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Oh the Horror: No Work for Hire in Friday the 13th Screenplay

by | Oct 14, 2021 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a summary judgment grant, ruling that an author was an independent contractor when writing the screenplay for a horror film and entitled to authorship rights, and therefore entitled to exercise his copyright § 203 termination right. Horror Inc. v. Miller, Case No. 18-3123 (2d Cir. Sept. 30, 2021) (Carney, J.)

Victor Miller is an author who has written numerous novels, screenplays and teleplays. Sean Cunningham is a producer, director and writer of feature films and is the general partner of Manny Company. Miller and Cunningham were close friends who began working together around 1976 and collaborated on five motion pictures in their first five years working together. Miller was a member of the Writers Guild of America, East (WGA) and was a signatory of their Minimum Basic Agreement (MBA), which was the collective bargaining agreement at the time.

In 1979, the success of the horror film Halloween inspired Cunningham to produce a horror film. Cunningham reached out to Miller and they orally agreed that Miller would write the screenplay for their upcoming project. The two came to an agreement using the WGA standard form. Miller then began developing the screenplay and the two worked closely together in discussing ideas for the film. Miller picked his working hours but was responsible for completing drafts based on the production schedule of the film. Cunningham had no right to assign additional works to Miller beyond the screenplay.

The dispute concerns whether, for Copyright Act purposes, Miller was an employee or independent contractor of Manny Company, of which Cunningham was the general partner. Cunningham argued that he taught Miller the key elements of a successful horror film, that he gave significant contributions and that he had final authority over what ended up in the screenplay. Miller agreed that Cunningham gave notes but stated that Cunningham never dictated what he wrote. The parties agreed that Cunningham did provide the ideas for making the movie killings “personal,” that the killer remain masked and that they kill a major character early. Miller received “sole ‘written by’ credit” as the screenwriter.

Horror Inc. (successor to Georgetown Horror) financed the project and was given complete control over the screenplay and film. Manny assigned its rights in the film and screenplay to Horror, which registered the copyrights. In the registration, Horror was listed as the film’s work made for hire author with a credit given to Miller for the screenplay. The initial film was a huge hit and has spawned 11 sequels.

In 2016, Miller attempted to reclaim his copyright ownership by invoking his termination rights under 17 U.S.C. § 203 and served notices of termination to Manny and Horror. The two responded by suing Miller and seeking a declaration that the screenplay was a “work for hire,” and therefore Miller could not give a valid termination notice. The district court granted summary judgment to Miller, stating that Miller was the author as he did not prepare the screenplay as [...]

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Design Patent Prior Art Must Be From Same or Analogous Field as Claimed Article of Manufacture

by | Oct 14, 2021 |

Finding that the Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board) applied an erroneous interpretation of claim scope, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a Board decision upholding an examiner’s rejection of a lip implant design patent as anticipated by a non-analogous art tool. In re: SurgiSil, Case No. 20-1940 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 4, 2021) (Moore, C.J.)

SurgiSil filed a design application for a lip implant shaped like a generally cylindrical rod that tapered to a point at each end. The examiner rejected the patent as anticipated by a “stump,” an art tool of similar, almost identical, shape used for smoothing and blending areas of pastel or charcoal. SurgiSil appealed the rejection to the Board. The Board affirmed the rejection, finding that the differences in the shapes of SurgiSil’s lip implant and the art tool were minor. The Board rejected SurgiSil’s argument that the two articles of manufacture were “very different,” reasoning that it is irrelevant whether a prior art reference is analogous for anticipation purposes. SurgiSil appealed.

Reviewing the Board’s legal conclusions de novo, the Federal Circuit found that the Board erred as a matter of law. Citing 35 U.S.C. § 171(a) and the 1871 Supreme Court decision in Gorham Co. v. White, the Court explained that a design patent claim does not cover the design in the abstract, and that it is limited to the particular article of manufacture identified in the claim. The Court concluded that the claimed design was limited to a lip implant, did not cover other articles of manufacture and that the Board’s decision therefore rested on an erroneous interpretation of the claim’s scope.



