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Yes, and It Counts! Single Purchase in Forum Establishes Personal Jurisdiction over Infringer

by Tessa Kroll | Sep 1, 2022 | Trademarks

The US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed exercise of personal jurisdiction over a foreign online retailer for a trademark infringement claim where the trademark owner purchased the only allegedly infringing article sold in the forum. NBA Properties, Inc. v. HANWJH, Case No. 21-2909 (7th Cir. Aug. 16, 2022) (Ripple, Scudder, JJ.)

NBA Properties owns the trademarks for the National Basketball Association (NBA) and NBA teams. HANWJH is a China-based online retailer that sells allegedly infringing NBA branded products on a well-known e-commerce site. HANWJH offered 205 allegedly infringing products that were available for purchase in Illinois, the forum state. HANWJH’s only online order in Illinois was made by an investigator for NBA Properties who purchased a pair of basketball shorts for delivery to an Illinois address. The shorts were delivered to the Illinois address before NBA Properties filed suit against HANWJH.

NBA Properties sued HANWJH for trademark infringement and counterfeiting under 15 U.S.C. § 1114 and false designation of origin under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) in the Northern District of Illinois. NBA Properties sought and received a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, including a temporary asset restraint on HANWJH’s bank account. After HANWJH failed to timely answer the complaint, NBA Properties moved for default judgment. HANWJH moved to dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing the following:

Operating a website is not sufficient on its own to establish personal jurisdiction.
A single transaction by the plaintiff cannot support the exercise of personal jurisdiction.
Even if the exercise of personal jurisdiction were otherwise appropriate, such exercise would offend the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

The district court denied HANWJH’s motion to dismiss and entered a default. HANWJH failed to object to the motion for default judgment, and the district court entered a final judgment. HANWJH appealed.

The Seventh Circuit reviewed the “minimum contacts” International Shoe criterion before turning to a more recent line of cases applying this standard to online retailers. Citing its 2020 decision in Curry v. Revolution Laboratories, the Court noted that the minimum contacts requirement is satisfied if “the defendant reasonably could foresee that its product would be sold in the forum.” The Court reasoned that allowing customers to order products from a website to the forum and then fulfilling an order to the forum can form the basis of personal jurisdiction—even when the only orders to the forum were made by the plaintiff, as long as the orders were made before filing suit. Applying these principles, the Court found that HANWJH had purposefully directed conduct at Illinois by establishing an online store, demonstrating a willingness and capacity to ship goods to Illinois and intentionally shipping an infringing product to an Illinois address. The Court explained that it was irrelevant that only a single allegedly infringing article was sold in Illinois and that it was purchased by the plaintiff, because the proper focus of the analysis was on HANWJH’s purposeful conduct. The Court also concluded that HANWJH’s [...]

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DMCA Scienter Requirement Not Satisfied without Evidence of Knowledge of Inducement or Concealment

by Rodney Swartz, PhD | Sep 1, 2022 | Copyrights

Interpreting a provision of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), 17 U.S.C. § 1202(b), for the first time, the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a summary judgment ruling that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the second scienter requirement of § 1202(b) by not showing that the defendant knew, or had reasonable grounds to know, that its actions would induce, enable, facilitate or conceal a copyright claim. Victor Elias Photography, LLC v. Ice Portal, Inc., Case No. 21-11892 (11th Cir. Aug. 12, 2022) (Newsom, Marcus, JJ; Covington, Distr. J.)

Victor Elias is a professional photographer who takes photographs for hotels and resorts throughout the United States, Mexico and the Caribbean. Between 2013 and 2017, Elias took pictures for Starwood Hotels & Resorts and Wyndham Hotel & Resorts. As part of his process, Elias embedded copyright management information (CMI) into the image files.

