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No First Place Trophy Here: Public Demo at Trade Show Found Invalidating

by Amol Parikh | Feb 23, 2023 | America Invents Act, Patents

Addressing the public use bar of pre-America-Invents-Act (AIA) 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s decision to invalidate a patent because the patent owner’s disclosure of a prior art device at a trade show more than one year before the patent’s priority date was an invalidating prior public use. Minerva Surgical, Inc. v. Hologic, Inc., Case No. 21-2246 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 15, 2023) (Prost, Reyna, Stoll, JJ.)

Minerva sued Hologic for infringement of a patent directed to surgical devices for a procedure called endometrial ablation, which stops or reduces abnormal uterine bleeding. The patent had a priority date of November 7, 2011, and the asserted claim included the term “the inner and outer elements have substantially dissimilar material properties” (SDMP term). The district court construed the SDMP term to mean that the “inner and outer frame elements have different thickness and different composition.”

On completion of discovery, Hologic moved for summary judgment of invalidity, arguing that the asserted patent claims were anticipated under the public use bar of pre-AIA § 102(b). According to Hologic, more than a year before the patent’s priority date, Minerva brought a device called Aurora to the 38th Global Congress of Minimally Invasive Gynecology sponsored by the American Association of Gynecologic Laparoscopists (AAGL 2009)—an event dubbed the “Super Bowl of the industry.” During the AAGL 2009 conference, Minerva had a booth with 15 fully functional Aurora devices, gave a presentation discussing the Aurora devices and distributed brochures. In light of the record, the district court granted summary judgment that the asserted claims were anticipated under the public use bar. Minerva appealed.

Minerva raised three arguments on appeal. First, Minerva argued that disclosure of the Aurora device at AAGL 2009 was not a “public use” because Minerva “merely displayed” the device. Second, Minerva argued that there was no disclosure of the “invention” of the asserted claim because the Aurora device disclosed at AAGL 2009 lacked the SDMP term. Third, Minerva argued that the invention was not “ready for patenting” because Minerva was still improving the SDMP technology at the time of AAGL 2009, so the device did not function for its intended purpose of ablating “live human” tissue. The Federal Circuit addressed each argument in turn.

The Federal Circuit found that the district court had correctly determined that the Aurora device at AAGL 2009 was a “public use” since it was shown to individuals other than the inventor under no limitation, restriction or obligation of confidentiality. The undisputed record showed that Minerva pitched the Aurora device to various sophisticated industry members, who were allowed, without confidentiality obligations, to scrutinize the Aurora device closely enough to recognize and understand the SDMP technology Minerva later sought to patent.

The Federal Circuit also concluded that the Aurora device disclosed the SDMP term. The Court found that the inventors conceived of the SDMP technology before AAGL 2009 and that documentation about the Aurora device from before and shortly after the event [...]

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Nothing Lasts for Everly, Not Even Copyright Co-Authorship Rights

by Kathleen Lynch | Feb 23, 2023 | Copyrights

Addressing a novel issue, the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled that a statute of limitations can time-bar a defense in narrow circumstances where a defendant uses it to seek affirmative relief. Garza v. Everly, Case No. 21-5530 (6th Cir. Feb. 10, 2023) (Bush, Guy, JJ.) (Murphy, J., concurring).

After successful careers writing and recording music as the Everly Brothers, Don and Phil Everly disputed copyright ownership of certain songs. Don sued Phil’s estate, seeking declaratory judgment that Don was the sole author of “Cathy’s Clown.” After a bench trial, the district court held that Don repudiated Phil’s co-authorship of “Cathy’s Clown” and Phil failed to reassert his co-authorship rights within the three-year timeframe provided by the Copyright Act. The trial court also ruled that Phil’s estate was “time-barred from asserting he was a co-author as a defense,” since the Copyright Act time-barred him from asserting the same as a claim. Don died in the interim, and Phil’s estate appealed.

There were three issues on appeal:

Whether the lower court improperly applied the Copyright Act’s scheme for authorship claims
Whether the finding of Don’s repudiation was erroneous
Whether the court erred in applying the statute of limitation to Phil’s defense.

