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2020 IP Law Year in Review: Trademarks

by Sarah Bro and Eleanor B. Atkins | Jan 21, 2021 | Trademarks

Executive Summary

2020 was a year like no other, so you’d be forgiven if the year’s biggest headlines in trademark law didn’t quite catch your attention. In 2020, the US Supreme Court shaped trademark jurisprudence through a trio of notable decisions. A pandemic and shelter-in-place orders pushed more consumers to virtual marketplaces, forcing brand owners, and the courts, to take a renewed look at counterfeiting and online enforcement. The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) has continued its strict registrability and failure-to-function assessments, and new legislation, rules and fees were directed at cracking down on fraudulent trademark applications and clearing dead weight from the USPTO register to make room for new and growing brands. A COVID-19 stimulus package just so happened to establish the standard for obtaining injunctive relief in litigation under the Lanham Act. And the year saw industry-specific developments with the potential for broader application in the field. This report provides a summary of 2020’s notable moments in trademark law with insights and outlooks for brand owners and practitioners moving into the year ahead.

Trademarks

2021 Outlook

Looking ahead, 2020’s legislation, rules and fees impacting the USPTO and the courts may add some clarity to trademark disputes in 2021, any may also inspire brand owners to examine their approaches to trademark portfolio management, watching and enforcement to maximize budgets, clear the way for brand expansion and more efficiently handle trademark disputes. In 2021, we also expect to see further developments in the fighting of counterfeits, the interplay of trademarks and expressive works and the application of failure to function refusals, especially as we continue to see trademark filings, disputes and market trends associated with an ongoing pandemic, political unrest and overdue social justice movements. Finally, in 2021, we expect to see brands remain at the forefront of representing positivity, innovation, unity and wellness, as we all work together to accelerate out of a challenging year.

Read the full report.

No Appellate Jurisdiction to Review Post-Verdict Appeal of Previously Denied SJ Motion

by Paul Devinsky | Jan 21, 2021 | Trademarks

In a closely watched trademark/counterfeiting case, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a judgment for contributory infringement, award of permanent injunction and monetary damage award against a commercial landlord found to have been willfully blind to trademark infringement and counterfeiting occurring on its leased property. Omega SA v. 375 Canal, LLC, Case No. 19-969 (2d Cir. Jan. 6, 2021) (Menashi, J.) (Lohier, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). The Court also concluded that it could not consider a post-verdict appeal on a legal issue raised in a denied summary judgment motion (i.e., whether the landlord needed to know of a specific vendor involved in the counterfeiting) when the appellant failed to file a timely notice of appeal and did not seek an interlocutory appeal or file a Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law on the issue.

375 Canal LLC is a commercial landlord with properties in Manhattan, including 375 Canal Street. Omega SA is a watch company. Omega sued Canal for contributory trademark infringement, alleging that Canal had continued to lease space at 375 Canal Street to vendors despite knowing that the vendors were selling counterfeit Omega goods. After discovery, Canal moved for summary judgment, contending that Omega did not identify a specific vendor to which Canal continued to lease property despite knowing or having reason to know that the specific vendor was selling counterfeit goods. Omega argued that its primary theory of willful blindness did not require identification of a specific vendor. The district court denied Canal’s motion, agreeing that Omega was not required to identify a specific vendor.

The jury found that Canal had contributorily and willfully infringed Omega’s trademarks, and awarded $1.1 million in statutory damages. The district court amended the final judgment to include a permanent injunction prohibiting Canal from infringing and taking other actions with respect to Omega’s marks, even outside of 375 Canal Street. Canal appealed, arguing that the district court erred by not requiring Omega to identify a specific vendor that Canal knew or should have known was infringing Omega’s trademarks. Canal raised this argument by appealing the pre-trial order denying Canal’s motion for summary judgment and the jury instructions.

The Second Circuit dismissed Canal’s appeal of the summary judgment denial and affirmed the jury instructions on the merits. On Canal’s challenge to the summary judgment denial, the Court began with the premise that a party generally cannot appeal an order denying summary judgment after a full trial on the merits because of its interlocutory character, which is not within appellate jurisdiction. The denial of Canal’s summary judgment motion did not qualify for an exception allowing review, such as situations where Congress has provided for review of certain interlocutory decisions, or where the Supreme Court has construed certain denials of summary judgment, such as those on the basis of qualified immunity, as final decisions permitting review. But even if it had qualified, Canal would have been required to file a notice of appeal within [...]

