IP UPDATE

Blackbeard’s revenge: State sovereign immunity ends long running copyright battle

by Sarah Bro | Feb 12, 2026 | Copyrights

The US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed a 2021 district court ruling and vacated a subsequent 2024 ruling in a decade-long legal battle over copyright infringement claims related to the pirate Blackbeard’s Queen Anne’s Revenge shipwreck, concluding the claims were barred under state sovereign immunity. Allen v. Stein, Case No. 24-1954 (4th Cir. Jan. 23, 2026) (Niemeyer, King, Harris, JJ.)

Background

The dispute stems from Frederick Allen and Nautilus Productions’ allegations that the state of North Carolina and its officials infringed on Allen’s copyrights for photographs and videos of the shipwreck recovery project.

Allen initially filed suit in 2015, alleging that North Carolina officials infringed his copyrights by using his footage without authorization and enacting legislation (dubbed “Blackbeard’s Law”) that designated such materials as public records. The district court largely dismissed Allen’s claims in 2017 on sovereign immunity grounds, but the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling on the validity of the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act (CRCA) in 2018, concluding that Congress had not validly abrogated state sovereign immunity for copyright claims. The Supreme Court affirmed that decision in Allen v. Cooper (2020), confirming that states are immune from copyright infringement suits under the CRCA.

Despite the Supreme Court’s ruling, Allen sought to reopen the case in 2021, relying on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) and introducing a new constitutional theory based on United States v. Georgia (2006). The district court allowed Allen to amend his complaint and proceed with his claims under the “Georgia theory,” which argues for case-by-case abrogation of state sovereign immunity for conduct that violates the Fourteenth Amendment. In 2024, the district court denied North Carolina’s sovereign immunity defense for Allen’s copyright infringement claims under this theory, allowing the case to proceed. North Carolina appealed.

Fourth Circuit decision

The Fourth Circuit reversed the 2021 district court decision and vacated the 2024 ruling, finding that the district court abused its discretion in reopening the litigation. The Fourth Circuit explained that Rule 60(b)(6) was the only applicable procedural mechanism for reconsideration because the case had been fully resolved in 2020 following the Supreme Court’s decision and Allen’s voluntary dismissal of the remaining defendant. The Court emphasized that Rule 60(b)(6) requires “extraordinary circumstances,” which were not present in this case. Allen’s failure to raise the Georgia theory earlier in the litigation did not meet this standard.

The Fourth Circuit also criticized the district court’s reliance on Rule 54(b), which applies to interlocutory orders, rather than Rule 60(b), which governs final judgments. The Court noted that the district court’s 2021 decision was based on erroneous legal premises and failed to properly evaluate the timeliness, merits, and prejudice factors required under Rule 60(b).

Pendent appellate jurisdiction

A key aspect of the Fourth Circuit’s decision was its exercise of pendent appellate jurisdiction to review the 2021 district court ruling, even though it was not directly appealable. The Fourth Circuit determined that the 2021 decision was “inextricably intertwined” with the appealable 2024 ruling on sovereign immunity because the [...]

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TRAIN Act targets transparency in generative AI training practices

by Jolie B. Schenerman | Feb 12, 2026 | Copyrights

Representatives Madeleine Dean (D-PA) and Nathaniel Moran (R-TX) introduced a bipartisan bill entitled the Transparency and Responsibility for Artificial Intelligence Networks (TRAIN) Act in the US House of Representatives. The legislative objective is to provide a mechanism to help musicians, artists, writers, and other creators determine if their copyrighted work was used to train generative artificial intelligence (AI) models without their permission, and if so, to pursue compensation for that use. A bipartisan group of senators also reintroduced the TRAIN Act in the US Senate.

The proposed legislation would create a new legal mechanism allowing copyright owners to use federal court subpoena power to obtain information about the materials used to train generative AI models. The bill would establish the first federal statutory definition of “generative AI models.” A generative AI model would be defined as an AI model that “emulates the structure and characteristics of input data in order to generate derived synthetic content,” including images, video, audio, text, and other digital content, as well as any subsequent variation of such a model.

