IP UPDATE
Exploring the Latest in Intellectual Property Law
IP UPDATE
Exploring the Latest in Intellectual Property Law
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House Backs Senate With Its Own Proposed NO FAKES Act to Control Digital Replicas

by | Sep 19, 2024 |

Following the introduction of the NO FAKES Act of 2024 in July by a bipartisan group of US Senators, US Representatives Adam Schiff (D-CA), María Elvira Salazar (R-FL), Madeleine Dean (D-PA), Nathaniel Moran (R-TX), Rob Wittman (R-VA), and Joe Morelle (D-NY) introduced the identically named companion legislation, Nurture Originals, Foster Art, and Keep Entertainment Safe (NO FAKES) Act, in the US House of Representatives on September 12, 2024. The language of both bills is substantially identical, with the intended purpose to create federal protection of “…intellectual property rights in the voice and visual likeness of individuals, and for other purposes.”

As described by Representative Schiff’s office in a news release announcing the bill, the House’s NO FAKES Act is intended to:

  • Recognize that every individual has a federal intellectual property right to their own voice and likeness, including an extension of that right post-mortem
  • Empower individuals to take action against parties that knowingly create, post, or profit from unauthorized digital replicas of them
  • Provide a safe harbor for platforms if they take down offending materials when they discover them or upon receiving proper takedown notices
  • Maintain protections for innovation and free speech
  • Provide a federal solution to a patchwork of state laws and regulations by January 2, 2025 – at least as it relates to digital replicas of individuals.

The rights established under the House’s NO FAKES Act will preempt any cause of action under state law for the protection of an individual’s voice and visual likeness rights in connection with a digital replica. We will continue to watch whether these bills are passed in identical form and signed by the incoming US president in 2025.



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The Conversation Continues: Some Post-Patent-Termination Royalties Are Acceptable

by | Sep 12, 2024 |

For the second time in less than two weeks, a circuit court decided an appeal hinging on the Brulotte rule, which holds that patent royalties are impermissible when based on payments for the use of expired patents. Like the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit upheld a royalty agreement that purported to require payments after patent expiration. Ares Trading S.A. v. Dyax Corp., Case No. 23-1487 (4th Cir. Aug. 14, 2024) (Krauser, Porter, Chung, JJ.)

Dyax is a biotechnology company engaged in “phage display” research – a laboratory process used to identify antibody fragments for use in developing medications. Dyax holds multiple patents related to phage display, including licenses to patents owned by Cambridge Antibody Technology (CAT). Dyax and Ares entered a licensing agreement. Dyax’s main obligation was to use its phage display technology to identify antibody fragments and then provide those fragments to Ares so that Ares could incorporate them into commercial medications, including one called Bavencio. In exchange, Ares agreed to pay Dyax at various research milestones and pay royalties for identified products, including Bavencio. Although Bavencio was first sold in 2017, the last CAT patent expired in 2018.

After learning of the Brulotte rule, Ares tried to renegotiate its contract obligations. When renegotiation attempts failed, Ares sued Dyax, seeking multiple related declaratory judgments revolving around its argument that its royalty obligations to Dyax were unenforceable under Brulotte. Dyax countersued on six claims, including for declaratory judgment that Brulotte did not apply. The district court found the royalty obligation enforceable and not in violation of Brulotte. Ares appealed.

Ares asked the Fourth Circuit to reconsider the applicability of the Brulotte rule and to relatedly find that Dyax had breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The Fourth Circuit first examined its own jurisdiction in the context of the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals. Of the 10 total claims and counterclaims, nine arose under Massachusetts contract law. According to the Fourth Circuit, these were not “substantial” patent law claims and thus regional circuit appellate jurisdiction was appropriate.

The Fourth Circuit next turned to the Brulotte prohibition on post-termination royalties and found no violation because “Ares’ royalty obligation is not calculated based on activity requiring post-expiration use of inventions” covered by Dyax or CAT patents. The Court emphasized the policies underpinning the federal patent regime and the Brulotte rule, particularly the importance of inventions entering the public space once a patent expires to allow continued innovation and general use of the once-patented invention. The Court also explained its understanding of the nuances of Brulotte, as informed by the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Kimble v. Marvel. For instance, a court’s inquiry must focus on post-expiration use, so where “royalties are not calculated based on activity requiring post-expiration use, they do not hinder post-expiration use ‘on their face’ and Brulotte is not implicated.” In the present case, this was a key delineation because the Fourth Circuit found that Ares’ [...]

