IP UPDATE
Exploring the Latest in Intellectual Property Law
IP UPDATE
Exploring the Latest in Intellectual Property Law
Results for ""
Subscribe to Results for ""'s Posts

Triple Trouble: Unauthorized Trademark Use among Organizations with Nearly Identical Name

by | Apr 1, 2021 |

The US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed a district court ruling that the use of nearly identical marks by a military order, a related foundation and a funding organization was likely to cause confusion. Military Order of the Purple Heart Service Foundation, Inc. v. Military Order of the Purple Heart of the United States of America, Inc., Case No. 19-7167 (DC Cir. Mar. 16, 2021) (non-precedential).

This case involved a dispute among three entities: the Military Order of the Purple Heart of the United States of America, Inc. (Order); the Military Order of the Purple Heart Service Foundation, Inc. (Foundation); and the Military Order of the Purple Heart Service Foundation Holdings, LLC (Holdings). The Order provides charitable services to veterans, and the Foundation funds the Order’s operations. Holdings is owned by the Foundation and licensed the Order to use Holdings’ “Purple Heart” word mark in connection with charitable fundraising for specific approved projects. The funding agreement between the parties was made in 2016, and the use of the trademark was agreed to in 2017. Following a warning from the Foundation in 2018 that the Order’s funding might be reduced for 2019 because of financial problems, the Order began fundraising on its own, at times purposely diverting funds away from the Foundation while using the “Purple Heart” mark without Holdings’ permission.

The Foundation and Holdings sued the Order for breach of the 2016 funding agreement, breach of the 2017 licensing agreement, and trademark infringement. The Order filed its own suit for breach of the funding agreement. The cases were consolidated and the district court ruled that the Order’s use of the mark without permission violated the licensing agreement and two provisions of the Lanham Act. The Order appealed.

The DC Circuit agreed that the Order’s use of Holdings’ mark was in plain violation of the parties’ 2017 agreement. The agreement stated that the Order could use the mark “only in connection with charitable fundraising for specific projects that are approved by [Holdings] and are consistent with [the Order’s] mission statement.” Thus, the Order’s fundraising advertisements using the mark without permission were inconsistent with the agreement.

The DC Circuit also found that the Order’s use of the “Purple Heart” mark was likely to cause confusion. Not only are the names of these entities nearly identical, but the Order’s national commander admitted at trial that the public frequently confuses the Order and the Foundation. Citing its 1982 Foxtrap precedent, the Court concluded that consumer confusion is likely where the marks in issue are identical and the record contains evidence that the businesses are sufficiently related so as to be connected in the mind of the relevant public.



read more

Blame the Lawyer: In Exceptional Case, Plaintiff’s Attorney Liable for Court and Appellate Fees

by | Apr 1, 2021 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed an award of attorneys’ fees against a plaintiff and his counsel, and further granted defendants’ motion for appellate attorneys’ fees and double costs where plaintiff had brought baseless claims, engaged in litigation misconduct and brought a frivolous appeal. Pirri v. Cheek, Case No. 20-1959 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 22, 2021) (non-precedential) (per curiam).

When Plaintiff saw Defendant present her patented idea for “online dating in reverse” on the television show “Shark Tank,” he knew that she had gotten the idea from his therapist, Richards, who had betrayed his confidence. Through his counsel, Plaintiff sued Richards as well as Defendant, her company and her co-inventors (whom he never served) (collectively, Cheek) for joint inventorship of the patent (Richards was not a named inventor), and several state law claims, including breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, conversion and unjust enrichment. At the initial pretrial conference, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed some of the state law claims and the joint inventorship claim against Richards. The district court dismissed the remaining state law claims as “obviously time-barred,” leaving only the joint inventorship claim against Cheek. Defendant moved for Rule 11 sanctions, which the district court denied.