Under the proposed framework, an owner of one or more copyrighted works would be entitled to seek a subpoena compelling a generative AI developer to produce copies of, or records sufficient to identify, the copyrighted works (or portions thereof) that were used to train the developer’s model. To obtain a subpoena, the copyright owner would submit a request to a US district court clerk that includes a proposed subpoena and a sworn affidavit attesting to the owner’s subjective good faith belief that the developer used some or all of the owner’s copyrighted works to train its generative AI model. The affidavit would also attest that the subpoena’s purpose is to obtain the owner’s copyrighted materials or records to sufficiently identify the owner’s copyrighted materials used to train the model, and that the copies or records requested would be used solely to protect the copyright owner’s rights.

Once a subpoena was issued and served in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the developer would be required to “expeditiously disclose” the requested copies or records to the copyright owner or an authorized representative.

The TRAIN Act also includes two enforcement provisions. First, if a developer fails to comply with a subpoena, the court may apply a rebuttable presumption that the developer did in fact use the copyrighted works to train its model. Second, if a copyright owner seeks a subpoena in bad faith, the recipient may pursue sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.

If enacted, the TRAIN Act would significantly expand transparency obligations for developers of generative AI models and provide copyright owners with a new tool to investigate potential unauthorized uses of their works.

Method steps must be done in order where there is logical dependency

by Art Dykhuis | Feb 12, 2026 | Patents

In a second appeal, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s summary judgment of noninfringement based on an implicit ordering of steps in a method claim after disagreeing with the lower court on another basis for noninfringement. Sound View Innovations, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, Case No. 24-1092 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 29, 2026) (Chen, Prost, Wallach, JJ.)

At the district court, Sound View asserted an expired patent against Hulu’s use of a central content server connected to end users through intermediate edge servers. The asserted claim recites downloading streaming content from a buffer in a helper server to an end user while concurrently retrieving more streaming content from a content server.

The district court issued a decision in favor of Hulu, which Sound View appealed. In that first appeal, the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the district court’s ruling, based on the district court’s negative claim construction.

On remand, the district court determined Hulu did not infringe, finding that the claimed method requires the steps of “receiving a request” and “allocating a buffer” to be performed in sequence. Since Hulu did not perform these claimed steps in order, the district court found there was no infringement. Sound View appealed.

The claim-at-issue recites:

Source: Sound View Innovations, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, Case No. 24-1092 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 29, 2026), Slip Op. at 4.

The Federal Circuit reasoned that the phrase “requested SM object” in the buffer-allocation step grammatically and logically depended on the prior step of “receiving a request,” because an object cannot be “requested” until a request has occurred. The Court explained that “‘requested’ is not only a grammatical descriptor, but also is a status indicator reflecting a completed action – the receiving of a request.”

The Federal Circuit applied precedent on implicit ordering of method steps and noted that “[o]ur caselaw on implicit ordering does not help Sound View, as it does not require a finding that the performance of the claimed steps would be inoperable if the steps are not followed in the order they appear in the claim” (emphasis added). The Court explained that the “logical” dependency between the method steps mandates that the request-receiving step precede buffer allocation. Because there was no dispute that the accused systems performed these steps in a different order, the Court affirmed summary judgment of noninfringement.

Relax, design patent claim scope doesn’t include functional elements

by Lisette Donewald | Feb 12, 2026 | Patents

Addressing the issue of functional versus ornamental features, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment of noninfringement, concluding that no reasonable juror could find the accused product’s design substantially similar to the patented design once functional features were properly excluded. Range of Motion Prods. v. Armaid Co., Case No. 23-2427 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 2, 2026) (Cunningham, Hughes, JJ.) (Moore, J., dissenting).

Range of Motion Products (RoM) owns a design patent titled “Body Massaging Apparatus.” RoM sued Armaid Company, alleging that its Armaid2 product infringed RoM’s patent. Armaid owns an expired utility patent (prior art to the RoM patent) titled “Limb Massager” (Armaid1) that embodies elements of the Armaid2 design. The relevant drawings from the product and patents are below.

