IP UPDATE

Beach Buggy Battle: Stipulation Insufficient to Establish Trademark Distinctiveness

by Tim Dunker | Jan 30, 2025 | Trademarks

The US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that a district court does not need to accept both parties’ stipulation that a mark is distinctive but instead is permitted to make an evidentiary inquiry in determining whether the mark is distinctive or generic. Moke America LLC v. Moke Int’l Ltd., Case No. 23-1634 (4th Cir. Jan. 15, 2025) (King, Groh, JJ.) (Richardson, J., dissenting).

Starting in the 1960s, British Motor Corporation (BMC) sold vehicles colloquially referred to as “Mokes” in the United Kingdom, Australia, and Portugal. By the time BMC ceased production in 1993, Mokes had garnered a small but devoted following for use as beach buggies in the United States, the Caribbean, and Australia.

In August 2015, Moke International and Moke USA sold their first vehicle using the MOKE mark and subsequently sought trademark registration. One year later, Moke America began US sales of vehicles using the MOKE mark. Both parties described their vehicles as being reengineered and redesigned versions of the BMC Moke.

The present dispute began when Moke America opposed Moke International and Moke USA’s registration based on priority use of the MOKE mark. The Trademark Trial & Appeal Board dismissed the opposition. Moke America then filed a district court complaint seeking a declaration of trademark ownership and asserting trademark infringement. Moke International and Moke USA counterclaimed for a declaration of trademark ownership and trademark infringement, as well as affirmance of the Board’s dismissal.

A party claiming ownership of a mark bears the burden of proving distinctiveness. A generic term is not distinctive. Generic terms in trademark law are those that describe a genus or class of which a particular product is a member, such as “CONVENIENT STORE retail stores, DRY ICE solid carbon dioxide, and LIGHT BEER ale-type beverages.” Generic terms can never be protected. The purpose of denying protection for these terms is to safeguard the public from having commonly used words and phrases removed from the “linguistic commons.” Certain marks that are originally distinctive may become generic through the public’s pervasive use of the term through a process known as “genericide.” Genericide occurs when the trademark ceases to identify the particular source of a product or service to the public and instead identifies a class of product or service. Common examples include ASPIRIN and ESCALATOR.

Since both parties sought ownership of the MOKE mark, the parties stipulated that the mark was distinctive and not generic. The district court found that a stipulation was insufficient and noted that the parties must set forth evidence that the mark was distinctive and not generic. The district court concluded that MOKE was once inherently distinctive but had become generic before either party sold a vehicle bearing the MOKE mark. Both parties appealed.

Seeking to overturn the district court’s finding of genericness, the parties argued that the district court was required to accept their stipulation of the MOKE mark’s distinctiveness. The Fourth Circuit disagreed, finding that blindly accepting a stipulation was incompatible with the court’s role of [...]

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What’s Shaking? Not an Interlocutory Appellate Decision on Damages

by Tessa Kroll | Jan 30, 2025 | Trade Secrets

The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit dismissed and remanded a district court certified interlocutory appeal concerning the standard for calculating a reasonable royalty under the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA). The Court explained that the rate instruction issued by the district court was erroneous because the parties had not yet gone to trial and the plaintiff had not yet proven liability. Therefore, the issue of damages might never arise. Silverthorne Seismic, L.L.C. v. Sterling Seismic Servs., Ltd., Case No. 24-20006 (5th Cir. Jan. 3, 2025) (Smith, Clement, Higginson, JJ.) (Higginson, J., dissenting).

Silverthorne licensed seismic data to Casillas Petroleum Resource Partners II, LLC, an oil and gas exploration company. Under this arrangement, Silverthorne provided data to Sterling, a seismic data processer, which processed the data and sent it to Casillas. Because Sterling’s data processing required more data than what Casillas had paid for, Sterling was only permitted to forward the data that Casillas had licensed. However, Sterling sent Casillas unlicensed data, which Casillas allegedly showed to potential investors.

Silverthorne sued Sterling for trade secret misappropriation under the DTSA and sought reasonable royalties for Sterling’s improper disclosure. Shortly before trial, the district court issued an order adopting the Fifth Circuit’s definition of “reasonable royalty” in University Computing (1974), which, in this case, would have required Silverthorne to prove what the parties “would have agreed to for . . . use [of] the alleged trade secret.” University Computing predates the DTSA, which provides for reasonable royalties for “disclosure or use of a trade secret.” Silverthorne appealed the order, noting that it would not be able to prove what Sterling would have agreed to pay to use the data, since Sterling was a data processor and not an end user. The district court certified the following question for appeal:

[W]hether a plaintiff is entitled to prove reasonable royalty damages under the DTSA using willing buyer(s) detached from the parties to the litigation when willing buyers (here, oil and gas exploration companies) exist for plaintiff’s alleged trade secret (here, seismic data), but the defendant and comparable entities (here, seismic processors) do not buy or license that trade secret.