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Party May Not Veil EU Individual’s Information under GDPR at the TTAB

by | Oct 14, 2021 | ,

In a rare precedential opinion, the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board (TTAB, Board) ruled that the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) does not apply in Board proceedings. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Inc. v. Intercontinental Exchange Holdings, Inc., Opposition Nos. 91235909; 91254514 (T.T.A.B. Sept. 27, 2021) (Faint, Interlocutory Attorney).

This was a consolidated proceeding between Chicago Mercantile Exchange and New York Mercantile Exchange (collectively, CME) and Intercontinental Exchange Holdings (ICE) and brought before the TTAB. CME sought to amend the Board’s standard protective order (SPO) to allow in-house access to information and materials designated by ICE as “Confidential – Attorney’s Eyes Only” and asked the TTAB to find that the EU GDPR does not apply in the proceedings.

The Board’s SPO is automatically imposed in all inter partes proceedings. In order for the Board to disturb their SPO, CME needed to show that protection of ICE’s trade secrets will impair CME’s prosecution of its claims. ICE asserted that CME failed to show good cause for modification of the SPO and the Board agreed. As an initial matter, CME failed to provide information sufficient for the Board to determine in-house counsel’s responsibilities, including whether those responsibilities included competitive decision-making such that disclosure to in-house counsel would competitively harm ICE. Secondly, CME failed to clearly demonstrate that there was a need for access to the highly sensitive competitive information to adequately prepare its case. Accordingly, the Board denied CME’s motion to amend the protective order.

CME next raised the issue of whether ICE may redact names, email addresses and other information from documents and electronically stored information (ESI) originating in the European Union prior to its production on the basis that the GDPR requires such redaction. CME argued that because ICE waited more than 18 months to assert this objection, the objection is waived, that CME will be severely prejudiced if ICE’s objection stands and that the GDPR does not apply in inter partes Board proceedings.

For background, the GDPR is an EU regulation made effective May 25, 2018, in order to protect the privacy and security of EU citizens’ personal data by limiting the transfer of such information among member states of the European Union, as well as between the European Union and other countries, including the United States. The broad definition given to “personal data” in the GDPR encompasses “any information relating to an identified or identifiable person.” However, this class of information (an individual’s name, position, job title and email address) is generally required to be produced in discovery pursuant to the Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 26(b)(1).

In this precedential decision, the Board, citing the 1987 Supreme Court case Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, established that a foreign country’s law precluding disclosure of evidence in US courts and tribunals will generally not deprive those courts and tribunals of “the power to order a party subject to its jurisdiction to produce evidence even though the act of production may violate that statute.”. Additionally, the GDPR does not per [...]

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Ex Parte Reexamination Not Allowed After Failed IPR Challenge

by | Oct 14, 2021 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that ex parte reexamination was unavailable to a challenger who repeatedly tried and failed to raise the same arguments for the same patent in a prior inter partes review (IPR) proceeding. In re: Vivint, Inc., Case No. 20-1992 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 29, 2021) (Moore, C.J.)

Vivint sued Alarm.com in 2015 for infringement of several patents. In response, Alarm requested that the Patent Trial & Appeal Board (PTAB) institute “a litany of post-issuance review proceedings,” including three separate IPR petitions directed to one of the patents. The PTAB refused to institute two of the petitions because Alarm failed show to a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail on at least one challenged claim and also refused to institute the third petition because it represented an example of “undesirable, incremental petitioning.” According to the PTAB, Alarm had “used prior Board decisions as a roadmap to correct past deficiencies” and allowing such “similar, serial challenges to the same patent” by the same challenger risked, not only harassment of patent owners, but also frustration of congressional intent behind the America Invents Act (AIA).

More than a year later, Alarm filed a request for ex parte reexamination of the patent—a request that used repackaged versions of arguments from its unsuccessful IPR petition. Despite the striking similarity between Alarm’s prior and current arguments, including two out of the four original IPR patentability questions being copied verbatim from the failed petition into the ex parte reexamination request, the PTAB found the petition raised substantial new questions of patentability and ordered reexamination. Vivint responded by seeking dismissal of the ex parte reexamination under 37 C.F.R. § 1.181, arguing that the PTAB has the authority under 35 U.S.C § 325(d) to deny the ex parte reexamination request because that statute applies to ex parte reexaminations and IPRs with “equal force.” The PTAB rejected Vivint’s request, stating that any § 1.181 petition raising a § 325(d) challenge must be filed before reexamination is ordered.

