IP UPDATE

Public use, even without explicit public disclosure, is patent bar under pre-AIA § 102(b)

by Tyler Jackson | Apr 23, 2026 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment of invalidity under the pre-America Invents Act (AIA) on sale bar, holding that a third party sale to the public of a product embodying a patented method and apparatus can trigger invalidity even where details of the invention were not expressly disclosed. Definitive Holdings v. Powerteq, Case No. 24-1761 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 14, 2026) (Moore, Dyk, Cunningham, JJ.)

Definitive Holdings sued Powerteq alleging infringement of a patent directed to methods and systems for reprogramming engine controllers. With a priority date of March 30, 2001, the patent was subject to pre-AIA law. Powerteq moved for summary judgment of invalidity under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), arguing that a nonparty, Hypertech, had sold a product (the PP3) that embodied all limitations of the asserted claims more than one year before the patent’s priority date.

Rather than disputing the underlying facts, Definitive challenged the admissibility of the evidence on which Powerteq relied. Definitive argued that the deposition testimony of Hypertech’s Rule 30(b)(6) witness, the PP3 source code, and expert testimony relying on that source code were inadmissible. The district court rejected those arguments and granted summary judgment of invalidity, concluding that the third party sales triggered the on sale bar. Definitive appealed.

The Federal Circuit reviewed the summary judgment ruling de novo, applying Tenth Circuit law.

Definitive first argued that the district court improperly relied on testimony from Hypertech’s Rule 30(b)(6) witness, Hypertech CEO and owner Jay Ramsay. The Federal Circuit disagreed, finding that Ramsay’s testimony was based on his personal knowledge and thus was sufficient to authenticate Hypertech’s sales records and establish that Powerteq’s expert analyzed source code from the PP3 product.

The Court explained that a reasonable juror could conclude that Ramsay had personal knowledge of Hypertech’s recordkeeping practices and sales activities. Because those portions of the testimony were sufficient to support summary judgment, the Court declined to address whether other portions of the 30(b)(6) testimony were properly considered and how the Tenth Circuit generally treats Rule 30(b)(6) testimony at summary judgment.

Definitive next argued that the PP3 source code and related expert testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay. The Federal Circuit disagreed. The Court explained that while comments or annotations in source code could, in some circumstances, qualify as hearsay statements, the operative source code itself functions as a set of commands or instructions. As such, it is not offered for the truth of any assertion. The Court therefore found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in considering expert testimony describing the functioning of the source code when granting summary judgment.

Finally, Definitive contended that the on sale bar did not apply because Hypertech’s sales of the PP3 did not publicly disclose how to perform the patented method, even if the PP3 embodied all claim limitations and was sold more than one year before the priority date.

The Federal Circuit rejected Definitive’s argument, emphasizing that Hypertech’s sales directly conveyed to the public the ability to practice the [...]

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How ex parte is ex parte reexam?

by Lisette Donewald | Apr 16, 2026 | Patents

Under a new procedure, announced in an Official Gazette Notice dated April 1, 2026, patent owners may now provide input before the United States Patent and Trademark Office decides whether to initiate an ex parte reexamination proceeding. Previously, while patent owners could participate after reexamination was ordered, they had no opportunity to submit arguments before the Office determined whether a request raised a substantial new question of patentability (SNQ). Under the new policy, patent owners may submit a limited pre-order paper to inform that threshold determination.

Ex parte reexamination is an administrative mechanism that allows third parties to challenge patent validity outside of court. Unlike inter partes review and post-grant review – both adjudicated by Patent Trial and Appeal Board judges – ex parte reexaminations are handled by the Central Reexamination Unit and initiation there turns on whether or not the request raises an SNQ.

The new procedure introduces an optional patent owner pre-order paper that must be filed within 30 days of service of the reexam request, with no extensions available. The submission is limited to 30 pages and must focus on why the cited prior art does not raise an SNQ. Supporting declarations are permitted and do not count toward the page limit, but incorporation by reference is not allowed.

The notice also places important limits on the scope of these submissions. The patent owner’s paper must be directed only to the issues raised in the request and should not address matters outside that scope. For example, the Office indicates that arguments regarding discretionary denial under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) are not part of the SNQ determination and therefore should not be included.