An administrative panel of the Fifth Circuit granted leave to appeal.

Majority Opinion

The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal as not involving a controlling question of law. The Court explained that interlocutory appeals are only permitted where an order involves a controlling question of law, the resolution of which would materially and immediately affect the outcome of litigation in the district court. The Fifth Circuit emphasized that a question is not controlling just because the answer would complicate a litigant’s ability to make its case or because the answer could save the parties from a post-judgment appeal. Applying these principles, the Court reasoned that damages issues generally do not control a case until the plaintiff establishes liability, unless the damages issue would be dispositive. Because Silverthorne had not yet established liability and was not barred from proving damages under the district court’s definition [...]

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Bottling the Truth: Equivalence and Reverse Equivalence

by Keval Amin | Jan 30, 2025 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled that the “substantially the same way” comparison in connection with a doctrine of equivalents (DOE) analysis involving a means-plus-function claim limitation should focus on the overall structure corresponding to the claimed function, not on unclaimed structure. Steuben Foods, Inc. v. Shibuya Hoppmann Corp., Case No. 23-1790 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 24, 2025) (Moore, Hughes, Cunningham, JJ.)

Steuben Foods holds patents for an aseptic bottling system designed to sterilize and fill bottles with foodstuffs at speeds exceeding 100 bottles per minute, making the technology suitable for high-volume food production. Steuben sued Shibuya for infringing its patents. At trial, Steuben successfully demonstrated that Shibuya’s aseptic bottling system infringed a patent claim related to a “second sterile region,” a feature designed to pre-sterilize a valve mechanism and prevent contamination. The jury awarded Steuben more than $38 million in damages and, in doing so, rejected Shibuya’s defense under the reverse doctrine of equivalents (RDOE). The RDOE is a rarely invoked defense that is asserted when an accused product, although meeting the literal terms of a claim, operates on fundamentally different principles and thus does not infringe. Despite the jury’s verdict, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) of noninfringement, holding that Shibuya’s RDOE defense precluded infringement. Steuben appealed.

The Federal Circuit reversed the JMOL based on the RDOE, finding that the district court improperly weighed evidence that should have been left to the jury. The Court emphasized that Steuben’s expert testimony constituted substantial evidence supporting the jury’s findings and warranted deference. The Court also rejected Shibuya’s narrow construction of the claimed “second sterile region,” which would have excluded food flow, and affirmed the broader interpretation adopted by the district court (an interpretation the Court noted better aligned with the claim language).

The Federal Circuit noted that it had “previously described RDOE as an ‘anachronistic exception, long mentioned but rarely applied.’” While the Court declined to definitively rule on the RDOE’s continued viability under the Patent Act of 1952, it favorably noted Steuben’s argument that “if a device literally falls within the scope of a claim, but the accused infringer believes the claim is too broad and its device should not infringe, the appropriate recourse is a § 112 challenge, not a claim of noninfringement under RDOE.” In this case, the Federal Circuit concluded that even if Shibuya had made a prima facie case under RDOE that the principle of operation of the accused product was so far removed from the asserted claim, “the jury’s verdict should not have been overturned under RDOE because [Steuben’s expert] provided rebuttal testimony that the jury was entitled to credit. JMOL of noninfringement was therefore improper.”

The district court had also analyzed whether, under the DOE, claimed structures, such as conveyor plates and systems, were equivalent to Shibuya’s rotary wheels and neck grippers. The district court concluded they were not. The district court had construed the term “means for filling the aseptically disinfected plurality of bottles [...]

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Vimeo’s Fleeting Interaction With Videos Doesn’t Negate Safe Harbor Protections

by Taylor MacDonald | Jan 23, 2025 | Copyrights

The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a district court’s decision, granting Vimeo qualified protection under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) safe harbor provision. Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, Inc., Case Nos. 21-2949(L); -2974(Con) (2d Cir. Jan. 13, 2025) (Leval, Parker, Merriam, JJ.) This case addresses, for the second time, whether Vimeo had “red flag knowledge” of the defendant’s copyrighted works under the DMCA.

DMCA Section 512(c) provides a safe harbor that shelters online service providers from liability for indirect copyright infringement on their platforms under certain conditions. Congress provided two exceptions that would remove the safe harbor protection:

Actual or red flag knowledge of infringing content
The ability to control content while receiving a financial benefit directly attributable to the accused infringement activity.

