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PTO and Copyright Office Seek Public Comments on Non-Fungible Tokens

by Amol Parikh | Dec 8, 2022 | Uncategorized

On November 23, 2022, the US Patent & Trademark Office and the US Copyright Office announced that they are seeking public input on intellectual property (IP) considerations related to non-fungible tokens (NFTs). The agencies will hold three public roundtables directed to patents, trademarks and copyrights, respectively, scheduled as follows:

January 10, 2023 – Patents and NFTs
January 12, 2023 – Trademarks and NFTs
January 18, 2023 – Copyrights and NFTs.

The roundtables will be livestreamed, and the agencies will post instructions for registration to view them live. Requests to participate as a panelist in any of the roundtables must be received by December 21, 2022, to be considered.

The agencies also issued a request for comments, soliciting answers to 13 questions of particular interest:

Describe current and potential future uses of NFTs in your field or industry.
Describe any IP-related challenges or opportunities associated with NFTs or NFT markets.
Describe how NFT markets affect the production of materials subject to IP protection.
Describe whether, how and to what extent NFTs are used by or could be used by IP rights holders to
1. Document the authenticity of an asset
2. Document the seller’s ownership of or authority to sell an asset
3. Document the seller’s authority to transfer any relevant or necessary IP rights associated with an asset
4. Document any limitations related to IP rights surrounding the sale, or the purchaser’s use, of an asset.
Describe whether, how and to what extent NFTs present challenges for IP rights holders, or those who sell assets using NFTs, with respect to the activities described in question 4.
Describe whether, how and to what extent NFTs are used by, could be used by, or present challenges or opportunities for IP rights holders to
1. Obtain their IP rights
2. Transfer or license their IP rights
3. Exercise overall control and management of their IP rights
4. Enforce their IP rights.
Describe how and to what extent copyrights, trademarks and patents are relied on, or anticipated to be relied on, in your field or industry to
1. Protect assets that are associated with NFTs
2. Combat infringement associated with NFT-related assets offered by third parties
3. Ensure the availability of appropriate reuse of NFT-related assets.
Are current IP laws adequate to address the protection and enforcement of IP in the context of NFTs? If not, explain why and describe any legislation you believe should be considered to address these issues.
Describe any IP-related impacts those in your field or industry have experienced in connection with actual or intended uses of NFTs. Describe any legal disputes that have arisen in the following contexts, and the outcome of such disputes, including citations to any relevant judicial proceedings:
1. The relationship between the transfer of an NFT and the ownership of IP rights in the associated asset
2. The licensing of IP rights in the asset associated with an NFT
3. Infringement claims when either (i) an NFT is associated with an asset in which another party [...]
  
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Words Matter: Court Sides with Translation Company in Insurance Coverage Dispute

by Hannah Cohen | Dec 8, 2022 | Trade Secrets

The US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit concluded that a company’s general liability insurer was obligated to provide coverage for legal fees incurred in fending off a trade secret and defamation lawsuit brought by a competitor. Lionbridge Tech., LLC v. Valley Forge Ins. Co., Case No. 21-1698 (1st Cir. Nov. 21, 2022) (Kayatta, Selya, Thompson, JJ.)

Lionbridge and TransPerfect are competitors in the language-translation industry. TransPerfect sued Lionbridge for misappropriation of trade secrets and defamation. TransPerfect alleged that Lionbridge concocted a scheme through its corporate owner to feign interest in acquiring TransPerfect and, through this scheme, improperly gained access to TransPerfect’s trade secrets, which could be used to poach TransPerfect’s customers and otherwise undermine TransPerfect’s business.

Shortly after the lawsuit was filed, Lionbridge informed its liability insurance carrier, Valley Forge, about the litigation. Valley Forge initially indicated that it would provide Lionbridge with coverage for legal costs associated with the litigation. Valley Forge subsequently disputed the requested coverage based on both the reasonableness of the fees incurred and the nature of the suit. Lionbridge filed suit against Valley Forge seeking full coverage from Valley Forge for its defense costs. The dispute centered on whether the fees incurred could be considered injury arising out of “[o]ral or written publication, in any manner, of material that slanders or libels a person or organization or disparages a person’s or organizations goods, products, or services,” as provided by Lionbridge’s insurance policy. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Valley Forge, finding that Valley Forge did not owe Lionbridge a duty to defend under the relevant policy provisions and exclusions. Lionbridge appealed.