Regarding the authorship issue, the Sixth Circuit explained that the Copyright Act allows authors to transfer ownership of works while retaining certain rights, including a termination right that lets authors later reclaim copyright ownership. Phil’s estate argued that because termination rights are inalienable, the trial court erred in finding that Phil was not a co-author since he should have had the opportunity to reclaim his rights. The estate also argued that any statute of limitations regarding Phil reclaiming co-authorship should not have started tolling until all of Phil’s descendants learned of these rights. The Sixth Circuit disagreed, explaining that the lower court properly applied the Copyright Act. Because Phil did not dispute repudiation within the statutory period, the trial court correctly denied his co-ownership. Furthermore, the statute of limitations does not “refresh itself” when an owner dies, because descendants cannot obtain rights a decedent had forfeit.

Addressing the repudiation issue, the Sixth Circuit found ample trial evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion. The evidence included 1980s vintage letters, phone calls, and a “Release and Assignment” Phil signed containing language relinquishing his co-authorship rights in “Cathy’s Clown.” There was also credible testimony that Don “plainly and expressly repudiated Phil’s authorship” decades prior.

Finally, addressing the statute of limitations defense, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the trial court. In doing so, it noted that Phil’s estate originally argued that Phil remained a co-author of “Cathy’s Clown” as a counterclaim to Don’s suit. It was only after Don successfully argued that the claim was time-barred that Phil’s estate “reframed the counterclaim into a defense.” The Court explained the general policies underpinning statutes of limitation and noted that they typically do not bear on defenses because plaintiffs could otherwise wait out the statutory periods for defenses before suing. However, this [...]

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Message Received: US Courts Are Appropriate, More Convenient Venue to Adjudicate US IP Disputes

by Courtney Seams | Feb 23, 2023 | Copyrights, Trade Secrets, Trademarks

Addressing personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens in a software licensing dispute, the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld a district court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over a Dutch entity and the court’s decision to not dismiss the case for forum non conveniens. dmarcian, Inc. v. dmarcian Europe BV, Case Nos. 21-1721; -2005 (4th Cir. Feb. 14, 2023) (Wilkinson, Heytens, Hudson, JJ.)

dmarcian is a North Carolina-based software company that developed software to help email users authenticate incoming emails. A Dutch businessman who owned Mailmerk contacted dmarcian to offer to market the software in Europe. While dmarcian was initially unreceptive to the offer, the two parties eventually reached an oral agreement for Mailmerk to rebrand as dmarcian Europe BV (dmarcian BV) and sell the dmarcian software in Europe and Africa.

A dispute arose when dmarcian BV claimed ownership of portions of the dmarcian source code. dmarcian BV filed suit in the Netherlands, eventually filing for and winning injunctive relief in the Netherlands when dmarcian terminated dmarcian BV’s license. dmarcian then filed suit in the Western District of North Carolina asking for a preliminary injunction against dmarcian BV, which dmarcian BV opposed with a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens. The district court denied the motion to dismiss and entered a preliminary injunction that precluded dmarcian BV from operating outside of Europe and Africa and required dmarcian BV to stop using the registered “dmarcian” trademark without a disclaimer. The district court later found dmarcian BV in contempt for violating the preliminary injunction and ordered dmarcian BV to pay $335,000 in sanctions. dmarcian BV appealed the injunction and the sanctions.

dmarcian BV argued that the district court did not have personal jurisdiction. The Fourth Circuit rejected that argument, finding that the North Carolina long-arm statute authorized jurisdiction over dmarcian BV. The Court found that the application of the long-arm statute to dmarcian BV complied with due process because dmarcian BV worked closely with the dmarcian team in North Carolina (e.g., receiving sales leads, attending virtual meetings, coordinating software development), dmarcian BV sought out dmarcian to initiate business, and there was a strong interest in protecting intellectual property rights in North Carolina.

The Fourth Circuit also upheld the denial of the dismissal for forum non conveniens because the Dutch court was not an adequate alternative forum since Dutch courts cannot effectively adjudicate US trademark claims. The Fourth Circuit found that any judgment by the Dutch court would have little effect in the United States and would deny relief to dmarcian for the infringement of its rights.

The Fourth Circuit upheld the preliminary injunction grant, finding that the district court properly applied US and North Carolina law extraterritorially and that dmarcian was likely to succeed on all claims. The Court found that US laws properly applied and that dmarcian was likely to succeed on the following claims:

Copyright infringement, because there was a registered copyright, dmarcian BV reproduced elements of the source code outside of the licensing agreement, and [...]