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Even Free Libraries Come With a Cost

by | Sep 12, 2024 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a district court’s judgment of copyright infringement against an internet book archive, holding that its free-to-access library did not constitute fair use of the copyrighted books. Hachette Book Group Inc. v. Internet Archive, Case No. 23-1260 (2d Cir. Sept. 4, 2024) (Menashi, Robinson, Kahn, JJ.)

Hachette Book Group, HarperCollins Publishers, John Wiley & Sons, and Penguin Random House (collectively, the publishers) brought suit against Internet Archive alleging that its “Free Digital Library,” which loans copies of the publishers’ books without charge, violated the publishers’ copyrights. Internet Archive argued that its use of the publishers’ copyrighted material fell under the fair use exception to the Copyright Act because Internet Archive acquired physical books and digitized them for borrowing (much like a traditional library) and maintained a 1:1 ratio of borrowed material to physical copies except for a brief period during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The district court reviewed the four statutory fair use factors set forth in § 107 of the Copyright Act:

  • The purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes.
  • The nature of the copyrighted work.
  • The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.
  • The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.

The district court found that Internet Archive’s use of the works was not covered by the fair use exception because its use was non-transformative, was commercial in nature due to its solicitation of donations, and was disruptive of the market for e-book licenses. Internet Archive appealed.

The Second Circuit affirmed, addressing each factor in turn.

The Second Circuit held that Internet Archive’s use of the copyrighted material was non-transformative because Internet Archive copied the works wholesale and the “transformation” of the material from a physical copy to a digital copy that could be loaned out was not sufficient to fundamentally alter the nature of the copyrighted material. The Court maintained that the “recasting of a novel as an e-book” is a “paradigmatic” example of a derivative work.

However, contrary to the district court, the Second Circuit found that Internet Archive’s use of the works was not commercial in nature despite its solicitation of donations, citing Internet Archive’s nonprofit status and free distribution of archived materials. The Court explained that the mere association with other platforms where users may buy print copies of the works combined with the existence of a “donate” button was insufficient to render the use commercial.

The Second Circuit held that the second fair use factor also weighed against Internet Archive, since both the fiction and nonfiction works digitized by Internet Archive were nonetheless original and creative. The Court held that the “greater leeway” that is allowed for fair use of “factual or informational” work was not sufficient to weigh in favor of Internet Archive since the nonfiction works nevertheless “represent the authors’ [...]

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Back to the Future: Expert Can Be Skilled Artisan Based on Later-Acquired Knowledge

by | Sep 12, 2024 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit clarified that a technical expert does not need to have been a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) at the time of the invention. Instead, they may rely on later-acquired knowledge to offer testimony from the vantage point of a skilled artisan at the time of the invention. Osseo Imaging, LLC v. Planmeca USA Inc., Case No. 23-1627 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 4, 2024) (Dyk, Clevenger, Stoll, JJ.)

Osseo owns patents related to orthopedic imaging systems that use X-ray beam techniques to create tomographic and/or densitometric models of a scanned object. The alleged invention date of the patents was 1999. Osseo sued Planmeca for infringement of dental imaging systems that generate and display 3D models to a user.

At trial, the jury was instructed to determine the requisite level of ordinary skill and was told that a POSITA would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical or computer engineering, plus three to five years’ experience working in a diagnostic imaging environment that uses the techniques described in the asserted patents. During cross-examination, Planmeca sought to demonstrate that Osseo’s technical expert did not have the requisite experience in 1999, the alleged date of invention. The jury returned a verdict that Planmeca infringed the asserted patents.

After trial, Planmeca moved for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL), arguing that Osseo’s expert’s testimony should be disregarded because he was not a POSITA at the time of the patents’ alleged date of invention in 1999. The district court denied the motion as legally incorrect. Planmeca appealed.