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CJEU Referral on Preliminary Injunctions by the Munich I District Court

by Dr. Henrik Holzapfel | Jan 21, 2021 | Patents

The 21st Civil Chamber of the Munich I District Court has referred a question on the availability of preliminary injunctions against patent infringements to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Luxembourg (Munich I District Court docket no. 21 O 16782/20, decision of 19 January 2021).

Key takeaways

The Munich I District Court has referred a question to the CJEU on whether the current standard for granting preliminary injunctions in patent litigation should be lowered.
The Munich judges indicate that the current standard imposes an undue burden on patentees, especially for newly issued patents.

IN DEPTH

Background

Granting a preliminary injunction requires a sufficient likelihood that the asserted patent is valid. Under current German appellate case law however, it is usually not sufficient to meet that standard by simply showing that the asserted patent has been granted by a respective patent office. Rather, with certain exceptions only, it is required that validity has been confirmed in inter partes invalidity proceedings (i.e., in opposition proceedings before the European Patent Office or the German Patent and Trademark Office, or in nullity proceedings before the Federal Patent Court). In the opinion of the Munich I District Court, this standard may impose an undue burden on patentees in view of the European Directive 2004/48/EC on the enforcement of intellectual property rights. The Munich judges reason that first, it would be difficult to enforce newly granted patents. Second, a patentee has little influence on whether validity of his patent will be challenged by third parties.

At the same time, and as mentioned by the Munich I District Court, it is widely accepted that there are exceptions that apply to the basic rule that that validity should first be confirmed in inter partes invalidity proceedings. For example in the landmark “Olanzapine” case, the Düsseldorf Appeal Court issued a preliminary injunction based on a patent that had been invalidated in first instance nullity proceedings, while an appeal in the invalidity proceedings was pending. Therefore, while the relevant patent had not survived first instance invalidity proceedings, a preliminary injunction was granted.

The question referred

The Munich I District Court referred the following question to the CJEU:

Is it in line with Article 9(1) of Directive 2004/48/EC for the Higher Regional Courts having jurisdiction at final instance in proceedings for interim relief to refuse in principle to grant interim measures for infringement of patents if the patent in dispute has not survived opposition or nullity proceedings at first instance?

Practice Note:

It will be interesting to follow the further development in connection with this referral, as the implications of the CJEU decision are likely to be far-reaching. The Munich referral may lead to new enforcement opportunities and strategies for patentees. At the same time, the Munich referral is in tension with current reform of German patent law which, if enacted, will emphasize a hurdle for injunctions, namely that injunctions must not be disproportionate.

PTO: Board to Align Indefiniteness Approach in AIA and District Court Proceedings

by McDermott Will & Emery | Jan 21, 2021 | America Invents Act

On January 6, 2021, US Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) Director Andrei Iancu, Commissioner for Patents Andrew Hirshfeld and Chief Administrative Patent Judge Scott Boalick issued a memorandum to the members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board to align the Board’s approach when deciding indefiniteness issues under 35 USC § 112 in America Invents Act (AIA) post-grant proceedings more closely with district court proceedings. The memo was issued under the PTO director’s authority to set forth binding agency guidance to govern the Board’s interpretation of statutory provisions. The memo cited to similar recent changes to the approach to claim construction in such proceedings, and stated that aligning “the indefiniteness approach [used] in AIA post-grant proceedings [to district court proceedings] will promote consistency and efficient decision making among coordinate branches of government that decide similar issues in co-pending proceedings.” The instructed approach, per the Supreme Court of the United States’ 2014 decision in Nautilus, applies to post grant review (PGR) and inter partes review (IPR) proceedings, but not to indefiniteness (or claim construction) issues decided outside the context of AIA reviews.

Post-AIA 35 USC § 112(b) (and pre-AIA § 112, second paragraph) require that “[t]he specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.” Claims not meeting this requirement are invalid for indefiniteness and may be determined indefinite during PTO examination, on appeal from examination and during AIA post-grant proceedings. In 2014 the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit approved the PTO’s long-standing approach to assessing indefiniteness during patent prosecution in its per curiam In re Packard decision that “[a] claim is indefinite when it contains words or phrases whose meaning is unclear.” At the time, this approach was used agency-wide to analyze questions of indefiniteness, in complement with the office’s broadest reasonable interpretation approach to claim construction.