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Patenting a Nice Cool Glass of Nicotinamide Riboside? Claims Covering Milk Invalid under § 101

by Alexander Piala, PhD | Feb 23, 2023 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that claims covering a naturally occurring composition were not patent eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101 merely because one component of the composition had been “isolated.” ChromaDex, Inc. v. Elysium Health, Inc., Case No. 2022-1116 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 13, 2023) (Chen, Prost, Stoll, JJ.)

ChromaDex sued Elysium (a former ChromaDex customer) for infringement of its patent directed to dietary supplements containing nicotinamide riboside (NR). Elysium moved for summary judgment, arguing that the asserted claims were invalid under the § 101 prohibition against patenting natural phenomena. After the district court granted summary judgment, ChromaDex appealed.

The asserted claims were directed to a composition comprising:

Isolated NR
One or more of tryptophan, nicotinic acid or nicotinamide
One of 22 carriers
Increased NAD+ biosynthesis after eating.

Both parties conceded that milk satisfies every element of the asserted claims with the exception that its NR is not “isolated.” Both parties also conceded that milk is a naturally occurring material and thus not patent eligible under § 101.

On these facts, the issue presented was whether the claim limitation that the NR must be “isolated” (which does not occur in nature) was sufficient to make the claims patent eligible. The Federal Circuit responded “no.”

The Federal Circuit analyzed the asserted claims under two tests: the “markedly different characteristics” test set out in Chakrabarty, and the Alice two-step test (unsure whether Chakrabarty remains controlling precedent).

Under the Chakrabarty test, a claimed composition is not a natural phenomenon if it has “markedly different characteristics” from what occurs in nature. The Federal Circuit found that ChromaDex’s claimed composition had no markedly different characteristics from natural milk. While ChromaDex argued that isolation potentially allowed for unnaturally high concentrations of NR, the claims did not require such concentrations. The claims included compositions structurally and functionally identical to milk and therefore failed the “markedly different characteristics” Chakrabarty test.

Proceeding to the two-part Alice test, under step 1 the Federal Circuit found that the claims were directed to a product of nature because there were no structural differences between the claimed composition and natural milk. Under step two, the Court found that there was no “inventive step” because the claims were merely directed to increasing NAD+ biosynthesis, which was a natural principle that resulted from drinking milk.

Practice Note: During claim drafting, care should be taken to avoid claims that encompass all structural and functional components of a naturally occurring material.

Review Delayed Is Not Review Denied

by Christopher M. Bruno | Feb 16, 2023 | America Invents Act, Patents

Considering whether the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) Director must complete review of the Patent Trial & Appeal Board’s (Board) inter partes review (IPR) decision within the statutory deadline for a final written decision, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concluded that the statute imposes no such requirement. CyWee Group Ltd. v. Google LLC et al., Case Nos. 20-1565, -1567 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 8, 2023) (Prost, Taranto, Chen, JJ.).

In 2018, Google filed two IPR petitions challenging certain claims of CyWee’s patents. The Board issued its final written decisions in January 2020, determining that all challenged claims were unpatentable for obviousness. CyWee appealed to the Federal Circuit in March 2020. In addition to challenging the patentability decision, CyWee challenged the appointment of Board administrative patent judges (APJs) as unconstitutional in view of the Appointments Clause. In March 2021, the Court affirmed the Board’s decisions and rejected CyWee’s constitutional challenge. The Court issued its mandate on June 10, 2020.

Eleven days later, the Supreme Court of the United States issued its decision in United States v. Arthrex, Inc., holding that APJs’ power to render final patentability decisions unreviewable by an accountable principal officer gave rise to an Appointments Clause violation but this violation could be remedied by, among other things, remanding to the acting PTO Director to decide to rehear the case. In response to a request from CyWee, the Federal Circuit recalled the mandate and remanded “for the limited purpose of allowing CyWee the opportunity to request Director rehearing of the final written decisions,” and required CyWee to inform the Court within 14 days of any decision denying rehearing. On remand, the Commissioner for Patents denied rehearing and ordered that the already-issued final written decisions were final decisions of the PTO. CyWee appealed.

