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“Self-Similar” More Objective Than One Might Think

by Art Dykhuis | Jun 9, 2022 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board) decision holding that the term “self-similar” was not indefinite and denying leave to file a sanctions motion. ClearOne, Inc. v. Shure Acquisition Holdings, Case No. 2021-1517 (Fed. Cir. June 1, 2022) (Moore, Newman, Hughes, JJ.)

Shure owns a patent relating to arrays of microphones and housings that can be fitted to a drop ceiling grid, providing “equivalent beamwidth performance at any given look angle.” During inter partes review, Shure moved to amend the claims to add a new claim reciting microphones “arranged in a self-similar configuration.” The Board granted that motion, holding that “self-similar” was not indefinite. The Board denied ClearOne’s motion for rehearing and separate motion for sanctions alleging a failure to disclose prior that Shure had asserted in a post-grant review initiated against one of ClearOne’s patents.

The Federal Circuit first reviewed the Board’s indefiniteness holding. Since “[d]efiniteness is a matter of claim construction,” the Court applied de novo review while reviewing underlying factual determinations for substantial evidence. The Court held that the intrinsic record alone supported the Board’s definiteness finding because it provided the scope of “self-similar” with reasonable certainty. The specification disclosed microphones arranged in a “self-similar or repeating configuration”; a “fractal, or self-similar, configuration surrounding a central microphone”; and arrangements in circular or other repeating shapes, such as “ovals, squares, rectangles, triangles, pentagons, or other polygons.” Thus, “self-similar,” when read in view of the specification, informed skilled artisans about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty.

The Federal Circuit rejected ClearOne’s argument that “self-similar or fractal-like” and “self-similar or repeating” distinguished self-similar from other types of patterns, holding that in context, it was clear that the phrases equated, not juxtaposed, self-similar with those patterns. Reviewing the extrinsic evidence, the Court also rejected ClearOne’s arguments premised upon “a series of rhetorical questions to show [ClearOne’s] varying interpretations of the self-similar term.” The possibility of varying interpretations, the Court held, “does not render [a term] indefinite,” as otherwise nearly every term would be indefinite if susceptible to alternative plausible constructions.

The Federal Circuit also rejected ClearOne’s motion for leave to seek sanctions. The Board held that allowing the sanctions motion would lead to an inefficient proceeding because the sanctions motion raised the same arguments as the denied request for rehearing, a ruling that ClearOne conceded on appeal. The Board also found a lack of intent to breach a duty to disclose references. Without analysis and applying the abuse of discretion review standard, the Court found that these factual determinations sufficiently established that the Board did not abuse its discretion.

PTO Re-Opens to Public

by Amol Parikh | Jun 2, 2022 | Patents

The US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) re-opened to the public on May 25, 2022. Both the headquarters in Alexandria, Virginia, and the regional offices in Dallas, Texas; Denver, Colorado; Detroit, Michigan and San Jose, California, are now open. The offices had been closed to the public since March 16, 2020, because of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Visitors will be required to complete a health questionnaire and may be denied entry depending on the results of the questionnaire. Local COVID-19 infection rates will determine whether masks are required in each office.

Although the PTO is open to the public, oral hearings before the Patent Trial & Appeal Board and Trademark Trial & Appeal Board will still be conducted by video or telephone. In-person interviews with examiners are now possible, however.

Oh Snap: Sufficient Reasoning Must Support Declaratory Judgment Dismissal

by Cecilia Choy, Ph.D. | Jun 2, 2022 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the dismissal of a declaratory judgment action because the district court failed to sufficiently support its decision. Mitek Systems, Inc. v. United Services Automobile Association, Case No. 21-1989 (Fed. Cir. May 20, 2022) (Dyk, Taranto, Cunningham, JJ.)

United Services Automobile Association (USAA) owns four patents directed to using a mobile device to capture and transmit an image of a bank check for deposit. Mitek created software for mobile check capture called MiSnap™, which it licenses in the form of a software development kit to financial institutions. In 2017, USAA sent letters to Mitek’s customers, some with claim charts and patent lists. The customers subsequently demanded indemnification by Mitek. In 2018, USAA sued Wells Fargo, a Mitek customer, in the Eastern District of Texas. As the case progressed, USAA served a subpoena on Mitek seeking documents, source code and testimony about MiSnap™. The case went to trial on two of the four patents, and Mitek and its products were frequently mentioned.