During this period and into 2018, Starwood and Wyndham contracted with Ice Portal (a division of Shiji at the time of the appeal) to process thousands of images, including 220 images taken by Elias, and make them available to online travel agents. This processing included converting the images to JPEG format, making copies in various industry-standards sizes and optimizing the files for faster display. The processing sometimes resulted in the loss of an image file’s metadata. In 2016, Elias discovered infringing online uses of his images that lacked the embedded CMI. He filed suit against Ice Portal, contending that the stripping of metadata resulted in loss of his embedded CMI, which violated two sections of the DMCA: 17 U.S.C. §§ 1202(a) and 1202(b).

Following discovery, the district found that Elias could not “satisfy the ‘second scienter requirement’ of the statute” and granted Shiji’s motion for summary judgment. Relying on the 2018 Ninth Circuit case Stevens v. Corelogic, the district court found that Elias had not established that Shiji “knew or had reason to know that its action would induce, enable, facilitate, or conceal infringement.” The court determined that Elias failed to demonstrate that the removal of CMI “is the reason, or even the likely reason, for the infringing use of the images,” or that “Shiji was even aware that searching for terms embedded in the extended attributes was a method used by copyright holders to find infringement on the internet.” Elias appealed.

Because this was a novel issue for the Eleventh Circuit, the Court interpreted § 1202(b) as an issue of first impression. After considering the plain terms of the statute and the opinions of sister circuits, the Court agreed with its sister circuits that to satisfy the scienter requirement of §1202(b), a plaintiff “must make an affirmative showing . . . [that] the defendant was aware [of] or had reasonable grounds to be aware of the probable future impact of its actions.”

Elias urged the Eleventh Circuit to adopt a standard that would only require a plaintiff to demonstrate that CMI was knowingly removed without consent and that the defendant either “knows, or has [...]

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File Like an Eagle: ANDA pH Specification Rules Infringement Inquiry

by Nitya Anand | Sep 1, 2022 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s finding of noninfringement in a Hatch-Waxman case under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) and § 271(a)-(b). The Court found that the alleged infringer’s abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) specification controlled the § 271(e)(2) infringement inquiry, and that there were no clear errors by the district court that would warrant reconsideration of the § 271(a)-(b) ruling. Par Pharmaceutical, Inc. et al. v. Eagle Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Case No. 21-2342 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 18, 2022) (Moore, Prost, Hughes, JJ.)

Par is the maker of Vasostrict®, a vasopressin injection product used to treat patients with critically low blood pressure. Par sued Eagle, an ANDA filer seeking to market a generic version of Vasostrict®, asserting infringement of two Orange Book-listed patents. The claims of both asserted patents required a vasopressin composition with a rounded pH between 3.7 and 3.9 (i.e., a pH between 3.65 and 3.94 before rounding). Par argued that Eagle infringed because Eagle’s ANDA sought approval for a product with a pH of 3.64, just 0.01 beneath the claimed range, and because “real-world” evidence purportedly showed that the pH of Eagle’s product drifts up over time. Accordingly, Par asserted infringement under § 271(e)(2), based on the filing of Eagle’s ANDA, and also sought a declaratory judgment that Eagle’s planned generic product would infringe under § 271(a)-(b). The district court disagreed. Par appealed.

Turning first to the issue of infringement under § 271(e)(2), the Federal Circuit explained that because drug manufacturers are bound by strict statutory provisions to sell only those products that comport with their ANDAs, if an ANDA defines a proposed generic drug in a manner that directly addresses the issue of infringement, the ANDA controls the infringement inquiry. The Court stated, however, that if an ANDA specification does not speak clearly and directly to the question of infringement, courts may look to other relevant evidence, such as data or samples the ANDA filer has submitted to the US Food & Drug Administration (FDA), to assess whether a proposed product will infringe.

The Federal Circuit found that in Eagle’s case, “the inquiry begins and ends with Eagle’s ANDA specification.” Eagle’s ANDA contained both a release specification, requiring the generic product to have a pH range of 3.4–3.6 (i.e., up to 3.64 before rounding) at the time of distribution, and a stability specification, requiring that same pH range throughout the entirety of the product’s shelf life. Par argued that the stability specification was irrelevant to the infringement inquiry because the FDA cannot ensure that every product Eagle sells complies with the stability specification. The Court disagreed, finding that the district court did not clearly err in ruling that Eagle’s ANDA defined a product outside the scope of Par’s claims.