Planmeca argued that the district court erred in denying JMOL because although Osseo’s expert became a POSITA eight to 10 years after the time of the invention, he was not so skilled at the time of the invention, and thus the verdict could not be supported by his testimony. The Federal Circuit reiterated that “[to] offer expert testimony from the perspective of a skilled artisan in a patent case – like for claim construction, validity, or infringement – a witness must at least have ordinary skill in the art.” The Court rejected Planmeca’s argument to add a timing requirement that the expert must have possessed the requisite ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Instead, the expert must be qualified to offer testimony from the vantage point of a skilled artisan.

The Federal Circuit explained that it made little sense to add a timing requirement because an expert could acquire the necessary skill level later and develop an understanding of what a POSITA knew at the time of the invention. The Court noted that the fact that the expert was not a POSITA at the time of the invention may well be used during cross-examination to undermine the credibility of the expert but also noted that an expert could avoid such potential damage by explaining how they gained the perspective of a POSITA at the time of the invention.

Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed [...]

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Lower the Red Flags: Flawed Fee Award Flops

by | Sep 5, 2024 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded a district court decision awarding attorneys’ fees, finding that the district court abused its discretion by failing to properly explain its basis for the fee award. Realtime Adaptive Streaming L.L.C. v. Sling TV, L.L.C., Case No. 23-1035 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 23, 2024) (Albright, Dist. J., sitting by designation; Moore, Lourie, JJ.)

Realtime Adaptive Streaming sued Sling and DISH for patent infringement related to digital data compression. The district court granted DISH’s motion for summary judgment of invalidity. While the invalidity finding was on appeal, the district court granted DISH’s motion for attorneys’ fees based on six so-called “red flags” that it found should have served as warning signs to Realtime that its case was fatally flawed.

The district court explained that the first red flag was two prior court decisions against Google and Netflix, which found similar claims of Realtime’s patent ineligible as abstract ideas under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Despite these decisions, Realtime pursued its claims. The second red flag came when the Federal Circuit ruled against Realtime in a related case. The third occurred when an inter partes review (IPR) proceeding invalidated key claims of Realtime’s patent. Following a nearly two-year stay, the district court identified the fourth and fifth red flags: a non-final office action from the US Patent & Trademark Office rejecting a key claim of the remaining patent, and a letter from DISH indicating its intention to seek attorneys’ fees if Realtime continued the case. The sixth red flag was an expert declaration from DISH that addressed invalidity of the claims at issue, and which was unfavorable to Realtime. Realtime appealed the district court’s attorneys’ fees award.

The Federal Circuit concluded that the district court erred by relying on the six so-called red flags without explaining the weight for each. Addressing the first flag, the Federal Circuit agreed with the district court’s reliance on the Google and Netflix decisions because they involved a patent with a virtually identical specification and essentially the same claims. The Court disagreed with the remaining red flags. The Court found that the second red flag related to a different technology and should not have put Realtime on notice that its patent claims were meritless. With respect to the third, fourth, and fifth flags, the Federal Circuit found that the district court did not adequately explain why these decisions supported exceptionality.

With regard to the sixth flag (the expert opinion), the Federal Circuit found that the district court’s analysis was insufficient. The Court explained that it is typical in a patent infringement case for the parties’ experts to disagree on invalidity issues. The Court found that Realtime and its expert developed critiques and counterarguments to DISH’s expert’s opinions, demonstrating that Realtime did not fail to give “serious consideration” to invalidity. While the district court may have found DISH’s expert more persuasive, that fact alone should not have put Realtime on notice that its claims lacked merit.

Accordingly, the Federal [...]

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Rebel Libertarians Aren’t at Liberty to Violate Lanham Act

by | Sep 5, 2024 |

In a case that required the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit to articulate the boundary between the Lanham Act and the First Amendment when the trademark in question is the name of a political party, the Court found that the Lanham Act can constitutionally apply to use of the mark and that the defendants were improperly using the mark as a source identifier. Libertarian Nat’l Comm. Inc. v. Saliba, et al., Case No. 23-1856 (6th Cir. Aug. 28, 2024) (Cole, Gibbons, Readler, JJ.)

The Libertarian National Committee (LNC) owns the trademark LIBERTARIAN PARTY. Party bylaws of the LNC provide a licensing regime that authorizes recognized state affiliates, such as the Libertarian Party of Michigan, to use the LNC’s mark as a source identifier.