Shortly thereafter, Mitek filed a complaint in California seeking declaratory judgment of no infringement as to all four USAA patents. To support jurisdiction for its declaratory judgment claim, Mitek alleged that there was real and substantial apprehension of imminent litigation between Mitek and USAA for infringement of the patents-in-suit. In response, USAA argued that there was no case or controversy as required by Article III of the Constitution, and thus the case should be dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. USAA also argued that the California court should exercise discretion to decline to hear claims for declaratory relief. USAA requested alternatively that the action be transferred to the Eastern District of Texas.

The California court transferred the case to the Eastern District of Texas. The Texas court then dismissed the action for lack of a case or controversy and stated that the court would exercise discretion to decline to entertain the declaratory judgment action. Mitek appealed.

Addressing subject matter jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit explained that the question was “whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interest, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.” Along these lines, a plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to establish jurisdiction at the time of the complaint, and a case or controversy must remain present throughout the course of the suit. The Court found that the Texas court’s decision provided insufficient reasoning for dismissal because it failed to identify first whether to treat the Rule 12(b)(1) motion as a facial or factual challenge, as required under Fifth Circuit precedent. The Federal Circuit instructed the district court on remand to explore any post-filing events that may have impacted jurisdiction, as well as similarities between Mitek’s relationships with Wells Fargo and other customers.

The Federal Circuit found that the district court’s case or controversy analysis was similarly inadequate. The Court explained [...]

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Except Where Futile, Litigant Must Preserve Issue at Jury Instruction Phase to Preserve Claim Construction Dispute

by Joshua Revilla | Jun 2, 2022 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the denial of a defendant’s post-judgment motion for a new trial based on a failure to preserve an O2 Micro challenge. The Court also reversed the denial of a prejudgment interest award to the plaintiff. Kaufman v. Microsoft, Case Nos. 21-1634; -1691 (Fed. Cir. May 20, 2022) (Dyk, Reyna, Taranto, JJ.)

Michael Philip Kaufman brought a patent infringement suit against Microsoft asserting his now-expired patent that covered a method for operating a computer to automatically generate an end-user interface that permit users to interact with data in relational databases (which store data in multiple tables that are related to each other in defined ways). Kaufman alleged infringement by Microsoft’s development tools for the .NET framework software platform, specifically Microsoft’s Dynamic Data product that allegedly automatically generated a web application for viewing and editing data. A jury found Microsoft liable for infringement and awarded $7 million in damages. Post-trial, Microsoft moved for judgment as a matter of law and a new trial, arguing that the district court failed to resolve claim construction disputes before trial and that Microsoft was therefore entitled to a new trial under 02 Micro. Kaufman moved for prejudgment interest. Both motions were denied, and both sides appealed.

Microsoft argued that the district court erred by not clarifying the claim term “automatically” and that a new trial was warranted under O2 Micro because the clarification reasonably could have led the jury to a different verdict. The Federal Circuit disagreed, explaining that Microsoft failed to preserve its O2 Micro challenge by not pursuing the matter at the jury instruction phase. The Court reasoned that the parties did not request a construction of “automatically” during the original Markman proceeding, nor did Microsoft propose a definition of “automatically” in its proposed jury instructions defining the term. Further, in its summary judgment briefing, Microsoft only said that there was a “fundamental legal dispute” as to the definition of “automatic.” Microsoft never clearly stated that a construction was needed on the term or offered the district court a formulation of such a claim construction. Microsoft also never defined a proposed construction for the term that would accommodate its action after trial. While the Court allowed that a claim construction issue does not always need to be re-raised in the specific setting of making proposals for, or airing objections to, jury instructions, that exception is limited to situations where the issue was sufficiently raised and settled earlier. The Court explained that application of that principle was settled in O2 Micro, “referring to circumstances in which the claim-construction position of the appellant was ‘made clear to the district court,’ a further objection would have been ‘not only futile but unnecessary,’ and the issue was ‘fully litigated and decided at the Markman stage of the litigation.’”