Requesters have limited ability to respond to a patent owner’s pre-order paper. While responses are not ordinarily permitted, a requester may petition to file a reply (limited to 10 pages). Any such reply must be filed within 15 days of service of the patent owner’s paper and requires payment of a fee.

These changes may shift the dynamics of ex parte reexamination practice. Historically, institution decisions were made based solely on the requester’s submission. The new procedure allows patent owners to present arguments earlier in the process, potentially assisting the Office in evaluating whether the request satisfies the SNQ standard before ordering reexamination.

For challengers, this change increases the importance of the initial request. Requests should be drafted with the expectation that the patent owner may respond before institution and that opportunities to reply will be limited.

Article III standing: Claims of future injury must be sufficiently tied to the claim limitations at issue

by Taylor MacDonald | Apr 16, 2026 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit dismissed an appeal of a post-grant review (PGR) for lack of Article III jurisdiction, finding that the appellant failed to meet its burden to prove it would likely suffer an injury in fact. ironSource Ltd. v. Digital Turbine, Inc., Case No. 2024-1831 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 7, 2026) (Moore, Lourie, Reyna J.J.)

Mobile advertising company Digital Turbine has a patent related to streamlined background processes for downloading and installing mobile applications. That patent is a continuation an earlier related patent which was invalidated during a prior PGR proceeding. Mobile advertising and app monetization platform ironSource once had a product on the market called Aura, which included “Click to Install” features. When faced with what it referred to as “veiled threats” of liability for infringement of the earlier patent, ironSource modified its Aura product – eventually removing it from the market – and petitioned the Patent Trial & Appeal Board for a PGR of the continuation patent’s claims 1 – 22.

During the PGR, the Board held that claims 1 – 22 were all unpatentable pursuant to its earlier decision in the earlier PGR but allowed Digital Turbine to amend the claims. In so doing, Digital Turbine included, among other changes, two narrowing limitations to the claims. The Board concluded that ironSource had not carried its burden of proving that the newly amended claims were unpatentable or ineligible for patent protection. ironSource appealed.

On appeal, the Federal Circuit explained that while Article III standing is not required before the Board, it is required to sustain an appeal of the Board’s decisions. The burden is on the appellant to prove it meets the requirements for standing under federal law at the time of filing. Federal law requires an appellant to prove it has “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the [appellee], and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo. Specific to patent cases, the appellant must show concrete evidence of its intended future actions that pose a substantial risk of infringement or an assertion of infringement.

To meet this obligation, ironSource submitted a declaration by one of its senior directors. The declarant discussed past changes and concessions to the Aura product that ironSource had made in light of Digital Turbine’s patent rights. It also stated that ironSource intended to reintroduce the Aura product to the market. Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit held that ironSource failed to meet its burden of tying that potential product’s features to the patent’s amended claims. Instead, ironSource focused on the claims of the original, alleging that they were “substantially identical” to the continuation patent’s claims, i.e., the claims Digital Turbine had previously “threatened” against the company. The Court emphasized, however, that ironSource failed to account for the narrowing limitations in the amended claims and thus failed to prove a likely injury in fact from infringement of the substituted claims.

Finally, the Federal Circuit distinguished [...]

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“X” marks the spot: A single DuPont factor may be dispositive

by Tyler Jackson | Apr 16, 2026 | Trademarks

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed dismissal of a trademark opposition, concluding that a single DuPont factor may be sufficient on its own to support a finding of no likelihood of confusion. Fuente Mktg. Ltd. v. Vaporous Techs., LLC, Case No. 24-1460 (Fed. Cir. April 8, 2026) (Prost, Taranto, Hughes, JJ.)

Fuente Marketing and Vaporous Technologies both sell smoking related products. Fuente owns two standard character trademark registrations for the letter “X,” used in connection with cigars and related accessories. Vaporous sought to register a highly stylized design mark for use with its vaping products. The parties stipulated that Vaporous’ mark consisted of “an abstract stick figure consisting of two diagonal intersecting lines in the shape of a wide stylized letter ‘X’ with a shaded circle above.”

Fuente opposed the application at the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB), arguing that Vaporous’ mark was likely to cause confusion with Fuente’s “X” marks. Applying the DuPont factors, the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board dismissed the opposition, concluding that there was no likelihood of confusion. Fuente appealed.