The First Circuit reversed, explaining that an insurer’s duty to defend depends on whether the allegations in the underlying litigation are reasonably susceptible to an interpretation that the policy provisions apply. The focus of the inquiry is the source of the injury, not any specific theories of liability set forth in the underlying complaint. The Court explained that this inquiry required a comparison of the allegation made in the underlying litigation against the insurance policy provisions.

After analyzing the underlying complaint against the insurance policy, the First Circuit determined that the policy provisions applied because the allegations “roughly sketch[ed]” an injury arising from a defamation claim. TransPerfect’s claims were rooted in alleged reputational harm to its business, which fit within the relevant provision. The Court noted that complete overlap between the policy provisions and the claims was not required.

The First Circuit next considered whether any policy coverage exclusions applied to preclude coverage. The relevant exclusions fell into two buckets:

Injuries caused by an insured with direct knowledge that its actions would inflict injury, or injuries arising out of an oral or written publication that the insured knows is false
Trade secret misappropriation.

Valley Forge carried the burden of proving that either or both categories of exclusions applied. The Court concluded that the first category did not apply because Valley Forge failed to show that all allegations [...]

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No Mulligans Here: PTO Rewinds Reexamination Based on Estoppel

by James M. Oehler | Dec 8, 2022 | Patents

The US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) terminated a pending ex parte reexamination after finding that the challenger was estopped because the prior art references could have been raised in a prior inter partes review (IPR). In re Tyler, Reexam. No. 90/014,950 (PTO Nov. 15, 2022).

In 2017, GITS Manufacturing filed two IPR petitions against a patent owned by G.W. Lisk after Lisk asserted the patent against GITS in district court. In 2018, the Patent Trial & Appeal Board issued final written decisions in each IPR, finding some claims unpatentable and maintaining the patentability of other claims. The Federal Circuit affirmed both IPR decisions in 2021.

In February 2022, the PTO initiated an ex parte reexamination of one of the patents based on a request filed by GITS. The reexamination proposed multiple grounds of unpatentability based on four prior art references that were not involved in the IPRs. GITS included a lengthy discussion and an expert declaration describing the prior art searches GITS performed in support of the certification that it was not estopped under 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(l) from asserting the grounds in the reexamination. Lisk filed a petition to vacate the reexamination proceeding, alleging that GITS was estopped because the reexamination references reasonably could have been raised in the previous IPRs. Lisk’s petition was supported by its own expert declaration describing prior art searches that a skilled searcher would have conducted.

A party is estopped under § 315(e)(1) from requesting a reexamination proceeding based on grounds that the party “raised or reasonably could have raised” during an IPR. The legislative history of § 315(e) defines “reasonably could have raised” as “prior art which a skilled searcher conducting a diligent search reasonably could have been expected to discover.” The PTO cited legislative history stating that “reasonably could have raised” does not require a “scorched-earth search,” leaving open the possibility that a diligent search may not discover a particular reference. But the PTO also distinguished the search an examiner or lawyer may conduct from the more robust search that a skilled searcher is assumed to conduct prior to filing a petition for a IPR proceeding.

The PTO evaluated each of the four references in GITS’s reexamination grounds based on the criteria described above. Two of the references were patent documents available in commercial databases that a skilled searcher could be expected to find. The third reference was a “seminal textbook” that GITS itself stated was used in the field to train those of skill in the art. The textbook reference was also found through standard citation searching of the patent at issue. The fourth reference was provided by a publisher that GITS stated “was an established publisher that was well known to those interested in the field,” and which maintained an online searchable database of its publications. The PTO determined that the fourth reference would have been found by a reasonably diligent search, despite the fact that a subscription fee was required to search the database.

The PTO also weighed [...]

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Construing the Construction: Federal Circuit Chips Away at IPR Win

by Thomas DaMario | Nov 29, 2022 | Patents

Addressing claim construction issues in inter partes review (IPR) proceedings before the Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board), the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed an obviousness finding as to some claims but reversed and remanded an obviousness finding as to another claim because of a claim construction error. VLSI Technology LLC v. Intel Corporation, Case Nos. 21-1826, -1827, -1828 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 15, 2022) (Chen, Bryson, Hughes, JJ.)