Turing to Kauffman’s appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the denial of prejudgment interest. The district court had reasoned that the jury verdict “subsumed interest” and that Microsoft was prejudiced by [...]

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Arthrex, Still Without Director Review, Gets Constitutional Review from Patent Commissioner

by Christopher M. Bruno | Jun 2, 2022 | Patents

A panel of the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit considered whether the Patent Commissioner, on assuming the role of the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) Director, can constitutionally evaluate the rehearing of Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board) inter partes review (IPR) decisions. The panel concluded that neither Appointments Clause jurisprudence nor the Federal Vacancies Reform Act (FVRA) impeded the Commissioner from exercising the PTO Director’s authority. Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc. et al., Case No. 18-2140 (Fed. Cir., May 27, 2022) (Moore, C.J.; Reyna, Chen, JJ.)

Approximately one year ago, Arthrex succeeded in the Supreme Court of the United States on its argument that the Appointments Clause of the Constitution was violated unless a presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed officer (such as the PTO Director) could review the Board’s final IPR decisions. (United States v. Arthrex, Inc.) The case returned to the PTO on remand. At the time, the position of PTO Director was vacant, and there was no acting director. Pursuant to the FVRA, the Commissioner of Patents (a position filled by the Secretary of Commerce) exercised the PTO Director’s authority to review Board decisions and ultimately rejected Arthrex’s challenge to the Board’s unpatentability determination. Arthrex appealed.

Arthrex contended that the Commissioner could not constitutionally exercise the PTO Director’s IPR review authority without running afoul of the Appointments Clause, that the FVRA barred the Commissioner’s exercise of authority and that the Commissioner violated separation of powers. Arthrex also challenged the ruling on the merits. None of these challenges were successful.

First, the Federal Circuit concluded that Arthrex reinforced long-settled Supreme Court precedent that an inferior officer could exercise a principal officer’s authority constitutionally on a temporary basis without violating the Appointments Clause. Here, the Court concluded that the Commissioner’s exercise of the PTO Director’s IPR review authority until a new director was installed presented no problem.

Second, the FVRA provides a statutory framework for the exercise of a principal officer’s duties under certain circumstances, which, if the law applied, would not have allowed the Commissioner to review IPR decisions. However, the Federal Circuit explained that the FVRA narrowly governs only those duties of an officer that are statutorily non-delegable (i.e., which US Congress has required to be exercised personally by the officer). According to the Court, such provisions did not apply here because nothing demonstrated that the PTO Director’s newly created authority to review IPR decisions was non-delegable.

Third, the Federal Circuit rejected Arthrex’s argument that the Commissioner’s service as the PTO Director violated the line of precedent that limits Congress’ ability to circumscribe the president’s removal authority for superior officers. Arthrex contended that the Commissioner, a non-superior officer, could be removed only for “misconduct or nonsatisfactory performance” and therefore could not fill the role of the PTO Director. The panel disagreed, explaining that the president could name an acting director “with the stroke of a pen,” and so the limits on removing the Commissioner from his role as Commissioner [...]

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Counterfeit Dealer Gets Smoked in Trademark Preliminary Injunction Proceeding

by Tessa Kroll | Jun 2, 2022 | Copyrights, Trademarks

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a preliminary injunction barring the defendant from selling counterfeit e-cigarette and vaping products bearing the plaintiff’s logo because the plaintiff’s psychoactive products were legal and could support a valid trademark. AK Futures LLC v. Boyd St. Distro, LLC, Case No. 21-56133 (9th Cir. May 19, 2022) (Kleinfeld, Fisher, Bennett, JJ.)

AK Futures manufactures e-cigarettes and vaping products, including delta-8 THC goods marketed under its “Cake” brand. Delta-8 THC is a psychoactive compound found in the Cannabis sativa plant, which encompasses both hemp and marijuana. The compound is similar in effect to delta-9 THC, the primary psychoactive agent in marijuana, but delta-8 THC is typically manufactured from hemp-derived cannabidiol (CBD). The cultivation and possession of hemp was legalized by the Farm Act in 2018.