Vivint filed a second § 1.181 petition seeking reconsideration of the § 325(d) issue, arguing that it would have been impossible for Vivint to file the § 1.181 petition before ex parte reexamination was ordered. Vivint also argued that even if the PTAB lacked general authority to terminate the reexamination, it could exercise such authority under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Vivint also asserted that the PTAB “acted arbitrarily and capriciously by applying the same law to the same facts and reaching a different conclusion.” The PTAB rejected Vivint’s arguments and denied its second petition, finding that Vivint could have sought a waiver of the rules having to do with the required prior-to-ex parte timing of a § 1.181 petition vis-à-vis institution of ex parte reexamination. The PTAB also noted that ex parte reexamination was not inconsistent with denying the initial IPR. Ultimately, after an examiner issued a final rejection for all claims of the patent, Vivint appealed to the PTAB. The PTAB affirmed and Vivint [...]

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Authentication Claim Under Alice—A Two-Step Process

by | Oct 14, 2021 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found patent claims directed to a method of authenticating the identity of a user performing a transaction at a terminal was patent-eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and reversed the district court’s entry of judgment on the pleadings. CosmoKey Solutions GmbH & Co. KG. v. Duo Security LLC, Case No. 20-2043 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 4, 2021) (Stoll, J.) (Reyna, concurring).

CosmoKey sued Duo for patent infringement and Duo moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that all claims of the patent at issue are ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The district court analyzed the claims under the Alice two-step framework. At step one, the court agreed with Duo, finding that the patent claims were directed to the abstract idea of authentication—the verification of identity to permit access to transactions. Relying on Federal Circuit precedent, the court reasoned that “authentication” is an abstract concept. Moving to step two, the court determined that the patent merely teaches generic computer functionality, reasoning that the patent itself admits that “the detection of an authentication function’s activity and the activation by users of an authentication function within a pre-determined time relation were well-understood and routine, conventional activities previously known in the authentication technology field.” After the court granted Duo’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, CosmoKey appealed.

Applying Third Circuit law, the Federal Circuit reversed the lower court’s decision and provided more insight into the “inventive concept” analysis and “two-step” process framework. The Federal Circuit first acknowledged that while it had previously found claims directed to authentication to be abstract, it also found claims directed to specific verification methods that depart from earlier approaches and improve technology eligible under § 101.

The Federal Circuit disagreed with the district court’s broad characterization of the claims under Alice step one, finding instead that the claims and written description suggest that the claims are directed to a more specific authentication function. Nevertheless, the Court noted that it did not need to answer this question because the patent claims satisfy Alice step two. Under step two, the Court focused on the purported technical advance and found that the invention provides a “specific improvement to authentication that increases security, prevents unauthorized access by a third party, is easily implemented, and can advantageously be carried out with mobile devices of low complexity.” The Court explained that the district court erred in its interpretation of certain sections of the specification. Specifically, the court read the specification to describe prior art that shows the steps were routine or conventional. However, the Court pointed out that the last four steps of claim one of the patent solved a technical problem in the field using steps that were not conventional.

Judge Jimmie V. Reyna concurred with the decision but took issue with the Court’s dismissal of analyzing the claims under Alice step one, finding the approach “extraordinary and contrary to Supreme Court precedent.” He noted that step two does not operate independently of step one, [...]

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Failing to Address All Reasons for Noninfringement Renders Appeal Moot

by | Oct 14, 2021 |

In deciding whether the district court correctly interpreted various claim terms in four patents related to communication techniques used in computer gaming technology, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that rendering a decision as to the terms for at least two of the patents would be moot. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on noninfringement. Acceleration Bay LLC v. Take-Two Interactive Software (Oct. 4, 2021) (Reyna, J.)