In 2022, two top officers of the Libertarian Party of Michigan resigned, and the third most senior member, Andrew Chadderdon, became acting chair of the Michigan affiliate. Chadderdon’s promotion sparked a dispute within the affiliate over the rightful leadership of the group. The dissenting members of the affiliate voted to remove him from the executive committee and voted themselves onto the committee. The Libertarian Party Judicial Committee determined that this replacement by the dissenting members violated the bylaws. It reinstated Chadderdon and voided the executive appointments, including those of the dissenting members, that resulted from the vote. However, the dissenting members (the defendants in this case) regarded themselves as the rightful executive board members of the Libertarian Party of Michigan. Despite being told to stop using LNC’s trademarks, the defendants continued to use them to hold themselves out as the official Libertarian Party of Michigan.

The LNC sued the defendants in federal court, bringing various claims of trademark infringement, and moved for a preliminary injunction barring them from continuing to use the LNC’s mark, which the district court granted. The defendants appealed.

The primary question before the Sixth Circuit was whether the defendants’ use of the LNC mark to “solicit party donations, fill out campaign finance paperwork, advertise events, and espouse political platform positions and commentary falls within the scope of the Lanham Act.” The defendants relied on the Sixth Circuit’s 2003 decision in Taubman Co. v. Webfeats to argue that their use of the LNC mark was political speech and therefore fell outside the ambit of the Lanham Act, which regulates commercial speech. Taubman concerned Webfeats’s use of a shopping mall’s trademark in domain names by the creator of a “fan site” and later a “gripe site.” Because Webfeats’s use of the mark was not to designate source but to comment on the trademark holder, it was protected expression.

The Sixth Circuit found Taubman to be inapposite, however. Citing the Supreme Court’s 2023 holding in Jack Daniel’s Properties, the Sixth Circuit pointed out that the defendants used the LNC’s mark “to designate the source of their political services as affiliated with the LNC” and thus implicated the core concern of trademark law: use of a mark as a source identifier.

The Sixth Circuit [...]

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Some Post-Expiration Patent Royalty Payments May Be OK

by | Sep 5, 2024 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court’s finding that a contract impermissibly allowed for patent royalties after the patent expired because the post-termination royalty payments were allocated to non-US patents. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Atrium Med. Corp., Case No. 23-16020 (9th Cir. Aug. 23, 2024) (Friedland, Mendoza, Desai, JJ.) (per curiam).

C.R. Bard held one US and one Canadian patent covering a type of vascular graft. In 2011, Bard and Atrium entered a licensing agreement to settle a patent dispute. Under the terms of the agreement, Atrium agreed to pay Bard a 15% royalty on covered US sales until 2019 (when the US patent expired) and a 15% royalty on covered Canadian sales until 2024 (when the Canadian patent expired). The contract also included a quarterly royalty minimum. Through 2019, as the contract contemplated, Atrium paid royalties on its US and Canadian sales. Because of a US Food and Drug Administration delay, Atrium had lower than expected sales and never exceeded the quarterly minimum royalty.

Atrium eventually refused to continue making royalty payments, which after 2019 covered only Canadian sales (likewise never exceeding the quarterly minimum). Bard sued for breach of contract in 2021. Atrium argued that the royalty provision was unenforceable under Brulotte v. Thys, a 1964 US Supreme Court decision holding that collecting royalties for patent use after a patent’s expiration constitutes patent misuse. The district court determined that the “clear and primary purpose” of the parties’ contractual minimum royalty was to compensate Bard for US sales of the patented product. The district court therefore agreed with Atrium. Bard appealed.

The Ninth Circuit undertook to determine whether the terms of the parties’ contract constituted patent misuse under Brulotte. The Ninth Circuit first explained that in Brulotte, the Supreme Court considered a contract between the owner of multiple patents related to picking hops and farmers who made seasonal license payments to use machines incorporating those patents. The Supreme Court found patent misuse because the license amount did not decrease as patents incorporated into the machines expired, which indicated that the farmers were paying to use expired patents.