AK Futures sued Boyd Street Distro, a Los Angeles purveyor of smoke products, for trademark and copyright infringement. Boyd Street sold virtually identical counterfeit Cake-branded e-cigarettes and vaping products containing delta-8 THC. At the time of suit, AK Futures had a registered copyright protecting its Cake logo—a stylized “C” overlaying a two-tier cake—and pending trademark applications for six marks incorporating the word “Cake” or the Cake logo for use in connection with e-cigarette products. The district court granted AK Futures’ motion for preliminary injunction. Boyd Street appealed.

On appeal, Boyd Street conceded the copyright claim, but argued that AK Futures could not own a valid trademark in connection with its e-cigarettes and vaping products because the sale of delta-8 THC was prohibited under federal law. In response, AK Futures argued that the 2018 Farm Act legalized delta-8 THC and products containing the compound.

The Ninth Circuit agreed that AK Futures’ use of the marks in commerce was lawful and could give rise to trademark priority. The Court found that the “plain and unambiguous” text of the Farm Act indicated that delta-8 THC products were lawful. The Farm Act removed “hemp” and “tetrahydrocannabinols in hemp” from Schedule I in the Controlled Substances Act, where “hemp” is defined as “the plant Cannabis sativa L. and any part of that plant, including . . . all derivatives, extracts, [and] cannabinoids . . . with a delta-9 concentration of not more than .3 percent.” The Court noted that the delta-9 THC concentration level was the only statutory metric for distinguishing marijuana from hemp, and that the terms “derivative, extract, or cannabinoid” were substantially broad. The Court thus concluded that “hemp” encompasses delta-8 THC products that contain no more than 0.3% delta-9 THC.

Boyd Street argued that the US Drug Enforcement Agency had interpreted the Farm Act as not applicable to delta-8 THC because it is “synthetically derived” and argued that US Congress never intended the Farm Act to legalize psychoactive substances. The Ninth Circuit perfunctorily dismissed these arguments based on the clear and unambiguous statutory language. Since the Cake-branded products allegedly contained less than 0.3% delta-9 THC, the Court held that AK Futures was likely to succeed in demonstrating that its [...]

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Delay in Enforcing Trademark Measured from When Infringement Became Actionable

by Eleanor B. Atkins | May 26, 2022 | Trademarks

Addressing laches and progressive encroachment, the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded a district court’s grant of summary judgment based on laches because the district court failed to “conduct a meaningful analysis” as to when the trademark infringement first became actionable. A.I.G. Agency, Inc. v American International Group, Inc., Case No. 21-1948 (8th Cir. May 13, 2022) (Loken, Gruender, Grasz, JJ.)

A.I.G. Agency (Agency) is a family-owned insurance broker in Missouri and American International Group, Inc. (International) is a large insurance company. Each company has used its version of an AIG trademark for decades. Agency first adopted the mark in 1958 while International began using AIG sometime between 1968 and 1970. In 1995, International sent a demand letter to Agency notifying it of International’s trademark registration and requesting that Agency cease use of the AIG mark. Agency responded that it had the right to use AIG in Missouri and Illinois because it had been using the trademark in those states long before International obtained its registration. In 2008, International again reached out to Agency demanding that it stop using AIG as a mark. Agency again asserted that it had the right to use the mark in Missouri and Illinois. International responded that it did not object to Agency’s use of AIG in St. Charles and St. Louis Counties in Missouri, but it would contest Agency’s use beyond that limited geographic scope.

Nearly a decade later, in 2017, Agency sued International for common law trademark infringement and unfair competition. International asserted that Agency’s claims were barred by laches and counterclaimed for trademark infringement, trademark dilution and unfair competition. Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted summary judgment for International, finding that Agency’s claims were barred by the doctrine of laches. Agency appealed.