Despite the Supreme Court’s decision in Nautilus that a claim is unpatentable for indefiniteness if the claim, read in light of the specification delineating the patent and the prosecution history, fails to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention, the PTO reaffirmed its intent to follow Packard in examination (whether original, appeals or reexamination). In 2018, in the interest of consistency and efficiency, the PTO changed its claim construction standard for post-grant trial proceedings to review a claim of a patent, or a claim proposed in a motion to amend, from the broadest reasonable interpretation to the same Phillips standard that would be used to construe the claim in a district court action.

The memorandum noted that there has been some confusion as to whether the Packard or Nautilus standard should apply in AIA proceedings. While parties to such proceedings argued for one or the other, neither the Board nor the Federal Circuit ruled as to which standard applied. Now, in the interest of clarity, consistency and efficiency, and to “lead to greater [...]

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What’s Cookin’? No Likelihood of Confusion Between Two KITCHEN Marks

by Eleanor B. Atkins | Jan 21, 2021 | Trademarks

Addressing the assessment and application of the DuPont likelihood of confusion factors, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board’s finding of no likelihood of confusion between W WEIGEL’S KITCHEN NOW OPEN & Design and QT KITCHENS & Design for food and beverages sold in the parties’ respective convenience stores. QuikTrip West, Inc. v. Weigel Stores, Inc., Case No. 20-1304 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 7, 2021) (Lourie, J.)

QuikTrip West has used its mark QT KITCHENS since 2011 in connection with its combination gas station/convenience stores. In 2014, Weigel Stores began using W KITCHENS in connection with its similar stores. Responding to QuickTrip’s cease-and-desist letter, Weigel twice altered its mark: first removing the “S” from “KITCHENS” to make it singular and changing the font, and then adding the words “WEIGEL’S” and “NOW OPEN” (and once again modifying the font). Nonetheless, when Weigel filed an application to register its final modified mark in 2017, QuikTrip opposed.

The Board concluded that there was no likelihood of confusion between the two marks and dismissed the opposition. Although many factors weighed in support of a likelihood of confusion finding—including partially identical and related services, overlapping trade channels and consumers, and similar purchase conditions—the Board ultimately found that the differences between the marks were significant enough to outweigh those other factors.

On appeal, QuikTrip argued that the Board erred in three ways:

It improperly assessed the marks’ similarities.
It failed to properly consider the evidence of Weigel’s bad faith.
It gave undue weight to the marks’ dissimilarities when weighing the DuPont likelihood of confusion factors.

The first DuPont factor considers the similarity (or dissimilarity) of the marks. QuikTrip argued that the Board gave insufficient weight to the shared term “KITCHEN,” while giving undue weight to the other parts of the marks. The Court disagreed: “[i]t is not improper for the Board to determine that, ‘for rational reasons’ it should give ‘more or less weight . . . to a particular feature of the mark’ provided that its ultimate conclusion regarding the likelihood of confusion ‘rests on [a] consideration of the marks in their entireties.'” In this case, the Board properly found that “KITCHEN” is a “highly suggestive, if not descriptive” word when used in connection with these goods and services, and therefore the fact that the marks shared this term did not offset the many differences between the marks.

QuikTrip also challenged the Board’s review of the 13th DuPont factor, which broadly covers any other fact(s) relevant to the effect of the use of the mark, including, for example, a bad faith intent to confuse. QuikTrip argued that this factor weighed in favor of a likelihood of confusion, citing evidence alleging that Weigel photographed QuikTrip stores and marketing materials. The Court pointed to Weigel’s multiple efforts to modify its mark, however, and concluded that [...]

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Jetting along the Thin Line between Appellate Standing and Admitting Infringement

by Thomas DaMario | Jan 14, 2021 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that an inter partes review (IPR) petitioner that had not been accused of infringement had standing to appeal a final decision in an IPR because the petitioner alleged facts establishing that there was a substantial risk of infringement of the challenged claims. General Elec. Co. v. Raytheon Techs. Corp., Case No. 19-1319 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 23, 2020) (Hughes, J.)

Raytheon owns a patent directed to a configuration for mounting a turbofan gas turbine engine to an aircraft pylon. Turbofan engines rely on four main component sections—the fan, compressor, combustor and turbine—to generate thrust from the continuous ignition of a mixture of fuel and pressurized air. The compressor and turbine sections are further divided into high-pressure and low-pressure segments. Each of these segments consists of stages, which include a matched set of rotating blades and stationary airfoils. The patent claims recite a “first” spool, which the parties equate with a low-pressure spool, turbine and compressor, and a “second” spool, consisting of the high-pressure spool, turbine and compressor. The claimed “second” spool includes “at least two stages.”