VLSI owns a patent directed to a technique for alleviating the problems of defects caused by stress applied to bond pads of an integrated circuit. Bond pads are a portion of an integrated circuit that sit above interconnected circuit layers and are used to attach the chip to another electronic component, such as a computer or motherboard. When a chip is attached to another electronic component, forces are exerted on the chip’s bond pad, which can result in damage to the interconnect layers. The patent discloses improvements to the structures of an integrated circuit that reduce the potential for damage to the interconnect layers when the chip is attached to another electronic component while also permitting each of the layers underlying the pad to be functionally independent in the circuit.

VLSI filed suit against Intel alleging infringement of the patent. During claim construction, the district court construed the claim term “force region” to mean a “region within the integrated circuit in which forces are exerted on the interconnect structure when a die attach is performed.” Before the district court’s construction but after the suit was filed, Intel filed petitions for IPR of the patent and advocated in its petitions for the same construction of “force region” that the district court ultimately adopted.

VLSI did not contest Intel’s construction, but it later became apparent that the two parties disagreed over the meaning of “die attach,” which formed part of the construction. Intel argued that the term “die attach” refers to any method of attaching a chip to another electronic component, including a method known as wire bonding, which was taught by a prior art reference included in Intel’s petitions. VLSI argued that the term refers to a method of attachment known as “flip chip” bonding and does not include wire bonding. In the Board’s final written decisions, it did not address the term “die attach,” but found that “force region” was not limited to flip chip bonding and subsequently found the challenged claims invalid as obvious. The Board also construed a second disputed term “used for electrical interconnection not directly connected to the bond pad,” which is recited in only one claim of the patent, in favor of Intel, and subsequently found that claim unpatentable. VLSI appealed.

On appeal, VLSI raised a number of procedural and substantive challenges to the Board’s construction of the two disputed terms. VLSI argued that the Board failed to acknowledge and give appropriate weight to the district court’s construction of “force region.” The Federal Circuit dismissed this argument, as there was ample evidence in [...]

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Court Uncorks New Way to Serve Trademark Complaints

by Amol Parikh | Nov 29, 2022 | Trademarks

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that Section 1051(e) of the Lanham Act permits a plaintiff in a district court case to serve a complaint against a foreign defendant via the Director of the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO). San Antonio Winery, Inc. v. Jiaxing Micarose Trade Co., Ltd., Case No. 21-56036 (9th Cir. Nov. 14, 2022) (Siler, Callahan, Thomas, JJ.)

San Antonio Winery is a Los Angeles-based winery best known for its Stella Rosa brand of wines. The winery is owned and operated by the Riboli family. San Antonio has registered the trademarks RIBOLI and RIBOLI FAMILY, which it has used since at least 1998 to market its wines and other products.

Jiaxing is a Chinese company that has sold products using the Riboli name. In 2018, Jiaxing registered the mark RIBOLI for use in connection with articles of clothing and shoes. In 2020, Jiaxing applied to register the mark RIBOLI for use with additional types of products, including wine pourers, bottle stands, containers, cocktail shakers, dishware and various other kitchen and household items.

After learning that Jiaxing was using the Riboli name to sell products in the United States, San Antonio filed a complaint asserting Lanham Act claims for trademark infringement, trademark dilution and false designation of origin, as well as related state-law claims. San Antonio also sought an injunction prohibiting Jiaxing from using the RIBOLI mark in connection with its products, an order canceling Jiaxing’s 2018 registration of the RIBOLI mark, and an order either directing Jiaxing to abandon its 2020 application to register RIBOLI for additional uses or prohibiting the PTO from granting the application.

Because Jiaxing is a Chinese company, San Antonio’s service of process was governed by rules for serving parties abroad, such as by the Hague Convention. Concerned with the amount of time it might take to effect service under the Hague Convention, San Antonio instead sought to serve Jiaxing under Section 1051(e) of the Lanham Act, which applies to foreign domiciliaries who apply to register a trademark. Section 1051(e) states that if a trademark applicant is not domiciled in the United States, the applicant may designate the name and address of a person in the United States who may be served with notices or processes in proceedings affecting the mark. If the designated person cannot be found at the address, the notices or processes may be served on the PTO Director.