Plaintiff sought leave to amend the complaint to add several new defendants and claims, but the district court denied the motion as futile. Notwithstanding the dismissal of Richards from the suit, Plaintiff subpoenaed Richards’s employment records, but withdrew the subpoena when Richards moved to quash. Plaintiff requested a discovery extension, which the Court denied as relating to irrelevant material. Just before the close of discovery, Plaintiff moved for voluntary dismissal with prejudice. Defendant opposed the dismissal motion in order to seek fees, and the district court denied the motion. Six days later, Plaintiff renewed the motion for dismissal, arguing that the previous denial of Rule 11 sanctions collaterally estopped a fees award. Again, Defendant opposed, and the Court denied the motion.

Two months later, the district court held a pre-summary-judgment conference, before which it ordered Plaintiff to file a letter indicating whether and why he would oppose summary judgment. After declining on several occasions to concede summary judgment or identify any evidence supporting his claims, Plaintiff finally consented to summary judgment for Defendants, which the district court granted.

The district court later granted Defendant’s motion for fees, finding that the case was exceptional. Because Plaintiffs’ counsel had prepared, signed and filed all the relevant submissions, the district court held counsel jointly and severally liable for the award.

Plaintiff appealed, and Defendant moved for appellate fees and double costs.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the fee award, finding no abuse of discretion, and further found that the appeal was frivolous as argued in part because Plaintiff’s counsel distorted the factual and legal bases for the fees award and “leveraged inapposite legal doctrines to make arguments that can only be described as baffling.” The Court concluded that “[w]hen an appeal is frivolous as argued, we may hold a party’s counsel jointly and severally liable.”



read more

Set Phase to Subject Matter Ineligible: More Accurate Haplotype Phase Method Still Abstract

by | Apr 1, 2021 |

In an appeal from a final rejection of a pending application, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that claims directed to methods for determining “haplotype phase” were correctly rejected as subject matter ineligible. In Re: Board of Trustees of The Leland Stanford Junior University, Case No. 20-1288 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 11, 2021) (Reyna, J.)

This case was consolidated for the purposes of oral argument with In Re: The Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University, Case No. 20-1012 (Stanford Part I). Both cases relate to methods of determining “haplotype phase” (a scientific way of describing the methodology for determining from which parent a particular allele (or gene) is inherited).

Stanford Part I related to a claimed method that utilized “linkage disequilibrium data” and “transition probability data” to increase the number of haplotype predictions made. In Stanford Part I, the Federal Circuit held that this claimed method for increasing the number of haplotype predictions made did nothing more than recite a haplotype phase algorithm and instruct users to “apply it,” similar to the claimed subject matter prohibited by Alice.

The claims at issue in this appeal were directed toward a method of improving the accuracy and efficiency of haplotype predictions, which involves “building a data structure describing a Hidden Markov Model,” and then “repeatedly randomly modifying at least one of the imputed initial haplotype phases” to automatically recompute the parameters of the Hidden Markov Model until the parameters indicate that the most likely haplotype phase is found. In addition to these mathematical steps, the claims recited the steps of receiving genotype data, imputing an initial haplotype phase, extracting the final predicted haplotype phase from the data structure and storing it in computer memory.

The examiner and then the Patent Trial & Appeal Board found that this claimed improved process was directed toward patent-eligible subject matter—a mathematical algorithm. Stanford appealed.

Applying the two-step Alice framework, the Federal Circuit first determined whether the claims were directed to an abstract mathematical calculation and thus directed to patent-ineligible subject matter under 35 USC § 101.

Stanford argued that the claimed process was not directed to a patent-ineligible abstract idea, but instead represented an improvement on a technological process—namely, an improvement in the efficiency of haplotype phase predictions that this mathematical algorithm could yield. The Federal Circuit found that Stanford had forfeited this argument by failing to raise it before the Board.

Stanford separately argued that another claimed advantage was that the claim steps resulted in more accurate haplotype predictions, rendering the claimed invention a practical application rather than an abstract idea. The Federal Circuit disagreed, explaining that the improvement in computational accuracy alleged here did not qualify as an improvement to a technological process, but rather was an enhancement to the abstract mathematical calculation of haplotype phase itself.