As to Par’s declaratory judgment claim under § 271(a)-(b), the Federal Circuit found that the district court did not commit clear error in its consideration of Par’s infringement arguments. The district court considered but did not find compelling Par’s evidence of an upward pH drift in Eagle’s post-release pH data [...]

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Can’t Dismiss Lanham Act Claim Based on FDCA Preemption

by Tim Dunker | Aug 25, 2022 | Trademarks

The US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed-in-part and vacated-in-part a district court ruling dismissing claims under the Lanham Act and Massachusetts consumer protection law based on statements on a website regarding compliance with the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). Azurity Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Edge Pharma, LLC, Case No. 21-1492 (1st Cir. Aug. 12, 2022) (Barron, Howard, Thompson, JJ.)

Azurity is a specialty pharmaceutical company that markets a hydrochloride vancomycin drug that received pre-market approval from the US Food & Drug Administration (FDA). Edge Pharma is a drug compounding company that also markets a hydrochloride vancomycin drug that competes with Azurity’s drug but has not yet received FDA approval. In 2020, Azurity filed suit against Edge in the US District Court for the District of Massachusetts under both the Lanham Act and a Massachusetts consumer protection law based on statements that Edge allegedly made on its website. Azurity argued that these statements represented or conveyed the impression that Edge was not in violation of Section 503B of the FDCA, which authorizes drug compounders that meet certain conditions to market their drugs without first obtaining FDA approval. Azurity alleged that these statements were literally false and/or misleading and that other statements holding out Edge’s drug as superior to Azurity’s were similarly false and/or misleading. Edge moved to dismiss Azurity’s claims for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted.

The district court granted Edge’s motion as to Azurity’s Lanham Act claim on the ground that the FDCA precluded Azurity’s claim. The district court stated that the claim would require it to interpret the meaning of Section 503B in a way that would interfere with the FDA’s authority to administer and enforce the FDCA. The district court also ruled that Azurity’s consumer protection claim failed because it was premised on the same allegations as Azurity’s Lanham Act claim. Azurity appealed.

The FDCA requires FDA pre-approval to market any drug. However, there are exemptions for “compounded” drugs and “outsourcing facilities” that manufacture compounded drugs. The FDCA provides registration and compliance requirements to be considered an “outsourcing facility.”

Edge made several statements on its website regarding alleged FDCA compliance, FDCA registration and other commercially available options for its compounded drug. The First Circuit referred to these as compliance statements, registration statements and superiority statements, respectively. With respect to Edge’s compliance and registration statements, the Court did not find that the FDCA precluded Azurity’s claims and instead adopted the framework used by the Ninth and District of Columbia Circuits. The First Circuit noted that those circuits established that, “[a]bsent a clear and unambiguous ruling from a court or agency of competent jurisdiction, statements by laypersons that purport to interpret the meaning of a statute or regulation are opinion statements, and not statements of fact,” and thus, as such, are “not generally actionable under the Lanham Act.” The Court found that Azurity’s reliance on a non-binding FDA guidance document regarding “essentially a copy” provision of Section 503B was not a [...]

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Fifth Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Walker Process Claim, Disagrees with Federal Circuit Transfer of Action

by Marisa (Reese) E. Poncia | Aug 25, 2022 | Antitrust, Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed a summary judgment order dismissing a Walker Process monopolization action brought by Ronald Chandler and his oilfield service company Chandler Manufacturing (collectively, Chandler). The Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s tossing of the action, holding that the alleged claims lacked a nexus to antitrust injury and were time barred under the four-year statute of limitations. Ronald Chandler et al. v. Phoenix Services, LLC, Case No. 21-10626 (5th Cir. Aug. 15, 2022) (Wiener, Graves, Duncan, JJ.)