General Electric (GE) competes with Raytheon in the commercial aviation engine market and petitioned for IPR, challenging several claims based on two prior art references, Wendus and Moxon. Wendus discloses all elements recited in the challenged claims, except that it teaches a single-stage high-pressure turbine instead of the claimed “at least two-stage” high-pressure turbine. Moxon states that to improve fuel efficiency, “a move to one instead of two HP turbine stages is thought unlikely.” The Patent Trial and Appeal Board found that all elements recited in the challenged claims were found in the prior art but found that the claims were not proven to be non-obvious, in part because Wendus expressly considered at least some of the one-stage versus two-stage tradeoffs and specifically chose the one-stage option. This express consideration meant that Wendus taught away from combination with Moxon, the Board reasoned. GE appealed.

Before reaching the merits of the appeal, Raytheon moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of standing, arguing that it had never sued or threatened to sue GE for infringing the patent. Accordingly, the standing dispute centered on whether GE had sufficiently alleged an injury in fact. The Federal Circuit explained that “when an appellant relies on potential infringement liability . . . it must establish that it has concrete plans for future activity that creates a substantial risk of future infringement or would likely cause the patentee to assert a claim of infringement.” In the context of an appeal of an IPR proceeding, “it is generally sufficient for the appellant to show that it has engaged in, is engaging in, or will likely engage in activity that would give rise to a possible infringement suit.” GE presented evidence that it spent $10 to $12 million in 2019 developing a geared turbofan architecture and design and that it offered its geared turbofan design to Airbus in response to a request for [...]

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Revenge of the Grammar Nerds: Grammatical Canons Overturn $8.6 Million Jury Infringement Verdict

by Christopher M. Bruno | Jan 14, 2021 | Patents

Addressing whether the phrase “a plurality of” should apply to each element in a series, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit entered judgment of non-infringement, finding that the district court’s claim construction that did not require a plurality of each recited component was at odds with the claim language based on the application of grammatical rules. SIMO Holdings, Inc. v. Hong Kong uCloudlink Network Technology Limited, Case No. 19-2411 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 5, 2021) (Taranto, J.)

SIMO sued uCloudlink for patent infringement based on sales of certain GlocalMe WiFi hotspot devices and a wireless phone model. Generally, these hotspots and patented technology seek to reduce costs for calls and internet access for people traveling internationally.

The sole patent claim at issue covered an apparatus that performed certain communications protocol data transfer and authentication functions that enabled an international traveler to take advantage of a non-subscribed carrier without incurring roaming charges. At issue was the interpretation of that claim language, specifically whether the preamble, which recited a series of technological components (e.g., memory, processors, programs and, importantly here, “non-local calls database”), was a limiting part of the claim, and, if so, whether the language that recited “a plurality of” these components meant that the claimed invention must have a plurality of each of these components, or just more than one of all of them taken together. This was a determining factor for infringement, as it was essentially undisputed that the uCloudlink devices did not have one (let alone multiple) non-local calls databases. The district court concluded that the preamble language was limiting but, parsing the grammar involved and noting that specification “states that the non-local calls database is optional,” concluded that a non-local calls database was not a necessary component, and that summary judgment of infringement was warranted. UCloudlink appealed.

The Federal Circuit agreed that the preamble was limiting, but disagreed that a structure not having a recited element could infringe. The claim in issue recited “[A] wireless communication client or extension unit comprising . . .” followed by a list of components including the non-local call database. Notwithstanding that the database was found in the preamble, the Court concluded that it was limiting because it followed the term “comprising” and provided the necessary structure for the invention, which otherwise would have had no limiting description of the physical components of the apparatus. Moreover, the Court noted that subsequent claim language, which recited “the wireless communication client” and “the extension unit,” referred to those items identified in the preamble after “comprising.”

The Federal Circuit relied on many grammatical canons, its own precedent, various Scalia & Garner textualist interpretation books and the law-school writing-class favorite, Strunk & White. Applying these sources together, the Court reiterated that nouns in series are generally each treated as modified by a phrase that precedes the series (here, “a plurality of”), and that such a rule is particularly forceful when the series ends in an “and” rather than an “or.” And, with no article [...]

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Patent Owner’s Disavowal of Appeal from District Court’s Noninfringement Judgment Moots IPR Appeal

by Sarah P. Hogarth | Jan 14, 2021 | Patents

Addressing the standard for mootness in inter partes review (IPR) proceedings following a district court noninfringement judgment, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that a petitioner’s IPR appeal was moot after the patent owner decided not to appeal the final judgment of noninfringement. ABS Global, Inc. v. Cytonome/ST, LLC, Case No. 19-2051 (Fed. Cir., Jan. 6, 2021) (Stoll, J.) (Prost, C.J., dissenting in part).