Acceleration Bay is the owner of four unrelated patents that are generally directed to communication techniques associated with computer gaming. In particular, certain of the patents teach that an originating computer sends a message to its neighbors on a broadcast channel using point-to-point connections, and that the neighboring computers then sends the message to only their neighboring connections. This reduces the number of connections that each computer must maintain and improves efficiency in the system.

Acceleration Bay filed a patent infringement suit claiming that Take-Two Interactive Software, a software designer for various video games, including Grand Theft Auto V, NBA 2K15 and NBA 2K16, directly infringed the four asserted patents. As part of the district court proceedings, multiple terms recited in the claims of the four patents were construed. In particular, the court construed the claim term “m-regular” to mean “a state that the network is configured to maintain, where each participant is connected to exactly m neighbor participants.” Additionally, the court effectively embedded this definition of “m-regular” into other construed claim terms, including “fully connected portal computer” and “each participant being connected to three or more other participants.”

After claim construction, the district court granted summary judgment of noninfringement in favor of Take-Two on all asserted patents. In granting summary judgment, the court observed that Take-Two makes software, not computer networks or broadcast channels, and therefore its customers must introduce those elements. As such, direct infringement is inappropriate because multiple entities, not just Take-Two, contribute to the allegedly infringing system. The court rejected Acceleration Bay’s argument under Centrak, Inc. v. Sonitor Techs., Inc. that Take-Two was actually the “final assembler” because it installed the software for its customers. The court additionally identified multiple reasons why the “m-regular” limitation was not met in the accused products, including the fact that Acceleration Bay identified no source code to support its theory. Acceleration Bay appealed.

With respect to two of the four patents on appeal, Take-Two argued that Acceleration Bay’s appeal is moot because it only addressed one of the two reasons the district court granted summary judgment of noninfringement. Specifically, the court granted summary judgment on these two patents because (1) the accused products do not meet the “m-regular” limitation and (2) Acceleration Bay’s “final assembler” theory fails as a matter of law. On appeal, Acceleration Bay addressed only the “final assembler” theory. As such, the Federal Circuit found that a ruling on this issue would not affect the court’s summary judgment ruling, and the appeal of these two patents is [...]

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Induced Infringement Finding May Support Willfulness Finding

by | Oct 7, 2021 |

In a redux visit, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that the record compelled reversal of a district court’s refusal to reinstate a jury’s willful infringement verdict and enhanced damages award but affirmed an attorneys’ fees award, taking into account the finding of willful infringement. SRI International, Inc. v Cisco Systems, Inc., Case Nos. 20-1685; -1704 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 28, 2021) (Stoll, J.)

This is the second appeal in the case. In the first appeal, the Federal Circuit found that the record was insufficient to establish that Cisco’s conduct before May 2012 (when Cisco became aware of the asserted patents) rose to the level of wanton, malicious and bad faith behavior required for willful infringement. In view of the finding, the Court concluded that Cisco could not have willfully infringed and therefore vacated the district court’s enhancement of damages for pre-May 2012 conduct. As for post-2012 conduct, the Court remanded the case to the district court to decide in the first instance whether the jury’s finding of willful infringement after May 8, 2012, (the date Cisco received notice) was supported by substantial evidence. The Court also vacated the district court’s decision to award SRI its attorneys’ fees and remanded for recalculation. On remand, the district court interpreted the original Federal Circuit opinion as requiring a more stringent standard willful infringement and concluded that substantial evidence did not support the jury verdict of willful infringement after May 8, 2012. SRI appealed.

In the second appeal, the Federal Circuit determined whether the record demonstrated that substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict of willful infringement after May 2021. In analyzing willful infringement, the Court reviewed the instructions provided to the jury on induced infringement:

“Defendant is liable for active inducement only if plaintiff proves by a preponderance of the evidence” that, among other things, (1) “Defendant took some action intending to encourage or instruct its customers to perform acts that you, the jury, find would directly infringe”; and (2) “Defendant was aware of the asserted patents at the time of the alleged conduct and knew that its customer’s acts (if taken) would constitute infringement of an asserted patent.”