The Eighth Circuit explained the difference between the equitable affirmative defense of laches (which is meant to bar claimants from bringing unreasonably delayed claims) and the doctrine of progressive encroachment (under which the period of delay in a trademark infringement case is measured not from when a claimant first learned of the allegedly infringing mark, but from when that infringement first became actionable). The Court explained that “[t]he doctrine [of progressive encroachment] saves trademark holders from being hoisted upon the horns of an inequitable dilemma—sue immediately and lose because the alleged infringer is insufficiently competitive to create a likelihood of confusion, or wait and be dismissed for unreasonable delay.” Here, Agency argued that it did not have an actionable and provable claim for infringement until 2012 when International changed its marketing strategy.

The Eighth Circuit found that the district court failed to “conduct a meaningful analysis” to determine when the infringement became actionable, noting that the district court found that laches barred the claims because “both parties have been using ‘AIG’ in the same markets for decades, each with full knowledge of the other’s activities.” The Court further criticized the district court for not employing a specific test to determine [...]

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There Should Be No Secret about Scope of Trade Secret Injunction

by Jodi Benassi | May 26, 2022 | Trade Secrets

In the context of an interlocutory appeal, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated a portion of a preliminary injunction in a case involving alleged misappropriation of trade secrets for failing to provide sufficient specificity as to what it prohibits. Carl Zeiss Meditec, Inc. v. Topcon Medical Systems, Inc. et al., Case No. 2021-1839 (Fed. Cir. May 16, 2022) (Hughes, Linn and Stoll, JJ.)

Topcon Medical filed an interlocutory appeal, seeking vacatur of a preliminary injunction granted by a district court in the Northern District of California. Topcon asserted that the injunction failed to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d) because it did not provide an adequate description of what specific acts are prohibited. Topcon argued that the injunction is ambiguous as to whether it applies to all of its platform or only to a certain module. Topcon further argued that the ambiguities are exacerbated by the district court’s misunderstanding of evidence presented from a declaration and deposition in the case and the court’s use of that evidence to draw conclusions about the misappropriation of trade secrets.

The Federal Circuit agreed with Topcon that the preliminary injunction failed to provide any notice required under Rule 65(d) as to whether—and to what extent—Topcon’s continued use of the platform and modules is outlawed. As to the basis for the injunction, the Court noted that “the district court did not address whether all [the] information [asserted in the complaint] was confidential, or whether it was acquired, used, or disclosed improperly. Second, as Topcon convincingly argues, the scope of the asserted trade secrets captured under CZMI’s argument is staggering, including unspecified software architecture, unnamed user interfaces, generically noted research, and other information simply identified as trade secrets.” The Court explained that Rule 65(d) expressly requires that the injunction order must “describe in reasonable detail—and not by referring to the complaint or other document—the act or acts restrained or required.” The Court further agreed with Topcon that the district court’s reference to declaration evidence related to data that was not the data on which the misappropriation claim was based, which “exacerbate[d] the ambiguity of the injunction and in no way support[ed] extending the injunction to cover [other parts of the accused] platform or …decoder.”

Because the grant of injunction did not identify the specific acts prohibited, the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the injunction to the district court to clarify the scope of the injunction.

Time Bar Dismissal Saves Patent Found Unpatentable

by Bhanu K. Sadasivan, PhD | May 26, 2022 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit dismissed an appeal, finding it lacked appellate jurisdiction to review a Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board) decision to vacate an institution decision of inter partes review (IPR) based in part on the Board’s time bar evaluation. Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Bennet Regulator Guards, Inc., Case No. 21-1759, (Fed. Cir., May 13, 2022) (Lourie, Stoll, JJ.) (Newman, J. dissenting)

This is the third time this case has been before the Federal Circuit. On July 18, 2012, Bennett served Atlanta Gas with a complaint alleging infringement of its patent. The district court dismissed the complaint without prejudice. More than two and a half years after service of the complaint, Atlanta Gas filed an IPR petition. Bennett argued that Atlanta Gas’s IPR petition was time barred, but the Board disagreed, instituted review of all claims and found every claim unpatentable in a final written decision. After receiving the final decision, Bennett sought sanctions for Atlanta Gas’s failure to notify the Board of Atlanta Gas’s changed parentage. On appeal, the Federal Circuit vacated the Board’s final written decision, finding the IPR time barred under 35 U.S.C. §315(b). (Bennett Regulator Guards, Inc. v. Atlanta Gas Light Co.). The Supreme Court thereafter issued its decision in Thryv, Inc. v. Click-To-Call Tech, where it held that time bar determinations are not reviewable. On remand from the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s unpatentability decision, did not address the time bar decision and remanded the case back to the Board to finalize its order on sanctions (Bennett II). On remand, the Board vacated its institution decision in light of the US Patent & Trademark Office’s (PTO) changed policy on time bar evaluations and declined to award the requested sanctions. Atlanta Gas appealed.

The Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Atlanta Gas argued that the Board’s decision was a final sanctions decision that is reviewable under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A) and that any portion of the Board’s determination beyond the sanctions award violated the Court’s mandate in Bennett II. Bennett countered that the Court lacked jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) and the Supreme Court’s Thryv decision and that the Board’s decision was not inconsistent with the Bennett II mandate. The Court agreed, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction because the Board’s decision was based in part on its time bar evaluation and, therefore, was not purely a sanctions decision. Additionally, the Court found that the time bar determination was within the scope of the mandate, albeit mooting its determination of unpatentability.

Judge Newman dissented. In her view, the sanctions order was the only issue on appeal. She also pointed out the inconsistency with the Bennett II mandate, noting the contradiction in the Federal Circuit currently mooting the unpatentability decision with the Bennett II decision finding the patent unpatentable. She explained that denial of appellate review could be seen as authorizing the Board to vacate its final decisions [...]

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Déjà vu Decision on Likelihood of Confusion

by Amol Parikh | May 19, 2022 | Trademarks

The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court’s dismissal of a trademark suit that was essentially identical to a previous lawsuit that was dismissed based on a finding of lack of confusion. Springboards to Education, Inc. v. Pharr San Juan Alamo Independent School District, Case No. 21-40336 (5th Cir. May 10, 2022) (Willett, Engelhardt, Wilson, JJ.)

Springboards sells products to school districts in connection with its “Read a Million Words Campaign.” The campaign builds excitement around reading by incentivizing school children to read books through promises of induction into the Millionaire’s Reading Club and access to rewards, such as t-shirts, backpacks and fake money. Springboards’ goods may typically bear any combination of trademarks that it registered with the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO), including “Read a Million Words,” “Million Dollar Reader,” “Millionaire Reader” and “Millionaire’s Reading Club.”

Pharr San Juan Alamo (PSJA) is a public school district in Hidalgo County, Texas. Springboards sued PSJA in 2016 in federal court, alleging trademark infringement based on the school district’s use of “millionaire”-themed reading incentive programs allegedly “using products and services bearing marks and branding identical to or confusingly similar to Springboards’ marks.” While the case was pending, the Fifth Circuit issued its decision in Springboards to Education, Inc. v. Houston Independent School District, where it found that another public school district’s summer reading program did not infringe Springboards’ trademarks. Observing the parallels between the Houston case and the PSJA case, the district court granted PSJA’s motion for summary judgment that it did not infringe any of Springboards’ trademarks. Springboards appealed.

Calling it “déjà vu all over again,” the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that PSJA’s use of Springboards’ marks was not likely to cause confusion. The Court explained that distinguishing between Springboards’ catalog of “millionaire”-themed goods and unaffiliated “millionaire”-themed goods that other educational entities have elected to deploy is not difficult, and unique imprints on “millionaire”-themed reading challenges are widespread in the educational field. The Court noted that as in Houston, Springboards did not allege that PSJA itself is in the business of competing with Springboards by selling its own “millionaire”-themed products to the school districts that make up Springboards’ customer base. The Court thus concluded that PSJA’s use of a million-word reaching challenge did not confuse and was not intended to confuse the sophisticated school districts that Springboards targets with its marks.

Springboards tried to distinguish the Houston case by arguing that the Houston school district had one summer reading program whereas PSJA has had several year-long reading programs and that the requirements of PSJA’s reading program are identical—and not merely similar to—Springboards’ model program. Springboards also noted that its founder worked his entire career in Hildago County (where PSJA is located) and visited schools, teachers and administrators in the district—unlike Houston, which was over 300 miles away. The Court found that these facts did not move the needle, in light of its finding that sophisticated school district customers can [...]

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