A Walker Process monopolization action involves antitrust claims regarding fraudulently obtained patents. Chandler alleged that even though Phoenix Services’ patent for fracking technology was declared unenforceable in separate federal litigation in 2018, Phoenix Services continued to enforce the patent to exclude competitors from the market (for example, by sending cease-and-desist letters to Chandler’s clients that attempted to utilize the technology). A Walker Process claim requires a showing of the following:

The defendant obtained its patent by “knowing and willful fraud on the patent office and maintained and enforced the patent with knowledge of the fraudulent procurement.”
The plaintiff can satisfy all other elements of a Sherman Act monopolization claim.

In the district court, a Texas federal judge granted summary judgment to Phoenix Services, finding that Chandler filed the lawsuit too late and that the defendants involved ultimately could not be held liable. Chandler appealed.

The Fifth Circuit first addressed its appellate jurisdiction. The Court made it clear that it did not agree with the Federal Circuit’s transfer of this Walker Process case (on the basis that it did “not present a substantial issue of patent law” since the underlying patent had already been declared unenforceable in earlier litigation), but that under the Supreme Court’s 1988 decision in Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp. it did not find the transfer “implausible.” It therefore accepted jurisdiction but noted that its acceptance did not mean that it found the Federal Circuit’s decision correct.

The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that unlike the situation in Xitronix v. KLA-Tencor, where it and the Federal Circuit debated the appellate jurisdiction issue of Walker Process claims, the patent involved here had already been declared unenforceable. However, the Fifth Circuit pointedly noted its position that Walker Process claims should fall under the appellate purview of the Federal Circuit.

On the merits, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the Texas district court that Chandler did not sufficiently demonstrate that its alleged lost profits were caused by Phoenix Services’ alleged antitrust behavior. The Court found that Chandler failed to present substantial evidence that the cease-and-desist letters materially harmed Chandler’s business.

Antitrust plaintiffs must show the following:

Injury-in-fact, e., an injury to the plaintiff proximately caused by the defendants’ conduct
Antitrust injury
Proper plaintiff status, which ensures that other parties are not better situated to bring suit.

Only injury-in-fact was analyzed in the appeal. Chandler argued that the cease-and-desist letter sent to its clients eventually drove the client out of business. However, the Fifth Circuit [...]

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Claim Cancelation Limits but Doesn’t Prohibit Assignor Estoppel Defense

by Cecilia Choy, Ph.D. | Aug 25, 2022 | Patents

On remand from the Supreme Court, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reconsidered the boundaries of the doctrine of assignor estoppel. The Federal Circuit found that the patent assignor was estopped from challenging the validity of an asserted patent because the asserted claim was not materially broader than the specific claims assigned to the patent owner. Hologic, Inc. v. Minerva Surgical, Inc., Case Nos. 2019-2054; -2081 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 11, 2022) (Stoll, Clevenger, Wallach, JJ.)

Csaba Truckai filed a patent application for a device that was designed with a moisture-permeable head to treat abnormal uterine bleeding while avoiding unintended burning or ablation. Truckai assigned the pending patent application to his company, Novacept, which was later acquired by Hologic. Truckai then founded a new company, Minerva Surgical, and developed a new device that used moisture impermeability to avoid the unwanted ablation. Hologic subsequently filed a continuation application to expand the scope of its claims to encompass applicator heads in general, regardless of moisture permeability. The US Patent & Trademark Office issued a patent on the expanded claims in 2015, and Hologic subsequently sued Minerva for patent infringement.

Hologic argued that doctrine of assignor estoppel barred Minerva from challenging the validity of the patent claims. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment of infringement. On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the summary judgment of no invalidity. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and declined Minerva’s request to discard the doctrine of assignor estoppel but clarified that it comes with limits, holding that “assignor estoppel applies only when an inventor says one thing (explicitly or implicitly) in assigning a patent and the opposite in litigation against the patent’s owner.” The Supreme Court remanded to the Federal Circuit to address whether Hologic’s claim was materially broader than the one Truckai assigned. The Supreme Court explained that if the asserted claim was materially broader than the assigned claim, “then Truckai could not have warranted its validity in making the assignment and without such a prior inconsistent representation, there is no basis for estoppel.”