The Federal Circuit reviewed the Board’s factual findings for substantial evidence and its ultimate likelihood of confusion determination de novo. Fuente challenged the Board’s analysis of two DuPont factors and argued that the Board improperly weighed the factors as a whole.

The Federal Circuit focused on the first DuPont factor, which evaluates the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. The court found that substantial evidence supported the Board’s finding that this factor weighed heavily against a likelihood of confusion. The Federal Circuit agreed that consumers were more likely to perceive Vaporous’ mark as a stylized stick figure rather than the letter “X.” Unlike Fuente’s standard character mark, Vaporous’ design mark did not sound like the letter “X” as it had no pronunciation, and it incorporated prominent visual features – including a shaded circle comprising roughly one fifth of the mark – that were “not a minor or unnoticeable feature.”

Although the Board found that the remaining DuPont factors were neutral or favored Fuente, the Federal Circuit explained that it could “discern the Board’s path to dismissal” and affirmed the conclusion that in a case like this one DuPont factor was sufficient to establish dissimilarity between the marks. The Court emphasized that a likelihood of confusion analysis is a balancing test, and no minimum number of factors must favor one party.

Practice note: This decision reinforces that a single DuPont factor, particularly the dissimilarity of the marks, may be dispositive of likelihood of confusion. Parties should not assume that favorable findings on other factors can overcome a clear lack of similarity in appearance, sound, connotation, or commercial impression.

Settled means settled: Broad settlement release equates to res judicata

by Kavya Rallabhandi | Apr 16, 2026 | Trademarks

The US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed a summary judgment decision, concluding that an intellectual property owner’s claims were barred by the scope of a settlement agreement resolving earlier state court litigation between the parties. Clear Touch Interactive, Inc. v. The Ockers Co. et al., Nos. 25-1304, 25-1374 (4th Cir. Apr. 1, 2026) (Wynn, Harris, JJ.) (Rushing, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Clear Touch, a designer and manufacturer of interactive technology products, entered into exclusive reseller agreements with information and communications technology reseller Ockers in 2014. After Clear Touch revoked Ockers’ exclusivity in 2017, Ockers began developing a competing product called TouchView. Clear Touch terminated Ockers as a reseller in 2019. The following year, Ockers filed suit in South Carolina state court alleging breach of contract and asserting various tort, trade secret, defamation, and civil conspiracy claims.

In June 2021, the parties resolved the state court action through a settlement agreement that dismissed the case with prejudice and included a broad mutual release of all claims and counterclaims – known or unknown – that were brought or could have been brought and that arose out of or related to the subject matter of the lawsuit.

Despite that settlement, Clear Touch filed a federal action one month later against Ockers, two of its officers (John J. Houser and Jason Houser), and TouchView Interactive, asserting claims for trademark infringement, trade secret misappropriation, and unfair competition based on the TouchView product. The defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the settlement agreement and the state court’s dismissal with prejudice barred Clear Touch’s claims.

The district court initially allowed some claims to proceed, including certain Lanham Act claims and claims against TouchView Interactive, but dismissed the remainder. After discovery, however, the court revisited the preclusion issue and granted summary judgment to Ockers and its officers, concluding that all of Clear Touch’s remaining claims were barred by res judicata. The district court also granted summary judgment to TouchView Interactive, finding it to be a shell entity with no commercial activity. Following a jury verdict in favor of Ockers, Clear Touch appealed.

Clear Touch challenged the district court’s res judicata determination, arguing both substantive error and procedural error under Rule 54(b). The Fourth Circuit rejected both arguments. Substantively, the Fourth Circuit held that Clear Touch failed to create a genuine dispute regarding the settlement agreement’s plain language or the parties’ mutual intent to release all claims, including those that could have been brought, arising from the same operative facts. Even when viewed in the light most favorable to Clear Touch, the federal claims were precluded because they could have been asserted as counterclaims in the prior state court action, which had been dismissed with prejudice.

Procedurally, the Fourth Circuit found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to revisit its earlier rulings. Rule 54(b) permits revision of nonfinal orders when new evidence emerges or a legal error becomes apparent. Here, supplemental evidence showed that Clear Touch [...]

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