Despite pushback, the Supreme Court refused to overturn Brulotte in 2015 when it decided Kimble v. Marvel. That case involved a patent holder’s license allowing Marvel to incorporate patented web-shooting technology into a Spiderman toy. In Kimble, the Ninth Circuit had ruled that the license agreement was invalid under Brulotte because it required Marvel to continue to pay a royalty fee after the patent expired. The Ninth Circuit noted, however, that an ongoing license after the expiration of a patent may be permissible if the license contemplates both patented and non-patented features, as long as the terms of the royalty adjust when the patent expires. For instance, a license covering both a patented invention and a trade secret may continue past the life of the patent, as long as the royalty rate diminishes after the patent expires. This reflects that the royalty is [...]

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Arguing Internet Availability to Establish Copyright Infringement Is Bananas

by | Aug 29, 2024 |

In an unpublished opinion, the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a district court’s decision finding that a pro se Californian artist failed to establish that an Italian artist had reasonable opportunity to access the copyrighted work simply because it was available to view on the internet. Morford v. Cattelan, Case No. 23-12263 (11th Cir. Aug. 16, 2024) (Jordan, Pryor, Branch, JJ.) (per curiam).

A plaintiff alleging copyright infringement may show factual copying by either direct or indirect evidence showing “that the defendant had access to the copyrighted work and that there are probative similarities between the allegedly infringing work and the copyrighted work.” To do so, however, the copyright owner must establish a nexus between the work and the defendant’s alleged infringement. Mere access to a work disseminated in places or settings where the defendant may have come across it is not sufficient.

Joe Morford’s Banana and Orange and Maurizio Cattelan’s Comedian both “involve the application of duct tape to a banana against a flat surface” (see images below from the court decision’s appendix). Cattelan’s Comedian went viral and sold for more than $100,000 at Miami’s Art Basel. Morford claimed that Comedian was a copy. The district court found that Morford failed to show that Cattelan had reasonable opportunity to access Banana and Orange and thus could not establish a copyright claim. Morford appealed.

On appeal, Morford argued that because he could show striking similarity between Banana and Orange and Comedian, he was not required to proffer evidence of access to show copyright infringement. In the alternative, he argued that he could show substantial similarity and that Cattelan had reasonable opportunity to access Banana and Orange as it was widely disseminated and readily discoverable online.

The Eleventh Circuit explained that in circuits adopting a widespread dissemination standard, that standard requires showing that the work enjoyed “considerable success or publicity.” Morford showed that Banana and Orange was available on his public Facebook page for almost 10 years and featured on his YouTube channel and in a blog post, with views in more than 25 countries. But Banana and Orange’s availability on the internet, without more, was “too speculative to find a nexus” between Cattelan and Morford to satisfy the factual copying prong of a copyright infringement claim, according to the Court.

The Eleventh Circuit also found that Morford failed to meet the high burden of demonstrating that the original work and accused infringement were so strikingly similar as to establish copying. Such similarity exists if the similarity in appearance between the two works “is so great that [it] precludes the possibility of coincidence, independent creation or common source,” but identical expression does not necessarily constitute infringement. In this analysis, a court addresses the “uniqueness or complexity of the protected work as it bears on the likelihood of copying.” Morford argued that he [...]

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Later-Filed, Earlier-Expiring Patent Not an ODP Reference

by | Aug 29, 2024 |

Addressing invalidity due to obvious-type double patenting (ODP) based on later-filed-related patents, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a district court’s application of In re Cellect (Fed. Cir. 2023) and held that the later-filed, earlier-expiring continuation patents were not available as ODP references against the earlier-filed, later-expiring patent. Allergan USA, Inc. v. MSN Labs Private Ltd., Case No. 24-1061 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 13, 2024) (Lourie, Dyk, Reyna JJ.)

In 2015, the US Food and Drug Administration approved a new drug application for a drug sold by Allergan to treat the symptoms of irritable bowel syndrome. In 2019, Sun Pharma filed an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) seeking to market a generic version of the drug. Allergan then sued Sun Pharma and MSN Labs for infringement of four patents related to the drug. One of the patents, which claims a compound of the drug, had been granted almost three years of patent term adjustment (PTA) and was followed by two more patents from continuation applications in the same patent family. The other three patents all claimed tablet forms of the drug. The claims of one of the patents recited that a glidant was optional while the claims of the other two patents did not require a glidant at all.