On remand, the Federal Circuit considered whether Truckai warranted the assigned claim’s validity at the time of assignment and whether the assigned claim was materially broader than the asserted claim.

The Federal Circuit concluded that Truckai had represented that the assigned claim was valid. The Court explained that the assigned claim was initially rejected as being anticipated, but Truckai successfully argued for its allowance. The claim was then canceled in response to a restriction requirement, but such cancellation did not speak to the claim’s patentability because an assignee would understand that it could later prosecute the claim’s subject matter under standard patent practice. Therefore, cancelation did not nullify the claim, and it “remained viable for further prosecution.” Additionally, the assignment was not just to the rights to the application, but to the rights to any continuation, continuation-in-part or divisional patent applications not yet filed. When presenting the application, Truckai signed [...]

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Not “Use It or Lose It”: Even if Unexercised, Director’s Authority over Institution Decisions Remains

by Christopher M. Bruno | Aug 25, 2022 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit denied mandamus relief, finding that a party is not entitled to petition the director for review of a Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board) decision denying institution of an inter partes review (IPR) or post-grant review (PGR) proceeding. This ruling reflects the Court’s ongoing consideration of the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Arthrex, Inc., which held that Board judges cannot constitutionally render final decisions in IPRs without US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) Director oversight. Click here for our discussion of the case on remand, for which the Federal Circuit just denied en banc rehearing. In re Palo Alto Networks, Inc., Case No. 22-145 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 16, 2022) (Dyk, Chen, JJ.) (Reyna, J., concurring).

After being sued by Centripetal Systems for patent infringement, Palo Alto Networks filed petitions for IPR and PGR of some of the asserted patents. The Board denied institution, and Palo Alto Networks filed requests for Director rehearing. Although the PTO acknowledged receipt of the request, it informed Palo Alto Networks that the Director was not considering requests for rehearing of institution decisions “at this time.” Thereafter, Palo Alto Networks sought a writ of mandamus from the Federal Circuit. Between the request for mandamus and the Court’s decision, the PTO issued guidance explaining that although the PTO was not considering requests for rehearing, “the Director has always retained and continues to retain the authority to review such decisions sua sponte after issuance (at the Director’s discretion),” and indeed, exercised its authority to initiate sua sponte review since.

The Federal Circuit rejected Palo Alto Networks’ claim that the Director’s refusal to consider petitions for rehearing of institution decisions amounted to an abdication of authority prohibited by the Appointments Clause. Even assuming that institution decisions were “final decisions on how to exercise executive power” implicating the Appointments Clause, the Court found that the Director maintains statutory and regulatory authority to review institution decisions (unlike in Arthrex), and that the Board renders such decisions only based on the Director’s delegation of authority (also unlike Arthrex). Accordingly, the structural authority maintained by the Director is sufficient, even if such authority goes unexercised, according to the Court.

Writing separately, Judge Reyna agreed that no Appointments Clause violation had occurred but on different grounds. Although Judge Reyna noted that a categorical rejection of requests for rehearing by the Director might raise constitutional concerns, he concluded that mandamus was inappropriate for several reasons. First, the Director’s caveat that she refused to accept requests “at this time” did not constitute a categorical refusal but rather an exercise of discretion. Second, the Director’s invocation of her sua sponte authority to review belied a lack of exercise of discretion. The Director did in fact exercise sua sponte authority to consider Palo Alto Networks’ request, even though briefing in the Federal Circuit was pending, and thus a writ of mandamus was inappropriate.

