision not to name JS Global as an RPI, the Board’s precedent would allow SharkNinja to correct the mistake during the proceeding.

In Apple Inc. v. Uniloc 2017 LLC, Case No. IPR2020-00854 (Oct. 28, 2020) (Quinn, APJ) (designated precedential on Dec. 4, 2020), the Board exercised its discretion to deny Apple’s motion for joinder because it would have resulted in a “serial attack” on Uniloc’s patent. Apple had previously filed an IPR petition on the same patent, alleging various grounds of invalidity. The Board denied institution because it failed to show a reasonable likelihood [...]

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US Courts Can Compel Parties to Transfer Ownership of Foreign Patents

by | Dec 17, 2020 |

Addressing a district court decision agreeing to transfer ownership of certain US patents, but declining to do likewise for the related foreign patents, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit explained that US courts have authority to compel litigants before them to transfer ownership of their patents and held that ownership of the foreign patents should have been transferred as well. SiOnyx LLC v. Hamamatsu Photonics K.K., Case Nos. 19-2359, 20-1217 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 7, 2020) (Lourie, J.).

In 1998, a professor at Harvard discovered a process for creating black silicon with unique properties and launched a company, SiOnyx, to commercialize the invention. SiOnyx eventually met with Hamamatsu, a manufacturer of silicon-based photodetector devices, and entered into a nondisclosure agreement (NDA) to share confidential information to explore a potential joint venture. SiOnyx provided information to Hamamatsu under the NDA, but the joint venture plans never came to fruition, and Hamamatsu allowed the agreement to lapse. A short time later, Hamamatsu began marketing photodetector devices using black silicon and applied for foreign patents covering its products, along with related US patents. SiOnyx sued Hamamatsu for breach of contract, infringement of a SiOnyx patent and for ownership of Hamamatsu’s patents.

The case ultimately went to trial and led to a jury verdict in SiOnyx’s favor on breach of contract and infringement. The jury also found that one of SiOnyx’s employees had contributed to the inventions claimed by Hamamatsu’s patents. Based on that inventorship finding, the district court transferred sole ownership of the US patents to SiOnyx pursuant to an NDA provision retaining intellectual property rights for confidential information shared under the agreement. The district court also treated the ownership transfer as an equitable remedy in view of Hamamatsu’s breach of the agreement. However, the district court declined to transfer ownership of the foreign patents because it questioned its authority to do so. Both parties appealed.

On appeal, the Federal Circuit first disposed of most of the appellate issues as being resolved by the jury verdict. Regarding ownership of the patents, Hamamatsu argued that the jury finding of co-inventorship by SiOnyx’s employee, rather than sole inventorship, implied that Hamamatsu employees also contributed to the invention and thus warranted partial ownership. The Court rejected this argument because it found that Hamamatsu had not shown that its contribution was derived from confidential information shared under the NDA and thus did not trigger any ownership rights under the agreement. The Federal Circuit also reasoned that Hamamatsu’s inventive contribution would not bar the equitable relief imposed by the district court. As for the foreign patents, the Court agreed with SiOnyx that the same grounds that led to transfer of the US patents also warranted transfer of the foreign patents, and reiterated that US courts have authority to compel the parties properly before them to transfer ownership of their patents.



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Fifth Circuit Says No Preliminary Injunction in Boozy Beverage Trademark Fight

by | Dec 17, 2020 |

The maker of BRIZZY-brand hard seltzer claimed that consumers would confuse a product branded VIZZY hard seltzer with its own. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit disagreed, however, and affirmed the district court’s denial of the preliminary injunction with an explanation as to how the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits with respect to its trademark infringement claim. Future Proof Brands, L.L.C., v. Molson Coors Beverage Company, et. al., Case No. 20-50323 (5th Cir. December 3, 2020) (Smith, J.).

With a booming market for hard seltzers and ready-to-drink cocktails, it is no surprise that disputes over brand names of the bubbly alcoholic beverages have followed. After the district court denied Proof Brands’ request for a preliminary injunction against Molson Coors’ entry into that market, Proof Brands appealed. The Fifth Circuit issued a reminder that a preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy which should not be granted unless the party seeking it has clearly carried [its] burden of persuasion,” and reviewed the district court’s denial of Future Proof’s request for an abuse of discretion. The Court further noted that under Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Hidalgo Cnty. v. Suehs, Future Proof must demonstrate four factors to obtain a preliminary injunction, namely: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted, (3) that the substantial injury outweighs the threatened harm to the party sought to be enjoined and (4) that granting the preliminary injunction would not disserve the public interest. Concluding that Future Proof was unable to demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of its trademark infringement claim, the court did not address the remaining three preliminary injunction factors.

Future Proof argued that in the course of determining whether there was a likelihood of confusion between the BRIZZY and VIZZY trademarks, the district court erred in analyzing the various factors, or “digits,” of consumer confusion used by the Fifth Circuit. The Court tackled each of the “digits” assessing the likelihood of consumer confusion, noting that even with “some errors,” the district court correctly concluded that Future Proof failed to show a substantial likelihood of success on its trademark infringement claim.

Starting with the type or strength of the trademark allegedly infringed factor, the Fifth Circuit disagreed somewhat with the district court and found the BRIZZY mark to be suggestive, rather than merely descriptive of “fizzy” beverages. Nevertheless, the Court noted that suggestive marks—like descriptive marks— are “comparatively weak” for purposes of a confusion analysis, and cited a number of third-party carbonated beverage brands sharing the common “-IZZY-” root to affirm its agreement with the district court that BRIZZY is a weak trademark. With a “weak” mark at issue, the Court found the similarity factor to weigh only marginally in favor of the injunction, especially given key differences between the product packaging and labels for the respective BRIZZY and VIZZY beverages.

Moving on to the defendant’s intent factor, [...]

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