The Federal Circuit found that the jury considered the evidence provided by SRI in view of the instructions on induced infringement and that Cisco induced infringement of the asserted claims. Acknowledging that the standard for induced infringement is different than that for willful infringement, the Court nevertheless found that the jury’s unchallenged finding related to induced infringement (i.e., Cisco did not challenge the jury’s findings on appeal) and, combined with Cisco’s lack of reasonable defenses to infringement, was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict of post-2012 willful infringement. Since Cisco was found to have willfully infringed on the asserted patents, the Court determined that SRI was entitled to enhanced damages.



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No Immunity: State Right of Publicity Law is § 230 “Law Pertaining to Intellectual Property”

by | Oct 7, 2021 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that § 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c), does not preclude claims based on state intellectual property laws, reversing in part a district court’s dismissal of a plaintiff’s state law claims for violation of her right of publicity. Hepp v. Facebook, Case Nos. 20-2725; – 2885 (3d Cir. Sept. 23, 2021) (Hardiman, J.) (Cowen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

In 2018, Karen Hepp, a Philadelphia newscaster, discovered a photo of herself making its way around the internet. The picture, taken without Hepp’s knowledge or consent, depicts her smiling in a convenience store and was posted in two locations online. The first post was a Facebook advertisement promoting a dating service, which encouraged users to “meet and chat with single women near you.” The second post was to Imgur and was subsequently linked to a Reddit thread, where it spurred a flurry of indecent user commentary. Hepp sued Facebook, Imgur and Reddit for violations of Pennsylvania’s right of publicity statute. The district court dismissed Hepp’s claims with prejudice, holding that all three companies were entitled to immunity as internet service providers under § 230(c). Hepp appealed.

The Third Circuit found that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over Imgur and Reddit on a “purposeful availment” minimum contacts basis and affirmed dismissal of the claims against those parties.

With respect to Facebook, the Third Circuit considered whether it was immune under § 230(c). Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act was intended to promote the internet, specifically by preserving “the vibrant and competitive free market …unfettered by Federal or State regulation.” Accordingly, § 230(c) provides Good Samaritan protection for internet service providers, encouraging them to host and moderate third-party content by immunizing them from some publisher liability regarding certain moderation decisions. However, pursuant to § 230(e)(2), such immunization does not “limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual property.”

The first question addressed by the Third Circuit was whether § 230(e)(2) can apply to state law claims generally. The Court acknowledged that precious few cases interpreting § 230’s intellectual property provision exist, and that the existing cases present a clear split on whether § 230(e)(2) applies only to federal intellectual property claims. The Court, adhering to what it regarded as the most natural reading of § 230(e)(2), (i.e., that a state law can be a “law pertaining to intellectual property law”) determined that application of § 230(e)(2) was not limited to federal claims. The Court was not persuaded by Facebook’s policy arguments regarding a purported increase in uncertainty regarding the contours of § 230(c) immunity if state law intellectual property claims, which vary from state to state, were exempt from such immunity.

The second question the Third Circuit addressed was whether Hepp’s right of publicity claim arose from a “law pertaining to intellectual property.” In finding that it did, the Court relied on a survey of legal dictionaries and determined that the term “intellectual property” [...]

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Federal Circuit to WD Tex.: Denial of Transfer Motion was Clear Error, Abuse of Discretion

by | Oct 7, 2021 |

For the third time in as many months, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found clear error in the US District Court for the Western District of Texas’s denial of a defendant’s motion to transfer venue. In re Juniper Networks, Inc., Case No. 21-160 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 24, 2021) (per curiam).

WSOU Investments d/b/a Brazos Licensing filed seven complaints against Juniper Networks in the Western District of Texas for infringement of seven different patents. Juniper, a Delaware corporation headquartered in Sunnyvale, California, moved the district court to transfer the case to the Northern District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Juniper pointed out that Brazos is a self-described patent assertion entity that does not conduct any business other than asserting patents and argued that “whatever ties Brazos has to this District appear to have been created for the purpose of its patent litigation activities in this District.” Additionally, two of Brazos’s officers, its CEO and its president, reside in California. Juniper argued that the Northern District of California was a clearly more convenient forum, noting that potential key witnesses were located in the Northern District of California. Juniper also asserted that the accused products were designed, developed, marketed and sold primarily from its Sunnyvale headquarters. While acknowledging that six of the actions could have been brought in the Northern District of California, the district court denied Juniper’s motion to transfer based on its analysis of the four private interest and four public interest factors. Juniper petitioned the Federal Circuit for writ of mandamus directing the district court to transfer the six cases.