CyWee contended that the post-Arthrex, mandated review by the PTO Director was untimely—and thus violative of due process—because the PTO Director did not have the ability to review the institution decision and final written decision within their respective three-month and one-year statutory deadlines. The Federal Circuit disagreed, calling CyWee’s contentions “meritless.” Rather, the Court found that because the PTO Director had permissibly delegated to the Commissioner for Patents authority to render institution and final decisions to the Board, those decisions were timely so long as the PTO Director’s delegees rendered them within the statutorily prescribed periods. By contrast, the PTO Director’s final review authority—a constitutional necessity born from Arthrex—has no similar statutory deadline.

CyWee also argued that the PTO Director’s later review was too late to satisfy a general requirement that the PTO Director consider the effect of regulations on the PTO’s ability to timely complete instituted IPRs. The Federal Circuit rejected this argument too, finding that even if the statute imposed a general timeliness requirement that was subject to judicial review, nothing about the process afforded to CyWee would have violated such a requirement.

With a different spin on the timeliness issue, CyWee also argued that the Board’s extension [...]

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Took a DNA Test, Turns Out “100% THAT BITCH” Is 100% Registrable

by Eleanor B. Atkins | Feb 16, 2023 | Trademarks

Addressing a refusal to register for failure to function as a trademark, the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board (Board) reversed, finding that the evidence of consumer perception of “100% THAT BITCH” did not demonstrate that the proposed mark is such a widespread and common expression that it failed to function as a source identifier. In re Lizzo LLC, Serial Nos. 88466264, 88466281 (TTAB Feb. 2, 2023) (Cataldo, Pologeorgis, Coggins, ATJ).

World-renowned, Grammy-winning artist Lizzo, through her company, Lizzo LLC, filed two applications to register 100% THAT BITCH for use in connection with clothing and related goods in International Class 25. The mark is a reference to a lyric (“I just took a DNA test, turns out I’m 100% that bitch”) from her chart-topping hit, “Truth Hurts.” The US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) issued an office action refusing to register the mark based on failure to function as a trademark under Sections 1, 2 and 45 of the Trademark Act. Specifically, the examining attorney asserted that the phrase is a “commonplace expression widely used by a variety of sources to convey an ordinary, familiar, well-recognized sentiment.” The PTO denied the request for reconsideration, and Lizzo appealed.

In assessing a refusal to register for failure to function as a trademark, the Board must look to consumer perception of the mark; specifically, whether the mark serves merely an ornamental or informational purpose rather than a source-identifying one. In this case, the relevant consumer consists of the general public, as there were no limitations on the channels of trade or classes of consumers identified in the applications. The examining attorney argued that the evidence demonstrated only that the mark, as used on the relevant goods, portrayed “a message of self-confidence and female empowerment used by many different entities in a variety of settings”—a message that Lizzo “did not originate[,] . . . but merely popularized.”

The Board discounted much of the evidence proffered to show that the mark was ornamental as it largely all referred to Lizzo, her music and/or her song, “Truth Hurts,” demonstrating that “consumers encountering 100% THAT BITCH on the specific types of clothing identified in the application—even when offered by third parties—associate the term with Lizzo and her music.” The Board further noted that all of the evidence regarding third-party use corresponded with the release of Lizzo’s “Truth Hurts”—a correlation that suggests the term was not widely known or used until Lizzo popularized it.

Although there was no disagreement that the proposed mark conveys a “feeling of female strength, empowerment and independence,” the Board found that the record supported that “most consumers would perceive 100% THAT BITCH used on goods in the application as associated with Lizzo rather than as a commonplace expression.” Accordingly, the Board reversed the refusal to register.

Ninth Circuit Extends § 230 Immunity to Domain Name Registrars

by Kavya Rallabhandi | Feb 16, 2023 | Trademarks

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s suit against a domain name registrar, holding that the plaintiff did not adequately allege that the registrar used the disputed trademark “in commerce” as required by the Lanham Act. The Court also extended immunity under the Communications Decency Act to include domain name registrars. Rigsby v. GoDaddy Inc. et al., Case No. 21-16182 (9th Cir. Feb. 3, 2023) (Clifton, McKeown, Thomas, JJ.).