Seeking to avail itself of Section 1051(e), San Antonio inquired whether the US-based lawyer who had represented Jiaxing in connection with its trademark applications would accept service on Jiaxing’s behalf. When the lawyer did not respond, San Antonio served the district court complaint on the PTO Director, who then sent a letter to Jiaxing confirming service of process was effectuated pursuant to Section 1051(e).

After Jiaxing did not appear to defend itself in the action, San Antonio filed a motion for default judgment. The district court denied the motion on the ground that Jiaxing had not [...]

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First Amendment Punches Out Alleged Lanham Act Violation

by Anisa Noorassa | Nov 29, 2022 | Trademarks

Addressing the balance between trademark rights under the Lanham Act and the First Amendment right to protected expression, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court judgment finding that the defendant’s use of the term “Punchbowl” was not a Lanham Act violation because it was expressive and not misleading as to its source. Punchbowl, Inc. v. AJ Press, LLC, Case No. 21-55881 (9th Cir. Nov. 14, 2022) (Ownes, Bress, Fitzwater, JJ.)

Punchbowl is an online communications company that provides “online events and celebration invitations and greeting cards” as part of its subscription-based service. Punchbowl has used the mark Punchbowl® since 2006 and the mark was registered with the US Patent & Trademark Office in 2013. Punchbowl describes itself as “The Gold Standard in Online Invitations & Greeting Cards,” and uses the logo of a punch bowl ladle:

Punchbowl filed suit claiming that AJ Press infringed on Punchbowl’s mark through its subscription-based online news publication Punchbowl News. Punchbowl News covers “insider” political topics and reports on events in Washington, DC, and derives its name from the use of the term “punchbowl” by the Secret Service to refer to the US Capitol building. As such, the Punchbowl News logo comprises of an overturned image of the US Capitol filled with purple punch and the slogan “Power. People. Politics.”

AJ Press argued that its use of the term “Punchbowl” was protected under the First Amendment and did not violate the Lanham Act. The district court granted summary judgment to AJ Press, concluding that its use of the name “Punchbowl” did not give rise to liability because it constituted protected expression and was not explicitly misleading as to its source. Punchbowl appealed.

Traditionally, the likelihood of confusion test is used for claims brought under the Lanham Act. When artistic expression is at issue, however, that test fails to account for the full weight of the public’s interest in free expression. If the product involved is an expressive work, courts generally apply a gateway test, grounded in background First Amendment concerns, to determine whether the Lanham Act applies. One approach was set forth in the Second Circuit’s 1989 decision in Rogers v. Grimaldi to determine whether First Amendment concerns were strong enough to outweigh the need to protect a mark. The Rogers test requires the defendant to first “make a threshold legal showing that its allegedly infringing use is part of an expressive work protected by the First Amendment.” Once this threshold is satisfied, the Lanham Act will not apply unless the plaintiff can establish that “the defendant’s use of the mark (1) is not artistically relevant to the work or (2) explicitly misleads consumers as to the source or the content of the work.”

The Ninth [...]

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Functionality Dooms Alleged Trade Dress Protection

by Kathleen Lynch | Nov 29, 2022 | Trademarks

The US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment of noninfringement in a trade dress suit, finding that the trade dress was functional and the attorneys’ fee award—as diminished by the district court—was appropriate. Pocket Plus, LLC v. Pike Brands, LLC, Case No. 21-3414 (8th Cir. Nov. 15, 2022) (Gruender, Melloy, Erickson, JJ.)

Since 2009, Pocket Plus has sold vertically oriented pouches that attach to waistbands or belts to carry water bottles, cell phones and other small objects. Pike Brands, d/b/a Running Buddy, began selling similar pouches in 2012 and introduced a vertical version in 2015. In 2021, Pocket Plus sent cease and desist letters to Running Buddy, then sued for trade dress infringement under Iowa common law and the Lanham Act. Running Buddy moved for summary judgment, arguing that Pocket Plus’s trade dress was unprotectable. Running Buddy also threatened Rule 11 sanctions because of the weakness of the case. After winning summary judgment, Running Buddy moved to recover attorneys’ fees, which the district court partially granted. Both parties appealed, with Pocket Plus challenging the summary judgment grant and both parties challenging the amount of the attorneys’ fee award.