Next, under step two of the Alice inquiry, the Federal Circuit found that the claims did not include additional limitations that, when taken as a whole, provided an [...]

Continue Reading



read more

Thank You to Our Readers

by | Mar 31, 2021 | ,

We greatly appreciate our readers over the past year and are pleased to share that we were recently recognized for our intellectual property thought leadership in the 2021 JD Supra Readers’ Choice Awards, which acknowledge top authors and firms for their thought leadership in key topics during all of last year.

Sarah Bro, a regular contributor to IP Update, was recognized as “Top Author” for trademarks. She focuses her practice on trademark prosecution, enforcement and brand portfolio management, as well as licensing, due diligence, copyright, right of publicity and domain name matters. Through our various blogs and thought leadership pieces, we are dedicated to maintaining our position as a leading firm for intellectual property work and keeping clients abreast of significant and relevant topics in the industry.



read more

The Road Less Traveled: IPR Denial Decisions Appealable via Mandamus

by | Mar 24, 2021 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concluded that while it did not have jurisdiction to consider the direct appeal of a Patent Trial & Appeal Board decision denying institution, it could review the decision under its mandamus jurisdiction. Mylan Laboratories Ltd. v. Janssen Pharmaceutica, N.V., Case No. 20-1071 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 12, 2021) (Moore, J.)

In 2019, Janssen sued Mylan in district court for infringement of one patent. Less than six months later, Mylan petitioned the Board for inter partes review (IPR) of that patent. Opposing institution, Janssen argued that the IPR would be an inefficient use of Board resources because of two co-pending district court actions (one involving Mylan and one involving a third party) that implicated the same validity issues as the IPR petition. Janssen also argued that those district court actions would likely reach final judgment before any IPR final decision. The Board agreed with Janssen. Mylan appealed and also requested mandamus relief.

On appeal, Mylan argued that the Board’s determination to deny institution based on the timing of a separate district court action that did not involve Mylan undermined constitutional and due process rights.

Before addressing the merits of the appeal, the Federal Circuit addressed two jurisdictional questions: whether it had jurisdiction over Mylan’s direct appeal and whether it had jurisdiction over the mandamus request. As to the first question, the Court relied on its decision in St Jude Medical v. Volcano, finding that decisions denying institution are not subject to review on direct appeal. As to the second question, the Court concluded that judicial review was available in extraordinary circumstances, and particularly in situations involving denial of petitions. The Court stated that “[t]o protect our future jurisdiction, we have jurisdiction to review any petition for a writ of mandamus denying institution of an IPR.”

Having found that it had jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit turned to the merits. The Court explained that when a mandamus petition challenges a decision denying institution, it will be especially difficult to satisfy the requirements for mandamus because the relevant statute bestows the Board with significant discretion. The Court concluded that there is no reviewability of a Board denial of institution except for colorable constitutional claims. The Court found that Mylan lacked a clear and indisputable right to relief and also failed to state a colorable claim for constitutional relief since it did not identify a deprivation of “life, liberty or property” necessary to a procedural due process claim. The Court also found that there were no substantive due process claims since there is no fundamental right to have the Board consider whether to institute on an IPR petition based only upon co-pending litigation to which petitioner is a party. The Court thus denied Mylan’s petition.



read more

Freeze Frame: EU Copyright Holders Entitled to Restrict Framing

by | Mar 24, 2021 |

In a case referred by German authorities, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) resolved a dispute between a visual arts copyright collecting society and a cultural heritage foundation involving a digital library that includes images and links to the institution providing the subject matter. The CJEU affirmed that the principle of the right of communication to the public is subject to technical measures to prevent infringement. VG Bild-Kunst v. Stiftung Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Case C-392/19 (CJEU, 9 March 2021) (Grand Chamber).

Takeaways:

  • Framing and inline linking remain generally permitted. Both forms of linking do not necessarily constitute an act governed by copyright law.
  • Where the copyright holder has adopted or obliged licensees to employ, measures to restrict framing so as to limit access to its work from websites other than that of its licensees, framing must be authorized by the rights holders concerned.