Not a Well-Crafted Housing: Product-by-Process Claim Element Isn’t Limiting

by Thomas DaMario | Aug 25, 2022 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a ruling that certain claims reciting a “housing . . . being cast in one piece” should be construed as a product-by-process claim element and affirmed the subsequent finding of invalidity of all challenged claims. Kamstrup A/S v. Axioma Metering UAB, Case No. 21-1923 (Aug. 12, 2022) (Reyna, Mayer, Cunningham, JJ.)

Kamstrup owns a patent directed to an ultrasonic flow meter housing in the form of a monolithic polymer structure that is cast in one piece. The patent specification explains that the invention can be fabricated with fewer steps compared to existing meters, since only a single step is used to form the monolithic polymer structure. Axioma petitioned for inter partes review of all claims of the patent, and the Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board) found each claim unpatentable as either obvious or anticipated.

The Board construed the claim term “being cast in one piece” to be a product-by-process claim element. Kamstrup did not present any evidence showing that this claim element provided structural or functional differences distinguishing the housing itself from the prior art, and therefore the Board determined that the housing element was not entitled to patentable weight. The Board subsequently invalidated the independent claim and various dependent claims based on a prior art meter having a housing. The Board also found the remaining dependent claims to be invalid based on two additional references, which the Board determined were sufficiently analogous to flow meter technology to merit consideration in its obviousness analysis.

On appeal, Kamstrup challenged the Board’s product-by-process construction. The Federal Circuit explained that product-by-process claiming is designed to enable an applicant to claim an otherwise patentable product that resists definition other than by the process by which it is made. Where a product-by-process claim element is implicated, structural and functional differences distinguishing the claimed product from the prior art must be shown in order for that claim element to be relevant (limiting) to the anticipation or obviousness inquiry. If no structural or functional differences are shown, the element is given no patentable weight. Turning to the claim element at issue, the Court found that the plain meaning of the term “housing . . . being cast in one piece” implicated a product-by-process interpretation since it described the structure “being” cast in a particular way. The Court also affirmed the Board’s finding of invalidity because Kamstrup failed to identify any disclosure in the specification, prosecution history or extrinsic evidence of any structural or functional differences between the housing element as claimed and the prior art.

Kamstrup also argued that the two secondary prior art references were not analogous prior art because they fell within the field of “medical devices for thermodilution,” and therefore they should not be included in an obviousness analysis. The Federal Circuit disagreed, finding that the references were directed to “sensing or measuring fluid flow and fluid flow characteristics such as temperature,” which is related to “flow meters that include different types of sensors.”

Prior Art Citation to Inventors’ Report Not “By Another” for § 102(e)

by Paul Devinsky | Aug 25, 2022 | America Invents Act, Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that a prior art patent’s summarization of a report authored by the inventors of a patent challenged under inter partes review (IPR) did not constitute a disclosure “by another” under pre-America Invents Act § 102(e). LSI Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of Minnesota, Case No. 21-2057 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 11, 2022) (Dyk, Reyna, Hughes, JJ.)

The Regents of the University of Minnesota (UMN) sued LSI Corporation and Avago Technologies (collectively, LSI) for infringement of a patent related to methods for reducing errors in binary data sequences. LSI petitioned for IPR, challenging several claims of the asserted patent and arguing that they were anticipated by two prior art references, Okada and Tsang. Tsang made reference to a “Seagate Annual Report” that was published by the inventors of the asserted patent, and which was later embodied in the patent’s application.

The Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board) found that one of the challenged claims was anticipated by Okada. The Board also found that LSI had not shown that the other challenged claims were rendered unpatentable by either Okada or Tsang and further rejected an invalidity (anticipation) theory first raised by LSI during oral arguments as untimely (while noting that the argument failed even if timely raised). The Board determined that the Tsang reference was not “by another” under § 102(e) because LSI’s petition relied solely on material that was originally disclosed in the inventor’s Seagate Annual Report. LSI appealed the Board’s determinations relating to invalidity based on Okada or Tsang.