The Eighth Circuit began by noting that the issue of validity was complicated by Pocket Plus’s shifting explanation of what its trade dress was, explaining that its “definition evolved throughout the litigation,” becoming increasingly detailed. Eventually, the Court reasoned that regardless of which definition prevailed, the result was the same.

Addressing the noninfringement finding, the Eighth Circuit recited the relevant legal principles, explaining that to prove infringement, a plaintiff must show that its trade dress is nonfunctional and distinctive and that a lack of protection may confuse customers. The Court explained that it must consider trade dress in its entirety—not as individual elements—and determine whether features are protectable “arbitrary embellishment” or simply essential to product use. In this case, Pocket Plus never registered its trade dress so it did not benefit from a presumption of nonfunctionality. Pocket Plus argued that its vertical orientation and over-the-hip design were nonfunctional elements since competitors made pouches differently and that packaging illustrations likewise made the trade dress nonfunctional. The Court was not persuaded, finding that each feature the plaintiff pointed to was designed to “affect [the pouch’s] suitability for carrying objects,” making each feature essential to purpose and therefore functional. Because the Court found functionality, it affirmed noninfringement without addressing the other requirements.

The Eighth Circuit next considered the attorneys’ fees. Under the Lanham Act, a court may, in its discretion, grant attorneys’ fees to the winning party but only in “exceptional cases” after “considering the totality of the circumstances.” Pocket Plus argued that this case was not “exceptional” while Running Buddy argued that the district court abused its discretion in awarding only a portion of the attorneys’ fees.

The Eighth Circuit addressed both exceptionality and the amount awarded, in turn. To be “exceptional,” a case must be objectively unreasonable, motivated by ill will or frivolous. The Court noted Pocket Plus’s weak [...]

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Press # For Options, but Not for a Trademark Registration

by Brennen Baylor | Nov 29, 2022 | Trademarks

In a precedential opinion addressing the most fundamental requirement for trademark protection, the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board (Board) affirmed the US Patent & Trademark Office’s (PTO) refusal to register a “#” based mark on the ground that it fails to function as a mark. In re Pound Law, LLC, Ser. No. 87724338 (TTAB Nov. 9, 2022) (Adlin, Lynch, Larkin, ATJ)

Pound Law, claiming acquired distinctiveness under Section 2(f) of the Lanham Act, sought to register #LAW as a mark for providing legal services and legal referral services to consumers seeking a lawyer where legal representation or referral is initiated by phone. During prosecution, the Examining Attorney refused registration on the ground that #LAW failed to function as a service mark, reasoning that a consumer would only understand that dialing #LAW would put them in contact with some legal service provider, but not specifically Pound Law. Pound Law appealed.

Pound Law argued that the Examining Attorney improperly applied a per se rule against mnemonic or vanity telephone number marks as being incapable of functioning as a mark identifying the source of goods or services. In response, the Examining Attorney asserted that the PTO refused registration only after engaging in a specimen-based determination tailored to the #LAW mark. The Examining Attorney argued that, based on the manner of using the mark with a telephone, a consumer would regard #LAW only as a means of contacting Pound Law and concluded that #LAW does not indicate the source of legal services to be rendered, only a means by which legal services might be obtained.

To assess whether #LAW conveys an informational message or functions as a source identifier, the Board considered whether the nature of #LAW affects consumer perception of the asserted mark. The Board cited examples #LAW or #law being used throughout the legal industry, including as a hashtag in social media content. The Board reasoned that, in the context of social media, a hashtag functions as a searchable keyword, not as a source identifier. Pound Law argued that it ran radio advertisements vocalizing #LAW as “pound law” to explain to consumers that the asserted mark is not a hashtag.

The Board did not find Pound Law’s evidence persuasive, explaining that Pound Law’s radio advertising was insufficient to instill Pound Law as the source of the legal services in a consumer’s mind since “there is no correct pronunciation of a trademark, and consumers may pronounce a mark differently than intended by the brand owner.” The Board also pointed to evidence of Pound Law’s “extensive visual-only advertising,” which does not distinguish the use of an octothorpe as specifically a pound sign on a telephone keypad as opposed to a hashtag used on social media platforms. The Board concluded that many consumers would understand and pronounce #LAW as a hashtag (i.e., vocalized as “hashtag law”) “given the prevalence of social media and hashtags.” On this point, the Board highlighted “quite persuasive” evidence of numerous examples from the record showing third parties—e.g., law firms, legal [...]