Scott Rigsby, the first double leg amputee to complete an IRONMAN triathlon and founder of the Scott Rigsby Foundation (a nonprofit for wounded veterans and disabled persons), registered the domain name “scottrigsbyfoundation.org” with GoDaddy.com in 2007. GoDaddy is the world’s largest domain name registrar. When Rigsby failed to renew the domain name in 2018 because of a billing glitch, a third party registered the domain name and changed the content to an online gambling site. Rigsby filed suit against GoDaddy in the US District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, seeking declaratory judgment and alleging Lanham Act and state law claims. The suit was transferred to the US District Court for the District of Arizona pursuant to the forum selection clause in GoDaddy’s terms of service. The district court dismissed all claims with prejudice. Rigsby appealed, challenging dismissal and transfer of venue.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed dismissal. As an initial matter, the Court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to review the transfer order because the transferor fell within the Eleventh Circuit.

Turning to the Lanham Act claims under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), Rigsby alleged that GoDaddy knowingly provided use of the domain name in a deceptive manner. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument for two reasons. First, § 1125(a) has a use in commerce requirement, and GoDaddy simply granted the third-party gambling site access to the domain name. The Court held that the third party’s use in commerce does not subject the registrar to liability for trademark infringement or unfair competition. Second, as a domain name registrar that did not engage in activities other than registration, GoDaddy is shielded from liability for cybersquatting under the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA). Importantly, the Court held that the plaintiff did not prove that GoDaddy registered, used or trafficked the domain name with a bad-faith intent to profit—a registrar’s lack of intervention with an infringing third-party use is not equivalent to use in commerce or active promotion of infringement.

The Ninth Circuit also barred Rigsby’s state law claims and related injunctive relief, explaining that GoDaddy is entitled to statutory immunity under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA). (See § 230(c)(1) (“[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider”).) The Court identified three reasons why GoDaddy qualifies for CDA immunity. First, the Ninth Circuit joined the Second Circuit in ruling that domain name registrars and website hosting companies qualify as interactive computer services because [...]

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You Can’t Skirt around Obviousness by Arguing Expectation of Success Must Be Absolute

by Alexandra Cavazos, PhD | Feb 16, 2023 | Patents

Affirming an obviousness decision by the Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board), the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit explained that the expectation of success need only be reasonable and not absolute. Transtex Inc. v. Vidal, Case No. 20-1140 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 3, 2023) (Prost, Reyna JJ.) (Schall, J. dissenting).

Transtex makes aerodynamic trailer skirts, which improve fuel efficiency by reducing air drag. Transtex sued WABCO in the US District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, alleging that WABCO’s trailer skirts infringed several Transtex patents. WABCO responded by filing two inter partes review (IPR) petitions, one of which was against a patent with claims directed to “resilient” trailer skirts and the “resilient” struts used to attach them to a trailer.

WABCO argued that the challenged claims of the patent were obvious over a combination of the Layfield and Rinard references. WABCO submitted expert declarations stating that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that Layfield’s rigid struts could benefit from being constructed of resilient, more flexible material. Accordingly, a skilled artisan would have been motivated to look to other, similar types of trailer components that are also flexible—like that disclosed in Rinard—to improve upon Layfield’s rigid struts. WABCO successfully relied on much of the same expert testimony to argue that a skilled artisan would also have enjoyed a reasonable expectation of success in combining the more rigid struts of Layfield with the compressible materials taught in Rinard because Rinard taught the utility of having compressible “air scoops” at the tail end of a trailer, which would compress downwards when the trailer contacted a loading dock.

The Board agreed with WABCO and found the challenged claims obvious. According to the Board, Layfield taught all of the claim limitations except for a “resilient strut” that could flex both toward the center of the trailer and away from the center of the trailer and then regain its shape while Rinard taught the benefits of using compressible air scoops made out of a resilient material as part of a trailer skirt system. The Board also concluded that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine Layfield with Rinard and would have had a reasonable expectation of success, given the predictable nature of the field. Transtex appealed.

The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that substantial evidence in the form of expert testimony supported the Board’s finding that although Layfield taught a more rigid strut instead of a resilient strut as claimed, a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine Layfield’s strut with the resilient materials disclosed in Rinard and would have enjoyed a reasonable expectation of success when doing so. The Court concluded that this was a case where the evidence of motivation to combine, which “everyone agrees meets the substantial evidence threshold,” significantly overlapped with the evidence relating to a reasonable expectation of success, so it was correct to conclude that a skilled artisan would have reasonably expected the resiliency benefit that motivated them to combine [...]