The Federal Circuit noted that LSI did not challenge the Board’s untimeliness determination and rejected LSI’s argument that it did not need to because the Board nevertheless reached a merits decision on the argument. The Court cited to its 2016 decision in Intelligent Bio-Systems v. Illumina Cambridge, which held that “the Board’s rejection of arguments on the ground that they were newly raised in a reply brief was not an abuse of discretion even though the Board went on to address the merits.”

Turning to the § 102(e) issue, the Federal Circuit first explained that an invention is anticipated under § 102(e) if the invention is described in a patent application filed “by another,” but a patent owner may overcome such anticipation by establishing that the relevant prior art disclosure describes the owner’s invention. Describing the history of the Tsang reference and the patent under review, the Court explained that the inventors originally submitted a Seagate Annual Report to Seagate, a UMN collaborator. Tsang, a Seagate employee, received the report and quickly filed a patent application for an improvement on the methods described in the report. This application listed only Tsang as inventor and made direct reference to the Seagate Annual Report.

The Federal Circuit then addressed whether LSI’s IPR petition relied on Tsang’s improvement to the inventors’ report or simply on Tsang’s summary of the inventors’ report. The Court explained that while LSI’s petition relied on both Tsang’s summary of the [...]

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Rebuttal Presumption of Irreparable Harm Still Alive When Assessing Trademark Preliminary Injunctions

by Amol Parikh | Aug 25, 2022 | Trademarks

In one of the first decisions to construe the Trademark Modernization Act of 2020 (TMA), the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that a district court properly applied the TMA’s rebuttal presumption of irreparable harm when it denied a trademark owner’s motion for a preliminary injunction. Nichino America, Inc. v. Valent U.S.A., LLC, Case No. 21-1850 (3rd Cir. Aug. 12, 2022) (Bibas, Matey, Phipps, JJ.)

Nichino and Valent sell pesticides for farming. Since 2004, Nichino has offered a trademarked product known as CENTAUR. Valent trademarked a competing product called SENSTAR in 2019, giving it a logo resembling CENTAUR’s colors, fonts and arrow artwork. Both pesticides are used in the same geographic areas against many of the same insects, and both are sold to farmers through distributors. SENSTAR is a liquid and uses a unique combination of two active chemicals. It costs $425 per gallon and ships in cases containing four one-gallon containers. CENTAUR is manufactured as a solid and sold by the pallet, with each pallet containing 622 pounds of pesticide packed into bags and cases. CENTAUR costs $24 per pound.

Nichino sued Valent for trademark infringement and sought a preliminary injunction against SENSTAR’s launch, arguing that Valent’s use of the SENSTAR mark would create confusion among consumers. The district court found that Nichino narrowly demonstrated that its infringement claim would likely succeed but explained that “there is not an abundance of evidence of likelihood of confusion” between the products. As part of its injunction analysis, the district court applied the TMA to presume Nichino would suffer irreparable harm without an injunction. However, the court noted that the presumption was rebuttable. The court credited Valent’s evidence of a sophisticated consumer class that makes careful purchases and noted the lack of any evidence of actual consumer confusion. The court also found that Nichino failed to proffer any affirmative evidence that it would suffer irreparable harm. Accordingly, the district court found that the presumption of irreparable harm was rebutted, and therefore denied the injunction request. Nichino appealed.

Nichino argued that the TMA precluded the district court from finding no irreparable harm. The Third Circuit, however, found that the district court “admirably navigated” the TMA’s rebuttable presumption by finding that Valent rebutted the presumption and Nichino did not independently show irreparable harm. The Court explained that the three-step process for applying the TMA’s rebuttable presumption requires the following:

The court must assess the plaintiff’s evidence only as it relates to a likelihood of success on the merits.
If the plaintiff’s evidence establishes likely trademark infringement, the TMA is triggered, and the burden of production shifts to the defendant to introduce evidence sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the consumer confusion is unlikely to cause irreparable harm.
If a defendant successfully rebuts the TMA’s presumption by making this slight evidentiary showing, the presumption has no further effect.

The Third Circuit found that the district court correctly followed this three-step analysis in finding that Valent rebutted the TMA’s [...]

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