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Delayed Disclaimer: Patent Owner Arguments Made during IPR Not a Claim Limiting Disclaimer in That Proceeding

by Aashish Kapadia | Nov 29, 2022 | Patents

Repeating a conclusion from an earlier non-precedential opinion in VirnetX, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board) need not accept a patent owner’s arguments as a disclaimer in the very same inter partes review (IPR) proceeding in which those arguments are made. CUPP Computing AS v. Trend Micro Inc., Case Nos. 2020-2262, 2020-2263, 2020-2264, at *11 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 16, 2022) (Dyk, Taranto, Stark, JJ.)

CUPP Computing is the owner of three related patents each entitled “systems and methods for providing security services during power management mode.” After CUPP sued Trend Micro for patent infringement, Trend Micro filed petitions for IPR against all three patents, asserting that several claims of CUPP’s patents were obvious over two prior art references. The Board instituted all three IPR and found all challenged claims unpatentable as obvious. CUPP appealed.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s conclusions. The principal issue concerned CUPP’s argument that the Board erred in claim construction. In CUPP’s view, all of the evidence required the claimed “security system processor” be remote from a “mobile device processor.” The Court rejected CUPP’s arguments. Starting with the claims, the Court found that they simply required that the two processors be different. Although some claims required the security system to send a wake signal to or communicate with the mobile device, that language did not support CUPP’s remoteness construction. As the Court explained, just as an individual can send a note to oneself via email, a unit of the mobile device can send signals to and communicate with the same device. Indeed, some of the claims teach communication via an internal port of the mobile device, which was consistent with a preferred embodiment disclosed in the specification in which the two processors could be within the same mobile device.

The Federal Circuit then addressed CUPP’s disclaimer arguments. The Court agreed with the Board that CUPP’s statements made during the original prosecution were far from clear and unmistakable, being susceptible to several reasonable interpretations that are contrary to CUPP’s construction. The Court also agreed with the Board that CUPP’s arguments during the Trend Micro IPRs do not qualify as a disclaimer for purposes of claim construction. While a disclaimer made during an IPR proceeding is binding in subsequent proceedings, the “Board is not required to accept a patent owner’s arguments as disclaimer when deciding the merits of those arguments.”

As the Federal Circuit explained, expanding the application of disclaimers to the proceedings in which they are made—as CUPP proposed—is rife with problems. IPR proceedings are more similar to district court litigation than they are to initial examination, and it is well established that disclaimers in litigation are not binding in the proceeding in which they are made. Further, CUPP’s proposal would effectively render IPR claim amendments unnecessary, as patent owners would be free to change the scope of their claims retrospectively without regard to the protections provided by the IPR claim amendment process, such as [...]

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Supreme Court to Consider First Amendment Protection for Parody Dog Toy

by Eleanor B. Atkins | Nov 29, 2022 | Cert Alert, Trademarks

The Supreme Court of the United States has agreed to consider the scope of protection afforded by the First Amendment to commercial parody products that feature the unauthorized use of another party’s trademark(s). Jack Daniel’s Properties, Inc. v. VIP Products LLC, Case No. 22-148 (Supr. Ct. Nov. 21, 2022) (certiorari granted). The questions presented are as follows:

Whether humorous use of another’s trademark as one’s own on a commercial product is subject to the Lanham Act’s traditional likelihood-of-confusion analysis, or instead receives heightened First Amendment protection from trademark-infringement claims.
Whether humorous use of another’s mark as one’s own on a commercial product is “noncommercial” under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(C), thus barring as a matter of law a claim of dilution by tarnishment under the Trademark Dilution Revision Act.

This is the second time Jack Daniel’s has filed a petition for certiorari in connection with this case. The Supreme Court first considered the matter in January 2021, following the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s decision to vacate and remand the district court’s finding of trademark infringement, reverse the judgment on dilution and uphold the validity of Jack Daniel’s trademark and trade dress rights.

The case then returned to the district court, which granted summary judgment to VIP Products. The Ninth Circuit affirmed and then Jack Daniel’s filed its second petition for certiorari.

The Supreme Court will seek to settle the long-standing split amongst the US Courts of Appeal regarding the proper analysis for parody in trademark infringement and dilution claims and the scope of protection afforded to it via the First Amendment.

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