Framing

At the core of this decision is “framing.” The technique of framing consists of dividing a website page into several frames and posting within one of them, by means of a clickable link or an embedded internet link (inline linking), an element from another site in order to hide from users the original environment to which that element belongs.

Background

The decision was based on a request for a preliminary ruling in proceedings between VG Bild-Kunst, a visual arts copyright collecting society in Germany, and SPK, a German cultural heritage foundation. The proceedings concerned VG Bild-Kunst’s refusal to conclude a license agreement with SPK for the use of its catalogue of works unless the agreement contained a provision obliging SPK as a licensee, when using protected work and subject matter covered by that agreement, to implement effective technological measures to prevent third parties from framing such protected work or subject matter.

The German Federal Court of Justice referred the following question to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling:

Does the embedding of a work—which is available on a freely accessible website with the consent of the right holder—in the website of a third party by way of framing constitute communication to the public of that work within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29 where it circumvents protection measures against framing adopted or imposed by the right holder?

The Decision

The CJEU’s reasoning behind the above ” takeaways” is that by adopting or obliging licensees to employ, technological measures limiting access to works from websites other than those on which the copyright owner has authorized communication to the public of such works, a copyright holder is deemed to have expressed its intention to attach qualifications to its authorization to communicate those works to the public by means of the internet, in order to confine the public for those works solely to the users of one particular website.

Consequently, where the copyright holder has adopted or obliged licensees to employ, measures to restrict framing so as to limit access to its work from websites other than that of its [...]

Continue Reading



read more

Waiver in PTO Trademark Appeals Applies “Per Decision, Not Per Case”

by | Mar 24, 2021 |

Addressing a “narrow question of statutory interpretation,” the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of a trademark case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that a party that appeals a Trademark Trial & Appeal Board (TTAB) decision to the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit may, after remand to and issuance of a new decision by the TTAB, seek review of the new decision in federal district court. Snyder’s-Lance, Inc. v. Frito-Lay N.A., Inc., Case No. 19-2316 (4th Cir. Mar. 17, 2021) (Wynn, J.)

Princeton Vanguard, a snack food producer, applied to register its mark “Pretzel Crisps” on the principal register. Frito-Lay opposed. The TTAB denied Princeton Vanguard’s application, concluding that the mark was generic.

Under the Lanham Act, Princeton Vanguard could appeal the TTAB’s original decision to either the Federal Circuit under 15 USC § 1071(a) or federal district court under § 1071(b). Princeton Vanguard elected a direct appeal to the Federal Circuit pursuant to § 1071(a), thus waiving its right to district court review. The Federal Circuit concluded that the TTAB applied the wrong legal standard in evaluating whether Princeton Vanguard’s mark was generic and remanded the case to the TTAB. The TTAB again concluded that Princeton Vanguard’s mark was generic. This time, Princeton Vanguard appealed to a federal district court pursuant to § 1071(b).

The district court sua sponte dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that Princeton Vanguard’s appeal of the original decision to the Federal Circuit pursuant to § 1071(a) precluded Princeton Vanguard from appealing the second decision to a district court pursuant to § 1071(b). Princeton Vanguard appealed.

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the statutory text of the Lanham Act supported Princeton Vanguard’s argument in favor of jurisdiction. The Court explained that Princeton Vanguard’s waiver of its right to district court review of the original TTAB decision pursuant to § 1071(a) did not apply to any subsequent decisions in the same case, and that the waiver applied “per decision, but not per case.”

The Court rejected Frito-Lay’s argument that Princeton Vanguard was taking a second bite at the apple by seeking re-review in federal district court of issues already decided by the Federal Circuit, reasoning that Princeton Vanguard was seeking district court review of the second, separate decision that had not been reviewed by the Federal Circuit. The Court stressed, however, that the Federal Circuit’s review of the TTAB’s original decision was binding as to issues it decided.