The US District Court for the District of Delaware held a three-day bench trial and concluded that the asserted claim of the compound patent was invalid under the ODP doctrine and that the claims of the three tablet patents were invalid for lack of written description. On the issue of ODP, the district court found Allergan’s “first-filed, first-issued” distinction “immaterial.” The district court stated that “[w]hen analyzing ODP, a court compares patent expiration dates, rather than filing or issuance dates.” Allergan appealed.

The Federal Circuit reversed on both issues. The Court held that the claims of the later-filed, earlier-expiring continuation patents were not available as ODP references against the first patent because the purpose of the ODP doctrine is to prevent patentees from obtaining a second patent to effectively extend the life of the first patent. The Federal Circuit explained that the district court misread Cellect as binding it to solely consider expiration dates in the ODP analysis. The Court explained that Cellect only controls to the extent that it requires a court to consider the later-filed patent’s expiration date (i.e., the expiration date after the addition of PTA) in its ODP analysis, not the expiration date that it would have shared with the reference patents in the absence of a PTA award. The panel majority emphasized that it does not follow that the later-filed patent must be invalidated by the earlier-filed reference patents simply because it expires later. The majority noted that “Cellect does not address, let alone resolve, any variation of the question presented here – namely, under what circumstances can a claim properly serve as an ODP reference – and therefore has little to say on the precise issue before us.”

The Federal Circuit also [...]

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It’s All Grecco to Me: No “Sophisticated Plaintiff” Exception to Discovery Rule

by | Aug 29, 2024 |

In a case of first impression, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that there is no “sophisticated plaintiff” exception to the Copyright Act’s discovery rule, which provides that a copyright claim only accrues upon the copyright owner’s discovery of the infringement or when the copyright owner (in the exercise of due diligence) should have discovered the infringement. Michael Grecco Productions, Inc. v. RADesign, Inc., Case No. 23-1078 (2d Cir. Aug. 16, 2024) (Wesley, Chin, Lee, JJ.)

Michael Grecco Productions (MGP) is a photography studio and business owned by commercial photographer Michael Grecco, who presents himself as an industry leader in copyright registration and enforcement. This case arose in the context of Grecco’s January 2017 photos of a model wearing shoes designed by Ruthie Davis. The photos were published in a magazine in August 2017. MGP claimed that Davis republished at least two of these photos on her brand’s website and social media platforms without a license. In its complaint, MGP alleged that Davis’s use of the photos began on August 16, 2017, but that MGP did not discover this infringement until February 8, 2021. On October 12, 2021 (more than four years after the infringement began but less than one year after its discovery), MGP filed suit against Davis alleging copyright infringement. MGP’s complaint also pled facts describing Grecco’s “efforts to educate photographers concerning the benefits of copyright registration” and how Grecco himself “spends time and money to actively search for hard-to-detect infringements, and how he enforces his rights under the Copyright Act.”

Davis moved to dismiss the suit as time-barred, arguing that the complaint was deficient on its face based on the Copyright Act’s three-year limitations period. Purporting to apply the governing “discovery rule,” the district court found that MGP’s “relative sophistication as an experienced litigator in identifying and bringing causes of action for unauthorized uses of Grecco’s copyrighted works leads to the conclusion that it should have discovered, with the exercise of due diligence,” the alleged infringement within the statute’s three-year limitations period. Based on this rationale, the district court granted Davis’s motion to dismiss. MGP appealed.

Reviewing the district court’s ruling de novo, the Second Circuit found that the district court erred as a matter of law in concluding that MGP’s complaint was barred by the three-year limitations period.

The Second Circuit explained that it (and 10 other circuit courts) had already held that in enacting the Copyright Act, Congress intended to employ “the discovery rule” as the measure of when a claim for infringement accrues. Under this rule, a claim for copyright infringement accrues when a diligent plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the infringement. This timing is in contrast to “the injury rule,” under which the claim would accrue when the infringement in-fact occurred. As the Court explained, the discovery rule is not an equitable tolling or estoppel doctrine available to some “worthy” plaintiffs but not others. Rather, it is the rule used to determine when a cognizable claim for copyright [...]

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