Applying Fifth Circuit law, the Federal Circuit noted that a motion to transfer under § 1404(a) should be granted if “the movant demonstrates that the transferee venue is clearly more convenient.” The Court noted that district courts enjoy broad discretion in transfer determinations, but that it has routinely issued mandamus when a district court’s denial of a motion to transfer amounts to clear abuse of discretion.

The Federal Circuit explained that the “single most important factor” in transfer analysis is the relative convenience and cost of attendance for witnesses. Juniper identified 11 potential witnesses, all of whom were located in the Northern District of California, while Brazos only identified one Texas-based employee as a potential witness. The district court found that this only weighed slightly in favor of transfer, assigning “little weight” to both party and prior art witnesses and concluding that many of the witnesses were “unlikely to testify.” The Court disagreed, holding that the district court clearly erred in not giving sufficient weight to this factor in light of the “striking imbalance” in the parties’ 11-to-one listing of potential witnesses. The Court noted that it previously rejected both of the arguments used by the district court to discount the weight applied to Juniper’s witnesses. In August 2021, the Court held in In re Hulu, LLC that the district court’s discounting of party and prior art witnesses was “untethered [...]

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Only One More Ratification Needed: European UPC Might Be Ready to Launch

by | Oct 7, 2021 | ,

The German parliament recently passed the Approval Act (the Act) regarding the planned European Unified Patent Court (UPC) and the protocol on a UPC on provisional application (PPA). The Act was passed after Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court rejected applications for a preliminary injunction directed against the Act. The instrument of Germany’s ratification of the PPA (not of the UPC Agreement (UPCA)) has been deposited with the European Council. The UPC Preparatory Committee published a report calling Germany’s ratification “a decisive step on the establishment of the Unified Patent Court after the work has been on hold for several years during the examination of the Agreement by the German Federal Constitutional Court.”

The PPA will only come into effect after at least 13 EU Member States (which must include Germany, Italy and France, i.e., the three Member States in which the most European Patents were in effect in 2012) ratify the PPA and deposit their respective instrument with the European Council. The PPA must also ratify the UPCA (or at least have parliament’s approval to do so) and deposit this second instrument with the European Council. In this complex scheme, the German ratification was previously the main legal hurdle.

Now, after publication of Slovenia’s Approval Act in its National Law Gazette and the expected deposit of its PPA and UPCA instruments, only one more national ratification and instrument deposit is needed to reach the required 13 ratifications. According to a note published by the Presidency of the Council of the European Union on September 24, 2021, Austria is likely to move next, whereupon the project will reach the minimum number of ratifying Member States. The Austrian Government submitted a draft for an approval act to its parliament in July 2021 and expects approval.

Upon the complete ratification of the UPCA and PPA, the UPC will form on a provisional basis and commence its existence as a legal entity. The UPC Preparatory Committee (Committee) can then formally start its work. Although there is no timeline set for the initial provisional application stage, the Committee expects that stage to continue for approximately six to 10 months following ratification. As stated in the note by the Presidency of the Council, this stage includes the adoption of the secondary legislation of the UPC, including procedures, establishment of a budget, recruitment of judges and administrative stuff, election of a president, the final configuration and testing of the file management system and ensuring that all IT infrastructure is properly set up and secured. In addition, a working agreement with the European Patent Office (EPO) on patent application and patent validation remains to be completed. Many observers regard the timeline to complete preparations as challenging, noting that several of the above points will likely require significant discussion. With these issues in mind, the Competitive Council (Council) met on September 29, 2021, to discuss further actions regarding the preparations and to invite ministers to inform the Council of recent or upcoming developments in [...]

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