Practice Note: If the TTAB issues multiple decisions in the same proceeding, each decision is considered a separate decision for purposes of waiver under §§ 1071(a) (b), even if the decisions implicate similar issues.



read more

For Certain Not Secret Now: Court Declines to Seal Alleged Trade Secret in Amended Complaint

by | Mar 24, 2021 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a decision declining to seal information in an amended complaint where the defendant failed to prove that the information was a trade secret. DePuy Synthes Products, Inc. v. Veterinary Orthopedic Implants, Inc., Case No. 20-1514 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 12, 2021) (Dyk, J.)

After DePuy sued Veterinary Orthopedic Implants (VOI) for patent infringement, the district court issued a protective order providing that “supplier . . . names and identifying information” would be treated as “Highly Confidential Material—Attorney Eyes Only.” DePuy later filed an amended complaint containing such information when it joined VOI’s manufacturer as a defendant. The amended complaint disclosed the manufacturer as such and alleged additional facts about the defendants’ relationship. VOI argued that the manufacturer’s identity and additional facts about the VOI-manufacturer relationship should be sealed as trade secrets. DePuy argued that the manufacturer’s identity was already public, but took no position regarding the additional facts. After the district court declined to seal the amended complaint, VOI appealed.

The Federal Circuit first considered whether it had jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine and whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion to seal.

The Federal Circuit found that it had jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine because:

  • The district court’s order conclusively determined the sealing issue.
  • The sealing issue was important although unrelated to the merits of the infringement claim.
  • Meaningful review after final judgment would be impossible because disclosed information can never be secret again.

On the merits, the Federal Circuit found no abuse of discretion, reasoning that there was no clear error in the district court’s finding that the manufacturer’s identity was not a trade secret where (1) the manufacturer openly advertised itself as an orthopedic manufacturer, (2) the manufacturer and VOI did not have a confidentiality agreement or a confidential relationship giving rise to an implied obligation of confidentiality, and (3) a third-party email suggested that VOI’s relationship with the manufacturer was “known within the relevant community.” The Court further found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s declining to seal the additional allegations despite DePuy’s non-opposition because the district court was required to independently weigh the parties’ interest in confidentiality against the public right of access.

Practice Note: Parties routinely seek sealing of information that may not qualify as formal trade secrets. The district court’s duty to independently evaluate sealing means that parties must be prepared to articulate the particularized harm they will suffer absent sealing or risk the public disclosure of the information, even where the parties agree to treat information confidentially.



read more

No Estoppel in the Name of Different Interests and Claims

by | Mar 17, 2021 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that 35 USC § 314(d) did not bar its review of a Patent Trial & Appeal Board determination that a petitioner was not estopped from maintaining inter partes review (IPR) proceedings since the alleged estoppel-triggering event occurred post-institution. Uniloc 2017 LLC v. Facebook Inc., Case Nos. 19-1688, -1689 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 9, 2021) (Chen, J.)

Facebook and WhatsApp (collectively, Facebook) filed two IPR proceedings challenging certain claims of Uniloc’s patents. Apple also filed a petition challenging a subset of claims of the patent. Facebook subsequently filed a third petition that was substantively identical to Apple’s petition and also filed a motion to join Apple’s IPR. LG Electronics filed petitions identical to Facebook’s three petitions and also filed motions to join Facebook’s IPRs. The Board instituted Facebook’s third petition and granted Facebook’s motion to join Apple’s IPR. The Board then instituted Facebook’s original IPRs and ordered the parties to “brief the applicability, if any, of 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(1)” against Facebook, in light of the soon-to-be-issued final written decision for Apple’s IPR. At the time, LG’s petition and motion to join Facebook’s IPRs had not been decided.