Source: Range of Motion Prods. v. Armaid Co., Case No. 23-2427 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 2, 2026), Slip Op. at 14.

The district court granted summary judgment in Armaid’s favor, concluding that after properly filtering out functional elements, no reasonable jury could find the Armaid2 design substantially similar to the RoM’s design patent. RoM appealed.

The Federal Circuit reviewed claim construction de novo, the underlying factual findings for clear error, and the summary judgment determination de novo. Applying the ordinary observer test as articulated in Egyptian Goddess, the majority found that several prominent features of the claimed design, most notably the clam shaped arms, were functional. The Court relied on RoM’s own marketing materials, which described the arm shape as providing leverage, and the fact that Armaid’s prior utility patent had claimed similar features.

After excluding those functional elements, the Federal Circuit assessed whether an ordinary observer familiar with the prior art would be deceived into believing the accused design was the same as the patented design based solely on their ornamental aspects. Consistent with post-Egyptian Goddess precedent, the analysis proceeded in two steps: determining whether the designs were “plainly dissimilar,” and if not, comparing the designs in light of the prior art.

The majority concluded that the designs were plainly dissimilar, citing differences in arm shape and the manner in which the fixed arm connects to the hinge. The panel majority further stated that even if the designs were not plainly dissimilar, a comparison against the prior art would yield the same result. The Federal Circuit therefore affirmed summary judgment of noninfringement.

The decision is notable for Chief Judge Moore’s dissent. The dissent argued that both the district court and the majority improperly usurped the jury’s role by resolving what should have been a fact question, which is whether the designs were substantially similar in overall appearance. More broadly, the dissent criticized the Federal Circuit’s evolution of the ordinary observer test, contending that Egyptian Goddess shifted the inquiry away from the Supreme Court’s substantial similarity framework established in Gorham Co. [...]

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Can’t patent idea of using asynchronous data streams during web conferencing

by Dexter Hamilton | Feb 5, 2026 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s dismissal of a patent infringement suit, holding that the asserted web conferencing claims were directed to an abstract idea, lacked any inventive concept, and were therefore not patent eligible under 35 U.S.C. Section 101. US Patent No. 7,679,637 LLC v. Google LLC, Case No. 24-1540 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 22, 2025) (Moore, CJ.; Hughes, Stoll, JJ.)

The patent owner accused Google of infringing a patent that describes systems for web conferencing that allow users to view and manipulate multiple data streams asynchronously, for example by reviewing earlier content while a live presentation continues. The representative claims recited client applications for presenting and observing participants, and some claims recited a server application and a “time scale modification component” to maintain audio quality at different playback speeds. Google moved to dismiss, arguing that the claims were ineligible under Section 101. The district court agreed and denied leave to amend on the rationale of futility. The patent owner appealed.

Reviewing de novo, the Federal Circuit applied the two-step Alice framework. At step one, the Court concluded that the claims were directed to the abstract idea of allowing users to manipulate and review data streams in a web conferencing environment. The Court found that the claims recited desired results, such as asynchronous viewing, without explaining how those results were achieved or identifying any specific technological improvement. The patent owner argued that the claims were not result oriented because they recited two client applications, but the Court found that the claims still failed to describe any technical mechanism for performing the claimed functions.

The patent owner also pointed to alleged “functional claiming” in Google’s own patents, but the Federal Circuit noted that the eligibility of unrelated patents was irrelevant. The Court further rejected the notion that the mere existence of factually distinguishable Google-owned patents somehow amounted to a sweeping concession by Google that all patents involving functional claiming approaches were necessarily patent eligible.

Turning to step two, the Federal Circuit concluded that the claims lacked an inventive concept. The specification described the client applications and the time scale modification component as conventional components performing their ordinary functions. The patent owner largely repeated its step one arguments, which the Court found insufficient to supply an inventive concept.

Finally, the Federal Circuit rejected the patent owner’s argument that dismissal at the pleading stage was premature. Because the asserted patent was ineligible as a matter of law and the patent owner identified no factual allegations that could alter the Section 101 analysis, any amendment would have been futile.