EMI, an affiliate of Capitol Records, vehemently opposed Vimeo’s inclusion of videos containing EMI’s music on its site and initiated the present suit in 2009. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Vimeo, dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims on the ground that Vimeo was entitled to the safe harbor protection provided by Section 512(c). EMI appealed.

In a 2016 appeal (Vimeo I ), the Second Circuit considered Vimeo’s activities under the DMCA. In Vimeo I, the Court (in the context of an interlocutory appeal) ruled that the copyright holder must establish that the service provider (e.g., Vimeo) had “knowledge or awareness of infringing content,” and that the service provider bore the initial burden to prove it qualified for the DMCA safe harbor, whereupon the burden shifted to the copyright holder to prove a disqualifying exception.

Knowledge of Infringement

In Vimeo I, the Second Circuit cited its 2012 decision in Viacom Int’l v. You Tube and explained that red flag knowledge incorporates an objective standard. The facts actually known to the service provider must be sufficient such that a reasonable person would have understood there to be infringement that was not offset by fair use or a license. Vimeo I clarified that service provider employees who are not experts in copyright law cannot be expected to know more than any reasonable person without specialized understanding.

The Second Circuit explained that this knowledge analysis is a fact-intensive one, and that copyright owners cannot rely on service provider employees’ generalized understanding to prove red flag knowledge for any video (or other work). The Vimeo I court also noted that the DMCA did not place a burden on service providers to investigate whether users had acquired licenses. In Vimeo I, the Second Circuit further instructed that because the legal community cannot agree on a universal understanding of fair use, it would be unfair to expect “untutored” service provider employees to determine whether a given video is not fair use on its face.

Right and Ability to Control

In analyzing what constitutes the right and ability to control, the Second Circuit emphasized that Congress’ purpose behind the DMCA was to effect a compromise between rightsholders and safe harbor claimants: “Congress recognized that the [...]

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Untwisting the Fixation Requirement: Flexible Rules on Moveable Sculptures

by Hannah Hurley | Jan 23, 2025 | Copyrights

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded a district court’s dismissal of a claim of copyright infringement for kinetic and manipulable sculptures, finding that movable structures were sufficiently “fixed” in a tangible medium for copyright purposes. Tangle, Inc. v. Aritzia, Inc., et al., Case No. 23-3707 (9th Cir. Jan. 14, 2024) (Koh, Johnstone, Simon, JJ.)

Tangle, a toy company, holds copyright registrations for seven kinetic and manipulable sculptures, each made from 17 or 18 identical, connected 90-degree curved tubular segments. These sculptures can be twisted or turned 360 degrees at the joints, allowing for various poses. Aritzia, a lifestyle apparel brand, used similar sculptures in its retail store displays, leading Tangle to file a lawsuit alleging copyright and trade dress infringement. Aritzia’s sculptures were larger, were a different color, and had a chrome finish.

The Copyright Act requires that a work of authorship be “fixed in any tangible medium of expression.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). At the pleading stage, the district court concluded that the sculptures were not fixed and thus dismissed Tangle’s copyright claim. The district court also dismissed the trade dress claim for failure to provide adequate notice of the asserted trade dress. Tangle appealed.

While the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court’s dismissal of the trade dress claim, it disagreed with the district court’s ruling on the copyright claim. Comparing the kinetic, movable sculptures to music, movies, and dance, the Court found that Tangle’s dynamic sculptures were entitled to copyright protection and that Tangle adequately alleged valid copyrights in its sculptures. The Court held that the works’ ability to move into various poses did not, by itself, support the conclusion that they were not “fixed” in a tangible medium for copyright purposes.

The Ninth Circuit held that under the “extrinsic test” test, which looks at “the objective similarities of the two works, focusing only on the protectable elements of the plaintiff’s expression,” as set forth in the Court’s 2018 decision in Rentmeester v. Nike, Tangle plausibly alleged copying of its protected works by alleging that the creative choices it made in selecting and arranging elements of its copyrighted works were substantially similar to the choices Aritzia made in creating its sculptures.

Since Aritzia failed to dispute that Tangle had properly alleged copying, the Ninth Circuit stated that Tangle only needed to show that the sculptures were substantially similar to prove infringement. Applying its 2004 decision in Swirsky v. Carey, the Ninth Circuit explained that “substantial similarity can be found in a combination of elements, even if those elements are individually unprotected.”

The Ninth Circuit found that the copyrighted and accused sculptures were similar enough to the ordinary observer to constitute infringement because both were comprised of identical, connected 90-degree curved tubular segments that could be twisted and manipulated to create many different poses. The Court further explained that the vast range of possible expressions could afford the sculptures broad copyright protection.