In June 2017, Cytonome/ST filed a complaint against ABS asserting infringement of six patents, including the patent of interest in this case. ABS filed a petition for IPR of all claims of the patent. In April 2019, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB, the Board) issued its final written decision invalidating certain claims of the patent. Two weeks later, the district court granted ABS partial summary judgment, holding that the accused products did not infringe any of the asserted patent’s claims. In June 2019, ABS appealed the PTAB’s final written decision. In a briefing before the Federal Circuit, Cytonome/ST’s counsel filed an affidavit stating that Cytonome/ST “has elected not to pursue an appeal of the district court’s finding of non-infringement as to the patent and hereby disclaims such an appeal.” In June 2020, the district court entered final judgment, including as to non-infringement of the patent.

The Federal Circuit dismissed ABS’ appeal of the PTAB’s final written decision on the ground that the appeal was moot in view of the district court’s non-infringement judgment. The Court characterized the question as one under the voluntary-cessation doctrine. In the context of intellectual property infringement cases, the voluntary-cessation doctrine requires the property owner claiming mootness to prove that the “allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur,” i.e., that it will not assert the intellectual property right against the same accused products again. If it does, the burden shifts to the accused infringer to show that it “engages in or has sufficiently concrete plans to engage in activities” that would not be covered by the property owner’s non-assertion decision.

Applying the doctrine, the Federal Circuit concluded that Cytonome/ST could not reasonably be expected to assert infringement of the patent against ABS because ABS had already secured a district court judgment that the accused products do not infringe and Cytonome/ST disclaimed any appeal of the non-infringement judgment. In effect, ABS was insulated from liability for infringement, including for future infringement for products that are “essentially the same” as ABS’ currently accused products pursuant to the Kessler doctrine. Further, the Court found that ABS had not demonstrated it could reasonably expect Cytonome/ST to sue it for infringement of the patent in the future as ABS had not shown it had current or concrete future plans to engage in activities not covered by Cytonome/ST’s disavowal: “Cytonome’s disavowal of its right to appeal the summary judgment of noninfringement ‘estops Cytonome from asserting liability against ABS for infringement of the…patent claims in connection with the accused products, thereby allowing ABS to make, use, and sell those products [...]

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Supreme Court to Consider Doctrine of Assignor Estoppel in Patent Cases

by Amol Parikh | Jan 14, 2021 | Cert Alert, Patents

The Supreme Court of the United States agreed to review assignor estoppel in patent cases. Minerva Surgical, Inc. v. Hologic, Inc., et al., Case No. 20-440 (Supr. Ct. Jan. 8, 2021) (certiorari granted). The question presented is:

Whether a defendant in a patent infringement action who assigned the patent, or is in privity with an assignor of the patent, may have a defense of invalidity heard on the merits.

Csaba Truckai is the inventor of two patents relating to endometrial ablation that were ultimately acquired by Hologic. Truckai later founded Minerva and developed a system that competed with Hologic’s system. The district court ruled that Minerva could not challenge the validity of the patents because Truckai was barred by assignor estoppel from attacking his own patents. A jury found that Minerva infringed both patents and awarded Hologic more than $4.7 million. On appeal, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed, confirming that assignor estoppel bars an assignor from asserting invalidity of an assigned patent in district court, and “declined Minerva’s invitation to ‘abandon the doctrine’ of assignor estoppel entirely.”

State University Challenges Board on Sovereign Immunity in Inter Partes Review

by Paul Devinsky | Jan 14, 2021 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reiterated that “[s]overeign immunity does not apply to IPR proceedings when the patent owner is a state.” Board of Regents of the University of Texas System v. Baylor College of Medicine, Case No. 20-1469 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 10, 2020) (per curiam).

Baylor College of Medicine petitioned for inter partes review (IPR) of two patents owned by the Board of Regents of the University of Texas System (UT). UT moved to dismiss the petitions on state sovereign immunity grounds. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board denied the motion, citing Regents of the University of Minnesota v. LSI Corp. (IP Update, Vol. 22, No. 7).

UT appealed, arguing that University of Minnesota was wrongly decided, but admitted that the panel was bound by it. Predictably, the panel affirmed the Board.

Practice Note: UT’s strategy implies that it intends to use its case as a vehicle to seek en banc (and possibly Supreme Court) review of the University of Minnesota decision.

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