In response to the Board’s order, Facebook argued that it should not be estopped under § 315 from challenging the patentability of any claim upon the issuance of a final written decision in Apple’s IPR. Facebook argued that if the Board did find it estopped, Facebook should be able to continue as a petitioner against one of the claims, which it never challenged, in Apple’s IPR. Facebook also argued that if LG’s IPR petition was granted and LG was joined as a party to its first IPR, the IPR should proceed as to all challenged claims (regardless of whether Facebook was found estopped) because LG was not a party in Apple’s IPR. Uniloc responded, arguing that once the Board issued a final written decision in Apple’s IPR, Facebook would be estopped as to all claims challenged in its first IPR and the Board must terminate that proceeding. Uniloc also argued that allowing LG to join the IPR would create inefficiency and confusion.

The Board ultimately instituted LG’s IPR petitions and granted LG’s motion to join Facebook’s IPRs. In its Patent Owner Responses to the original Facebook IPR petitions, Uniloc argued that LG should be barred from maintaining the first Facebook IPR once the Board issued a final written decision in the Apple IPR because LG was estopped as a real party in interest (RPI) or privy to Facebook. A few months later, the Board issued a final written decision in the Apple IPR upholding the patentability of all challenged claims. The Board’s decision in the first Facebook IPR found that Facebook was estopped under § 315(e)(1) as to claims also challenged in Apple’s IPR, but not other claims since § 315(e)(1)’s estoppel provisions apply only to grounds that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised “with respect to that claim.”

In its final [...]

Continue Reading



read more

Subscription to RSS Feed Doesn’t Trigger Implied-License Defense

by | Mar 17, 2021 |

The US Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit affirmed a district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law against an alleged copyright infringer on its implied-license defense, finding that a blog operator’s publication of entire articles through a really simple syndication (RSS) feed does not give rise to an implied license without substantial evidence showing an intent to grant a license. MidlevelU, Inc. v. ACI Information Group, Case No. 20-10856 (11th Cir. Mar. 3, 2021) (Pryor, J.)

MidlevelU published a free blog designed to attract potential customers in the midlevel healthcare market. MidlevelU made the full text of its blog articles (instead of only headlines and article summaries) available in an RSS feed. ACI is a content aggregator that subscribed to the blog’s RSS feed. ACI copied and published more than 800 entries from MidlevelU’s blog by including those articles in a curated index of abstracts and full-text articles of academic blogs. ACI had no license agreement with MidlevelU.

After discovering the ACI’s activities, MidlevelU registered 50 of its most recent articles for copyright protection with the US Copyright Office. MidlevelU also sent ACI a cease-and-desist letter demanding that its content be removed from ACI’s index. ACI removed the content from the index and coded links to index entries for MidlevelU’s articles so that they would redirect to the MidlevelU’s website. Months later, MidlevelU discovered that, although its content was no longer available on the index website, it still appeared in the website repositories of university libraries. These entries credited ACI as the content’s publisher and directed visitors to view the blog’s full-text content in the “subscribers only” section of the blog aggregator’s website.

MidlevelU sued ACI in federal district court, alleging copyright infringement of the registered articles. ACI asserted an implied-license defense. Relying on the Latimer case, which sets forth the test for implied license in work-for-hire situations, the district court entered judgment as a matter of law in MidlevelU’s favor, finding that there could be no implied license because the ACI could not meet the “creates a work at another person’s request” element of the Latimer test. ACI appealed.

The 11th Circuit found that the district court read Latimer too broadly by applying its holding outside of the work-for-hire context, but the Court nevertheless affirmed the district court’s decision because a jury could not have reasonably inferred from the evidence that the MidlevelU impliedly granted a license to ACI. The Court noted that it had never held that the Latimer test was the only way to prove an implied license. An implied license may arise from circumstances outside of work-for-hire situations: “Creating material at another’s request is not the essence of a license: an owner’s grant of permission to use the material is.”

When an owner clearly manifests consent to use of its copyrighted material, the owner impliedly grants a non-exclusive license. Citing Fields, a district court case in the search-engine web crawler context, ACI argued that an implied license arose because the MidlevelU did [...]

Continue Reading



read more

BLOG EDITORS

Paul Devinsky

Amol Parikh

STAY CONNECTED

Subscribe

TOPICS

ARCHIVES