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Things May Be Bigger in Texas, but Not Necessarily More Convenient

by Benjamin Ediger, Ph.D. | Feb 16, 2023 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit granted a mandamus petition after analyzing the Fifth Circuit’s public and private interest factors for transfer motions and ordered the US District Court for the Western District of Texas to transfer a case to the petitioner’s venue. In re Google LLC, Case No. 23-101 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 1, 2023) (Lourie, Taranto, Stark, JJ.).

Jawbone Innovations, LLC, had an eventful 2021:

February: Incorporated in Texas
May: Obtained ownership of nine patents (all directed to technologies behind the eponymous product line that liquidated in July 2017)
August: Rented office space in Waco, Texas
September: Asserted the nine patents it just acquired against Google in the Western District of Texas–Waco Division.

Google moved to transfer the dispute to the US District Court for the Northern District of California. That district was where (1) the accused products (earbuds, smartphones, speakers, displays and software) were researched, designed and developed; (2) the asserted technology was developed, and the asserted patents were prosecuted; and (3) the witnesses and sources of proof were primarily located. In contrast, no witnesses or sources of proof were located in the Western District of Texas. Moreover, Jawbone Innovations had no personnel in Waco nor activities related to the accused technology in the whole of Texas.

Judge Albright nevertheless denied Google’s transfer motion, weighing the Fifth Circuit’s four public interest factors and four private interest factors and finding that the transferee venue failed to meet the Fifth Circuit’s “clearly more convenient” standard. With the district court finding half of the eight factors not favoring either the transferee or the transferor, its holding boiled down to a ruling that considerations of “court congestion” and “judicial economy” (found to favor the transferor) outweighed considerations of “unwilling witness compulsion” and the “cost of attendance for willing witnesses” (found to favor the transferee).

Google petitioned the Federal Circuit for a writ of mandamus. The Court, applying the Fifth Circuit’s eight factor test, identified clear error in the district court’s analysis of five of the factors.

First: Addressing the “cost of attendance for willing witnesses” factor, the Federal Circuit found error in the district court’s conclusion that this factor only slightly favored transfer. Rather, the Court explained that this factor “weigh[ed] heavily in favor of transfer” because the transferee venue was clearly more convenient for potential witnesses, especially Google employees with technical, marketing and financial knowledge of the accused products. The error was localized to how the district court considered a Google declaration identifying at least 11 potential employee witnesses (all of whom were located in the transferee venue) and Jawbone Innovations’ assertions that the declaration omitted three potentially relevant Texas-based employees. The Court noted that while this 11 to three imbalance alone was sufficient to settle this factor, the district court’s error went further, finding Google’s declaration unreliable and less worthy of consideration because of the alleged omissions. The Federal Circuit determined this was error on error because the district court improperly ignored that the depositions [...]

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PTO Eliminates CLE Certification and Recognition for Patent Practitioners

by Amol Parikh | Feb 9, 2023 | Patents

The US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) announced a final rule amending 37 C.F.R. § 11.11(a)(1) and (a)(3) to eliminate provisions concerning voluntary continuing legal education (CLE) certification for registered patent practitioners and persons granted limited recognition to practice in patent matters before the PTO. The final rule is effective February 27, 2023.

On August 3, 2020, the PTO provided that patent practitioners could voluntarily certify completion of CLE under 37 C.F.R. § 11.11(a)(3). Section 11.11(a)(1) provided that the Office of Enrollment and Discipline (OED) director could publish whether registered patent practitioners (or persons granted limited recognition under 37 C.F.R. § 11.9) certified that they completed the specified amount of CLE in the preceding 24 months. On October 9, 2020, the PTO published proposed CLE guidelines with a request for comments, and on June 10, 2021, the PTO announced that it would proceed with the voluntary CLE certification in spring 2022. After considering public comments, however, the PTO decided on December 16, 2021, to indefinitely delay the implementation of the voluntary CLE certification.

After further consideration of the public comments, the PTO published an interim final rule (IFR) on November 14, 2022, eliminating voluntary CLE certification and recognition provisions from the rules governing practice in patent matters before the PTO. The IFR provided an opportunity for stakeholders to submit comments by December 14, 2022. The PTO did not receive any comments and therefore adopted the IFR without change. For more information about the rule change, see the Federal Register notice.

The PTO may reconsider CLE reporting for patent practitioners in the future.

Because CLE certification was voluntary, its elimination is not expected to have a significant impact on patent practitioners.